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In September 1994, the US Army's XVIII Airborne Corps participated in Operation Uphold Democracy, a UN-sanctioned operation to return Haiti's deposed president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to office.
What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal (ends)? What are the likely costs or risks in performing that sequence of actions (risk management)? During the 1996 Operation Assured Response in Liberia, forces from the Republic of Georgia, Italy, and Germany joined with US special operations, Air Force, Navy, and Marine forces to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation.
Unless limited by the establishing directive, the commander of the supported force will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort.
Assigned forces are those forces that have been placed under the combatant command (command authority) of a unified commander by the secretary of defense. Apportioned forces and resources are those made available for deliberate planning as of a certain date. Allocated forces and resources are those provided by the NCA for execution planning or actual implementation. Augmentation forces are forces to be transferred from a supporting commander to the combatant command (command authority) or operational control of a supported commander during the execution of an operation order approved by the NCA.
Recommending to the JFC or subunified commander the proper employment of Army component forces. The written basis for allied unity of command is found in directives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Interdiction is an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.
The Ranger News Blog presents current news within the Ranger community; members and the public viewing our website can add comments. In June 2008, Pedersen-Keel deployed to Afghanistan for 12 months with the 3rd BCT where he served as a company executive officer and platoon leader. Pedersen-Keel's awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal (2), the Army Commendation Medal, the National Defense Service Medal, the Afghanistan Campaign Medal with two Campaign Stars, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, the Army Service Ribbon, the Overseas Service Ribbon, the NATO Medal, the Air Assault Badge, the Expert Infantryman Badge, the Parachutist Badge, the Pathfinder Badge, the Combat Infantryman Badge, the Ranger Tab, and the Special Forces Tab. The Incident Action Plan screen is where the Incident Commander can set operational objectives.
The Incident Action Plan screen is where the Incident Commander can set management objectives. This screen allows the Incident Commander to document the plan and develop a contigency plan.
This screen allows the Incident Commander to document all hazards and what the risk mitigation is for each hazard.
If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Unified action describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified (subunified) commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. Multinational, interagency, and nonmilitary forces work with the combatant commander through cooperation and coordination. The National Security Council's Haiti Interagency Working Group planned the operation with the UN, Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Atlantic Command, and XVIII Airborne Corps. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational and tactical. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives. It includes employing military forces and arranging their efforts in time, space, and purpose. While tactical commanders fight the current battle, operational commanders look deeper in time, space, and events.
Mutual confidence and communications among commanders and staffs allow the flexibility to adapt to tactical circumstances as they develop.
A well-designed plan and successfully executed operation shape the situation for tactical actions. An essential element of operational art, therefore, is the ability to recognize what is possible at the tactical level and design a plan that maximizes chances for the success in battles and engagements that ultimately produces the desired operational end state. An engagement is a small tactical conflict between opposing maneuver forces, usually conducted at brigade level and below.
Tactical success is measured by the contribution of an action to the achievement of operationally significant results. In early April 1996, gunmen had filled the streets of Monrovia, Liberia, as the country split into armed factions intent on seizing power. The capabilities of joint, multinational, and interagency partners can expand strengths, compensate for limitations, and provide operational and tactical depth to Army forces.
General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. Land operations and joint operations are mutually enabling-land operations are inherently joint operations.
They may change these relationships between phases of the campaign or major operation or between tasks within phases.
Support of the land force commander's concept for ground operations is an essential and integral part of each phase of the operation. Those most important to Army force operations include employment of carrier-based aircraft, lodgment by amphibious assault or maritime pre-positioned deployment, and naval bombardment with guns and missiles. The Marine Corps often provides powerful air and ground capabilities that complement or reinforce those of Army forces.
ARSOF can conduct diverse missions and are a valuable combat multiplier for land operations (see FM 3-05).
Forces and resources so assigned are available for normal peacetime operations of that command. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) apportions major Army forces by type to combatant commanders for deliberate planning.
