PHILOSOPHY 525: SEMINAR IN PHENOMENOLOGY
Spring Semester of 1992
6:00 PM - 8:30 Thurs
102 Mudd Hall of Philosophy

Instructor: Dallas Willard

THEME:
The "Hermeneutical" Dimension of the Phenomenological Movement

A seminar in Phenomenology must at this late date choose a
area within the vast intellectual and literary domain which the
Phenomenological movement has become in order to have a subject
matter manageable within one semester. This semester I have
chosen to concentrate on the "hermeneutical" dimension of the
Phenomenological Movement, which has arisen out of Heidegger's
Being and Time. This dimension remains "phenomenological" in
that it purports to clarify the essences of human experiences and
their objects, but it relativizes those essences to human history
and rejects the strongly realistic position of Husserl and the
early Phenomenological Movement. This is similar to the retreat
from realism and the power of mind to transcend its own states
and flow that occurs in Twentieth Century Anglo-American
philosophy, as Kantianism metamorphoses to reincarnate itself in
the pragmatisms, positivisms and "ordinary language" philosophies
which replaced the realism of Moore, Russell and the American New
Realists.

After an introduction to Husserl's views, the semester will
be devoted to reading major texts from Heidegger, Gadamer and
Derrida. The emphasis will be on discovery and evaluation of
their accounts of consciousness and its objects.

Texts to be purchased are, in order of use:
1. Husserl, Ideas I (Boyce-Gibson transl., paperback)
2. Heidegger, Being and Time
3. Dreyfus, Being-In-The-World
4. Gadamer, Truth and Method
5. Derrida, Edmund Husserl's ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY:
   An Introduction
6. Derrida, Speech and Phenomena

Formalities: Each "for credit" participant in the seminar
will be expected to make an oral presentation in class on a
chosen text and explain and defend her/his interpretation in
discussion. <Other participants may wish to do this, and we will
see if it can be arranged.> The presentation is to be made from
a written basis provided to the members of the seminar. A few
one-page precis will be assigned. Participation in discussions
will be noted. A critical/expository paper on a text, or a
philosophical analysis of a central problem in the materials covered, will be due at the end of the semester.

Schedule of Readings:

HUSSERL:

January 16: Two one-hour lectures on the Husserlian problematic in its historical context and on the structure of the cognitive act as developed by him. Special attention to Ideas I, subsections 27-32, 42-44, 47, & 61.

January 23: Comments and textual analysis on--
2. The eight "General Structures of Pure Consciousness" (subsections 76-88).
    FOR SEMINAR PREPARATION EMPHASIZE SUBSECTIONS UNDER 2 & 3.

HEIDEGGER:

January 30: Introducing Heidegger's Being and Time
Dreyfus, pp. 1-59
Heidegger, pp. 1-64 (Note especially the task of destroying the ontological tradition, pp.41-49)

February 6: The "Basic State" or fundamental essence of Dasein or human being. "BEING IN." pp. 65-122
Dreyfus, chapters 4 & 5

February 13: The Being of Humans (Dasein): CARE
pp. 125-273
Dreyfus, try to read on through Drefus now to 281, but especially chapters 11, 14, 15.

February 20: Two Lectures on Division Two of Being and Time
I. Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care. (Read pp. 274-285 & 249-380)
II. Historicality and Ontology. (Read 424-458)

GADAMER:

February 27: Gadamer's Interpretation of "Truth" in the Experience of Art and in the "Human Sciences."
Lecture over pp. xi-73 of Truth and Method
Read pp. xi-xxvi & 91-150: ON PLAY.
March  5: Overcoming Romanticism and Historicism through Hermeneutical Phenomenology. Read *Truth and Method*, pp.153-173, 204-234

March 12: Historical Conditions of Understanding. Prejudice, Authority, Tradition (pp. 235-274)

March 19: The Ultimacy of Language to Life and Understanding. Read *Truth and Method* 345-447

DERRIDA


<Spring Recess>

April  9: Ideality, History and "Difference" (Read pp. 76-153)

April 16: Signs, Meaning and "Representation." (Read *Speech and Phenomena*, 3-59, 107-128)

April 23: "Voice" and the Illusions of "Presence." "Differance" (Read *Speech and Phenomena*, 60-104, 129-160)
Sources (in Hoose Library) for Philosophy 525: SEMINAR IN PHENOMENOLOGY

