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Lay down on the bench, so the back of the pew is higher than your body.If you are able, get on the floor under the pew. The Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act (the Act) includes the provision that the Minister, MCSCS may formulate emergency plans respecting types of emergencies other than those arising in connection with nuclear facilities. The PERP describes the arrangements and measures that may be taken to safeguard the health, safety, welfare and property of the people of Ontario affected by an emergency. While the focus of this plan is on emergency response, it also recognizes the important link to prevention, mitigation, preparedness (plans, training, public education, exercises, and emergency information), and recovery, as proactive components that are critical elements in any emergency response.
Emergency Management Ontario (EMO) is the organization charged with responsibility to monitor, coordinate, and assist with the promotion, development, implementation and maintenance of emergency management programs in Ontario. This edition of the PERP supersedes and replaces the Provincial Emergency Response Plan, dated December 2005. An emergency is a situation or an impending situation that constitutes a danger of major proportions that could result in serious harm to persons or substantial damage to property and that is caused by the forces of nature, a disease or other health risk, an accident, or an act whether intentional or otherwise. Emergency management consists of organized programs and activities taken to deal with actual or potential emergencies or disasters. Prevention refers to the actions taken to prevent the emergency itself and can greatly diminish the response and recovery activities required for certain emergencies. Preparedness refers to those measures taken prior to the emergency or disaster to ensure an effective response.
Emergency Management Ontario (EMO) is the overall provincial emergency management organization, and is responsible for the promotion, development, implementation and maintenance of effective emergency management programs throughout Ontario, and for the coordination of these programs with the federal government. The PERP is the plan that is used to coordinate overall provincial emergency response and outlines how EMO and the ministries respond to widespread or large-scale emergencies.
Emergencies vary in intensity and complexity depending on factors such as time of occurrence, weather conditions, severity of impact, nature of the affected infrastructure and buildings, and demographics. Occasionally, emergencies arise that overwhelm the capacity of community authorities to completely carry out the emergency response operations necessary to save lives and protect property. If necessary, the province can declare an emergency and directly control the commitment and application of provincial resources, and possibly those of affected and unaffected communities. Provincial response support can be provided to the Government of Canada in the event of a national emergency. The aim of the PERP is to establish a framework for a systematic, coordinated and effective emergency response by the Province of Ontario to safeguard the health, safety, welfare and property of its citizens, as well as to protect the environment and economy of the area affected by an emergency, excluding nuclear emergencies. The federal government, through Public Safety Canada (PS) is responsible for the national emergency response system.
The Province has exclusive jurisdiction for matters of property and civil rights in the province and for all matters that affect the public health, safety and environment of the province, under this Act. The federal government has also made arrangements with First Nations and with the province concerning emergency preparedness and response activities in Ontario under which the province agrees to provide assistance in emergency preparedness and response to First Nations communities. The Ontario government is responsible for protecting public health and safety, property and the environment within its borders.
The Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services (Minister, MCSCS) formulates the PERP under authority of subsection 8.1 of the Act.
References in this plan to the Minister, MCSCS will refer to those powers vested in the Solicitor General by the Act2. Pursuant to section 6 of the Act, ministers of the crown presiding over a ministry of the Government of Ontario and agencies, boards, commissions or other branches of government designated by the Lieutenant Governor in Council shall formulate emergency plans for the type of emergency assigned by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.
Declaration of a provincial emergency may also be made by the Premier of Ontario, if the urgency of the situation requires that such a declaration be made immediately.
Ministers’ emergency plans shall authorize Crown employees to take action under the emergency plans where an emergency exists but has not yet been declared to exist (section 9(a) of the Act).
Ministers of the Crown and Crown employees are protected from personal liability for doing any act or neglecting to do any act in good faith in the implementation or intended implementation of emergency plans such as the PERP (subsection 11 (1) of the Act). Pursuant to section 14 of the Act, ministry emergency plans shall conform to the standards set out in regulations under the Act.
Pursuant to subsection 6(1) of the Act, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may assign to a minister, the responsibility for the formulation of an emergency response plan to address a specific type of emergency.
Ontario municipalities possess legislated responsibilities to establish emergency management programs under the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act. Coordination of provincial response to emergencies that occur in the North and in unorganized territories is the responsibility of the ministry to which the type of emergency that has occurred has been assigned through the OIC. Provincial ministries that are assigned a type of emergency by the OIC will produce emergency response plans according to their assigned type of emergency, to enable the Province of Ontario to respond effectively to each emergency. These plans identify issues arising from provincial emergencies that require a broader response than a primary ministry’s response capabilities, and outline how inter-ministerial issues will be coordinated. Denotes a plan which is in the process of development, is subject to change as a result of internal or external review, and is also still subject to various approvals. Denotes a plan that has been extensively reviewed, which may or may not have been exercised or evaluated, and has yet to receive final approvals. Denotes a plan which has completed the review process, has likely been exercised and evaluated, and has received all of the necessary approvals. The Chief, EMO is responsible for monitoring, coordinating, and assisting with the promotion, development, maintenance, and, through the PEOC, the implementation of these plans.