One branch goes from the NCA to combatant commanders to the service component commands and subordinate joint commands. A JFC is a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force (JTF) commander authorized to exercise COCOM or operational control (OPCON) over a joint force. COCOM is a nontransferable command authority exercised only by combatant commanders unless the NCA direct otherwise. TACON is authority normally limited to the detailed and specified local direction of movement and maneuver of forces to accomplish a task. Administrative control is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support. The ASCC commander, using ADCON authority, is responsible for the Army Title 10 functions of preparing, maintaining, training, equipping, administering, and supporting Army forces attached to joint forces subordinate to the combatant command.
These ARFORs are responsible for accomplishing operational-level Army tasks within the joint force to which they are assigned.
Providing Army forces within a joint operational area (JOA) is the responsibility of the ASCC of the combatant command. Even if separate Army forces are conducting independent operations within a JOA, there is only one ARFOR headquarters in that JOA. A dual-hatted ARFOR commander normally gives some Army-specific tasks to a deputy commander. These include Title 10 lead service CUL support responsibilities and interagency support requirements.
In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, more than 800,000 military personnel from 36 nations combined their will, forces, and resources to oppose the Iraqi armed forces. Military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), may afford participating nations time to establish formal, standard agreements for broad, long-term objectives. The true basis lies in the earnest cooperation of the senior officers assigned to an allied theater.
These may include dealing with cultural issues, interoperability challenges, and an immature theater C2 organization. Integrating the support functions of several national forces, which may be spread over considerable distances and across international boundaries, is a challenging task.
Although each nation is responsible for sustaining the forces it deploys, multinational CSS may achieve significant economy of force. The level of command authority vested in a multinational force commander is established by agreement among the multinational partners. Consensus building, rather than direct command authority, is often the key element of successful multinational operations. It is the simplest to establish and may be the only arrangement that satisfies national sensitivities. The lead nation can retain its own C2 structure and employ other national forces as subordinate formations. There is always a temptation to push multinational participants into secondary positions and do things according to US Army doctrine or habit.
Additional specialized liaison personnel in fields such as aviation, fire support, engineer, intelligence, public affairs, and civil affairs are also exchanged based on mission requirements.
This approach requires each troop-contributing nation to receive, understand, plan, and implement missions the same way as the other troop-contributing nations. For example, not all armies have the staff structures or means to process, reproduce, or rapidly disseminate plans and orders. Integrating indirect fires, naval surface fires, close air support, interdiction, and information operations requires common maneuver and fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs).
There are many instances in which direct access to finished intelligence, raw data, source information, or intelligence systems is not allowed outside national channels. By understanding the influence of other agencies, commanders can add diplomatic, informational, and economic depth to their military efforts.
When commanders and planners identify these objectives, they submit them through the JFC to the Joint Staff for consideration and nomination to interagency working groups. Each operation is different: factors vary with the situation and perspectives of the participants. However, participation of multinational and interagency partners adds additional layers of complexity.
JFCs may delegate targeting oversight functions to a subordinate commander or may establish a joint or multinational targeting board. Within their AOs, land and naval force commanders are normally supported commanders and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate synchronization, JFCs establish priorities for execution of operations throughout the theater or JOA, including within the land and naval force commanders' AOs.
They visualize the links between operations within the land AO and joint operations occurring outside it.
To ensure timely and effective fires, JFCs develop control measures and FSCMs early and emphasize them continuously.
In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination does not preclude attacking targets beyond the FSCL. The establishing commander synchronizes operations on either side of the FSCL out to the limits of the land AO. Army force commanders communicate their requirements through the JFC to the JFACC and AADC when developing air and missile defense plans. The modernization levels, maintenance standards, mobility, and degree of interoperability of different partners will probably vary. Gaining and maintaining unity of effort in multinational and interagency environments requires constant attention.
National and organizational culture, language, communication, media relations, and law enforcement all play important roles in this environment. Military forces, civilian agencies, NGOs, and international organizations approach war and MOOTW from different perspectives. Commanders involve representatives from each partner in defining issues in clear, unambiguous, agreed-upon terms. In multinational environments, media from partner states have their own standards and requirements.
Commanders seek clear law enforcement guidance from US and multinational political leadership during planning for unified action. Upon completion of the deployment, he volunteered for the Special Forces Assessment and Selection Course. Management objectives documents clear and concise leaders' intent for the success of the incident. Public law charges combatant commanders with employing military forces through unified action.