Farber, Marvin, The Foundations of Phenomenology, 1943. (A summary, largely paraphrase, of Husserl's works up through the Logical Investigations.)
Rapaport, Heidegger and Derrida, University of Nebraska Press, 1989.
Revue philosophique de la France et de l'etranger, "Derrida" number, (#2 -- April/June 1990. (Not on reserve)
Richardson, William J., Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought
Silverman, Hugh J. Silverman, Derrida and Deconstruction, Routledge, 1989. (Not on reserve)
Our aim in the first session (last week) and this is to provide a statement of Husserl's phenomenology (problems, results, method) sufficiently comprehensive, clear and textually based, to allow entrance into the Hermeneutic phase of the phenomenological movement (Heidegger and after)

The main points covered last time were:
1. Husserl's original project: Clarification of Mathematical Cognition—both the concept of number and the calculative techniques supposedly based thereon.
2. The failure of his (really, Brentano's) theory of representation to clarify the use of formal techniques, the substance of Mathematical work.
3. Retreat to general analysis of consciousness and of the types of elements (including "acts": object directed wholes) contained within it, in the 1894 treatise, "Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic" <see Shorter Works>, and later in the Logical Investigations.
4. Major results:
   A. The act of consciousness-of (as well as cognition-of) as one particular type of whole among others—Exhibiting parts and properties and relations—determined solely by the properties and relations of the parts of the total act.
   B. Properties (of objects general, including mental events) as universals ("Ideas" in something like Plato's sense) that are connected by "Ideal law," which then indirectly governs the possibilities and impossibilities of the "instances" or "individuals" to which the properties belong. Concepts and properties as a sub-class of properties generally. (See summary of Husserl's arguments for universals on the last page of the handout of last session.)
   C. The laws of logic (the syllogism, modus ponens, etc) as cases of "Ideal law," and the logical and other formalisms "explained" by parallelism of formal symbol systems with the formal structure of propositions and concepts comprehending whatever domain the formalism is referred to.
   D. The generic properties of mental acts, and the Ideal laws founded therein as "translucent," capable of "clearness and distinctness" in the Cartesian sense, and hence of exhaustive knowledge, with no "hidden" aspects. Hence the idea of a "presuppositionless" understanding of consciousness and cognition. (See p. 17 of last time's handout packet, and Ideas, subsection 75.)
E. The use of parts of acts (sensations, sub-acts) to bring specific types of objects to consciousness by apperception (or Auffassung)—e.g., "totalities" (enumerated groups) or physical objects. (See subsection 41 of Ideas I for a typical discussion of this. The point is that the immanent content of the act does not "get in the way" of the object which the whole act intends. The part of the act is used but does not become the object of the act. Eg. When we count we "use" the acts of awareness of the individual objects, but we do not count our acts. Similarly for our sensations of an apple. This doctrine of "apperception" must be kept in mind when we come to the "noema" or "appearance" teachings of Husserl's Ideas. The noema (appearance) is not seen, but used in seeing whatever it is the appearance of.

F. Phenomenology as foundational work for all cognitive disciplines, since it establishes the basic disclosure of consciousness of the types of objects studied in each area of research and the appropriate evidential structures through which consciousness progress to cognition. See next to last page of the handout packet from last time for the program of "foundational" studies presented as relevant to all disciplines. It is one form of the the "unity of science" motif that animates so much of modern philosophy from Descartes on. (Also Aristotle.)

This summarizes the point at which Husserl had arrived by 1913, when Ideas I was published in the first volume of the cooperative Jahrbuch für Philosophy und Phanomenologische Forschung, where Heidegger's Being and Time would appear in 1927.