Under certain circumstances, it may be necessary to enhance the coordination of provincial emergency response by implementing provisions from this plan.
If the urgency of the situation requires that declaration of a provincial emergency be made immediately such a declaration may also be made by the Premier.
2.3 It is not possible, without the risk of serious delay, to ascertain whether the resources normally available can be relied upon. Therefore, an emergency could be declared if operational information indicates that existing government resources and legislative powers are insufficient to address the emergency. The process leading to a provincial declaration of emergency will vary depending on the situation. When a provincial declaration of emergency is made, the Premier (or minister designated to exercise the powers conferred on the Premier by the Act,) will ensure that the federal government is informed.
Once a provincial declaration of emergency has been made the LGIC has the power to make emergency orders and may delegate these powers to a Minister or to the Deputy Minister of Emergency Planning and Management. A Minister to whom powers have been delegated may delegate any of his or her powers to the Deputy Minister of Emergency Planning and Management.
These orders are only made if they are necessary and essential, would alleviate harm or damage, and are a reasonable alternative to other measures.
The decision-maker must determine whether it is reasonable to believe that the order will alleviate harm or damage. The decision-maker must believe the order represents a reasonable alternative to other measures that are available to address the emergency. This part of the test requires the consideration of options that may be available before an emergency order is made.
The order must apply only to the areas where it is necessary and should be effective only for as long as necessary. Orders generally prevail over all Ontario statutes and regulations, with limited exceptions (E.g.
It is important to note that this criterion does not require that all other alternatives be attempted prior to making an emergency order.
An order made by the LGIC or a Minister is revoked 14 days after it is made unless revoked sooner. A provincial emergency declaration may include the Province of Ontario in its entirety or any portion or area thereof. During an emergency, the Premier, or a Minister to whom the Premier delegates the responsibility, is required to regularly report to the public with respect to the emergency. The Premier is required to submit a report in respect of the emergency in the Assembly within 120 days after the termination of an emergency. The Deputy Minister of Emergency Planning and Management is required to make a report to the Premier in respect of any orders that he made, within 90 days after the termination of an emergency, for the Premier to include in his report. The basic structure established for the response to a provincial emergency, following the IMS model, is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
The LGIC and the Premier of Ontario provide overall direction to the management of the emergency response. The mandate of the Cabinet Committee on Emergency Management (CCEM) is to ensure that the province is prepared to address emergency situations and assume other responsibilities, as Cabinet deems appropriate. The PEOC provides overall coordination of the provincial response, based on the strategic direction from the Deputy Minister and CCEM. During all stages of response, EMO (through the Deputy Minister of Emergency Planning and Management) will ensure that both the Cabinet Committee on Emergency Management (CCEM) is kept fully informed of the emergency situation and receive current assessments and updates on which to base operational decisions.
The PEOC coordinates with the primary ministry to ensure that there is no duplication of effort, and that the operation runs smoothly. Decisions regarding operational emergency response requirements will be conveyed by the PEOC to those Ministry EOCs and community EOCs that are involved in the emergency response. Welcome and thank you for visiting the website for Teachers College, Office of Public Safety. Brookfield Office Properties Extends Tender Offer for All Outstanding Preferred Shares of MPG Office Trust, Inc.
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For all of us, and especially for the people of Japan, the memory is fresh and for so many families who lost loved ones or their homes in the earthquake or the tsunami that followed, the loss is profound indeed.
The resilience the Japanese people have shown in recovering has been impressive and inspiring. Most often, there is a bit of both, which, frankly, is to be expected when confronted with a task as complex as remediating Fukushima Daiichi while at the same time preparing the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa facility to be restarted. As Japan progresses in the Fukushima cleanup and wrestles with the role that nuclear will play in its future, it will need to sort through many of the same political, regulatory, economic, and technical issues that we faced in the United States after the accident at our Three Mile Island facility in 1979.
For that reason, I have been asked to share with you my reflections on the TMI experience and how they may inform the answers to the questions you are dealing with today.
