

USC SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHY 426

TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY

Fall Semester 2008

4-5:15PM, MW, MHP 105

Instructor, D. Willard

This course is a study of major philosophers and philosophical movements centered in France and Germany from (approximately) 1900 to the present. The main thought tendencies or movements studied are Bergsonianism, Phenomenology, Existentialism, Structuralism/Hermeneutics, Critical Theory, PostStructuralism/Deconstruction, Post-Modernism. We will conclude with an examination of Emmanuel Levinas's attempt to evade "the violence inherent in knowledge" through elucidation of a relation to "the other" that cannot be totally captured, distorted, or concealed by concepts that apply to the world of "ordinary" cognitive consciousness. Our aim is to understand the major theses and conceptualizations in this range of philosophical work, and to consider their development and the most significant lines of justification presented for them. Our aim is to work from primary sources in translation as much as possible, with only occasional use of secondary sources.

Formal Requirements: One mid-term and a final as designated below. Several one-page *précis* on crucial passages will be assigned. Each student must keep and maintain a notebook, with a clearly marked division for each class meeting. In that division there will be recorded, first, notes on the reading assigned for the day (no more than 3 pages), second, notes from the class lecture/discussion, and, third, a record of the student's own reflections on the materials covered for that day. These can be in your own handwriting: just legible, with no "neating up." If you miss a day here or there, no matter. What does matter is consistency. If there are Graduate Students in the course, they will also write one critical, expository paper of 12-15 pages on a primary text to be agreed upon.

Texts:

1. Kearney and Rainwater, THE CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY READER.
2. Bergson, AN INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS.
3. Husserl, THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY, Alston translation.
4. Kaufman, EXISTENTIALISM FROM DOESTOEVSKY TO SARTRE.
5. Buber, I AND THOU, Kaufmann translation.
6. Geuss, THE IDEA OF CRITICAL THEORY.
7. Lyotard, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE.

8. Sartre, THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE EGO.
9. Levinas, OUTSIDE THE SUBJECT.

{Two recommended secondary sources (not “required”):

Kearney, Richard, MODERN MOVEMENTS IN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY.

Protevi, John, A DICTIONARY OF CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY.}

Schedule:

Aug. 25: Introduction to the course. *Epistemological realism*—Is what we are conscious of independent of our consciousness?—as *the* philosophical issue around 1900. (G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, American “New Realism.”) How there came to be something called “European Philosophy” and what its main characteristics are. An overview of its development.

Aug. 27: The basic idea of 20th Century European Philosophy is that human experience or “consciousness,” and its basic types, can, to a significant extent, be detected, brought before the mind, and characterized in their essence. Keep this in mind with each reading. A motivating force back of the drive to accurately characterize “consciousness” was the wide spread conviction that it had been *wrongly characterized* by Modern Philosophy from Descartes to the 20th Century. This “drive” completely dominates 20th Century European Philosophy from Bergson and Husserl to Levinas.

Readings for today: Henri Bergson, AN INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS.

Sept. 1: Labor Day. University Holiday. No class.

Sept. 3: Concluding Bergson’s effort to achieve “Realism” beyond “concepts.” (Keep in mind when we come to Levinas.) Husserl’s effort to describe “consciousness” or “mental acts” in such a way that “Realism” is possible and actual.

Readings for today: Finish Bergson’s AN INTRODUCTION. Adolf Reinach, “What is Phenomenology” (a handout). And pp. 1-21 of Husserl, THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY. (a handout).

Sept. 8: Husserl’s account of how the mind grasps an object that is not a part of it. The “enigma” of “transcendence.” On *seeing* the essences of types of consciousness. Definition of “Phenomenology” according to Husserl.

Readings for today: Continue THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY. Brief selection from Brentano and from Sartre on “Intentionality.”

FIRST PRECIS, ON “THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY” PP. MID-27-31, DUE AT CLASS ON SEPT. 15.