There is almost nothing of genuinely fundamental status that is changed from the above summary until Husserl's death. The noema, the life-world, and history are important new concepts, but are extensions rather than modifications of the position here summarized. Husserl the chameleon is pure myth. He now devotes himself largely to re-working matters already dealt with at length, and to trying to eliminate what he takes to be barriers to understanding his views and to phenomenological co-working. Often with disastrous results. Nowhere is this more true than in the case of the "reductions" or the "epoche" which he introduced to thwart certain "temptations" to misdescribe acts of consciousness and essences. (Ideas I, subsection 61)

What the Reduction is. (Subsection 31)
What the Reduction is to. (Subsection 33)
What the Reduction is not:
Doubt or denial
Loss of "the world" (end subsection 50)
Ceasing to be a human being.
Affirmation that experiences are uncaused by events in the world. (cf. opening subsection 54)
The many Reductions (subsections 56-61)

Ideas I has four main projects:
I. To summarize his earlier results about facts, essences and Ideal laws, and to protest "Naturalistic" (Empiricist) Misconstructions of them. (Chapters One and Two)
II. To lay out and explain a series of methodological steps which are supposed to enable us to really get at the essences of experiences as they are "in themselves." The many reductions or "brackets" (epoches). (Chapters Three through Seven).
III. To state and explain the eight "General Structures of Pure Consciousness," that is, the eight essential features which every act of consciousness, every segment of consciousness which has its object, must have. (Chapters Eight through Ten)

REFLEXION (subsection 77-79)
RELATION TO THE PURE EGO (subsection 80)
PHENOMENOLOGICAL TIME FLOW (subsections 81 & 82)
UNITY OF EXPERIENCE AS "IDEA" (subsection 83)
INTENTIONALITY (Subsection 84)
SENSATE MATTER AND FORM (subsection 85)
"FUNCTIONAL" ROLES OF PARTS EXPERIENCE (subsec 86)
NOESIS/NOEMA (subsections 87 through 127)
Most attention is paid to the eighth structure, the "Noesis/Noema" contrast.

IV. To describe how the act of consciousness achieves satisfaction or fulfilment in "the object itself." The "Phenomenology of Reason," or of "justified" consciousness. (Chapters Eleven through Thirteen)
NOTES FOR PHENOMENOLOGY SEMINAR  
1/30/92

We finish up last time by comments on:
- Noema or Appearance (Ideas I, subsections 41 & 97-99)
  - A third reduction now? (see handout) --
  - Many levels in one act (subsection 111)
- Noema as "meaning" (subsection 131) and
  - The move from appearance to reality (subsect 135)
- Degrees of "givenness" and rationality (#138&141)
- Being and Reason (# 142)

A few special notes from Logical Investigations (attached):
1. Sensation, act-character and apperception.
2. Point of complete fulfillment.
4. Some completely transparent objects.

SUMMARY ON HUSSERL'S CATEGORIES:

A. The individual or "fact" (All entities or events which exist at or through a time. (Logical Investigations, Eng. Trans. pp. 109-110, 148 etc.) THE DOMAIN OF CAUSAL LAW.
   Includes:
   i. The Real (this table)
   ii. The Reelle (my perception of this table)
   iii. The Irreelle (the appearance of this table to me)
   <A further distinction between independent and "non-independent" particulars is also drawn.>

B. The Universal or "Ideal" (All entities indifferent to time <and space> in their existence and nature.)
   Includes all properties and relations as identities within a range of cases, whether the the "cases" are from i, ii, iii, or are also "Ideal objects," universals, themselves. THE DOMAIN OF IDEAL LAW.

NOTE: You will find in Heidegger, Gadamer, and Derrida no analysis of the act of consciousness comparable in detail to Husserl's!!!! Do they have any analysis of it at all????

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NOW TO BEING AND TIME:

The assumption of Heidegger's work is the failure of philosophy as an intellectual discipline.
- Not a rigorous intellectual discipline, for Husserl.
- Not successful in liberating and guiding life, for Heidegger. (Held Husserl also to have failed, paid the same compliment later by Derrida.)

Does not, however, give up the basic Cartesian/Husserlian way of working, though it often is made to appear that he does.
1. The status of the concept of Being, of the question about Being, today: What is it to be? What is the difference between being and not being? What does the words "existence" or "being" mean? Question contemporaneously dismissed! (Being and Time, 21ff)

2. These questions and responses concerning Being presuppose that the question is understood, is formulated in some way. What is the essence of questioning? (p. 24)
   "I question, so what is it, exactly, I am doing?"