At Fukushima, of course, the accident was preceded by, and caused by, a massive natural disaster with tragic consequences – the Great Japan Earthquake and the tsunami it spawned. This, in turn, led the feedwater pumps that delivered water to the steam generators to shut down, shutting the turbines themselves down. Heat and pressure increased as a result and a relief valve that should have managed this event malfunctioned leading to a partial meltdown of the reactor core. The failure of the auxiliary pumps because of the valve closure was later cited as a major factor, and it was a violation of existing regulations.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s rules had required the reactor to have been shut down if all three of the valves were shut for maintenance. Communication with the public and with local governments by the local utility became a source of criticism – I know this will sound familiar to you, and it is one of the reasons our Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee has made improving communications an integral part of our recommendations. Information was shared in a fragmented way, and claims that no radiation had been released were contradicted by instruments both at the plant and off-site. Indeed, the NRC in Washington DC had some difficulty obtaining accurate information, and an NRC historian has written that the degree of core melting wasn’t known for years.
One problem TMI avoided that Fukushima unfortunately has had to deal with was a hydrogen explosion. Although a hydrogen bubble formed in the dome of the pressure vessel, it was managed in several ways, part of which included very controversial venting into the atmosphere.
I want to share with you three other important aspects of the Three Mile Island accident before sharing with you my thoughts on their implications for the challenges Japan is dealing with today: the question of evacuating the local population, the cleanup effort, and estimates of the health impact. In large part because of the mistrust and poor information that was provided, the governor of Pennsylvania, on the advice of then-NRC Chairman Joseph Hendrie, advised evacuation of pregnant women within a five-mile radius of the facility, and that was soon extended to 20 miles. Approximately 140,000 people left the area, but more than half remained and 98 percent returned within three weeks.
As for the cleanup, the reactor was decommissioned and officially not completed until 1993 – 14 years after the accident. Epidemiological studies have concluded that the accident has had no observable long-term health effects due to any radioactive releases. I do not want to dismiss the impact of emotional distress that people may have suffered but the fact remains that the radioactive releases from TMI had no discernable health effects.
I know that you are particularly interested in how our regulatory apparatus and nuclear industry responded to the accident, and I will share that with you in a moment.
The movie’s message was that the industry couldn't be trusted to run these plants safely, and the TMI accident played directly into that narrative. This, together with a more stringent post-accident regulatory environment and other factors led to a steep decline in the U.S.
Fifty-one reactor orders were canceled from 1980-1984, and of the 129 nuclear power plants that had been approved prior to TMI, only 53 were completed. Perhaps understandably, the regulatory pendulum did indeed swing too far towards over caution.
The NRC was not created in response to a crisis, but like the JNRA it was a new agency under considerable pressure to act and to demonstrate its independence and its power. Its regulatory framework was not risk-based and therefore lost sight of what was important.
Just for one example, the NRC’s post-TMI regulations required lots of training for people who had nothing to do with safety.
Certainly a lesson of TMI was that better training was required to increase skills and clarify accountability. Ultimately, the NRC recognized that the pendulum had swung too far, and it adjusted its course. Emphasis was focused on those things that are truly critical, including the total loss of electrical power, which as we know is what happened at Fukushima Daiichi. After all, we live in democracies where regulatory agencies are answerable, to one degree or another, to elected officials. What is essential is that there is a source of information that is trusted by the public as honest and independent.
There are some excellent materials that have been produced along these lines, but we need more, and we need more sustained efforts to get this information to the public. Japan may have a better chance to keep a scientific focus at its regulatory agencies than we did in the U.S. One of the most important lessons the nuclear industry learned from TMI was to avoid excessive regulation by sharing best practices and essentially regulating itself.
I know that many may be skeptical that the nuclear industry can self-regulate but I challenge those skeptics to look at the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), their relationship with the NRC and their common goal of excellence in safety.
About 18 months before TMI a very similar accident sequence occurred at the Davis Besse Plant. When it comes to nuclear safety information there are no barriers, there are no borders, there is no competition, and there is only the common goal of advancing the safety of nuclear technology. No matter how effectively we prepare, or how thorough the regulatory regime, nuclear power plants are complex systems and unexpected events are inevitable. We have stopped looking at them as isolated equipment malfunctions, operator errors, or acts of God. While part of that involves multiple layers of backup and technical systems, an effective organizational and management system can make a decisive difference. For that reason, the Nuclear Reform Plan that TEPCO is implementing, and whose progress our Committee is overseeing, focuses extensively on management and organizational reform. To be successful, it is essential that we enable employees to think on their feet and react quickly and effectively, and empower them to put safety first and to speak up when they see a problem. TEPCO is making progress in its adoption of a safety culture, though we have impressed upon them the importance of not letting up and of ensuring that it extends throughout the organization and down to the very front lines of the workers. So those are the lessons that I believe we learned from TMI, and some of their implications for Japan as it travels its own journey in deciding on the future of nuclear power.
So you face a decision that we did not, which is what to do with the plants you already have, let alone the ones you might build in the future.
I have great respect for the fact that this must be a decision for the people of Japan alone. Japan is one of the most important members of the global economic community and continued reliance on fossil fuels imported from other countries will have negative economic implications for the country, and will contribute to carbon emissions.