Sept. 10: Husserl on “the natural standpoint” and its “suspension” in phenomenological description.

Readings for today: Husserl, IDEAS I, subsections 27-36. (a handout)

Sept. 15: Husserl's vision of how "Naturalism" threatens to destroy "European Humanity." The Existentialist shock! When "science" fails humanity. Then what?

Readings for today: Husserl, "Vienna Lecture" etc., in THE CONTINENTAL READER, pp. 3-22, and Willard, "The Critique of Naturalism in Husserl's *The Crisis of European Sciences...*" (a handout)

AT THIS POINT IN THE COURSE THERE IS A MAJOR BREAK, AND A TURN TO A DIFFERENT WAY OF TRYING TO THINK ABOUT THE HUMAN PERSON AND ITS *EXISTENZ*. TO HELP YOU WITH THE TRANSITION, GIVE A QUICK READ TO WALTER KAUFMAN'S "CHAPTER ONE" OF EXISTENTIALISM FROM DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE. (Pp. 11-51)

Sept. 17: Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard.

Readings for today: Kaufman, pp. 52-120.

Sept. 22: Nietzsche, Ortega, Rilke, Kafka.

Readings for today: Kaufman, pp. 121-157.

Sept. 24: The realm of the "Thou."

Readings for today: Martin Buber, *I and Thou*.

Sept. 29: Heidegger and Being in terms of Time. Dasein: "There Being." "Nothing" is what?

Readings for today: Kaufman, pp. 233-264.

Oct. 1: Heidegger, The Ground of Metaphysics.

Readings for today: Kaufman, pp. 265-279

Oct. 6: Heidegger, "Being and Time."

Readings for today: Kearney and Rainwater, *The Continental Philosophy Reader*, pp. 23-48.

TAKE-HOME MID-TERM EXAM HANDED OUT. DUE AT CLASS ON 13TH.

Oct. 8 Heidegger, "Anxiety." Sartre, "The Wall" and Self-Deception.

Readings for Today: Kearney and Rainwater, pp. 48-52 and Kaufmann, pp. 281-328.

Oct. 13: Why Existentialism is a form of Humanism, and the Myth of Sisyphus (Camus)

Readings for today: Kaufmann pp. 345-369 & 375-378.

Oct. 15: The "ego" as not "real," a "construction" in terms of "Intentionality."

Readings for today: Sartre, THE 'TRANSCENDENCE' OF THE EGO.

Oct. 20: The Emergence of “Hermeneutics” from the rejection of pure phenomenological insight and the “situatedness” of all human consciousness. Gadamer and Ricoeur.

Readings for today: Kearney and Rainwater, pp. 109-121 & 136-155

Oct. 22: “Enlightenment” and “Critical Theory.”

Readings for today: Kearney and Rainwater, pp. 194-211; begin Raymond Geuss, *The Idea of Critical Theory*.

Oct. 27: “Critical Theory.” Critical Theory and Structuralism.

Readings for today: Finish Geuss, *The Idea of Critical Theory*.

Oct. 29: “Structuralism” and the flight from “human Existenz.” De Saussure.

Readings for today: Kearney and Rainwater, pp. 289-304

Nov. 3: The interesting case of Michel Foucault

Readings for today: Kearney and Rainwater, pp. 336-360.

Nov. 5: Derrida, “Deconstruction” and the radical critique of Husserl’s “Wesensschau.”

Readings for today: Selections from SPEECH AND PHENOMENA (handout)

Nov. 10: Derrida: Against being as “presence.” Heidegger and after. The Phenomenology of “absence.”

Readings for today: “Difference” Kearney and Rainwater, pp. 438-464.

Nov. 12: “Naming” and “Predication” as *Violence*—a critical evaluation.

Readings for today: Dallas Willard, “Predication as Originary Violence,” (handout)

Nov. 17: Levinas and the “ethical” as “beyond” the violence of “predication.”

