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Analysis & ProjectionsMonthly and yearly energy forecasts, analysis of energy topics, financial analysis, Congressional reports. Markets & FinanceFinancial market analysis and financial data for major energy companies. InternationalInternational energy information, including overviews, rankings, data, and analyses. In the International Energy Outlook 2016 (IEO2016) Reference case, transportation sector delivered energy consumption increases at an annual average rate of 1.4%, from 104 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu) in 2012 to 155 quadrillion Btu in 2040.
In 2012, OECD nations accounted for 55% of the world’s total transportation energy consumption, and the non-OECD nations accounted for 45% (Figure 8-1). Worldwide, petroleum and other liquid fuels [326] are the dominant source of transportation energy, although their share of total transportation energy declines over the IEO2016 projection period, from 96% in 2012 to 88% in 2040. The OECD as a whole does not contribute to the worldwide growth in transportation fuels consumption in the IEO2016 Reference case.
Nine countries and regions, which together account for 75% of global fuel consumption by light-duty vehicles, have adopted mandatory or voluntary standards for increasing fuel economy and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Fuel economy and emissions standards typically are applied to the vehicles that a company sells in a given country, rather than to all the vehicles it produces in a given country. Virtually all (94%) of the projected growth in world transportation energy use occurs in the developing non-OECD economies, where strong economic growth leads to rising standards of living that translate to demand for personal travel and freight transport to meet growing consumer demand for goods in non-OECD nations. Much of the growth in non-OECD (and world) transportation energy use occurs in the emerging economies of non-OECD Asia. Like India and China, the other economies of non-OECD Asia also show significant growth in transportation energy demand from 2012 to 2040 in the IEO2016 Reference case. Although the largest expansion in non-OECD transportation energy use occurs in non-OECD Asia, substantial increases are also projected for Africa, the Middle East, and the non-OECD Americas. In the non-OECD Americas, growth in transportation energy use is slower than in the non-OECD as a whole. Passenger or personal mobility-related fuel consumption accounted for 61% of total world transportation energy consumption in 2012. Worldwide, projected energy consumption for all transportation modes grows from 2012 to 2040. The growth trends for energy consumed by passenger modes in OECD and non-OECD regions from 2012 to 2040 differ considerably in the IEO2016 Reference case (Figure 8-7), with the OECD total declining by 1 quadrillion Btu and the non-OECD total increasing by 31 quadrillion Btu.
The transportation of people and goods accounts for about 25% of total world delivered energy consumption (Figure 8-8). The United States, where on-road passenger travel is especially prevalent, was the world’s largest transportation energy consumer in 2012, the most recent year for which detailed international transportation data are available by mode.
Major European countries (those in the OECD) and China are also major transportation energy consumers, at 19 quadrillion Btu and 13 quadrillion Btu, respectively, in 2012. On-road use accounts for the largest share of transportation energy consumption in all regions of the world, but there is considerable variation across regions in the use of other modes of transportation. Global transportation energy consumption is dominated by two fuels: motor gasoline (including ethanol blends) and diesel (including biodiesel blends). By mode, the largest increases in annual energy consumption for non-OECD passenger travel from 2012 to 2040 in the Reference case are for light-duty vehicles (20 quadrillion Btu) and aircraft (6 quadrillion Btu). In 2013, three types of jet aircraft stock were available for national and international passenger travel: narrow-body, wide-body, and regional.
In most regions, narrow-body aircraft used for regional and transcontinental trips account for more than half of total aircraft fleets. In contrast to passenger modes of travel, the trends in freight modes in the OECD and non-OECD regions are similar (Figure 8-12). Rising global incomes increase the demand for personal mobility, measured as passenger-miles per capita, in all the world regions, with different rates of increase depending on current income levels (Figure 8-13) and travel patterns, as well as the unique nature of regional geographies. OECD regions are, for the most part, economically developed and thus have higher levels of personal mobility than the non-OECD countries. As a result of the increase of more than 100% in non-OECD travel demand from 2012 to 2040, the region’s total energy use for passenger travel in 2040 is more than 50% higher than the OECD total, compared with about two-thirds the OECD total in 2012. The transportation modes used for passenger travel also reflect the effects of rising incomes and the current difference between OECD and non-OECD personal mobility choices. Demand for personal travel by aircraft, measured as revenue passenger-miles, shows a similar trend. Air passenger travel, measured by revenue passenger-miles (RPM) [327], includes both domestic travel (within a single IEO2016 region) and international travel (across regional boundaries).
In 2013, the United States had the world’s highest level of domestic air passenger travel and the second-highest level of international air passenger travel, at 603 billion RPM and 264 billion RPM, respectively. As gross domestic product (GDP) per capita increases in the world regions, RPM per capita also increases.
The movement of freight (including trucks, rail, and domestic marine vessels), measured in ton-miles [328], also shows the impact of economic growth.
The industrial sector uses more delivered energy [294] than any other end-use sector, consuming about 54% of the world’s total delivered energy.
Overall, total industrial sector energy use increases from 73 quadrillion Btu in 2012 to 85 quadrillion Btu in 2040 in the OECD countries, and from 149 quadrillion Btu in 2012 to 225 quadrillion Btu in 2040 in the non-OECD countries. In the IEO2016 Reference case, real inflation-adjusted gross output is used to estimate industrial sector energy consumption by disaggregating economic activity into sectors and industries.
Total gross output includes all economic activity, while industrial energy use includes three subsectors: nonmanufacturing, energy-intensive manufacturing, and nonenergy-intensive manufacturing (Table 7-3) [295].
Globally, much of the slower growth in the nonmanufacturing sector is offset by increased growth in the services and nonenergy-intensive manufacturing sectors, whereas the energy-intensive manufacturing share of total gross output does not change. For Mexico and Chile, there is a notable increase in the nonenergy-intensive manufacturing sector share of their combined economies.
Both China and OECD Europe have declared goals to move away from heavy industry in the future.
Within gross output sectors there is a shift in regional shares of total world production for individual industries.
Industrial sector delivered energy consumption varies by region, according to differences in industrial gross output, energy intensity (measured as energy consumed per unit of gross output), and the composition of industries. The strong rates of growth in industrial sector consumption of electricity and natural gas in both the OECD and non-OECD regions are attributable to increases in the other industrials group of nonenergy-intensive manufacturing (see Table 7-1).
Biomass currently provides most of the renewable energy (excluding hydroelectricity) consumed in the industrial sector and continues to do so throughout the projection, largely because of its role in providing byproduct energy to the pulp and paper industry. Coal becomes a less important source for industrial energy consumption in both the OECD and non-OECD regions in the IEO2016 Reference case. The following industries are considered to be energy-intensive: food, pulp and paper, basic chemicals, refining, iron and steel, nonferrous metals (primarily aluminum), and nonmetallic minerals (primarily cement). Increases in energy efficiency and changes in industrial gross output affect the growth of industrial sector energy consumption.
Among the energy-intensive industries, the largest consumer of delivered energy is the basic chemicals industry, which in 2012 accounted for about 19% of total delivered energy consumption in the OECD industrial sector and about 14% in the non-OECD industrial sector.
The iron and steel industry accounted for about 10% of industrial sector delivered energy consumption in OECD countries in 2012, and its 2040 share remains the same in the IEO2016 Reference case. The refining industry is a major energy consumer, accounting for about 8% of delivered industrial energy consumption in OECD countries and about 6% of delivered industrial energy consumption in non-OECD countries throughout the 2012a€“40 period.
In parallel with the large growth in industrial sector energy consumption in non-OECD countries overall, energy consumption in the nonmetallic minerals industry increases significantly over the projection.
Non-OECD countries are experiencing significant population growth, which contributes to similar growth in the food industry in the IEO2016 Reference case.
The pulp and paper industry accounted for about 6% of delivered industrial energy consumption in OECD countries in 2012, and its share declines to about 4% in 2040 in the IEO2016 Reference case. The nonferrous metals industry (primarily aluminum) accounted for about 2% of delivered industrial energy consumption in both the OECD and non-OECD regions in 2012. Regions around the world have different industrial sector energy profiles and may develop in different ways in the future. Energy and environmental policies significantly influence the trends in industrial sector energy consumption in OECD Europe.
Over the past decade, much of the world's industrial sector energy growth occurred in the nations of non-OECD Asia. Steel is a major energy-intensive industry in China, and the amount of steel being produced in China is unprecedented.
Steel production in China continues to grow throughout the projection period but not as rapidly as during the past decade.
Secondary production from recycled scrap metal, which uses significantly less energy than primary production from raw material inputs, can reduce the energy intensity of both steel and aluminum production [305]. In China, which produces more steel and aluminum than any other country, the iron and steel industry used 16 quadrillion Btu of energy in 2012, and the nonferrous metals industry (which includes aluminum and other metals) used 2.1 quadrillion Btu [307].
The two main barriers to increasing the use of scrap in secondary production of steel and aluminum are capital investment and availability of scrap.
Steel and aluminum scrap sources include obsolete buildings and transportation equipment, as well as discarded appliances and beverage cans. In 2012, China imported almost 5 million metric tons of steel scrap and 2.6 million metric tons of aluminum scrap [312] (Figure 7-7). With the relative increase in EAF production, the electricity demand share in the steel industry rises from 10% in 2012 to 22% in 2040 (Figure 7-8). As with other energy-intensive industries, China's chemicals industries have experienced rapid growth.