In 2013, Japan significantly scaled back its emissions targets to a 3.8 percent cut by 2020 versus 2005 levels, backing away from the previous target of a 25 percent reduction. Without those nuclear plants, Japan will continue to depend on fluctuating prices for fossil fuels, and dependent upon importing them from some very unstable places.
A decline or abandonment of nuclear power in Japan would also send an unfortunate signal to the rest of the world. Many nuclear components are made here in Japan by such companies as Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Toshiba and Japan Steel Works, which heavily depend on their domestic market. And I know that your organization will continue to play an indispensable role in conducting research and providing data, information and reports that are essential for the formulation of good policy. TEPCO’s Nuclear Reform Special Taskforce presented a progress report on the Nuclear Safety Reform Plan (3rd Quarter, 2014 FY) to Mr.
I’m very glad to hear that you are working hard together and that the Nuclear Safety Oversight Office is moving forward. TEPCO’s Nuclear Reform Special Taskforce presented a progress report on the Nuclear Safety Reform Plan to Mr. The Social Communication Office reported on efforts to grasp how audiences would receive information from TEPCO in order to communicate more effectively.
TEPCO’s Nuclear Reform Special Taskforce presented a progress report on the Nuclear Safety Reform Plan (2nd Quarter, 2014 FY) to Mr. Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here, at your place of work at the site, to share with you a conversation that I had yesterday with President Hirose and Chairman Sudo. From personal experience, I mentioned that it was that it was difficult when you are in the field, at the site working very hard every single day, that all you read in the news media are negative things. So today, I have the honor to humbly stand in front you, on behalf of international community, to say thank you very much for what you do every single day here at the site.
In yesterday’s conversation with President Hirose, I explained to him some personal history from early in my career when I was assigned to work at the cleanup of the Three Mile Island reactor accident.
Many of my university colleagues said I should leave the nuclear industry and go work in the aerospace industry and do exciting space station or airplane work. The accident at TMI and the situation here in Fukushima has put you in the same place that I was. Overtime, one of the most satisfying things for me, and also my staff that worked at TMI, was that we gained the appreciation of the value of what we were doing and overcame the negative things that were said in the news media. So what I’d like to state to you is that despite all the hard work and frustrations that you endure every day, that your efforts are appreciated. It has been an extraordinary privilege to serve as the Chairman of TEPCO’s Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee.
Through my many trips to Japan and the development of relationships with so many talented and dedicated people, I have gained an even greater respect and affection for the Japanese people – their determination, their resilience, their hard work ethic, and their extraordinary talents. And it will restore confidence and momentum to nuclear power globally, which is essential not only to the industry itself and those related to it, but to the world’s ability to develop sustainable strategies to address climate change and economic growth. At Fukushima, it is so easy to get bogged down into the engineering details or the periodic news reports of some technical problems, that one loses sight of the bigger picture. All of this, of course, is preparation for the main event: the eventual removal of the fuel debris that melted in Units 1, 2, and 3. A very important component of that plan is something that our committee recommended: the creation of a distinct entity within TEPCO to take responsibility for Fukushima Daiichi.
Acting on this recommendation, TEPCO established the Fukushima D&D Engineering Company and placed at its helm Naohiro Masuda.
Because D&D will be such a long-term project, the public may become frustrated at what they perceive is a slow pace of progress. Any of you who have ever had a roof leak or a pipe burst or a basement flood knows what a relentless and insidious challenge water can represent. Most obviously, there is the need to protect the environment, though even now the constant monitoring of seawater shows that, especially outside the mostly enclosed port area of the plant, radiation levels are extremely low and in most instances would even meet World Health Organization standards for drinking water. But beyond the environmental and health issues, the reality is that TEPCO’s water management has taken on symbolic importance. At some point, however, Japan will have to make politically difficult decisions about what to do with the water after it has been cleaned. Now I want to turn for the last few minutes of my remarks to a discussion about the broader future for TEPCO and nuclear power in Japan. The people of TEPCO, the people who are out there every day under difficult conditions at Fukushima, the ones working so hard to bring KK back online, the workers enduring cramped consolidated offices at headquarters in Tokyo, deserve more recognition than they have received.
In the immediate aftermath of the accident, many workers who were once proud to say they worked at TEPCO found themselves ostracized.
Her visit evoked an especially warm response because she is not, after all, just any ambassador.