Readings for today: “Ethics as First Philosophy,” Kearney and Rainwater, pp. 122-134.

Nov. 19: Levinas and the critique of Buber and Marcel.

Readings for today: OUTSIDE THE SUBJECT, pp. xv-48.

Nov. 24: “The face,” the “Outside” and Infinity as opposed to Totality.

Readings for today: OUTSIDE THE SUBJECT, pp. 86-95, 116-125, & 144-158

Nov. 26: Postmodernism as a theory of the *essence* of consciousness and knowledge—“phenomenological” continuities and discontinuities. Lyotard and Richard Rorty.

Readings for today: Lyotard, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION, pp. vii-53, and Kearney and Rainwater, pp. 425-426.

Dec. 1: The philosophical assumptions of “Postmodernism,” as a social condition and as a theory of knowledge. The triumph of “essence” and Husserl’s revenge. Knowledge as a social ferment. “Instabilities.”

Readings for today: THE POSTMODERN CONDITION, pp. 53-82.

Dec. 3: Lecture: “An Overview of 20th Century European Philosophy: Its nature and its significance for the Human and the Philosophical Quest, with a Comparison to ‘Analytic’ Philosophy.”

No further readings.

Final Exam: 4:30-6:30PM, Dec. 10, 2008.

Some features that distinguish 20th Century European Philosophy from 20th Century Anglo-American Philosophy:

1. 20th C. E. is strongly tied to the Kantian and Post-Kantian reaction to the impasse created by British Empiricism, and especially by the thought of David Hume. This “reaction” included the various “irrationalisms,” such as those of Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. AAA philosophy tends to idolize Hume, not so much because they agree with particular theses he maintains, but because he provides a supportive “background” for the vague secularist skepticism which is the atmosphere of the Anglo-American academy at present.
2. 20th C. E. is centered on problems of great human interest—the nature of human life and human being, meaning/meaninglessness, political and aesthetic judgment and activity, etc.—in a way AAA is not. It seems, therefore, to be more closely involved with Classical philosophy and its problems. In its own way 20th C. E. is subversive—or seems to be—of “life as usual.” It is intrinsically more interesting to the young. More “revolutionary.”
3. 20th C. E. is strongly “phenomenological.” What this means in practice is that it focuses upon *description* of experiences of whatever kind and of objects **as they are experienced**. Husserl is the one who tried to make a philosophical methodology of this “description,” but the effect was to open more widely what could be taken as a subject matter for philosophical analysis. And then others turned “description” loose upon human life and world in a way unrestrained by Husserl’s rather traditional assumptions about cognition and the human mind.
4. 20 C. E. is, to put it mildly, little impressed by science—except for the harmful ways in which it can be taken—and of these it has much to say. But at least the sciences are of no benefit for philosophical understanding, according to it. It is very critical of *scientism*—the view, roughly, that there is something called “science” (singular) and that it is solely in charge of knowledge and reality.
5. In particular, *logic*—as understood by AAA—is **not** central to philosophical work. History, the political and social, literature, etc. etc. are or can be central, along with the “reflexive” analysis peculiar to “Phenomenology.” It does not take the logical to be primary to the **subject matter** of philosophy, as AAA does.
6. The theme of the human “self” and its “world” as known and lived is central and constant to 20th C. E. Watch the modulations of this theme from Bergson and Husserl to Derrida and Levinas: What is the self? What is its “object” and “world”? What is the relationship between the self and its object and world?
7. “Realism” is a sub-theme in 20th C. E. Is the world we know/live in ‘there’ independently of our relationship to it? Note how this sub-theme emerges in Bergson and Husserl, and how it stays alive right up to the end in Levinas. Of course how this turns out will depend upon what is made of the mind/object relation.

As Husserl repeatedly says here, **transcendence** of the act of cognition toward its object is the problem that the “critique of cognition” or “theory of knowledge” must solve. Transcendence is what is “enigmatic.” P. 17, mid-p. 22, 27, etc. etc.