Changes in China’s economy support the projected growth of its bulk chemicals industry. China’s use of energy resources in bulk chemical production differs from use in most other large producing regions, in that it relies heavily on coal as a feedstock. Generally, the relative levels of use of different feedstocks depend on the delivered costs of the fuels, although other factors also matter.
Environmental concerns such as carbon dioxide emissions, water use, and waste disposal may have a larger effect on potential CTO projects. In the IEO2016 Reference case, the coal share of China’s chemical feedstock fuel use is projected to increase from 20% to 32% from 2012 to 2040, while the liquids share (mostly heavy petroleum feedstocks) declines by 6%.
The energy intensity of China's gross domestic product (GDP), or energy use per dollar of GDP, has generally improved (decreased) since 1990 from a level more than three times higher than in the OECD countries to a level two times higher in the mid-1990s. Under the terms of the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–15), China for the first time implemented specific targets aimed at reducing energy intensity (a 16% reduction in energy use per dollar of GDP, which would reduce intensity to 40% above OECD levels by 2015). Figure 7-11 shows the increase in China's energy consumption for both fuel and feedstock in the chemical industry. The nations of non-OECD Asia outside China and India (or other non-OECD Asia) are some of the fastest-growing industrial energy-consuming nations worldwide. The countries that are members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) [323] have the highest growth rates among the other non-OECD Asia countries. To encourage private sector participation, especially by financial institutions, in support of energy efficiency and conservation investment and implementation. Since the 1970s, industrial sector energy demand has varied significantly among the Non-OECD nations of Asia.
In the industrialized OECD nations, electricity penetration in the industrial sector has been linked with fuel substitution in production processes (for example, replacing inefficient blast furnaces with electric arc furnaces) and the development of new uses for electricity in increasingly mechanized industries [325].
A disaggregated view of electricity demand growth in China's industrial sector reflects the structural changes occurring as the economy grew (Figure 7-14). In comparison with China, the Philippines shows a more variable historical trend of electricity use in the industrial sector (Figure 7-15). The future rate of electric demand growth in non-OECD Asia industries is more dependent on the changing composition of industry than on overall economic growth. In Victoria, heating and cooling our homes accounts for around 60% of our annual energy use. Energy used for cooling our homes is increasing rapidly as more and more homes instal air conditioners. Many appliances use standby energy when they are not being used, especially those operated by remote control or with lights or clocks on them which stay lit. The other type of appliance energy use which is growing fast is energy consumed by televisions. Energy use from appliances is projected to grow more than any other area of household energy use by 2020.
In 1966, the average fridge had a volume of 209 litres in the fridge compartment and 36 litres in the freezer. The improvement in efficiency means our total energy use from fridges and freezers is starting to decrease. Australia’s household energy use was 299 petajoules in 1990 and 397 petajoules in 2007.
In 2020, it is projected that Australian households will be using a combined total of 467 petajoules. Jurgen Weiss of The Brattle Group and Sara Birmingham, Director of Western Policy, of SEIA discuss the German solar experience and what lessons can be learned from it. This report is a comprehensive study taking an in-depth look at Germany’s solar support programs and how the United States can benefit in the long term from the experiences of the world’s leading solar producer.
The Solar Energy Industries Association (“SEIA”) asked The Brattle Group to prepare a report outlining the major lessons learned from the past decade of solar PV energy support in Germany. Recent reports about the rising cost of Germany’s feed-in tariffs (FITs) for solar PV and about resulting reform efforts have led some to view the German solar support programs as having been too expensive, resulting in oversupply of solar PV, having led to an unreliable electric system, having hurt the competitiveness of the German economy, or all of the above, and hence as being a poor role model for other countries to follow. The costs of Germany’s renewable support (including solar PV) program have indeed been significant – and higher than expected - and the success of those programs have led to penetration levels of renewable energy sources high enough to require modifications to both the renewable program itself and to overall electricity market design.
The core of Germany’s solar PV program consists of a set of FITs for solar PV installations of various sizes ranging from residential rooftop installations to utility-scale projects. Over the years and in response to unexpected growth in installations above expectations, the program has undergone several reforms, the most recent of which is currently awaiting final legislative approval.
The primary lessons from the German experience are that a system of FITs such as the one used in Germany can be highly effective in promoting the growth of solar PV, that the impact on trade-exposed heavy electricity users can and perhaps should be mitigated, but that FITs for new installations should be adjusted regularly and perhaps automatically in response to observed relative to targeted deployment levels so as to avoid undue increases of electricity rates for retail customers. In hindsight the German FITs for solar PV did not adjust quickly enough to rates of installations far in excess of what had been expected, even though reforms to the renewables law in response to those installations ultimately did introduce much more frequent and steeper reductions in those FITs, which allowed Germany to avoid a complete crash of PV installations along what happened in Spain and Italy.
First, there is widespread acknowledgement that Germany’s solar PV support program has been instrumental in bringing down the cost of solar PV. Second, associating the high residential retail prices of electricity in Germany purely with the solar PV and other renewable support programs would be misleading. Third, it is also true that payments for solar PV have increased substantially in the past few years. Fourth, it is important to note that heavy electricity users in industrial sectors exposed to international trade have been exempt from a significant portion of the renewables levy and generally face electricity prices in line with or even below other European competitors. Fifth, even if ex-post a somewhat optimized FIT design might have lowered the cost impact of Germany’s solar PV program for retail customers (except the exempt industrial users), high costs incurred to-date are not a good reason to abandon the solar PV program now. Finally, the reform efforts of the solar PV and renewable support programs in Germany should not be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a broad failure of the Germany system of FITs.
Finally, Germany is in the process of fundamentally changing its system for supporting renewable energy development. Indeed, since 1990 the share of core renewable energy sources – biomass and biogas, wind and solar PV – in Germany has increased from essentially zero to 20% by 2012, as illustrated in Figure 2 below. In the remainder of this report, we examine the German program for renewable energy (and in particular solar PV) support in more detail.
A first and important topic relates to the cost of solar PV energy in Germany and the impact Germany’s solar PV FITs, might have had on the evolution of PV costs. As can be seen from Figure 3 below, the installed cost of solar PV systems in Germany has been declining steadily and significantly over the past decade.
Source: Reproduced from Figure 3, Recent Facts about Photovoltaics in Germany, Fraunhofer ISI, April 10, 2014. This decrease in installed cost has taken place at the same time as installed capacity has increased and as FIT rates have declined dramatically, as can be seen in Figure 4 below.
A second important topic relates to the retail rate impact of the German FIT program for solar PV. Electricity rates in Germany, especially for households, are among the highest in the world. Sources: BDEW Strompreisanalyse November 2013, Worldbank (GDP Deflators), The Brattle Group analysis. Source: Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energien, BEE-Hintergrund zur EEG-Umlage 2013, The Brattle Group analysis. The industrial exemption simply means that residential consumers are picking up the share of payments from which certain industrial companies are exempt.
A final way to gain a better understanding of the renewables levy is to look at the components by technology, as is done in Figure 7 below.
Like in other countries, industrial rates in Germany tend to be lower than commercial and residential rates.
Figure 9 below shows the range of industrial electricity tariffs in Germany for large industrial customers (with 100 GWh or more of annual demand).
To provide more detail, Figure 10 shows that the larger the demand, the lower the effective price paid by industry for electricity.
Source: Reproduced from Figure 3, Agora Energiewende, Comparing Electricity Prices for Industry, March 2014. The bottom line is that the renewable energy levy has not had a uniform impact on all customer classes in Germany.
A third important factor to be considered has to do with the fact that renewable energy support in Germany takes the form of FITs granted for a period of 20 years with FIT levels periodically lowered for future projects. Figure 11 below shows the historic evolution of FIT payments for solar PV installations and projections going forward until the official target level of 52GW of installed PV is reached. Sources: Bundesnetzagentur, Zentrum fur Sonnenenergie- und Wasserstoff-Forschung Baden-Wurttemberg, Vorbereitung und Begleitung der Erstellung des Erfahrungsberichts 2014, Vorhaben IIc Stromerzeugung aus Solarer Strahlungsenergie gema? § 65 EEG, Zwischenbericht, February 2014, The Brattle Group analysis. As Figure 11 shows, total payments under FITs for solar PV currently amount to approximately €10 billion per year. Sources: Zentrum fur Sonnenenergie- und Wasserstoff-Forschung Baden-Wurttemberg, Vorbereitung und Begleitung der Erstellung des Erfahrungsberichts 2014, Vorhaben IIc Stromerzeugung aus Solarer Strahlungsenergie gema? § 65 EEG, Zwischenbericht, February 2014, The Brattle Group analysis. Two additional factors contribute to dampening further cost increases of the German program going forward.
In summary, because FITs have declined very rapidly over time, especially following the period 2009-2011, total payments under FITs for solar PV are likely peaking at present and will decline in real terms going forward, eventually quite rapidly as older PV systems receiving higher FITs will no longer be covered by 20-year FIT guarantees. The renewables levy reflects the difference between FIT payments to renewable energy producers and the market value of the produced electricity when sold on wholesale markets. If wholesale prices are unaffected by renewable energy production, FITs are indeed more expensive the lower wholesale market prices are, all else equal.