With regard to emergency drills, he advised TEPCO to consider how best to set priorities for the information from each section and how to visualize their level of importance (such as color coding), so that executives can make composed, measured judgments during an emergency. If a problem arises, determine its cause and solve it with the entire team, including contractors. Discuss what is the best option constantly, because sometimes, a backup plan may end up becoming the best option, and make decisions with the team. In all the attention that’s being given to the very real technical challenges being faced in the cleanup of the nuclear accident at Fukushima, it has been too easy to forget about the people who live there. But I know what it’s like to live in the shadow of an accident at a nuclear power plant. My past visits to Japan, in the capacity of a technical adviser to the Fukushima plant’s owner, the Tokyo Electric Power Company, focused on the cleanup technical challenges.
Before sharing more about what we heard, a quick geography lesson: The Fukushima Daiichi plant is located on the coast, and nearby are mostly small agricultural communities such as Hirono, Tomioka, and others. They asked me whether their children will be safe from radiation if they move back to their homes from the places to which they’d been evacuated.
Others find themselves unable to fish at all, excluded from fishing in their traditional waters and equally excluded from encroaching onto fishing grounds long claimed by other fishing cooperatives. Diligent monitoring, along with significant improvements in the control of contaminated water at the plant will protect the sea and make clear that the fish from the area’s waters are safe.
In the three years since the accident, when it comes to victims the focus has understandably been primarily on compensating them financially. More than anything, the people of the communities affected by the Fukushima accident need hope.


On behalf of the Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee, we extend our condolences to his wife, Mrs. Lady Barbara Judge CBE held a meeting with TEPCOa€™s Nuclear Safety Oversight Office on April 30, 2014.
Lady Judge received explanations on the status of activities of TEPCO’s Nuclear Safety Oversight Office.
Lady Judge commented that TEPCO needs to change its culture even more, from one emphasizing efficiency to one emphasizing safety, by showing examples of vehicles making abnormal noises and airplane speakers breaking.
Managers have the responsibility to create vertical relationships, so that all workers from top to bottom can share a common recognition.
Managers also have the responsibility to create horizontal relationships with outside entities whose involvement has, until now, been limited (such as those related to national defense and robotic development).
Causes of and countermeasures for recent trouble at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
Beyond the hospitality that has been extended to me, and the personal relationships we have developed, I have been impressed by the determination of the Japanese people to meet and overcome the terrible loss from the Great Japan Earthquake and tsunami, and the challenge posed by the accident at Fukushima Daiichi. At TEPCO, from the most senior executive to individual workers, one cannot but be impressed by their commitment not only to recovery but also to building a better, safer future.
So, even as we mark the third anniversary of the Fukushima accident and reflect on the intervening years, it is that future that I want to especially focus on, as well as the people who are so determined to make it happen.
A Japan that tries to survive without nuclear energy would not be the Japan of today, and certainly would not be the thriving, growing, environmentally responsible Japan that we all want to see tomorrow. And it wants you to succeed because people understand that if we are to successfully manage climate change and reduce our dependence on fossil fuels, nuclear power will be an important part of the mix.
There has been great progress on many fronts at Fukushima Daiichi over these last three years. The hastily assembled emergency methods that were being used to cool reactors in the immediate aftermath of the accident have given way to safer and more robust systems. Progress has been made in getting our arms around the main challenge posed by Fukushima: removal of the once-molten fuel from Units 1, 2, and 3. And at Chernobyl, where there was no containment vessel for that graphite reactor, the Soviets just built a concrete sarcophagus around it and essentially walked away. Through the use of robotic cameras and other high technology, and with participation of its international partners, TEPCO is learning more about the condition and location of the fuel, the condition of the containment vessels, and this will eventually lead to the development of a strategy for removing that fuel.
I am encouraged by the decision TEPCO has taken to create a distinct entity focused exclusively on the decontamination and decommissioning work at Fukushima.
I believe it also demonstrates that TEPCO recognizes that the talents, skills and organizational structure for D&D work are not necessarily the same as those needed to run a power company.
For that, it will be necessary to ensure that nuclear facilities like TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa facility and others like it can be operated with a very high margin of safety. I have visited KK and reviewed in depth the safety enhancements that have been made there, and I must say they are impressive. They even include providing for gravity-fed water from a lake in the mountain, in the event power to the pumps fails. But the most important changes go beyond these physical enhancements, important as they are.
It is quite literally a culture, one in which we want every worker to come to work every day thinking of safety in everything they do.
It is this kind of culture that I believe TEPCO did not pay enough attention, and which it is now building.
Let me give you an example: In 2008, engineers at Fukushima Daiichi came up with a hypothetical tsunami of 16 meters, and management said the idea was not credible. And it’s also complicated by the fact that the public does tend to overestimate the risks associated with nuclear energy, and underestimate those associated with fossil fuels. And I believe we have seen it play out in the meticulous planning for and execution of the fuel removal from Unit 4, despite the dire predictions that so many had made about how it would turn out. The Province of Ontario Emergency Response Plan, also referred to as the Provincial Emergency Response Plan (PERP), fulfils the above provision of the Act.