The transcendence of the act of cognition or consciousness toward its object has two main phases:

Mere intentionality: the property the act has of being of or about a definite object.
Knowing the object: grasping it as it really is in itself.

“Mere intentionality” is a “descriptive ultimate,” a feature of consciousness that is simply there as a part of the essence of consciousness. Here see the **handouts from Brentano and Sartre.**

“Knowing,” the cognitive apprehension of what the consciousness is about, and not just “being about” it, is what Husserl is concerned to elucidate in its essential nature. See mid-p. 26 on “The task of the Critique of cognition.”

Our presumed knowledge of the world about us cannot help us with this task: We don't know, until the task is successfully completed, whether it is really knowledge or not. (1st ¶ on p. 22, top p. 29)

And given all that knowledge it still does not explain the “how” of knowledge, the how of the two-fold transcendence of knowledge. Pp. 29-30. It lacks the appropriate concepts.

But not everything is doubtful. We have a starting point in what is “perfectly given.” That is, something that has nothing hidden or doubtful about it. These are the acts of consciousness are subjects of “pure seeing.” Last ¶ on p. 23, and see p. 24.

The ideal of **presuppositionlessness**. Nothing unexamined and validated.

So there is a self-validating starting point (pp. 23-24, top 26), but this is not the bewildering flux of individual acts of consciousness/cognition of myself. (bot. 37) Or any individual person. The “ego” involves the world and must be omitted through the “phenomenological reduction.” Mid-p. 34

That gets us to “a science of pure phenomena. Mid. 36

But **singular** acts of cognition are still “subjective.” 38, mid-40.

We must “see” **the essences** which are embedded in them and make them the kinds of acts of cognition/consciousness they are. Pp. 41-42

The two “transcendences” of the act of consciousness (pp. 27-28):

Transcendence ≠ not a component of the act.

Transcendence ≠ not completely given to the act.

Mid-Term Exam

Two essay questions:

1. Compare (how they resemble) and contrast (how they differ) Bergson's "intuition" with Buber's "Thou" ("You") relationship. In your considered opinion do you believe there is such a domain outside of "concepts" and "It"? Why or why not?
2. What is Husserl's "solution" to his problem of "transcendence" in knowledge? (What is the problem?) You will need to discuss both "intentionality" and "givenness" and explain how knowledge is more than "mere intentionality"?

And:

3. Brief explanations of the following (half page each):
 - A. Bergson's "duration" (pp. 46-49?)
 - B. How for Buber the "basic I-It" and "separation" emerges from the discreteness of the human body." (pp. 73-75)
 - C. Husserl's "Natural Standpoint" and its suspension. (Handout from Ideas)
- D. The "European crisis" according to Husserl (Continental Reader, 7, 12f)

Some notes on Derrida:

The point of the selection “Signs and the Blink of an Eye” (chapter 5 of *Speech and Phenomena*) is show that what is thought of or designated is NEVER fully present. The mistake of thinking it is might sometimes be fully present underlies the whole system of “philosophy” or “metaphysics” that Derrida (following some others, most notably Heidegger) seeks to “deconstruct” or deprive of its ultimacy. He says: “We cannot avoid noting that a certain concept of the ‘now’, of the present as punctuality of the instant, discretely but decisively sanctions the whole system of ‘essential distinctions’...the punctuality of the instant is a myth...an inherited metaphysical concept...the present of self-presence is not *simple*...<but> is constituted in a primordial and irreducible synthesis....” (p. 61)