There is clear evidence that wholesale price reductions are having some of this effect in Germany today. Such a mechanism would partially undo the effect of renewable energy lowering wholesale prices in that the additional payments made to fossil generation to ensure reliable electricity supply will also need to be recovered from ratepayers, most likely through transmission and connection charges, which in turn could be capacity- or energy based, rather than through energy charges. The more general impact of renewable and solar energy on the viability of fossil generation plant and the resulting negative impact on the asset value of the large German utilities is a complex issue and a full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Residential and commercial customers benefit since their suppliers pay less for acquiring power in the wholesale market, assuming that the wholesale price decline is passed on to final consumers. In this section, we provide some comments related to the effect of German renewable energy support on the competitiveness of German industry. Another popular measure of a country’s competitiveness is the ability to export products made locally. Sources: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Statistisches Bundesamt, The Brattle Group analysis. While many factors drive the economic performance of any country, these figures at least suggest that a direct relationship between renewable support policies and declining economic competitiveness of Germany is not easily detected. There is some evidence that in spite of sharply increasing renewable energy penetration, total greenhouse gas emissions in Germany have lately been increasing rather than decreasing. Sources: Reproduced from Figure 2, Umweltbundesamt, VET Bericht 2013, Treibhausgasemissionen der emissionshandelspflichtigen stationaren Anlagen in Deutschland im Jahr 2013. As can be seen from Figure 16, power sector greenhouse gas emissions have indeed increased by approximately 10% since 2009,[27] i.e. It is also true that in parallel to expanding renewable energy resources several new coal-fired power plants have either come online or are in the process of coming online. However, it would be incorrect to assume that recent and near-future additions of coal-fired power generation are the beginning of a renaissance of coal-fired power generation in Germany.
It is also questionable whether Germany’s long-term greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets of 80% by 2050 across all energy sectors, which translates into essentially no carbon emissions from the power sector, can be met without measures in addition to a more aggressive GHG emissions trading system or some other form of carbon pricing.
Finally, there is some contention that the increasing amounts of renewable generation are jeopardizing the reliability of electricity supply in Germany. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that until present the reliability of the German (and Western European) power supply tends to be significantly superior to the reliability of the U.S.
As Figure 17 shows, SAIDI scores in the United States are between 2 and 10 times as high as those in major European countries. What is however perhaps even more insightful is that German SAIDI scores have essentially remained flat or even decreased somewhat since 2007, i.e. It is however true that the discussion in Germany about the impact of continued increases of intermittent renewable energy production on future electric reliability has recently intensified. There has for example been a discussion related to increases of unscheduled power flows from and to Germany – and loop flows in particular - that may be caused by changes in generation from renewable resources in Germany. The TSOs have been studying the need for incremental capacity to ensure reliable supply of electricity. As discussed above in the context of renewable energy lowering wholesale market prices, it is also true that partially as a result of large increases in the supply of electricity from renewable resources such as wind and solar PV, the economic performance of much of Germany’s fossil generation fleet has significantly deteriorated. In the short run, the concerns about the availability of (non-renewable) generation during periods of low production from wind and solar PV has been addressed through a number of legislative and regulatory steps. Beyond these temporary measures, efforts are underway to introduce some form of capacity market mechanism, i.e. To support the further development of renewable energy sources, it will also be necessary to further invest in transmission and distribution infrastructure. A final area of investigation concerns the rationale and magnitude for renewable (and solar PV) support in the context of similar support for conventional power generation. Figure 18 shows that the average support for renewable energy (“Erneuerbare” – the green line on the chart) has only recently surpassed the average support for nuclear and hard coal support (Atomenergie – the red line, and Steinkohle – the black line). If support for a technology is designed to represent an investment into bringing a technology to market, then cumulative support for any given technology are a useful means of comparison. Figure 19 shows that total support for hard coal (Steinkohle, first column from the left) in Germany surpasses 300 billion Euros in real terms.
Projections suggest that the current levels of support of approximately $20 billion per year for renewables will be needed for several more years to come (even though, as discussed above, payments are leveling off and will likely begin to fall), so that the total support for renewables needed to shift Germany’s electricity sector away from fossil (and nuclear) fuel may well be comparable to the support given to fossil in nuclear fuels historically.[56] However, it also shows that the support for renewables will likely be comparable to the support given for other fuels and hence should not be singled out as unaffordable. For the past 15 years or so, Germany has embarked on an ambitious set of policies to transform its electricity (and broader energy) sector. This report took a closer look at the impact of Germany’s program of support for renewable energy and in particular solar PV. Germany has certainly contributed to the creation of a global solar PV industry and resulting costs of solar PV that have declined dramatically and begin to approach the costs of power generation from new fossil power sources in at least some countries (including Germany, where natural gas prices are high).
It is clear that the introduction of renewable energy including solar PV has had a fundamental impact on the German wholesale electricity market.
Given the fact that renewable energy has reached sizable market penetration and maturity, the focus of Germany’s policy is therefore appropriately shifting towards the creation of a regulatory environment that allows even higher penetration of renewable energy in line with intermediate and longer term targets, a task that requires adjustments both of renewable energy sources and the rest of the electric system to ensure continued supply of electricity at the high levels of reliability historically (and currently) enjoyed by German consumers. One lesson for the United States is therefore that complementary regulatory frameworks should be put in place – where they are lacking – to ensure that all elements of the electricity market face appropriate incentives and are compensated for the value they provide to the system.


It can certainly not be concluded that Germany is now (finally) abandoning a flawed system of FITs to support renewable energy system.
In hindsight, the period 2009-2012 is likely the one where the German FIT system was not well enough designed to avoid overshooting the solar PV targets (and hence avoiding the associated costs of committing to relatively high FIT payments at the time).
Germany’s renewable energy and solar PV support programs have led to Germany increasing the share of solar PV and wind in its energy mix significantly, putting the country on a path towards a broadly supported transition towards an electricity system primarily powered by renewable energy. In fact, according to the European Environment Agency, the EU-25 is 98 % dependent on them [1]. In 2020, the OECD and non-OECD shares of world transportation energy use are projected to be equal. World transportation sector liquid fuels consumption grows by 36 quadrillion Btu in the Reference case projection, with diesel (including biodiesel) showing the largest gain (13 quadrillion Btu), jet fuel consumption increasing by 10 quadrillion Btu, and motor gasoline (including ethanol blends) increasing by 9 quadrillion Btu (Figure 8-2). From 2012 to 2040 the total transportation market share of diesel fuel (including biodiesel), which is the second-largest transportation fuel, declines from 36% to 33% and the jet fuel share increases from 12% to 14% in 2040.
In 2012, pipelines accounted for 66% of transportation sector natural gas use, light-duty vehicles 28%, and buses 4%. The electricity share of total light-duty vehicle energy consumption grows to 1% in 2040 in the Reference case, as increasing sales of new plug-in electric vehicles penetrate the total light-duty stock. Some standards focus on reducing GHG or carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, some focus on improving fuel economy (or reducing fuel consumption), and others focus on combinations of the two objectives. The United States, Canada, and Mexico have footprint-based corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards, which set GHG emissions targets (in Canada) or GHG emissions and fuel economy targets (in the United States and Mexico) based on vehicle footprint, calculated as wheelbase multiplied by average track width.
The passenger modes include light-duty cars and trucks, buses, 2- and 3-wheel vehicles, airplanes, and passenger trains. Energy consumption for freight trucks increases by a total of 13 quadrillion Btu from 2012 to 2040, followed by marine vessels at 6 quadrillion Btu and rail and pipelines combined at about 2 quadrillion Btu. The difference is explained in part by the larger increase in non-OECD passenger travel per capita from a low average base relative to most OECD nations. In contrast to both the United States and OECD Europe, the largest share of China's on-road transportation energy use is for freight movement rather than passenger travel. For instance, marine transport accounts for one-fourth of South Korea's total transportation energy use, reflecting the importance of marine transport in a peninsula nation whose economy relies heavily on exports, with major trading partners reached by maritime travel. Together, these two fuels accounted for 75% of total delivered transportation energy use in 2012. In contrast, OECD energy demand for light-duty vehicles declines by 5 quadrillion Btu from 2012 to 2040, and annual energy demand for aircraft grows by only 4 quadrillion Btu. In general, the more developed OECD regions, with higher gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, also have higher aircraft-to-population ratios than the non-OECD regions (Figure 8-11). In both, energy consumption increases for all freight modes from 2012 to 2040, with the largest increases for trucks and international maritime vessels. In 2012, more than 80% of OECD personal travel was by light-duty vehicle, compared with 41% of non-OECD personal travel.
In 2013, the United States led the other world regions in total passenger air travel with 866 billion RPM, followed by OECD Europe with 830 billion RPM and China with 392 billion RPM.
OECD Europe, with the second-highest level of domestic air passenger travel, at 435 billion RPM, was first in international travel with 395 billion RPM. Freight travel demand is related explicitly to economic activity, including the production and consumption of goods in either intermediate or final form. Worldwide economic growth from the production and consumption of goods, as well as consumption of energy commodities, leads directly to growth in worldwide volumes of maritime freight movement. The industrial sector can be categorized by three distinct industry types: energy-intensive manufacturing, nonenergy-intensive manufacturing, and nonmanufacturing (Table 7-1).