It sets out the basic mechanisms, organizational structures, responsibilities, and procedures to guide Ministers and their staff when involved in a coordinated provincial response to emergencies in Ontario.
EMO was also charged with the responsibility for writing the PERP, and it is an avenue through which to fulfil its mandate for emergency management across the province.
These situations could threaten public safety, public health, the environment, property, critical infrastructure and economic stability. It can also greatly diminish the response and recovery activities required for certain emergencies and may result in a long-term, cost-effective reduction of risk.
Preparedness measures include plans, training, exercises, public education, alerting and notification systems, procedures, organization, infrastructure protection, and standards. The aim of these measures is to ensure that a controlled, coordinated, and effective response is quickly undertaken at the outset of the emergency to minimize its impact on public safety.
The aim of these measures is to assist individuals, businesses and communities to return to a state of normalcy. In most instances, for emergencies outside the capability of the individual, families or businesses, communities1 manage emergencies. On these occasions, direct provincial government assistance may be necessary to support emergency response activities. In the event of a national emergency, the federal government will implement its emergency response plans and, under the following legislation, will consult with the Province of Ontario.
The federal Governor in Council can declare a public welfare emergency, which includes an emergency caused by a real or imminent accident or pollution resulting in danger to life or property, social disruption or breakdown in the flow of essential goods and services, so serious as to be a national emergency.
While a declaration of a public welfare emergency is in effect, the Governor in Council may make necessary orders or regulations that are necessary to deal with the emergency. The Governor in Council must consult the provinces that are affected by the emergency before issuing a declaration of public welfare emergency.
This assistance is provided on request from Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) or a First Nations community.
The following sections outline the legislative and regulatory framework associated with this responsibility.
1990, ChapterE.9, (hereafter referred to as the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act or the Act). In that respect, this plan may be used for all types of emergencies other than those arising in connection with nuclear facilities. Such emergency declaration is subject to the criteria set out in the legislation governing emergency declarations.
The current Order in Council (OIC) assigning responsibilities to ministers is included as Annex A. The Act also defines the relationship between the Province and municipalities during actual emergencies. Pursuant to section 3 of the Act, municipalities shall formulate plans to respond to emergencies and adopt these plans by by-law. Municipal plans should reflect the coordination of services provided by all levels of local government in a given community. Pursuant to section 5 of the Act, the plans of lower-tier municipalities in an upper-tier municipality, excluding a county, shall conform to the plan of their upper-tier municipality.
Municipal emergency plans shall authorize municipal employees to take action under emergency plans where an emergency exists but has not yet been declared to exist (subsection 9.
Members of council and municipal employees are protected from personal liability for doing any act or neglecting to do any act in good faith in the implementation or intended implementation of emergency plans such as the PERP (subsection 11 (1) of the Act).
Counties, with the consent of their municipalities, may coordinate the emergency plans for their municipalities under subsection 3.
Pursuant to section 14 of the Act, municipal emergency response plans shall conform to the standards set by the Minister, MCSCS. MNDM is only responsible for abandoned mine emergencies and for providing support to the primary ministries for all other types of incidents. These provisions also apply generally to agencies, boards and commissions (ABCs) designated by the Lieutenant Governor in Council5. It is accepted that a nuclear emergency may nevertheless require the simultaneous implementation of the PERP to address many non-nuclear outcomes of such an emergency. Such emergency management programs include emergency plans, and to that end the PERP outlines general coordination requirements that all provincial ministries and municipalities should incorporate, as appropriate, into their emergency plans. In such a case, all other ministries would be expected to act in a supporting role, within their competencies. This would include, for example, provision for participation in emergency training and exercises. EMO will monitor, coordinate and assist with the development and maintenance of such plans.
It describes both Ontario’s structure and processes for managing emergency responses, as well as the structure to be used by EMO in coordinating a provincial emergency response. These MERPs will be expected to support provincial emergency response, and be supporting and complementary to the PERP. Pursuant to section 8 of the EMCPA, the approval authority for the Provincial Emergency Response Plan (PERP) is the Minister, MCSCS. The PERP shall be fully reviewed, amended and brought forward for Ministerial approval at least once every four years. Regulations mandate that the members of each Ministry Action Group (MAG) and Municipal Emergency Control Group (MECG) complete the annual training that is required by the Chief, EMO.
The Chief, EMO may also provide advice and assistance to ministers and municipalities for the development of their emergency management training programs.
It will be risk-based and include a range of exercise activities of varying degrees of complexity and interaction.