Regardless of the task or the nature of the threat, combatant commanders employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces, and coordinate with multinational and interagency partners, to achieve strategic and operational objectives. Together, the agencies and headquarters developed flexible force deployment options that reflected changing political conditions.
Understanding the interdependent relationship of all three helps commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. The National Command Authorities (NCA) translate policy into national strategic military objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art-the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle.
They seek to shape the possibilities of upcoming events in advance to create the most favorable conditions possible for subordinate commanders, whose tactical activities execute the campaign.
Tactical results influence the conduct of campaigns through a complex interaction of operational and tactical dynamics.
Without a coherent operational design to link tactical successes, battles and engagements waste precious resources on fights that do not lead to operational goals.
Battles and engagements that do not contribute to the campaign objectives, directly or indirectly, are avoided. Joint integration allows JFCs to attack an opponent throughout the depth of their AO, seize the initiative, maintain momentum, and exploit success. Air Force strategic and intratheater airlift, directed by US Transportation Command, supports the movement of Army forces, especially initial-entry forces, into an AO. The effectiveness of air interdiction and close air support depends, to a large degree, on integrating land maneuver with the joint force concept of operations. Sea control connotes uninhibited use of designated sea areas and the associated airspace and underwater volume.


Naval forces establish and protect the sea routes that form strategic lines of communications for land forces.
When coordinated under a joint force land component commander (JFLCC), Army and Marine forces provide a highly flexible force capable of decisive land operations in any environment.
Army forces support Coast Guard forces, especially during counterdrug interdiction and seizure operations. They can also conduct independent operations in situations that demand a small, discrete, highly trained force. For example, psychological operations units can fuse the capabilities of US government departments and agencies to counter adversary propaganda, misinformation and disinformation. Understanding the command and control (C2) relationships among the components of a joint force is the key to effective joint operations. In addition to forces assigned in peacetime, Army forces are allocated to combatant commanders in response to crises. Combatant commanders provide strategic direction and operational focus to forces by developing strategy, planning theater campaigns, organizing the theater, and establishing command relationships.
It is the authority to perform those functions of command that involve organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. It allows commanders below combatant command level to apply force and direct the tactical use of CSS assets but does not provide authority to change organizational structure or direct administrative or logistic support.
It includes organization of service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.
Commanders establish it between subordinate commanders when one organization must aid, protect, or sustain another (see JP 0-2; JP 3-0).
ASCC commanders establish C2 relationships for ARFORs and tailor the forces assigned to them to best meet combatant commander guidance. The term ARFOR is commonly used to describe both the headquarters of the Army forces provided to the joint force and the Army forces themselves. ASCCs, numbered army, and corps headquarters (with augmentation) are capable of serving as ARFOR headquarters. However, if an ARFOR commander becomes JTF commander, the next senior Army headquarters assumes ARFOR responsibilities.
Forming the coalition increased the size of the overall force, shared the cost of waging the war, and enhanced the legitimacy of the strategic aims. Alliance members strive to field compatible military systems, establish common procedures, and develop contingency plans to meet potential threats in a fully integrated manner. In successful coalitions, all parties agree to the commitment of forces, even if the resources each invests are different.
Since cooperation, in turn, implies such things as selflessness, devotion to a common cause, generosity in attitude, and mutual confidence, it is easy to see that actual unity in an allied command depends directly upon the individuals in the field.. Commanders may also be required to address different national procedures, the sharing of intelligence, and theater support functions. However, multinational partners provide additional resources to address the CSS challenges inherent in a force projection strategy. Multinational CSS may be provided by lead nation, role specialist nation, or acquisition and cross-service agreements. Political and military policies of multinational partners can limit options for the organization of a multinational command. Commanders may combine other nations' staffs to better coordinate complementary capabilities. Long-term friction and potentially catastrophic misunderstandings usually cancel out the short-term gain in productivity these actions produce. This integration fosters common understanding of missions and tactics, facilitates transfer of information, and enhances mutual trust and confidence. However, if the multinational force is composed of dissimilar nations, it may require a modified approach to achieve unity of effort.
Decision authority delegated to staffs and subordinate commanders also varies among armies.