Most of the long-term growth in industrial sector delivered energy consumption occurs in countries outside of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Gross output includes intermediate inputs such as energy, materials, and purchased services used in production processes, providing data on all industry links that make up economic activity.
In those regions, relatively rapid increases are projected for the services sector from 2012 to 2040, with all other gross output sectors, and particularly the nonmanufacturing sector, becoming smaller.
Although the IEO2016 Reference case does not show double-digit changes for its industrial sector, China remains one of the most influential economies in the world. India gains a larger share of world nonmetallic mineral production, in part because of rapid growth in its domestic construction industry. Enterprises are able to reduce energy consumption in a number of ways, including improving industrial sector processes to reduce energy waste and recover energy lost (often process heat), increasing the use of cogeneration, and recycling materials and fuel inputs to reduce costs and improve efficiency.
OECD countries typically have either flat or declining growth in the pulp and paper industry, resulting in the slower growth of renewables compared with total industrial sector energy consumption.
Anticipated energy efficiency improvements in the industrial sector temper the growth of industrial energy demand, particularly for the energy-intensive industries. In both regions, the basic chemicals share of industrial energy use in the IEO2016 Reference case rises to about 20% in 2040 (Figure 7-4 and Figure 7-5). In the non-OECD countries, the iron and steel industry accounted for 18% of delivered industrial sector energy use in 2012, and its share declines to about 14% in 2040. The process is more energy efficient and produces less carbon dioxide than the blast furnace process but depends on a reliable supply of scrap steel. In 2012, the nonmetallic minerals industry accounted for about 5% of total OECD delivered industrial energy consumption and about 7% of total non-OECD delivered industrial energy consumption. In 2012, the food industry accounted for about 4% of total delivered industrial energy consumption in OECD countries and 2% in non-OECD countries.
In the non-OECD countries, pulp and paper production accounts for about 1% of total delivered industrial energy consumption. A small decrease in the industry's share of total non-OECD industrial energy consumption in 2040 results from the increase in total industrial sector energy use as a result of growing demand. European Union (EU) climate and energy policies, part of the current Europe 2020 strategy, are concerned with reducing GHG emissions. That trend continues in the IEO2016 Reference case with strong expansion of the region's manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries.
From 2005 to 2012, gross output in China’s iron and steel industry grew at an average annual rate of 12% (and crude steel production closely matched that growth rate at 11%).
In 2013, the BOF and EAF process shares in China for crude steel production were 91% and 9%, respectively.
In comparison with the United States, China’s aluminum and steel recycling rates are low. Although increasing secondary production does require additional secondary production facilities, costs for those facilities are much lower than the costs of primary production facilities. Domestic scrap is usually less expensive than imported scrap, but it requires dedicated sorting, collection, and transportation, as well as access to large volumes of scrap material. Because the iron and steel industry is a much larger energy consumer than the aluminum industry, China's government aims to increase scrap input by improving recycling efficiency in the iron and steel industry. Olefins, including ethylene and propylene, are inputs for a wide variety of industrial and consumer chemicals, such as resins, plastics, and adhesives. Outside China, most methanol and ammonia production relies on natural gas feedstock, while ethylene production and propylene production rely largely on natural gas liquids (NGL) or on petroleum-based feedstocks. Coal is relatively inexpensive in China, but construction of coal-to-olefin (CTO) processing plants is not.
The CTO process generates more than twice as much CO2 per ton of olefin produced as a naphtha steam cracker does.
The difference results from the higher proportion of new ethylene crackers using coal instead of naphtha and gasoil for feedstock. That progress was interrupted from 2000 to 2005, however, when aggressive manufacturing goals set in China's 10th Five-Year Plan led to increases in energy intensity as production rose across many industries. Many observers expect that the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–20) will continue to target additional energy efficiency gains [322], along with a variety of other measures designed to reduce emissions. Feedstock plays a prominent role in the production of bulk chemicals, and there is little efficiency improvement to be gained for a given feedstock type (as opposed to heat and power uses, where incremental efficiency gains in boilers, power generation, motors, etc., have occurred in the past and are expected in the future).
Energy efficiency is viewed as one of the most cost-effective ways of enhancing energy security and addressing climate change, as well as promoting economic competitiveness, in the ASEAN member countries.
In 2012, the electricity share of industrial energy demand ranged from 11% in Northeast Asia (Mongolia and North Korea) to nearly 25% in the Philippines (Figure 7-13).
The electricity share of industrial energy use in other non-OECD Asia nations also has increased rapidly. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the electricity share of industrial energy demand in China’s energy-intensive industries (including iron and steel, pulp and paper, chemicals, and food) rose modestly, to 13%.
The electricity share of industrial sector energy demand in the Philippines moved between 15% and 20% in the late 1990s before increasing to 24% in 2012, when it exceeded the OECD level.
Growth in new electricity-intensive technologies occurs largely in downstream industries—notably, nonenergy-intensive lighter manufacturing. Those hot, sunny days, when electricity demand is driven up by air conditioners, are exactly the time when solar power can generate the most electricity. As we switch to bigger and bigger LCD and plasma screens, our energy use is growing steadily. The average fridge in 2020 is expected to use half as much energy as your fridge did in 1996.
However, this is largely because of the government’s energy labelling requirements and minimum energy performance standards for fridges and freezers.
Despite improvements in energy efficiency, as we grow wealthier, and our consumption of high energy goods and population increases, so will our energy use. We’d love you to display, print, download or reproduce any of the material on this site for your personal use or to share with your friends - check the Creative Commons licensees displayed on various pages for other ways you can share and use the information.
Prepared for SEIA by the widely-respected Brattle Group, the new report examines, among other things, the rising cost of Germany’s feed-in tariffs (FITs) for solar PV and resulting reform efforts.
However, a closer look at the German solar support program and its impacts shows that  those programs, while having had some flaws (now in need of correction), have proven relatively successful, especially given Germany’s overall commitment to significantly and rapidly expanding renewable energy production.
FITs guarantee a fixed compensation for electricity produced from solar PV facilities for a period of 20 years. Previous reforms included a cap on aggregate solar PV capacity of 52 GW, after which support in excess of market revenues is supposed to end.
Since 2007, average installation costs have fallen from close to €5 per Watt to between €1-2 per Watt. It is true that retail prices (for residential, commercial and small industrial customers) are among the highest in the world. Until 2007, annual payments to solar PV installations under the FIT program remained below €2 billion, but increased rapidly to close to €10 billion by 2013 and are expected to increase to about €11 billion per year before leveling off and ultimately decline. In addition to the exemptions for this group of customers, heavy electricity users also benefit directly from decreasing prices on wholesale markets, caused primarily by solar and other renewable energy production and hence a direct by-product of the renewable support program. Rather, while the reforms are indeed an effort to improve the design of the FIT system, for example by introducing more rapid adjustments of FITs to observed deviations of actual from desired installation levels, they are also a sign of the solar PV sector maturing. With almost a third of global installed capacity, this makes Germany by far the country with the largest installed solar PV capacity, as shown in Figure 1 below.
The reform efforts are largely the result of the perception that the cost of renewable energy support has grown to unsustainable levels and also that after more than a decade and significant progress in renewable energy development the time has come to phase out support and begin the process of fully integrating renewable energy into the energy system without subsidies. The report also points to the fact that existing market structures were not designed to accommodate large amounts of intermittent renewable generation and hence need to be adapted going forward. In particular, we look at the impact of the German program on the cost of PV, on retail rates, on German competitiveness, on GHG emissions and on system reliability. While Figures 3 and 4 above suggest a direct inverse relationship between increasing installations and declining cost, this relationship is likely only partially causal. There is no doubt that support for renewable energy production is having an impact on retail prices in Germany.
At first glance, approximately half of this increase is due to the renewables levy, the surcharge on bills to recover the costs of payments under FITs for various renewable technologies including solar PV. As can be seen, at the low end of the range electricity prices in 2014 for these costumers are lower than in 2013 and are less than a third of electricity prices at the high end of the range. Especially heavy electricity users pay electricity rates mostly in line with those paid in other EU countries. As Figure 4 above showed, FITs for solar PV have been decreasing steadily and strongly for the past 10 years. More than half of those payments are to PV systems installed in 2009, 2010 and 2011, when more than 7GW of PV were installed annually.
On a per kWh basis, the incremental costs of the remaining PV program in Germany will likely be minimal.
Hence, the renewables levy is not only higher the higher the total volume of FIT and market premium payments, but also the lower the market price of electricity. However, as shown in Figure 13 below, there is significant evidence that increasing power production from renewable energy sources is a major contributor to falling wholesale market prices in Germany.
As a result of significantly reduced operating hours and lower wholesale prices, much of the existing fossil generation fleet does not cover its operating costs.
An analytical decomposition of the overall performance of the German economy into the part attributable to renewable energy policies is well beyond the scope of this report (and likely beyond the capabilities of any analytical technique). If higher energy costs increase the costs of production in Germany, then over time it should make it less attractive to foreign countries to import German products, all else equal. Figure 16 below shows the evolution of CO2 emissions from stationary power plants with capacities greater than 50 MW. There are indeed some indicators that increased renewable energy production is having an impact on the operation of the German electricity system. This in turn is leading to a fear that absent a permanent approach to ensuring resource adequacy Germany may soon see significant retirements of underperforming fossil power plants, with the result that not enough non-renewable capacity may remain to ensure reliable supply of electricity during periods of low production from renewables, especially post 2022, when the remaining nuclear power plants are scheduled to retire.[51] The result has been an intense debate about changes to existing market rules that may be necessary to ensure sufficient overall generation capacity to guarantee that highly reliable electric service can be provided in the future. A reform of the energy law passed in 2012 and requires power plants planning to retire to inform the relevant TSO and electricity regulator at least twelve months prior to planned retirement. The former will primarily be required to transport wind (on- and offshore) from production sites in the north to demand centers further south.