Taking an act of consciousness to be the clearest or most commonly cited instance of something that is fully present, Derrida utilizes Husserl’s analysis of the flow of time through acts of consciousness to show (he thinks) that no act of consciousness is ever fully present at the moment of its occurrence (“the blink of an eye”) BECAUSE each such act is inextricably united with (“essentially” connected with) its surrounding past and future acts. (see ¶ spanning pp. 61-62) His conclusion is stated in the ¶ opening at mid page 64. Derrida’s analysis here and throughout his work is conditioned upon the ontological assumption that **whatever something is essentially related to is a part of its identity**. This is deep, systematic metaphysics, and we cannot go into it here. But you should note this assumption, because unless you share it you will have no reason to accept Derrida’s line of “analysis.” This “irreducible nonpresence of another now” (bot. page 65) is what he calls a “trace,” an essential presence of a nonpresence (which show up in many places for him.” The “trace” in its many manifestations “...radically destroys any possibility of a simple self-identity.” (top page 66) “This trace or difference <note the odd spelling> is always older than presence...” (mid 68)

How does the illusion of “presence” as the nature or essence of “what is” capture the human mind and then “Western” civilization? How, in Heidegger’s language, do we come to think of Being as a being? Derrida provides his explanation of the origin of this illusion in chapter 6 of *Speech and Phenomena*, here provided in handout.

He begins, as in much of his work, with a discussion of something from Husserl. This time it is Husserl’s discussion of expressing meaning in speech, and in particular his discussion of *monologue*, of speaking to oneself, whether aloud or silently. (Pp. 72-73) In this the “words” do not communicate and meaning does not have to “pass through the world.” (p. 75) The “voice” of this speaking seems to involve “the absolute proximity of the acts to themselves.” (p. 76, line 5) And indeed in actual communication the words spoken are not present to us as objects separate from the meaning. They are “ideal” and in a unity with the ideal meaning that is communicated. (See all of p. 77, but especially the last full sentence and the sentence spanning 77-78.) The ideal is the repeatable, and both meaning and voice sound, as ideal, are essentially repeatable. Thus we get, the Derrida, “This absolute proximity of the signifier <voice word> to the signified, and its effacement in immediate presence....” (mid p. 80)

But, as repeatable, “writing brings the constitution of ideal objects to completion.” (last line p. 80) The possibilities and the “growing risk” of writing. (1st ¶ p. 81) And this leads to METAPHYSICS!!! (Study the ¶ top p. 85. Especially the last sentence, but also the next sentences and the introduction of THE TRACE!!!)

The first sentences top. 86 is one of Derrida’s fuller statements about the *trace* and its centrality to his thought. Elsewhere he will say both that you cannot say what a trace is, that it neither exists nor is a concept. (See top p. 461 of *The Continental Reader*, also pp. 458 and elsewhere in “*Différance*.”)

In the selection from *Introduction to the Origin of Geometry* (handout) Derrida is applying his interpretation of meaning and words to the historical development of Geometry, again, piggybacking on Husserl’s late work on *The Origin of Geometry*. He wishes to show, utilizing Husserl’s discussion, that the words, concepts and propositions that make up geometry as a concrete, historical reality do not remain identical over time, but only the “same,” in his (and Heidegger’s) special sense of “same” where it incorporates non-identity but a kind of continuity. The “living present” of which he speaks so much is always “outside” of itself in the manner illustrated by the discussion of events in time, hearing the strokes of a clock, etc.

In the article “*Différance*,” in *The Continental Reader* (pp. 441ff), Derrida provides a discussion of many of his themes around a play upon the word “differ.” Do study footnote #8 on p. 82 of the selection from *Speech and Phenomena*. We will look at a few specific passages in this article/lecture; and, for future reference, please notice how Levinas begins to merge into the scene.

Notice the distinction between “nonidentity” and “the same,” in relation to “differ.” P. 441.

The “a” in “difference” and the silence of non phonetic writing. 443c-d

“Difference is...” Cross out the “is.” Mid 444,

No beginning or *arché* from which to begin to talk of difference. No telos. 445.