Multinational partners also normally operate separate intelligence systems to support their own policy and military forces. The ability to contribute to theater air and missile defense, training for operations in special environments, and preparing for defensive operations involving weapons of mass destruction is also important. US military capabilities allow other agencies to interact with foreign powers from a position of strength and security. Formal and task-specific interagency working groups coordinate policy and assign tasks among the various departments and agencies. In joint operations, leaders from the different services generally share a common tradition and understanding of military matters.
They conduct such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and developmental programs. The following areas require additional attention from commanders and staffs of units conducting unified action.
Commanders assigned theater-wide functions by the JFC coordinate with the land and naval force commanders when their operations, to include attacking targets, occur within a land or naval AO (see JP 3-09).
They identify interdiction targets outside the land AO that can help create conditions for their decisive operations. Land and amphibious force commanders may establish a fire support coordination line (FSCL) within their AO to facilitate current and future operations, and to protect the force (see JP 3-09).
However, failure to coordinate increases the risk of fratricide and may waste limited resources.
When the JFC apportions ARFOR assets, including operational-level assets, to the air component for counterair missions, they are generally placed in direct support to the air component. They and their staffs should establish a direct, personal relationship with their counterparts. US Army doctrine stresses rapid, agile operations based on exercising disciplined initiative within the commander's intent. Commanders of a joint or multinational force may have to compensate for significant technological differences among its components. It can also allow those leaders to issue guidance directly to their deployed national forces or veto operational decisions. A common goal is important, so commanders expend a lot of time and effort clarifying and restating it. National and organizational values, standards of social interaction, religious beliefs, and organizational discipline all affect the perspectives of multinational partners. Even when partners share a common language, different terminology and jargon can hinder understanding.
Commanders work with leaders of partner forces and their national press elements to develop an open, mutually beneficial environment. The entire chain of command must understand status of forces agreements (SOFAs), or status of mission agreements (SOMAs), which apply to UN operations.
After completing the Special Forces Qualification Course and language training, he was assigned to the 1st Bn., 3rd SFG (A) as a detachment commander in August 2012. Army Ranger School, Combat Lifesaver Course, Combatives Level I Course, Sniper Employment Leaders Course, Pathfinder Course, Maneuver Captain's Career Course, the Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Course, and the Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course. Once each management objective has been completed the Incident Commander can check them off as objective met.
They formulate theater strategies and campaigns, organize joint forces, designate operational areas, and provide strategic guidance and operational focus to subordinates. Actions within the three levels are not associated with a particular command level, unit size, equipment type, or force or component type. A campaign is a related series of military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. It provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Likewise, operational commanders anticipate the results of battles and engagements, and prepare to exploit them to obtain the greatest strategic advantage. Operational commanders create the conditions for the conduct of battles and engagements, while the results of battles and engagements shape the conduct of the campaign. A thorough understanding of what is possible tactically, and the ability to create conditions that increase the chances of tactical success, are important attributes of an operational commander.
Because of this, they are organized to endure losses, provided with combat service support (CSS) to generate and sustain combat power, and trained to deal with uncertainty.
Figure 2-1 illustrates the linkages among the levels of war using military actions in the Gulf War of 1991. On 9 April, President Clinton ordered the US military to evacuate American personnel and designated third-party foreign nationals.
Effective joint integration does not require joint commands at all echelons, but does require understanding joint synergy at all levels of command. For example, the Navy component commander or joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) is normally the supported commander for sea control operations; the joint force air component commander (JFACC) is normally the supported commander for counterair operations.
Land force commanders understand that defeating enemy air and space capabilities is necessary to ensure freedom of action on the ground.
When directed by the president or upon a formal declaration of war, the Coast Guard becomes a specialized service under the Navy. SOF provide the NCA and combatant commanders with options that limit the risk of escalation that might otherwise accompany the commitment of larger conventional forces.
SOF language capabilities and regional and cultural skills are also useful in stability operations and support operations. The secretary of defense, through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directs other combatant commanders to reinforce the supported combatant commander with augmentation forces. The other branch goes from the NCA to the military departments to their respective major service commands. JFCs plan, conduct, and support campaigns in the theater of war, subordinate theater campaigns, major operations, and battles. COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces to accomplish missions.