As mentioned above, support for renewable energy including in particular solar PV is in part motivated by the desire to cure market failures associated with the early stages of development of certain technologies.
Figure 19 below therefore shows cumulative support for various electricity production related fuels since 1970. Support for nuclear energy (Atomenergie, second column from the right) surpasses 200 billion Euros.
The nuclear accidents in Japan led to an acceleration of the efforts, which have produced some of the fastest increases in renewable power generation in the world.
The main conclusion is that by and large the German path has been remarkably successful, given the goal – shared by a great majority of the population – of “de-fossilizing” Germany’s electricity sector. With hindsight it is likely that the rapid expansion of solar PV capacity from 2009 to 2011 under the existing FIT program has settled German consumers with costs that are higher than what might have been possible had FITs been adjusted downwards earlier and more rapidly. In particular, it has led to a significant loss of profit margins for traditional fossil generation and corresponding losses to their owners. Apart from capacity mechanisms, appropriate pricing and procurement of ancillary services and demand response are likely key features of future electricity systems currently under-developed in Germany (and to some extent and in some regions also in the United States). There is significant evidence that FIT based systems, which provide the revenue certainty needed to attract low-cost financing for renewable energy, allow for lower cost renewable energy procurement than most of the alternatives used in the United States, in particular certificate based systems using Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs).[58] Therefore, if, as is the case in Germany, democratic support for a transition away from conventional and towards renewable energy is strong, the use of well-designed FITs is likely superior to alternative regulatory support mechanisms, especially during the early phases of renewable technology development. The primary lesson there is that since unlike conventional power sources solar PV development can be extremely dynamic, a system of FITs to support solar PV development must be able to adjust quickly (and perhaps automatically) to observed levels of installation. This transition involved new technologies, and as was the case for previous (and now conventional) forms of energy, the development of these technologies required public support – the levels of which are in line with cumulative levels previously provided to other forms of energy. Fossil fuel combustion produces carbon dioxide (CO2) and other anthropogenic (manmade) emissions, many of them harmful to human health. Non-OECD demand for transportation fuels continues to outpace OECD demand, and in 2040 the non-OECD regions are expected to account for 61% of global transportation energy consumption. Almost no increase in transportation energy consumption is projected for the nations in the OECD Americas, as continued fuel economy improvements offset growth in vehicle miles traveled.
Because fuel economy and GHG emissions policies have large effects on fuel consumption, vehicle standards are among the most important components of future demand for liquid fuels. The European Union (EU) and India have standards that specifically aim to reduce CO2 emissions. The overall target for a specific manufacturer is determined by averaging the targets for the footprints of all the vehicles the manufacturer produces. As more countries adopt light-duty vehicle standards, differences among them are likely to persist because of variations in policy goals and consumer preferences across countries. Significant increases in transportation energy use in these other non-OECD Asia nations are also projected for airline travel (17% of the total increase) and for heavy-duty trucks (7%). Fuel consumption in light-duty vehicles and heavy-duty trucks grows by similar rates in Brazil, with light-duty vehicles accounting for 31% of the total increase and heavy-duty trucks for 14%. The freight modes, which are used in the movement of raw, intermediate, and finished goods to consumers, include trucks (heavy-, medium-, and light-duty), marine vessels (international and domestic), rail, and pipelines. Non-OECD income (as measured by GDP) grows at a faster rate than in the OECD economies, and non-OECD consumers use more personal transportation as per-capita incomes grow. Together, the United States, OECD Europe, and China account for 55% of world transportation energy consumption (Figure 8-9). In Australia, where regional air travel helps connect coastal population centers with sparsely populated regions, interior air travel accounts for nearly 20% of total transportation energy consumption, compared with 9% in the United States and 6% in China.
Motor gasoline is used primarily for the movement of people, especially by light-duty vehicles. Nearly 28,000 passenger jets were in service in 2013, of which 55% were narrow-body, 19% were wide-body, and 26% were regional jets.
Production and consumption of goods worldwide are an integral part of globalized supply chains, including trade in intermediate products for global production processes, which in large part is made possible by containerized transportation shipping and advances in information technology. Accordingly, the two regions have the largest projected growth in transportation energy consumption in the IEO2016 Reference case. In the non-OECD region, a substantial portion of personal travel was by bus (35%), passenger rail (13%), and 2- and 3-wheeled vehicles (11%). Relatively wealthy OECD consumers already have a much higher rate of airline travel per capita than do non-OECD consumers. China was third in domestic air passenger travel, at 281 billion RPM, and other non-OECD Asia was third in international air travel, at 170 billion RPM (Figure 8-18). In 2013, Australia led the world with 4,200 RPM per capita, followed by the United States and Canada, both with 2,700 RPM per capita.
Non-service industrial gross output [329] per capita and GDP per capita can be used as proxies for production and intermediate and personal consumption. Approximately 80% of the world’s merchandise trade by volume is carried over water, with maritime trade in 2012 totaling nearly 60 trillion ton-miles [330]. The mix and intensity of fuels consumed in the industrial sector vary across regions and countries, depending on the level and mix of economic activity and on technological development. The industrial sector accounts for approximately 40% of total OECD delivered energy use from 2012 to 2040.
Growth in the transportation equipment industry is expected to account for much of the growth in both countries’ nonenergy-intensive manufacturing sectors.
The services sector share of China's economy increases in the Reference case, and growth in the nonmanufacturing and energy-intensive manufacturing sectors is slower than growth in the services sector.
India's share of world steel production also increases from 2012 to 2040, while China's share remains relatively flat.
In most of the non-OECD countries, the pulp and paper industry grows significantly, with corresponding growth in industrial sector renewable energy use. Similarly, in the non-OECD industrial sector, the coal share of total industrial delivered energy falls from 32% in 2012 to 27% in 2040. In 2012, OECD energy-intensive industries accounted for about 54% of the region's total industrial sector energy consumption, and non-OECD energy-intensive industries accounted for about 51% of the industrial sector total.
Recycling is a key contributor to industrial energy efficiency improvements, especially in the pulp and paper, iron and steel, and nonferrous metals industries (see Steel and aluminum recycling in China).
The chemicals industry in general uses petrochemical feedstocks, which are included in its energy use. As a supplement to scrap steel, direct reduced iron (DRI) can be used in electric arc furnaces. Their energy consumption is related primarily to demand for liquid fuels (primarily in the transportation sector), with some reduction in their energy use related to increases in energy efficiency. Increases in the industry’s energy use result primarily from growth in the construction industry, which is accompanied by growing demand for cement. With the large growth in non-OECD industrial sector energy consumption in the Reference case, the food industry share of the sector's total energy use remains at 4% in 2040. Paper manufacturing is an energy-intensive process, but paper mills typically generate about half of the electricity they consume through cogeneration, primarily with black liquor and biomass from wood waste. OECD Europe is a well-established industrialized region, where the major concern is implementing government policies that will improve energy efficiency and decrease GHG emissions. In 2012, about 11% of China’s crude steel production was secondary production (from recycling) [308], and 21% of its aluminum production was secondary production [309]. For example, the capital equipment costs for recycled aluminum production are approximately 10% of those for primary aluminum production [310].
Based on an analysis of China's steel industry structure in 2011 [311], recycling of scrap metal could be increased to 33% of total steel production without adding new secondary processing facilities. Over time, more scrap could become available in China, allowing a substantial reduction in the energy intensity of the country's steel and aluminum industries.
Reducing dependence on imports of commodity chemicals while still satisfying industrial production growth is a major factor in China’s continued expansion of its chemical industry. However, China continues to rely heavily (although not exclusively) on coal gasification technologies to produce many of its bulk chemicals. Coal feedstock costs represent only about 25% of the total costs for CTO production because of the high capital cost of production. The CTO process is also far more water-intensive, and most CTO projects are or will be located in water-stressed regions (such as Inner Mongolia and Western China), where water resources are well below the world average [320]. The natural gas share of feedstock fuel use also increases, with some of China’s projected growth in ammonia and methanol production capacity using natural gas and not exclusively coal. Consequently, the overall energy efficiency improvement in this industry from 2012 to 2040 is not expected to be significant, with overall intensity improvement at only 15%. The way industrial sectors in the non-OECD Asia nations have developed over time can provide a basis for understanding the variables that may influence industrial sector electrification in the future.
Since the early 1970s, industrial electricity use has doubled every eight years in China and in member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Most of the growth in the country's industrial sector electricity demand occurred in energy-intensive industries.
In addition, when advanced economies reach a certain stage in their development, the growth of industrial sector electricity demand slows.