An attempt to “bring us in view of what is at stake.” Can’t *describe*. Bot. 445f

The two meanings of “differ.” P. 446

The sign as a deferred presence. Mid p. 447

But difference is more fundamental than the sign. Bot. 447

“The signified concept is never present in itself. Top. 449
Just a chain of concepts. 449a-b

The “trace” as the way out of trying to describe difference by means of the language of metaphysics. Spanning 449-450
Study p. 450 very carefully. Esp. the last ¶ Difference and the “trace.”

The “speaking subject...is inscribed in the language.” Spanning 452-453.
No self-presence (self) before signs or without them. Consciousness not possible prior to “language.” Bot. p. 453

A wave at Nietzsche (454f) and Freud (455-458)
And the tie of Freud to “Trace.” Top 458

“Our ‘epoch’ as the de-limitation of ontology (of presence). Mid 458

Ontology “shaken” by difference. 458c, and by the trace. Top 461

Heidegger and the “forgetting of Being.” 460-461.
But he doesn’t go far enough. Top 462
Names remain “metaphysical.” Spanning 462-463.

Our “language” is “Older” than Being itself. Top. 463

No “unique word, a master name.” 463c. Laughter and dance. “Heideggerian hope.”

Points of emphasis in E. Levinas, *Outside the Subject*---

The title indicates Levinas' focus upon what falls beyond "Objectivism," in a sense made famous by Husserl, including beyond the human being ("subject") as a conceptually confined and defined entity or "being."

The book is one in which Levinas provides an exposition of many of his central views by bouncing them off of the views of other outstanding philosophers who had been his contemporaries (mainly) in 20th Century French philosophy, with special emphasis upon Jewish thought as it took on new life in philosophy during that century.

Note in his "Preface" his statement on p. 1 concerning "the proximity of person to person"—its irreducibility to the knowing truths, and its special "dignity of intelligibility. An 'original' rationality...conditioning that of other objects to be known." (pp. 1-2; compare 1st full ¶ on p. 3—"An order higher than knowing...") Page 3 is a precise statement of most of the basic themes in Levinas.

Note the discussion of how, for Buber, Hasidism (6-10) and biblical studies (11-14) contributed to the revitalization of Jewish traditions and thought in the philosophical dialogue of the 20th Century.

The idea of Divine "presence" and of the human to human "meeting," in Buber and in Marcel. (14-16) The "meeting" of God and man in "revelation" or the Bible and "holy history." "...The irreducibility of the Meeting to any relation with the determinable and the objective...remains Buber's principle contribution to Western thought." (p. 17)

Some criticism of Buber by Levinas, bottom p. 17-19: Leaving the Meeting to empty of specific content (merely formal) by choosing "to forget the Bible." (top 18) Dialogue is the doorway to the sacred, for Buber, but "the specifics of the thought and discourse that thus move toward God are never formulated." (mid 18)

Levinas wants to "continue" Buber with his ideas of the Other and their physical needs as occasions of the Meeting. (18-19) "Ah! Jewish materialism!...The Meeting is a particular case of a presence that is not representation...The immanent sphere can be broken...an irreducible proximity can disturb that order..." (p. 19)

Levinas aims to invert the order Buber and Marcel see in the person to person Meeting. He rejects the reciprocity of the I-Thou relation. (22-23) Marcel opposes language as the element of meaning and proposes the mystery of being, in which no person is entirely their own. (bottom 27) Everyone is incarnate in a body that lives in a social world seen by others in ways never accessible to the individual. "The meeting with the absolute Thou <God> is thus enveloped within the mystery of being" (p. 28), which, according to Marcel, one can never set before oneself to be understood. Similarly with meeting the human Other. It is something one can only live into in love. (29)

The “philosophy of dialogue” developed by Buber and Marcel puts the very vocation of philosophy in a new light. (top 30) What is that vocation? To replace opinion (mere belief) with knowledge. This led to “domination” and the well-know European disasters. (30-31) The follies of reason, the “privilege of presence,” “merciless critical inquiry.” (31) Does the “dialogue” of Buber and Marcel “respond to philosophy’s vocation?” (32)

It does, by “...opening a dimension of meaning in which persons encounter one another, an ethical dimension that thus specifies or determines the religious character, the excellence or elevation of the revelation of the Eternal Thou.” (34) The *total* independence of the I-Thou from the I-It, on which Buber and Marcel agree, signifies “that new ethics and that new order of the meaningful” (bottom 35) or “intelligibility” or “reason” that “responds to the vocation of philosophy.”