   Questioning is a seeking--
   Therefore has a direction. Spelled as:
   what is asked about
   what is interrogated
   what is to be found out

3. In asking about Being there are these three elements. (25ff)
   Especially: what is interrogated? (pp. 26-28)
   What circularity is not an issue here. (27-28)
NOTES FOR PHENOMENOLOGY SEMINAR
2/6/92

1. Access to Dasein, the "primary object of interrogation." (36f)
   Temporality the key to Dasein (38-40)
   Such access requires the Destruktion (Destroying, Deconstruction) of the History of Ontology--that is, insight into how it came to what it is. (41-49)
   Dasein distorted by tradition & the "uprooted Greek ontology" (43) Kant the Greek.

2. The task of Ontology (49)
   Phenomenology its method, the "things themselves" (49-50)
   Phenomenon (51 & 54)
   Logos (56)
   Resultant meaning of "Phenomenology" (59)
   Summary on Ontology / Phenomenology (top 60-62)
   Enter INTERPRETATION / HERMENEUTICS (61-62, see mid96)
   TIME in the "Design of the Treatise (63-64)

3. A fundamental structure in Dasein from which its "interpretation" or "interrogation" may start:
   BEING-IN-THE-WORLD (65ff)
   A first move: essence of the Being which is "mine" is always to-be. (67 & 78)
   "anxiety individualizes" (p 235)
   Decision/Authenticy/Existence (68)
   Existentialia vs. Categories (70, 71, 79)
   Distancing Anthropology/Psychology/Biology (71-77)

4. The "Preliminary Sketch" of Being-in-the-World
   "dwelling," "alongside of" (80-81)
   "Definite ways of being-in" (83)
   CONCERN (83, especially see note #1)
   CARE (83-84, see note #1 on 84, & 235-244)
   Negative characterization of "being-in" (85)
   The "baleful" `subject-Object-relationship' (86)
   "Knowing the world" as one way of being-in, but a founded or "derivative" one. (86-90)

5. Worldhood or "Worldliness" itself (91ff)
   Worldhood as existentialie (bottom 92, bottom 93)
   Unintelligible in terms of "nature" (94)
   Outline of the analysis to be done (top 95)
   Dasein reveals its structure/world in "dealing with entities" (THE ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL PP. 96-102)
   And entities "within-the-world" reveal this structure. (102f)
   See especially 104-105
   "Signs" as "ontological clue" to worldliness (107f)
   CIRCUMSPECTION OF OUR CONCERNFUL DEALINGS (110, 112)
   "Involvement" and "Significance" (114f)
   "toward-which" and "for-the-sake-of" (116f)
The three "Beings" now revealed. (121-122)

NOTES FOR PHENOMENOLOGY SEMINAR
2/13/92

1. Having arrived at mid-page 122 of the English text of Being and Time, we can now reflect upon the "basic argument" or the basic line or pattern of argumentation in Heidegger's thought.

It proceeds from the Husserlian distinction between primordial (unfounded) and derivative (founded) structures (complex essences) to be discovered by reflection on human "doing." Being-in-the-world (see e.g. top p. 107) is the one inclusive structure of being human. Being-in or Being-alongside a world is a "primordial structure of Dasein's Being" which along with other such elements <e.g. "They," Care, Understanding, and the other existentiale> are "analyzed" only by seeing. (pp. 80-81)

Given this distinction the ontological axiom in Heidegger's thinking is that the primordial structures and the corresponding types of entities (those bearing the structures or co-primordial with them) are the basic "realities." Which means above all, and especially in the context of philosophical work, that the founded structures, e.g. those of presence-at-hand, are never to be taken as what explains the primordial ones.

The bulk of Heidegger's work consists of:

A. Identifying structures as "primordial"
B. Showing ones mistaken for primordial to be derivative.
C. Explaining what it is about Dasein that led to failure to correctly identify and interrelate structures and types of beings as either primordial or derivative. (unfounded or founded)

If, as you read Being and Time, you keep asking yourself, "Which of these three things is he doing here?" it may cast a bit of light upon the path.