This has been steadily growing as we buy more and more electrical appliances for our homes. However, while our appliances are becoming more efficient, we tend to buy more and bigger ones. Today, Germany has 35 gigawatts (GW) of installed solar capacity and is on track to hit 52 GW in the near future, representing about 7 percent of the nation’s wholesale generation. The program requires that transmission system operators (TSOs) purchase all the power produced from these PV systems. At that point, electricity production from solar PV would represent about 7% of total German wholesale generation. In that sense, earlier investments are paying off in terms of much lower installation costs today. As a result, there is little reason to expect that Germany’s solar PV support program has hurt the competitive position of German industry to date, including the relatively few remaining very energy intensive industrial sectors. Germany is unique among OECD countries in having managed to significantly increase the share of renewables in its electricity mix – by now a power generation share of some 25% has been reached. It is suggested that as the share of renewable energy grows, renewable sources themselves should increasingly be capable of contributing to overall system stability.[10] The report also mentions that in the long run there is a question of whether or not existing market rules create sufficient incentives for investment in new generation capacity of any kind, an issue we return to later in this report.
In other words, it is likely that installation costs in Germany are lower today than they were 6-7 years ago in part because the large scale, in annual and cumulative terms, of PV installations in Germany have directly led to cost reductions as a result of learning and scaling effects. The magnitude of this impact is significant, especially when compared to typical American retail rates for power, even in places such as California or the Northeast, where retail rates tend to be high. The remaining drivers of increasing retail rates have primarily been taxes and other surcharges.
Importantly, 24% and 20% of the renewables levy represent price reductions in the wholesale market due to renewable energy production and the exemption of certain industrial facilities from fully paying the renewables levy, respectively. As we discuss below, this means that renewable energy support has likely not so far had any material negative impact on the competitiveness of the bulk of German industry.


At the same time, annual solar PV installations increased dramatically during a time period when FIT rates were still relatively high (compared to wholesale prices).
The high annual installations over this time period have led to sharp reductions in FITs, which are expected to continue to decline as can be seen in Figure 12 below. Even though inflation in Germany has generally been quite low, the combination of economic growth and some underlying inflation means that when expressed in inflation-adjusted terms, FIT payments for solar PV will likely decline from here on out. Mechanically, the German TSOs are either required to pay renewable energy producers the FIT price and sell the energy produced on the wholesale market or pay a market premium if the producer choses to sell the generated electricity directly on the market. To the extent this decrease is partially or entirely caused by the electricity production from renewable energy sources, it benefits consumers of all types, at least in the short run.[25]  While renewable energy production does result in permanent reductions in fuel and operations and maintenance costs of fossil fired generation, it is less clear how sustainable lower wholesale prices are in the longer run. The big German utilities (E.On, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall) owning the bulk of fossil generation have seen their share prices fall sharply, and have been suggesting that the operating losses suffered by its fossil generation are not sustainable and will likely lead to significant plant retirements, absent some major adjustments to market mechanisms. However, it is nonetheless useful to provide some basic background information to inform the discussion. However, as Figure 15 below shows, there is no indication that higher energy prices have harmed German companies’ ability to sell products abroad. The most common measures of reliability are various versions of SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index) and SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index).
Several sources report typical SAIDI scores in the United States of about 240 Minutes and SAIFI scores of approximately 1.5. If US reliability standards were used as the benchmark, Germany’s reliability could therefore deteriorate quite significantly before reaching US levels.
Given Germany’s historic high level of reliability, it is perhaps not surprising that the German system has been capable to remain highly reliable up to now, even with a significant and rising contribution of intermittent renewable energy sources. For example, it has examined the percentage of energy losses due to curtailment of wind generation at the national level.
It also allows the TSOs to require such plants to continue to operate (against compensation). The mechanism currently in place and just discussed is one such approach, as are the more formal capacity markets in place in several ISOs in the United States (such as PJM, NEPOOL and NY ISO). The costs of required infrastructure investments in the high voltage transmission system have been estimated at €16 billion[53], i.e. Often, such support is also provided with the desire to create or maintain certain industries with associated employment and larger economic benefits. It is also important to note that the high support per kWh is not unique to solar PV, but rather that at the beginning of the nuclear industry per unit support for nuclear energy was even higher.
While some of the support does not directly relate to electricity production (since coal can also be used for heating), the figures show that the 67 billion Euros spent on renewable support (Erneuerbare, fourth column from the left) through 2012 are significantly below the amounts historically spent for other sources of energy. With almost a third of globally installed solar PV capacity, Germany has now reached levels of renewable energy production leading to significant interactions with the rest of the electricity system. While the costs of electricity to most end use customers have indeed increased, it is important to note that the size of the renewables levy by itself is an incomplete (and likely exaggerated) measure of the cost of the program to consumers. However, these costs have been incurred and given the legal reforms already passed and currently underway, it is likely that the incremental cost of further increasing Germany’s solar PV capacity to its planned target level of 52 GW – from already achieved 35 GW - will be quite minor, given how far the FITs (and the cost of solar PV) have decreased. As a result, there is some legitimate concern, given the increase in re-dispatching activities, that if too many of money-losing fossil generators retire, electric reliability may be affected. At a share of renewable energy in excess of 20% and after more than a decade of support, prices for power from new renewable projects are now close enough to the cost of new conventional generation that a transition towards a more market-based approach seems justified.
Subsequent reforms to Germany’s renewable energy law have largely rectified this, with future FIT levels being revised often and in response to clearly defined build-out corridors, but it would have been preferable for these adjustments to have been automatic and part of the program from the start.
The total level of support has remained low enough that Germany’s economy has continued to perform well – in part due to the (partial) exemption of certain industries, which, while unpopular, is likely a reasonable measure to assure that German companies in energy –intensive and trade-exposed sectors do not suffer an unfair disadvantage. The quantities and profile of these emissions depend on the quantity and quality of fuel used, the technology used in the combustion, the end-of-pipe technologies (filters, catalytic converters) and other factors such as speed, loading factor, temperature and engine maintenance.
Brazil, the EU, India, and South Korea have weight-based corporate average standards, which are similar to footprint-based standards but based on vehicle weight.
Still, given the global nature of light-duty vehicle manufacturing, fuel economy is likely to increase for all new vehicles, and GHG emissions per mile traveled are likely to decrease. These demographic trends, combined with an underdeveloped transportation sector, explain the strong increase in transportation energy demand in the IEO2016 Reference case. World energy demand for aircraft increases by a total of 10 quadrillion Btu from 2012 to 2040, while the combined energy demand for buses, 2- and 3-wheel vehicles, and rail grows by 6 quadrillion Btu. Environmental Protection Agency recently proposed a significant increase in fuel economy standards for heavy trucks. Although incomes also rise in the OECD nations, OECD levels of personal mobility are already relatively high, and transportation patterns and infrastructure are well established. Diesel fuel is used primarily for the movement of goods, especially by heavy-duty trucks.
By region, the United States had the largest stock of passenger jets (7,800), and OECD Europe had the second-largest (5,500).
In Japan (with GDP per capita of $35,000), the ratio of aircraft per million population is estimated at 37, while for Canada (with GDP per capita of $41,000), the ratio is estimated at 127. Non-OECD economic growth and rising incomes in the IEO2016 Reference case lead to a higher overall rate of light-duty vehicle ownership (measured as the number of light-duty vehicles per 1,000 people), but in 2040 the non-OECD rate of light-duty vehicle ownership remains well below the OECD rate (Figure 8-15). Demand for airline travel increases in the Reference case for both the OECD and non-OECD regions, with more rapid growth among the non-OECD regions. In the coming years, as strong economic growth in many non-OECD regions results in higher GDP per capita, personal air travel also is expected to rise, as suggested by the trends shown in Figure 8-19.
Non-OECD industrial energy consumption, which accounted for 67% of world industrial sector delivered energy in 2012, accounts for 73% of world industrial sector delivered energy consumption in 2040.
In the non-OECD industrial sector, the share of delivered energy use declines from 64% in 2012 to 59% in 2040, as many emerging non-OECD economies move away from energy-intensive manufacturing, while energy use grows more rapidly in all other end-use sectors. In the IEO2016 projections, analysis of the key components of industrial gross output and how they change over time helps to explain regional changes in industrial sector energy consumption. OECD Europe, which continues to account for the third-largest share of world gross output through 2040, shows a small shift away from the most energy-intensive industries over the projection period. In the paper industry, China's share of world production increases as growth is slower in other regions, including in Russia and in other non-OECD Europe and Eurasia. The iron and steel industry is the largest consumer of coal in the industrial sector, and as regions shift from coal-fired furnaces to electric arc furnaces, coal use for iron and steel production declines. Consequently, the quantity and fuel mix of future industrial sector delivered energy consumption will be determined largely by the overall levels of energy consumption in those seven industries.
In 2012, petrochemical feedstocks accounted for roughly 60% of the energy consumed in the chemicals sector (which includes both energy-intensive basic chemicals and nonenergy-intensive other chemicals). In the blast furnace process, iron ore is reduced (meaning that oxygen molecules in the ore bond with the carbon molecules), leaving pure molten iron and carbon dioxide. DRI is much less energy-intensive than the blast furnace process, requiring only natural gas or steam coal, rather than coking coal. OECD countries have a small increase in liquids demand in the projection with a small increase in refinery energy consumption.
In contrast, much of non-OECD Asia is still developing, and although there are efforts underway to address pollution issues in the industrial sector, there is also significant government interest in increasing industrial growth that will help the non-OECD Asian economies raise incomes and standards of living. The gross output of pulp and paper declines toward the end of the projection period, and improvements in energy efficiency slow the growth of renewable energy use.