Combatant commanders may assign ASCCs responsibility for significant lead-service combat support (such as chemical decontamination) or common user logistic (CUL) functions.
The ASCC commander may delegate authority to coordinate and execute Army operational-level Title 10 and lead-service CUL support responsibilities to a subordinate Army support unit, normally a theater support command (TSC).
An ARFOR commander may not have OPCON of all of Army forces provided to the JFC; however, the ARFOR commander remains responsible for their administrative control (ADCON).
In certain smaller-scale contingencies, a division headquarters may be designated as ARFOR headquarters; however, a division headquarters requires extensive augmentation for this mission. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated the advantage of successful multinational warfare over unilateral efforts. While each nation has its own agenda, each brings value to the coalition, even if solely by contributing to the legitimacy of the enterprise.
Since coalition operations are not structured around standing agreements, a preliminary understanding of the requirements for operating with a specific foreign military may occur through peacetime military engagement. Deploying and employing combat power from a force projection base that is friendly, secure, and close to the AO-especially when that base offers a mature infrastructure-is preferable to making a forcible entry from a distant base. However, an international agreement is required to provide support under the lead nation and role specialist nation methods. Long-standing alliances, such as NATO, have integrated command structures with designated nations providing force commanders.
Under parallel command, multinational forces are directed through existing national chains of command. Multinational commanders carefully tailor the staff to balance coalition and US officers, and take particular care to accord coalition officers the same access and influence as their countrymen.
The JFC or multinational force commander may use his own staff for most planning functions, other national augmentees for their national expertise, and liaison officers to translate and relay instructions to their national forces. Detailed war-gaming, planning, and rehearsals help develop a common understanding of the operation plan and control measures. Rapport with the local population, language considerations, and special skills should be considered as well. Just as integrating different unit capabilities results in the advantages of combined arms warfare, so synchronizing military power with other instruments of national power leads to dynamic strategic capabilities. Once a department or agency accepts a task, it reports through the interagency working group to the Joint Staff. The National Security Act of 1947 establishes an interagency process for national security-related issues. Interagency operations bring together leaders and staffs that often have no common experiences.
These considerations are not all-inclusive but highlight factors important to effectively employing Army forces in unified action. It prepares targeting guidance, refines joint target lists, and reviews target information from a campaign perspective.
They advocate combinations of maneuver and interdiction inside and outside the land AO that impose dilemmas on the enemy.
The FSCL is an FSCM that is established and adjusted by land and amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. Short of an FSCL, the appropriate land or amphibious force commander controls all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations. When targets are attacked beyond an FSCL, the attacks must not produce adverse effects forward, on, or to the rear of the line. When determining the units best suited for particular missions, commanders must be sensitive to doctrinal differences and their consequences.
Incompatible communications, unfamiliar CSS needs, and differences in vehicle cross-country mobility can pose difficulties. They recognize that control of national forces and nonmilitary partners by their political leaders may affect mission accomplishment. Motivations of multinational partners may differ, but multinational objectives should be attainable, clearly defined, and supported by each member state.
Likewise, Army force commanders are linked to the appropriate US agencies and political leaders.
Commanders seek a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable end state and measures of effectiveness. Partners with similar cultures and a common language face fewer obstacles to interoperability.
To preclude misunderstandings, military planners anticipate confusion and take measures to clarify and establish common terms with clear and specific usage.


To avoid misunderstanding, senior multinational political and military representatives establish media ground rules that are as simple as possible. Where civil law enforcement is present and functioning, commanders establish systems and procedures to use it. Management objectives can also be known as WFDSS Objectives (Wildland Fire Decision Support System).
The aim is to achieve unity of effort among many diverse agencies in a complex environment.
Instead, actions are defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives (see Figure 2-1). A major operation is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces of a single or several services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational, and sometimes strategic objectives in an operational area.
Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements with relative attrition the only measure of success. In this regard, commanders exploit tactical victories to gain strategic advantage, or even to reverse the strategic effect of tactical losses.
A flexible plan gives tactical commanders freedom to seize opportunities or react effectively to unforeseen enemy actions and capabilities. Tactical commanders must understand the operational context within which battles and engagements are fought as well.