Levinas thinks the disembodied “I-Thou” in Buber “encounters being primordially” (top 26) and falls back into the philosophy of “being” (bot. 36) and “noemata” (top 37) Levinas insists that the Meeting with others cannot be captured by reflection. The human face cannot be conceptualized. (mid 39)

See the summary on Buber’s contribution in the 2nd ¶ opening on p. 41. But Levinas denies reciprocity between the I and the Thou. (44) God from the face of the other. (top 47) Rejection of Buber’s “dualism” and invocation of the necessity of “things” (“Its,” p. 47)

Note the comments on meaning and the face on pp. 94-95

Note the comments on Surrealism and the difference between vision and sound. (147-149)

Note the discussion of the “subject outside the subject” on pp. 156-158.

Phil. 426, '08

Review questions for final exam:

I. Short Answers (one hand-written page?):

1. "Duration" and "Reality." (Bergson)
2. Two senses of "transcendence" (and "immanence" in Husserl)
3. Husserl on seeing the essence of Red.
4. The "Bracket" or epoche on the "Natural Standpoint."
5. The difference between "underground man" and the "direct" person.
6. Characterization of the "It" world of Buber.
7. Why Dasein is the key to ontology for Heidegger. (*The Continental Phil. Reader* pp. 32d-35b and 36d-37a.
8. "Tradition" and "destruction" (deconstruction") in the quest for Being. (TCR pp. 39d-42 c)
9. Phenomenology and description in ontology. (TCR. 43-46)
10. The "transcendence" of the ego according to Sartre.
11. The existential significance of "The Myth of Sisyphus." (Kaufmann, 375f)
12. "Enlightenment" according to Critical Theory. (TCR 199ff)
13. "Structuralism," especially in Suassure. (TCR 289)
14. "Difference." (TCR 441ff, and the handout from *Speech and Phenomena*)
15. The "Trace." (TCR 461 and elsewhere in Derrida)
16. "Presence" and Being.
17. "Violence" and conceptualization.
18. The "Midas Touch."
19. The "passivity" of non-intentional consciousness. (Levinas)
20. "Outside the Subject."
21. The "legitimation" of "knowledge," (*The Post-Modern Condition*, pp. 7f, 27f, 41f, 60f)

II. Essays (four or five hand-written pages?)

1. Explain and evaluate Heidegger's "derivation" of Nothing from science, his understanding of what Nothing is, and how it is revealed to us in dread. (Kaufmann, *Existentialism from Doestoevsky to Sartre*, pp. 242-257) Why is science not "the last word?"
2. "Man has no nature." Review what Ortega has to say about this in Kaufmann pp. 153ff, and then select two other authors who hold that view. Explain and give some evaluation of their position.
3. Explain and evaluate Sartre's claim that Existentialism is a "Humanism."
4. What is "Critical Theory" and what are some difficulties it faces?

5. The theme of “domination” runs through much of Continental European Philosophy. It is, one might say, a human problem as well as a philosophical one. Explain what is at issue in this theme, and the difference between how Husserl (“Crisis” TCR pp. 7-14) and Levinas might deal with it.
6. Explain “knowledge” in its “Postmodern Condition,” and evaluate Lyotard’s account of “knowledge-now” in the light of how knowledge actually functions in everyday life.
7. Write a question about Contemporary European Philosophy that, to your mind, integrates some of its more important themes, and then answer it.