An Interim Plan is considered a working document and would be used to respond to an actual emergency. Depending on how plan development and approvals proceed, it may not always be necessary to have an Interim Plan. The Provincial Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) Report, which provides a methodology for analyzing hazards and assesses the province’s vulnerability to potential hazards, forms the basis for the PERP. A disaster can occur with little or no warning and can cause an extreme emergency condition in any area of the province. Emergencies vary in scope and intensity, from small, localized incidents, with minimal damage, to multi-jurisdictional disasters with extensive devastation and loss of life.
Communities have capabilities, plans and procedures to provide for the safety of their citizens in a time of emergency. The Province of Ontario has emergency resources and expertise that may be used to satisfy emergency response needs that are beyond the capabilities of communities.
The province may provide emergency response assistance that is supplemental to, and not a substitute for, community resources. Provincial assistance to communities is not dependent on a formal declaration of emergency by a community, except where prior agreements are in place. Should the emergency exceed community capabilities, the LGIC or the Premier may declare a provincial emergency and the premier or a designated minister may coordinate all emergency responses. Should the situation exceed the provincial capability the Premier or a designated minister may request emergency response assistance from the federal government. Mitigating hazards that pose further threat to life, property, the economy and the environment. Resources from the province or even the federal government may also be required, depending upon the nature and severity of the incident. Should an emergency require a coordinated provincial response or should a ministry require assistance in responding to the emergency, the necessary provisions of the PERP will be implemented.
All affected levels of government should remain fully engaged in the emergency response despite the involvement or declaration by other levels of government.
Accordingly, it should seldom be necessary to declare a provincial or federal emergency even though resources from these jurisdictions will frequently be provided in support of an emergency declared by a municipality or a First Nation.
In some cases, prior warning may come from outside organizations that have access to scientific methods of predicting floods, forest fires, and severe weather. In these situations, each community would be expected to respond using its resources in accordance with its own plan. If they are well coordinated, the plans of a regional municipality and its area municipalities should be mutually supporting.
Counties may also, with the consent of their constituent municipalities, coordinate planning and response activities with those lower-tiers.
However, the provision of resources alone from the provincial or federal government would not in itself necessitate any change in jurisdictional arrangements. These plans, governing the provision of necessary services, together with the procedures by which Crown employees and other persons are to respond, constitute the initial provincial emergency response. These MERPs should identify the resources and the procedures that are necessary to recognize, contain and then resolve the cause of any emergency that falls within their assigned type of emergency. Management of the emergency in accordance with the provincial Incident Management System (IMS). When appropriate, actions to be taken upon the declaration of an emergency by the LGIC or the Premier.
This does not imply that ministries should not deal with municipalities, First Nations communities or the federal government within their ministries’ emergency response plans, but that the overall coordinating authority for plans is the Chief, EMO.
This plan may also be implemented in conjunction with other emergency response plans that address specific hazards.
Providing a copy of their most current emergency plans to the Chief, EMO under subsection 6.2 of the Act.
Requesting assistance if necessary, in accordance with this PERP and established guidelines. Supporting a coordinated provincial emergency response in accordance with this plan and the ministry emergency response plan for the types of emergencies assigned to other ministers. Supporting emergency response operations of First Nations communities, the Nishnawbe-Aski Nation, or in other federal jurisdictions, if requested. EMO is available to assist in the development of such plans for First Nations, and to assist in emergency response operations pursuant to agreement with Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC). Communities should advise the PEOC when an emergency occurs or if an emergency seems imminent. This sharing of emergency information will facilitate a more rapid emergency response and will reduce planning time. The emergency requires immediate action to prevent, reduce or mitigate the dangers posed by the emergency. The declaration notification is passed to the PEOC, which will in turn inform the Regional Director, PS, of the emergency declaration. This declaration can be renewed for one further period of 14 days given that it meets the test of the declared emergency. The orders must only apply to the areas where it is necessary and should be effective for only as long as is necessary. For example, if the matter could be addressed by an order under the Health Protection and Promotion Act (HPPA), the availability of the HPPA order should be considered to determine whether an emergency order is a reasonable alternative to address the emergency.
In other words, it does not require that an emergency order is the only alternative available.
If the Assembly is not in session, the Premier is required to submit the report within 7 days of the Assembly reconvening. Organizational structures for incident management, including the provision for common response functions - Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance and Administration. Develop the overall provincial emergency management response strategy of the Government of Ontario.
Conduct high-level briefings and discussions of strategic issues with appropriate ministries. In this role, the Deputy Minister will ensure information and decisions are relayed between the CCEM and the PEOC, and vice versa in a timely and effective manner.
The PEOC is responsible for implementing and monitoring the operational strategy decided on by the Cabinet Committee on Emergency Management. While the primary ministry executes its ministry emergency response plan for the type of emergency assigned to it based on the existing emergency, the PEOC will operate as the provincial coordinator, with a focus on coordination issues outside of the scope of the primary ministry. Sakurai visiting Futtsu Thermal Power Station on March 2, 2016, and receiving an explanation from Power Station executives about safety initiatives. Klein visiting Fukushima Daiichi NPS on February 5, 2016, and receiving an explanation from TEPCO about progress on water management issues. As you know, I am the chairman of the independent advisory group that was assembled to monitor TEPCO’s progress under the Nuclear Safety Reform Plan it adopted back in 2012.