The strategic guidance issued by the president translated into orders and actions that led to the staff sergeant tank commander engaging Iraqi tanks in the middle of the night. The Army deployed Special Forces, an airborne company, signal augmentation and a medical section as part of a special operations task force from Special Operations Command-Europe. Army forces may be the supporting force during certain phases of the campaign and become the supported force in other phases. The Coast Guard and Navy cooperate in naval coastal warfare missions during peace, conflict, and war. An administrative control relationship exists between the secretary of the military department and the respective service component commands.
The four joint command relationships are COCOM, OPCON, tactical control (TACON), and support (see Figure 2-3).
Combatant commanders exercise COCOM through subordinate commands, to include subunified commands, service component commands, functional component commands, and JTFs.
The ASCC also provides theater-strategic and operational-level support to combatant command campaign and major operation planning. Patience, tolerance, frankness, absolute honesty in all dealings, particularly with all persons of the opposite nationality, and firmness, are absolutely essential. These developmental activities include, but are not limited to, ongoing personal contacts, pre-positioning of equipment, exercises, exchange programs, and humanitarian assistance.
Ideally, the TSC provides common multinational CSS, and with proper augmentation, other CSS functions, as the ASCC determines.
However, in certain circumstances, it may be prudent or advantageous to place Army forces under OPCON of a foreign commander. Staffs are integrated, and senior representatives from member nations often lead subordinate allied commands. Decisions are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces. Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a multinational force.
Operational and tactical plans address recognition signals, FSCMs, air support, communications, and liaison.
However, at a minimum, each nation contributes valuable human intelligence to the multinational effort.
Multinational commanders may assign host nation forces home defense or police missions, such as rear area and base security. The National Security Council provides national-level oversight of this process (see JP 3-08). The institutional values and experiences of the separate agencies and departments sometimes have few common points of reference. Effective cooperation and coordination with NGOs reinforces the legitimacy of the armed forces involved in a unified action. They routinely operate in high-risk areas and usually remain long after military forces have departed. It is not normally involved in selecting specific targets and aim points or in developing attack packages (see JP 3-60; FM 3-60).
Army commanders understand the theater-wide flexibility and reach of unified air operations. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure.
Attacks beyond the FSCL must be consistent with the establishing commander's priorities, timing, and desired effects. In dealing with joint and multinational forces, commanders must remember that doctrine and organization are closely linked. Some multinational partners may use systems similar to enemy systems, making measures to preclude fratricide vital. Commanders constantly work to sustain political consensus among the leaders, nations, and organizations involved in the operation. Some partners may resist establishing these to the level of detail that US commanders prefer. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions or officer-enlisted relationships, can significantly affect military operations.
To reduce duplication and increase coherence, commanders get from all participants a clear expression of their perceived role and mission as well as the resources they intend to contribute. To facilitate foreign and US media relations, US forces follow the DOD Principles of Information whenever possible. Where civil law enforcement systems and organizations are not available, commanders should deploy with appropriate US forces or use the capabilities of other partners. Following his training, he was assigned to the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Hood, Texas. Subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) synchronize joint operations in time and space, direct the action of foreign military forces (multinational operations), and coordinate with governmental and nongovernmental organizations (interagency coordination) to achieve the same goal. JTF 190 worked with the combatant commander, supporting governmental and nongovernmental agencies, joint and multinational forces, and nongovernmental organizations to secure the cities and countryside, disarm the Haitian military, replace the local police, and assist the Haitian people. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially under a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. Operational art requires commanders who can visualize, anticipate, create, and seize opportunities.
Flexible execution maintains the operational initiative and maximizes tactical opportunities. This understanding allows them to seize opportunities (both foreseen and unforeseen) that contribute to achieving operational goals or defeating enemy initiatives that threaten those goals. The destruction of the Iraqi tanks in turn enabled the coalition to restore the Kuwaiti government. Army forces entered Monrovia's Mamba Point embassy district, where they established security for international relief agencies headquartered there. The strengths of each service component combine to overcome the limitations or reinforce the effects of the other components. Inside JFC-assigned AOs, the land and naval force commanders are the supported commanders and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction.