Now let us look at some further Dasein structure elements:


3. Being-with and the "They" (149-150, 154, 156)
   Being-with/Care/Welfare (157-160)
   The "Who" revealed (164)
   And the "They" (164-5) Summary 167-8)

4. "Mood" (172-3)
   And "Thrownness" (173-175, 435) Esp. italicized bot.175.
   The priority of Mood. (176, 177)

5. Understanding & Projection (184-5) "SIGHT" (187)

6. Understanding and Interpretation. (188-9 <cf 89>)
   Fore-structure and THE CIRCLE (194-195)
7. Assertion as DERIVATIVE form of interpretation (175ff, cf266)
8. Language and the everydayness of Dasein (212-219)
9. The FALLING of Dasein (219ff)
   INAUTHENTICITY (220-224)
   TRANQUILITY (222)
10. Anxiety as the "handle" for "explicitly grasping Dasein's
    primordial totality of Being." (227) And Care again.
    <Note crucial statement on independence of entities from
    our "grasp" of them. And qualification. (mid 228)
11. Falling and Fear. (229-231)
    Summary on Anxiety and Dasein (233-235)
12. Full treatment on CARE. Summary p. 237
    Reality and Care. (255)
13. Truth as existentiale 256 & 261
    And the "traditional" truth, agreement, assertions (261-268)
    Truth depends on Dasein (269-273)
14. Some Comments on Dreyfus's critique of Searle (and Husserl?)
1. A number of topics scheduled for last session require some further notice. Specifically:
   Understanding/interpretation/assertion
   Care
   Truth -- two forms

2. "Temporality" as the ontological meaning of Care--
   The difference between care and temporality.
   Temporality as the abstract essential structure of care.
   As "the primordial unity" of Dasein (BT, 275, 276-7,--
   PP. 370-378 VITALLY IMPORTANT PAGES)
   Death (310-311) and conscience (314 & 320, 322-3)
   (Death as a positive structure. 378)
   RESOLUTENESS AS AUTHENTIC DASEIN (343, 348, 352-353, 357, 434-435)
   "the care-structure includes ... Selfhood" (370)
   WHAT `TEMPORALITY' IS -- 374, 376-7 (Bergson)
   Summary top 380

3. Historicality and Ontology.
   Dasein's primordial historizing (bott. 435)
   Historicizing of the community (mid 436)
   Repetition and "handing down." (437-8)
   <"Resoluteness=the loyalty of existence to its Self" 443>
   The theme of "historiology" (447)
   But where does this leave us with "Being"? (488)

4. Dreyfus' suggestion: "Plural Realism" (His book, p. 262-5)
   Its problems.

5. How strange Dasein is for Heidegger. Beyond "categories"

6. A comprehensive criticism of Heidegger's position:
   The attempt to transcend categories leads to vacuity
   And to the spurning of detailed description of specific cases.
   When Heidegger is done we just can't tell how Dasein works.
   The strength of "phenomenology" as Husserl practised it lay in the painstakingly detailed description of particular cases. Not so Heidegger! Who is right?
NOTES FOR THE PHENOMENOLOGY SEMINAR
3/12/1992

1. Is everyone on board?
The project in T&M: To understand understanding
   The general phenomena of "getting it right"
   This phenomena permeates the "professional" context
   Rejection of the theoretical as model of what understanding
   really is, judging all other efforts to get it
   right by it.
   Here we have an essence for sure. Is Gadamer's approach
   phenomenological? (xxxvi)

2. A suggestion that comes to us: All understanding
   is understanding of human accomplishment and its "artifacts,"
   especially traditions and texts.
   Probably a correct view of "getting it right" in professions
   This is the point of entry for "romantic" hermeneutics

3. Clean up from last time (see those notes)
   The "suggestion" gives point to:
   (1). Romantic Hermeneutics (Schliermacher)
   (2). Dilthey's effort to "break free" of history by history
       To admit historical conditioning of all understanding
       and yet achieve universal (essence) knowledge of the
       historical itself and as such.
   (3). The effort to "overcome" this epistemological problem
       through Heidegger's analysis of Dasein (see paragraph
       spanning 260-261); and through the consequential
       elevation of tradition (including prejudice). (mid262)
   (4). Stressing the "transcendental intent" of Heidegger's
       interpretation of Dasein and its implications for the
       problem of historical knowledge: THAT THE INTERPRETER
       BELONGS TO HER SUBJECT MATTER OR OBJECT. (263-4)

4. Our question for Part II of T&M, "Elements of a Theory of
   Hermeneutical Experience," is: HOW, FREED FROM THE
   'SCIENTIFIC' MODEL, CAN WE DO JUSTICE TO THE HISTORICITY OF
   UNDERSTANDING? (265) How "get this right"?