Currently, 70% of ammonia production [317] and more than 80% of methanol production [318] in China use coal as a feedstock, with a growing share going into the production of olefins, such as propylene and ethylene. In contrast, for petroleum-based production of olefins, such as in a naphtha-based steam cracker, the feedstock costs for naphtha are a much higher percentage of the total production cost [319].Thus, lower petroleum product prices will make steam crackers increasingly attractive, while lower coal prices would not have as much of an effect. Finally, the hazardous material and waste disposal associated with CTO processes also can lead to escalating expenses for industrial-scale CTO plants.
In general, the nations of other non-OECD Asia have among the highest projected growth in industrial sector gross output and associated delivered energy consumption. As economic reform was unfolding in China, industrial electricity demand surged from 984 terawatthours (TWh) in 2000 to 1,802 TWh in 2005. Unlike China, industrial demand for electricity in the Philippines is not distributed across a wide range of sectors and corresponds more closely to changes in gross output or to changes in total value added. As indicated by recent data, the electricity share of total industrial energy consumption in the United States and in other OECD countries has been relatively unchanged since 1990.
It doesn’t stay there for long, but it does drive the construction of new power stations to meet these brief demand peaks.
It includes fridges, lighting, computers, washing machines, dryers, home entertainment systems and more. It is also projected to be a significant proportion of our appliance energy use in the future. However, without energy efficiency regulations from government and a decrease in consumption, they are projected to account for over a quarter of our appliance energy use by 2020. TSOs in turn sell the power on wholesale markets and are made whole through a renewables levy (“EEG-Umlage” in German), which is collected from most customers.
Therefore, Germany’s residential retail tariffs would be among the highest in the world even without paying for Germany’s renewable let alone solar program.
While renewable energy policy likely remains a relatively minor contributor to Germany’s overall economic performance,  Germany is experiencing an economic boom with higher than ever exports and low unemployment rates when compared to most EU countries and also when compared to the United States.
There is broad political support for a continued aggressive move towards an essentially carbon-free sector by 2050 with a renewables share above 50% by 2030.
The perceived high cost of renewable support is at least partially viewed as a consequence of exempting significant portions of industry from paying “their fair share”, and in part due to an increasing renewables levy (“EEG Umlage” in German) viewed in isolation. In summary, there is evidence that renewable energy support in Germany has been highly effective in significantly increasing renewable energy as a share of total electricity supply. It is however also likely that some technological advances would have occurred in the absence, or at lower levels of installation. The costs of procurement (energy and transmission and distribution costs) have remained relatively stable in aggregate. The former is a reflection of the fact that renewable energy production creates additional supply (at zero or trivial variable cost), which in turn lowers wholesale electricity prices, at least for some period of time. In sum, a closer look at a decomposed renewables levy shows that less than half of the charge is for the core support of renewable energy, while the remainder is either a one-time charge (the catch up payment for 2013), related to cost shifting or whole sale price reductions due to the merit-order effect. This shows that given the now much lower FIT rates for solar PV, the impact of incrementally supported solar PV on the renewables levy will likely be quite small. It is however worth noting that almost the entire increase in rates is due to the renewable energy levy. This is because larger industrial users traditionally pay less than smaller residential users and because the amount of power consumption (partially) exempt from the renewable energy levy in Germany increases with total average annual electricity consumption. Due to the fact that FITs are in place for 20 years (for any given PV installation), support for past installations, including the large number of PV installed in 2009-2012, are “baked” into the renewable energy levy for many more years.[21] Because FIT rates have declined significantly since then, the impact of recently installed and future solar PV will be relatively modest. Total FIT payments to reach 52GW are expected to stabilize at approximately €11.3 billion per year.
Second, eventually the FIT payments for earlier PV installations, guaranteed for 20 years phase out even while it is likely that the PV installations themselves will continue to produce electricity.[22] Since the earliest installations of PV also receive the highest FITs, average compensation for solar PV will decline relatively rapidly after 2020 and in particular towards 2030, when the large amounts of PV installed between 2009 and 2011 stop receiving FIT payments. If wholesale prices dip below the average cost of new capacity and if new capacity is needed to guarantee adequate supply, wholesale prices may need to recover over time, or alternative revenue streams may be needed to attract new investments.
One such mechanism, discussed in more detail below, is the creation of a capacity market mechanism that would compensate at least those existing plants needed to maintain reliable supply for their operating costs. While there have been some warnings by German industry representatives that rising energy prices could put German competitiveness in jeopardy, there is as of yet little evidence to support this notion. As a matter of fact, since 1991 Germany’s share of exports in GDP has increased by 80% whereas the United States “export propensity” has only increased by half that much. While system reliability may be unchanged or even improving as just described, the cost of maintaining this reliability may be increasing, for example as a consequence of increasing re-dispatch costs, i.e.
Between 2010 and 2012, less than 1% of wind energy is lost due to curtailments in Germany.[40] ENTSO-E, the European Network of Transmission System Operators, also regularly examines risks to system reliability. The costs of the upgrades or retrofits are not borne by individual system owners, but rather are financed through a combination of the renewables levy and network tariffs. Germany is also exploring a focused capacity market concept, where only certain types of generation (new, flexible, etc.) could participate.
Such concerns are independent of the desire to compensate for the environmental externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions. Both are consistent with the idea that high initial support may be necessary to kick-start a learning process that triggers scale- and learning related cost decreases over time, i.e.
The approach of rapidly ramping up renewable energy production through a system of technology specific FITs guaranteed for 20 years and collected from most (but not all) end-use customer through a renewables levy has led to increases in electricity prices that in turn have resulted in concerns about their affordability and effect on Germany’s competitive position in the world. It is also important to note that exemptions for trade-sensitive and energy-intensive industries contribute to higher rates for non-exempt consumers, but also ensure that exempt industries do not suffer a competitive disadvantage internationally. As the recent Ukraine crisis has shown, the transition has also helped reduce the exposure of Germany to potentially volatile input prices to the traditional power system, a benefit that has largely remained unquantified, but could prove significant in the future. In several of the non-OECD regions, energy consumption in light duty vehicles accounts for the bulk of the increase in total transportation energy consumption, as economic growth raises standards of living and, in turn, the demand for personal transportation. Most of the decline in Japan’s transportation fuel use is for light-duty vehicles, with smaller decreases projected for freight trucks. Brazil and Japan have standards that aim to increase fuel economy, requiring light-duty vehicles to achieve specific miles-per-gallon ratings.
China has a combination standard based on both vehicle weight class and corporate average fuel economy, which is more stringent than the weight-based corporate average standard alone; light-duty vehicle manufacturers in China must meet fuel consumption standards for each weight class, as well as an overall corporate average fuel consumption standard. Freight modes accounted for the other 39% of total world transportation energy consumption. In addition, the effects of increases in personal travel on OECD transportation energy consumption are tempered by rising energy efficiency, resulting in no growth in transportation energy consumption (see Figure 8-1). Jet fuel accounts for 12% of the world’s transportation energy consumption, followed by residual fuel oil at 9%. India and South Korea had the smallest numbers of passenger jets (499 and 209, respectively) (Figure 8-10).
Africa, India, and other non-OECD Asia have the lowest aircraft-to-population ratios at 3, 2, and 2, respectively. Still, the light-duty vehicle share of non-OECD passenger travel rises to more than 50% in 2040, primarily at the expense of buses and 2- and 3-wheeled vehicles (Figure 8-16).
India and Africa had the lowest GDP per capita in 2013 ($5,000 and $4,300, respectively) and the lowest rates of personal air travel (less than 100 RPM per capita). In addition, several significant industrial manufacturing countries, including the United States and China, are initiating policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from their industrial sectors by switching to electricity and natural gas and by improving energy efficiency in industries that produce large amounts of GHG emissions.
In addition, the same industries emit large quantities of carbon dioxide (CO2), related to both their energy consumption (combustion emissions) and their production processes (process emissions).
Intermediate petrochemical products (or building blocks), which go into products such as plastics, require a fixed amount of hydrocarbon feedstock as input.
The molten iron is transferred to a basic oxygen furnace, where super-heated oxygen is used to remove any remaining impurities. Thus, the percentage of industrial sector delivered energy consumption accounted for by refinery use falls slightly from 2012 to 2040, as a result of small increases in overall industrial sector energy consumption (about 13%) from 2012 to 2040. The industrial sectors of the OECD Europe and non-OECD Asia regions illustrate the range of world industrial development and future growth in the IEO2016 Reference case. From 1990 to 2012, the EU reduced GHG emissions by 18%, and it seems likely that it will achieve its 20% target for 2020. Currently, China produces about one-third of the world’s ammonia [315], and although China is trying to reduce its level of fertilizer use [316], its pursuit of food security and continued modernization of farming probably will result in moderate growth of fertilizer consumption in the future. According to its most recent Five-Year Plan, China intends to increase coal use in producing olefins. In addition, the CTO process results in fewer valuable coproducts (such as butadiene and aromatics).