Additionally, naval forces augment theater aerospace assets and provide complementary amphibious entry capabilities.
In military operations other than war (MOOTW), SOF support combatant commander theater engagement plans, often directly supporting a US ambassador. It is for carrying out the military departments' Title 10 responsibilities of recruiting, manning, equipping, training, and providing service forces to the combatant commanders.
For theater-level support operations to function properly, combatant commanders must clearly articulate their CSS priorities. Coalition command is more challenging because it involves combining forces with no standing C2 arrangements. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces.
Commanders establish systems that maximize each nation's contribution and provide an effective intelligence picture to all units. They may also entrust air defense, coastal defense, or a special operation to a single member of the multinational force based on the special capabilities of that force. They are a significant factor and must be integrated into planning, preparing, executing, and assessing military operations. An FSCL applies to all fires of air-, land-, and sea-based weapons systems using any type of ammunition.
Removing part of a service's or nation's force structure may make it unbalanced and make it fight in a way not supported by its doctrine and training. The minimum requirement is a set of identifiable military conditions that commanders can use to direct military operations.
Commanders may have to accommodate cultural sensitivities and overcome diverse or conflicting religious, social, or traditional requirements.
Understanding each participant's agenda helps commanders synchronize the efforts of the each organization throughout the campaign. Army forces then supported the UN by stabilizing the country until elections were held in March 1995. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces are employed to influence the enemy disposition before combat.
It is practiced not only by JFCs, but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders.
Additional Army forces reinforced the Marine guards at the American embassy and secured the central evacuee assembly collection point. The combination of multiple and diverse joint force capabilities creates military power more potent than the sum of its parts. It protects military shipping at seaports of embarkation and debarkation in the US and overseas. Combatant commanders establish or designate operational command and support relationships for SOF based on mission requirements.
Although the service branch of the chain of command is distinct from the operating branch, both the Army service component command (ASCC) and the ARFOR operate within the combatant commander's chain of command.
The secretary of defense must approve transferring OPCON of units between combatant commanders. Army doctrine establishes four support relationships: direct, reinforcing, general, and general support reinforcing (see Chapter 4). Commanders analyze the mission's peculiar requirements so they can exploit the advantages and compensate for the limitations of a multinational force.
The formation of multinational CSS staff sections facilitates CSS coordination, reduces competition among multinational partners for common support, and lessens the burden on each (see JP 4-08). Because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if possible. Commanders arrange for the rapid dissemination of releasable intelligence and the use of available intelligence assets by all partners.
The national pride of multinational partners is an important intangible factor that is considered when assigning missions. However, education and teamwork can create an understanding and awareness of the missions, strengths, weaknesses, and outlooks of the interagency members. Commanders consider the activities of NGOs as well as mutual security and resource or support requirements when conducting unified action.
Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially important to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. It can be accomplished through training, exercises, and assigning missions that fit organizational capabilities. Commanders position units and assign command and support relationships to exploit interoperability and complementary capabilities.
Common understanding also helps identify obstacles, such as conflicting multinational or interagency priorities.
It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. From this experience, they gain the instincts and intuition, as well as the knowledge, that underlie an understanding of the interrelation of tactical and operational possibilities and needs. Multinational C2 structures are usually one of three types: parallel command, lead nation command, or a combination of the two (see JP 3-16). Western national forces were aligned under US leadership while Islamic forces were aligned under Saudi leadership.
A multinational intelligence staff at the headquarters facilitates integration of intelligence efforts.
Few translators have both the language and cultural expertise and the depth of doctrinal understanding necessary. Commanders recognize that gaining and maintaining public support requires clearly expressing the desired end state, objectives leading to it, and measures of effectiveness through the media. Figure 2-1 illustrates the link between the levels of war and the plans and actions of military forces.
The combined capabilities of Army forces, other services, and multinational troops demonstrated joint synergy and resulted in the successful evacuation of individuals from 73 countries. Different partners do not necessarily send the same messages; but commanders determine and coordinate methods to avoid contradictions. A battalion-sized unit from one country may have different capabilities than one from a different country. Backbriefs to commanders ensure that multinational subordinates understand intent and tasks.



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