5. Begin by re-examining the "hermeneutical circle" from
   Heidegger, looking for its consequences for the "circular
   structure of understanding itself. (266f)
   Meanings cannot be understood in an arbitrary way (268-9)
   The "forestructure of understanding" as safeguard. (269)
   Centrality of PREJUDICE (270-271)
   What "The Enlightenment" did. (272-3)
   It Romantic reversal. (273ff)

6. Rehabilitation of prejudice.
The essence of authority 279-280
   And tradition viz-a-viz reason(280-82)
   Summary bot. 282-283
   No perfect knowledge of history, no object in itself toward
   which historical research is directed. (284-5)
1. The "guiding idea" that emerges from Part II of T&M, "Elements of a Theory of Hermeneutic Experience", is "that the fusion of horizon that takes place in understanding is actually the achievement of language." (p. 378) "Language is already present in any acquisition of experience. (348; cf. 307, 350, 384, 389, 474-5)

2. The consciousness--the 'understanding'--we actually have is not mere self-reflection, whether Cartesian or Hegelian. (341-346) This follows from Heidegger/Yorck analysis of understanding in terms of life. "Application" the fundamental problem. (315) Rejection of cognitive/normative/productive distinction (310)

3. Historically effected consciousness (i.e. human consciousness) has the structure of experience (Erfahrung) (346ff)

"Experience" is:
- Valid so long as not contradicted (350)
- Not "controlled" or predictable (352)
- A process (not result)
  - Essentially negative, i.e. dialectical. 353, 356
  - Always an "escape" (365)
  - Experience = experience of human finitude (357)
  - No experience without questions. (362)

These elements repeat in hermeneutical experience. (358f) We will understand historical events only if we reconstruct the question to which the historical action of the persons involved were the answer." (371; cf 370, 375 & 472)

4. The finitude and its horizon is present as question and openness. (363, 370, 375) Prejudices constitute horizon. (306) WHICH ALLOWS UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT "HISTORICALLY EFFECTED CONSCIOUSNESS" IS. (377)

5. The fusion of horizons which constitutes understanding (304-305) takes place as an achievement of language. (378-9) "The linguisticality of understanding is the concretion of historically effected consciousness." (389)

For: "...the essence of tradition is to exist in the medium of language, so that the preferred object of interpretation is a verbal one." (389)

"The whole process of interpretation is verbal." (384;456)

6. So:
- "Being that can be understood is language." (474)
- "That which can be understood is language." (475)
- "Being is language--i.e. self-presentation--as revealed to us by the hermeneutical experience of being." (487)

7. What "coming into language" means (475; cf. 378)

8. The "ideality" of the word and the centrality of writing. (390)

9. Concept formation and "the genius of verbal consciousness
10. Against the dogmatism of "meanings in themselves" (473)
   And the "paradox of traditionary material"
NOTES FOR PHENOMENOLOGY SEMINAR
3/26/92

1. Where we come out with Gadamer's *Truth and Method*:
   A. What the rigor, the discipline, of "hermeneutical experience" is: uninterrupted listening. (p. 465)
      This replaces technique ("method")
   B. What then is the understanding of understanding achieved?
   C. Language and the preformation of thought. (542-9)
   D. Some critical reflections:
      Cases of absolute knowledge are abundant.(Don't faint)
      Confusion of knowing that p with knowing everything there is to know 'about' p.
      The issue of 'mis-framing' the objects of consciousness categorically: that is, of misunderstandin the kind of Being they have.
      The loss of 'vertical' intentionality and the substitution of horizontal and "productive" movement to other experiences.
      Resultant diffusion of all into language.
      Ijsseling's statement. (over)

2. Moving from hermeneutics to deconstruction, now, the basic idea is to apply to meanings, ideas, concepts, texts et.al.
   the same (quite arbitrary, or at least groundless) conception of identity that dominates modern philosophy, culminating in Hume: the one which simply eliminates all actual sameness (in the Leibnizian sense) from knowledge and reality. All of the identities of "vulgar thought," as Hume would say, are only "apparent." All that is left to do is to explain why they are apparent, which always means to discover actual beings and relations other than identity in terms of which the appearances of identities can be "explained." To deconstruct is to tell a story that has the effect of undermining an apparent identity, and especially to show that what is not it is it or what is it is not it. (See footnotes on pp. 2-4 of Intro. Orig. Geo.)
   Comments on some other points in the translator's (John P. Leavey, Jr.'s) "Preface" to IOG.