By the end of the decade, China had recorded double-digit annual growth in total electricity demand, with a commensurate rise in the electricity share of industrial energy consumption, to 18% in 2012—close to the overall share in the OECD countries. In the United States, electricity accounted for 15% of total delivered industrial energy consumption in 2012 and is projected in the IEO2016 Reference case to account for 16% of total delivered industrial energy consumption in 2040. Heavy electricity users in trade-sensitive areas are (partially) exempt from this renewables levy.
Currently installed solar PV represents close to 20% of total installed capacity and close to 50% of peak demand[2] and has begun to have significant impacts on grid operations during periods of low demand and high generation from solar PV, such as during sunny spring weekend days. Measured against retail rates, on the other hand, payments under solar PV FITs represent about 10% of total sales[3], or roughly twice the share of PV production. Therefore, after the market introduction phase, Germany is entering the market penetration phase of its renewables deployment, shifting from a primary goal of supporting the early technological development with an emphasis on affecting cost reductions through scaling and learning to a phase of developing complementary technologies and market mechanisms that make a future electricity system powered essentially by renewable technologies alone feasible.
As of the writing of this report, the reform of the renewable energy law (EEG) is well underway, yet not completed.
As the share of renewable energy has grown, the cost of supporting the total amount of renewable resources has also grown, and the achieved levels of renewable energy penetration begin to raise questions about future market design and renewable energy support.
They also exceed the rates in most other EU countries with the exception of Denmark, which still has slightly higher residential rates than Germany.[16] It is easy to attribute these high residential rates to the high cost of renewable energy support in Germany. The figure represents extra payments under FITs that are necessary to make the transmission service operators (TSOs), who have to compensate renewable energy producers under FITs, whole relative to the wholesale market value of the renewable energy, when renewable energy actually reduces that wholesale market value. It also shows that as a percentage of the overall renewables levy, and much more so as a percentage of overall retail rates, the support for solar PV represents a relatively small percentage – 26% of the renewables levy in 2013, decreasing to 23% in 2014, and less than 5% of total retail rates for non-exempt customers. Furthermore, rates for larger users tend to be significantly lower, even before taking account of the above-mentioned exemptions from the renewable energy levy. By actively purchasing on the wholesale market, large industrial customers also benefit directly from the lower wholesale market prices caused in part by renewable generation. In other words, the remaining third of the targeted PV capacity can be achieved with FIT payments that are rather modest when compared to the FIT payments already committed to through existing programs.
If wholesale prices are too low to cover the operating expenses of existing plants, then existing plants may retire prematurely, which in turn can lead to concerns about system reliability. Figure 14 below shows the evolution of Germany’s unemployment rate, one measure of a country’s economic strength, since 2007, i.e. In its most recent Summer Outlook Report and Winter Review[41], ENTSO-E generally sees no severe reliability issues in Germany. The Reservekraftwerksverordnung (regulation on reserve capacity), passed in June 2013, allows TSOs to sign contracts for required reserve capacity in coordination with the Bundesnetzagentur, the German electricity regulatory agency.
While there is consensus that significant investment in distribution networks will also be necessary, in larger part to integrate increasing amounts of decentralized solar PV generation, there is no consensus on the total amount of investment needed and to what extent other measures such as demand-response may help reduce overall investment.
Therefore, many countries including Germany (and the United States) have been providing some form of support for various forms of energy production. It has also led to concerns that existing market rules and structures will need to be adjusted to ensure reliable electricity supply in the future.
The exemptions have meant that electricity costs for large industrial users in trade-sensitive industries are generally in line or even below those faced by European competitors and thus likely have at least contributed to the fact that until now German industry’s competitive position remains quite strong. China’s standard requires light-duty vehicles to reduce fuel consumption per mile traveled.
Japan has a corporate average standard based on weight class, which requires each light-duty vehicle to meet the standard for its weight class rather than an overall standard for the manufacturer. Freight trucks made up by far the largest share (23%) of total transportation energy use, followed by marine vessels (12%) and rail and pipelines (a combined 4%). Although energy efficiency improvements also occur in the non-OECD regions, their impacts are overwhelmed by the increases in personal incomes and travel demand.
Petroleum products account for the largest share of transportation energy use by far, while nonpetroleum fuels account for a small portion of the world energy mix, with natural gas and electricity together accounting for about 4% of the world’s total transportation energy consumption. These numbers underscore the significant uncertainty associated with projecting future trajectories of aircraft-to-population ratios in non-OECD countries as they develop economically, which may reflect regional characteristics such as geography and population despite having similar GDP per capita.
Consequently the difference in light-duty vehicle travel shares between the OECD and non-OECD regions is narrowed, but not eliminated, by 2040 in the Reference case. Figure 7-4 and Figure 7-5 show energy consumption shares of the energy-intensive industries compared with all industrial sector energy consumption (including feedstock consumption) in 2012 and 2040 for the OECD and non-OECD, respectively. For any given amount of chemical output, depending on the fundamental chemical process of production, a fixed amount of feedstock is required, which greatly reduces opportunities for decreasing fuel consumption in the absence of any major shifts toward recycling and bio-based chemicals. Finally, there is a cost associated with transporting the basic olefins to China’s East Coast, where most of the plastic manufacturers are located. Over the same period, industrial electricity demand in the ASEAN countries increased from 182 TWh in 2000 to 399 TWh in 2012, when it accounted for 12% of total industrial energy use. Under the program, solar PV installations have increased dramatically, reaching a total installed capacity in excess of 35 GW by year-end 2013. The current reforms therefore also include a number of measures gradually moving solar PV and other renewables towards being more tightly integrated with electricity markets.  Finally, the increasing levels of renewable power generation have put downward pressure on wholesale prices received by existing fossil generators, which highlight both shortcomings of existing market rules – in terms of adequately incentivizing those plants needed to ensure reliability of supply – and the need to further adjust market mechanisms to ensure reliable supply in a system with a significant portion of intermittent power generation. Aggressive greenhouse gas reduction targets are widespread, including in the United States.
In April 2014, a basic compromise was reached and the government proposed a reformed renewable energy law with several key features.
There seems to be relatively broad support for the notion that past programs have been successful.
However, while renewable energy support is indeed contributing to high (and especially increasing) retail rates for electricity, such attributions have to be made with several important caveats.
A closer look at the decomposition of the renewables levy as shown in Figure 6 provides some additional important insights. The “true” support level is therefore more likely the renewables levy minus this wholesale price effect. It is therefore difficult to argue that support for solar PV in Germany places a very heavy burden on German consumers or, as further discussed below, German competitiveness.
It acknowledges that under certain conditions (summer, low demand, low levels of PV feed-in, moderate wind), Germany might experience voltage problems.[42] It cites as the most severe consequence of continued increases in renewable (including solar PV) capacity the possibility that “German TSOs may be forced to cancel planned outages of network elements due to conditions worse than anticipated, especially if important nuclear power plants in southern Germany might trip. Estimates of the magnitude of such support depend significantly on what forms of support are included.
The United States and Mexico have both fuel economy and GHG standards, and manufacturers must satisfy both. The energy consumption shares of the energy-intensive industries are shown as percentages of total delivered energy consumption in the OECD and non-OECD industrial sectors.
With increases in refinery energy consumption, the refinery share of total industrial sector delivered energy consumption rises slightly. In hindsight, they can largely be attributed to downward adjustments to the FIT for new installations not being more rapid in response to installations exceeding targets.
Germany’s experience therefore likely provides an opportunity to “look ahead” and see how electricity systems and the rules governing them will have to adapt when penetration rates of various renewable energy sources reach levels similar to those in Germany today and beyond. Notably, there continues to be consensus about the need to decarbonize the electricity sector. There is also some consensus that going forward changes are required, although there is an ongoing debate about what exactly those changes should be. Figure 5 below shows the evolution and composition of residential electricity rates in Germany since 1998 on an inflation-adjusted basis. Network investments will also have the effect of reducing some of the other renewables integration costs currently incurred (such as re-dispatch and curtailment). South Korea’s light-duty vehicle manufacturers can choose to meet either a fuel economy or a GHG emissions standard. A move away from resource-based or agriculture-based national output, which has long been observed in the developed economies, is anticipated in the long-term outlook for the world’s emerging economies. For much of the rest of the world, however, output from the paper industry expands steadily in the IEO2016 Reference case, in part because of a growing need for a variety of paper products in non-OECD Asia, including paperboard for packaging and other materials. That being said, Germany’s FIT was designed to be adjusted over time as needed, and it ultimately did. The proposed reforms contain goals of a renewable electricity share of between 40-45% by 2025 and of 55-60% by 2035.[9] The reform efforts also acknowledge that the original renewable energy law was successful. In practice, however, the different metrics are related: improvements in fuel economy reduce CO2 emissions, and CO2 emissions are a subset of GHG emissions.
With the large increase in industrial sector energy consumption in non-OECD countries, the static percentage of the paper industry indicates a significant increase in energy consumption associated with increasing demand. In that sense, Germany’s FIT program for solar PV did not lead to the boom-bust cycle undergone by other countries experiencing rapid solar PV expansion under FITs, such as Spain and Italy.[4]  Nonetheless, it would have been preferable to have designed automatic adjustments to the FITs based on known criteria at the outset rather than having to adjust the program on the go. A review of the renewable energy law conducted by the government in 2011 explicitly states so, citing in particular the fact that Germany is unique among industrial countries in actually having accomplished a significant increase in the share of renewable energy in total electricity production.



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