Points in Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*:

In the Forward by Jameson, note:

“the crisis of representation” spanning pp. viii-ix

“the two great myths” bottom ix and bottom xix

“the decentered subject” top x

Communication as “an essentially conflictual relationship” x-xi

Contrast between “storytelling” or narrative and “scientific” abstraction xii

Lyotard's distinction between the modern and the post-modern. Xxiii-xxiv

“The crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied upon it.” xxiv and the “many different language games...these clouds of sociality. Bottom xxiv.

Where can legitimacy reside? “Paralogy” and paradox?

“Scientific knowledge is a kind of discourse.” p. 3. Implications of this.

“exteriorization of knowledge with respect to the knower...” bottom p. 4

Becomes a commodity and a force in production. p. 5

“learning” not for educational value. Mid 6

The “working hypothesis” of Lyotard. Bottom p. 6-7

Effects of “computerization.” P. 7.

The “Legitimation” problem. In law and in science. P. 8 (and pp. 27ff)

And the recourse to “language games.” Pp. 9-10

And “the social bond.” Top 11 Society as **a battle**.

The “state of knowledge” depends upon the state “of the society within which it is situated.” 13c-d

The division of knowledge into two kinds, which division Lyotard rejects. Top 14

The self and the social network. P. 15

“A *self* does not amount to much.”

The “agonistic aspect of society” and the individual. Bottom half p. 16-17

Institutions do not change the “warfare” aspect.

The social bond is a “language game..” Bot. p. 15. “Atomization” of the social.

Top of page 17.

“Learning” and “knowledge.” Work through pp. 18-19 carefully. Knowledge and custom. Top 19. Customary knowledge as Narration. Bot. 19

And the importance and main (five) features of “narrative.” Bottom 19-23

Narrative compared to scientific knowledge. “Pragmatics” (Pp. 23-24) of Sc. Knowledge.

What competence depends upon. Bottom p. 24

Top p. 24 gives you the absolute foundation of what Lyotard takes to be the “postmodern condition of “knowledge.” (1) Knowledge by “adequation”

**problematic and (2)“what proof is there that my proof is true..” Cp. P. 44a:
“...proof needs to be proven.” And: “The truth of the statement and the competence
of its sender are thus subject to the collective approval of a group of persons who
are competent on an equal basis.” Note these assumptions of Lyotard.**

What distinguishes scientific knowledge. Its “pragmatics.” Mid 25-26

Plato starts the legitimation game in the science game. Pp. 28-29.

The “two reasons for stating the properties of the two kinds of knowledge.” 26c

Scientific knowledge depends upon narrative knowledge for its legitimation. 29

The two great narratives. P. 31 & 32

Humboldt’s picture of the threefold aspiration of research and teaching. 33a-b

The place where knowledge finds its validity. 35c-d

Final legitimacy. 36c

Heidegger’s mistake. Mid-37

Now delegitimation as a general phenomenon—Grad narrative lost. Bot. 37

Science cannot legitimate itself. Nietzsche. 39c

So it just plays its own “language game.” Mid-39

See the statement on Vienna, Wittgenstein and “what the postmodern world is all
about. 41c-d

Undecidability emerges. 42d-43. The effect on reason. Bot. 43

Legitimation take over by power/performativity. 46a, top 47

The change of the question for education. No longer “Is it true.” 51b

Signs of “the age of deligitimation.” 52c-d; and “imagination.” 53a-c

“The knell of the age of the Professor.” 53c-d

New rules and new “moves” prized. Performativity presupposed determinism or
stability. 54-55. The “uncertainty” principle. 56b

Catastrophic antagonism the rule. 59d

Changed meaning of the word “knowledge” and postmodern science. 60a

Legitimation based now on paralogy. 61a Science as model of “open” system.

64b-c. “The only legitimation...generate ideas, new statements.” 65b

A new “justice” and computerization. 66b and 67.