3. Remarks on Husserl's essay, "The Origin of Geometry" (IOG, pp. 157-180), and especially on the relation between ideal objects, science, and history as he understood them.

4. The first reading (by Derrida here) of the issues for Husserl's OG. (IOG 25-27, cf. 31)
   The alleged special status of the "mathematical object" (27-28)
   History's "breakthrough" into phenomenology. (29-30)
   "Crisis" and intellectual responsibility. (31-33)

5. "Naivete of apriori self-evidence": blessing and curse(34-35)
   The three confusions which threaten. (35-38)

6. Husserl and the "production" (alleged) of geometrical
idealities. Understanding and misunderstanding. (39-40, 42-44)
7. For "senses" the opposite of hallucination is not perception, but "history." (45-48)
8. The eidetic fund of the invariable "first time" for a geometric thought. (48-51)
9. The return to origin has its "radical generalities." (52ff)
   The unity of geometry's sense is that of a tradition (52f)
   "undecidability" and its implications (53-56)
   "Sedimentation" and cultural (non-causal) formation (56-57)
10. The absolute itself: the LIVING PRESENT AND ITS ACTION (58)
    and the "paradoxicality" of history (59)
    the culture of truth
11. Driving between Platonism and historicist Empiricism. (59f)
    Some almost phenomenology. (60-62)
12. Husserl does not describe the "first time" (62-63)--
    But launches into "history" --
    Because there alone is object-ivity (63-64)
    Charged with "fiction"? (64-65)
    Illegitimately. (65-66)
13. The possibility of the appearance of history is language (66)
    Language, the ideal and objectivity. (66-73)
    The three idealities of:
    Word (70)
    Sense (70-71)
    The "object" itself (71-72)
14. THE CENTRALITY OF REPEATABILITY TO DECONSTRUCTION AS
    EXPLAINED UNDER POINT 2 ABOVE. (72-74)
    Contrast between identity and reality (bottom 75)
15. The argument which supposedly gives us the required space
    "for a transcendental historicity...in all its enigmatic depth." (75-76)
A classical statement on the relation between written words, spoken words, mental experiences (thoughts) and their objective correlates:

"Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the representations."

<Aristotle, DE INTERPRETATIONE (On Interpretation), Chapter One (Bekker pagination 16a, 3 - 9)>

This model of language, experience and what they are of or apply to dominated philosophical interpretation of mind and reality with little opposition up through the Eighteenth Century. It really begins to break down on a large scale in the Twentieth Century, though it is significantly attacked in the Nineteenth. In late Twentieth Century thought it is as generally rejected as it was previously accepted. We will see at lengths how this goes in certain "Continental" philosophers. Among current American philosophers, Hilary Putnam:

"The deep systematic root of the disease <afflicting Modern philosophy>...lies in the notion of an `intrinsic' property, a property something has `in itself', apart from any contribution made by language or the mind." (p. 8, The Many Faces of Realism)

Donald Davidson: "Yet if the mind can grapple without distortion with the real, the mind itself must be without categories and concepts." (p. 185 of Truth and Interpretation)

And just one from the other side of the English Channel: Max Horkheimer:

"The core of dialectical theory is the recognition that the world of perception is a `product of human activity'." (p. xiv of Critical Theory: Selected Essays)

Relevant to the major points here see my "Predication as Originary Violence," in G. B. Madison, ed., Working through Derrida.

Whatever must ultimately be said, we surely must initially distinguish in every context of human consciousness and cognition: (i). A pattern of mental events or cognitive experiences in which consciousness is realized in the individual person. (ii). A pattern of connection among the matters studied and theoretically comprehended in the given case (e.g. geometry or art history). (iii). The logical pattern of connection between the theoretical 'ideas' (concepts, propositions and groups thereof), providing the unity of theory--hopefully, of truths--in the discipline. (iv). Socio/historical structures governing the 'progress' or 'growth' of the discipline. And how are these then to be accurately related? And how are we to determine how?
Phenomenology offers itself as an answer to this last question.