But many of those issues that we faced are, in fact, similar to the ones Japan has faced and continues to address. But the Three Mile Island accident had its genesis in a remarkably everyday event: the cleaning of a filter. This was a routine task, but as luck would have it that night, the filter proved especially difficult to clean. To handle the decay heat that was still being generated by the reactor, three auxiliary pumps activated automatically. But there were also human errors and, as it was later discovered, problems in the design of the user interface that led to operational confusion about what was happening, making an effective response more difficult. So, even though the radiation levels were unlikely to threaten public health, trust and confidence were severely eroded.
It helps us understand why the Fukushima decommissioning time scale is measured in decades. As you know, activism, politics, and the inherent uncertainties of statistical analysis means that some people will always believe that the health impacts were greater than they were. But first I want to share with you the impact this accident had on public opinion about nuclear energy, which in turn was critically important in shaping the governmental response. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was a relatively new agency, created by legislation in 1974 that split the functions of the former Atomic Energy Commission into two separate agencies: The NRC, an independent agency to regulate safety, and the Energy Research and Development Administration, which ultimately became the Department of Energy. As it tightened regulatory requirements, in my view it went too far in making regulations rigid and prescriptive rather than performance-based. With everything of equal importance and urgency, there was not enough sense of priority, of focus on what is important to safety and what is not.
But it makes sense to focus that training on the people who are, in fact, responsible for safety of the plant and the environment.
And even educated members of the public are liable to be confused by conflicting assertions about the safety of nuclear power or the severity of a particular event. We must understand that for the general public, radiation is frightening because it is mysterious and invisible. And the information must be presented in ways that can be grasped by non-scientists, comparing radiation exposure levels to experiences in their everyday lives – for example, their exposure to radiation in an airplane ride or from eating bananas. We now understand that the prevention of major accidents lies in preventing the inevitable unexpected event from cascading into a major crisis.
I believe they are especially difficult for companies accustomed to a top-down, rule-oriented management culture. In many ways our experiences were quite different: Fukushima, aside from being a more severe accident, followed a major natural catastrophe that led Japan to shut all its other nuclear power plants. Indeed, some of the environmentalists who were most vocally opposed to nuclear power in the aftermath of TMI now favor it as an alternative to fossil fuels. At the time, the shuttering of Japan’s nuclear power plants was cited as the main reason for the less ambitious targets. With the contributions that you and others are making, I have every confidence that, in the long run, Japan and its people will meet the many challenges ahead, and prevail. Sakurai held meetings with the Nuclear Reform Special Taskforce on March 4 9, 18 and 24, 2015.
Sakurai inspected a joint training exercise between Fukushima Daiichi, Fukushima Daini and the Headquarters on March 17, 2015. Sakurai had a meeting with TEPCOa€™s Nuclear Reform Special Taskforce on November 25, 2014. Sakurai advised that TEPCO should create Key Performance Indicators (KPI), which measure the extent to which the company has implemented the various safety related aspects of the Nuclear Safety Reform Plan, based on opinions from the sites, identify problems in the proposed KPIs in operation and continue to make improvements.
Sakurai had meetings with TEPCOa€™s Nuclear Reform Special Taskforce on October 15 and 29, 2014.
Sakurai advised TEPCO to write progress reports thinking how employees would perceive them.
Lake Barrett (Decommissioning member) gave the following speech to the staffs at New Office in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Dale Klein and I are here in Japan for a Reform Meeting with Chairman Sudo and the top management of TEPCO.
But, like me, with the time, I believe you will hopefully start to more appreciate what you are doing and learning.
Someday in a far future, you, like me, will be proud to tell your Grandchildren about what you are doing here today for them.
The Committee is an international group that meets quarterly to provide independent, candid advice – and occasionally criticism -- to TEPCO on its progress in implementing the Nuclear Safety Reform Plan adopted in 2013.
Success there will help restore confidence not only in TEPCO but also in Japan’s economic progress. The nuclear industry will learn many things as more technical information about the accident becomes available. As you have no doubt read, that is an effort without precedent, and it will require great care, great ingenuity, and great safety preparations.
TEPCO has committed to removing the debris from at least one of the three units by the end of their Fiscal Year 2020. In a world where it is difficult for business executives or government officials to think beyond the next quarter or the next election, this is an eternity.
Masuda-san, as you probably know, has been credited with his leadership in keeping the Fukushima Daini plant intact after the tsunami and brought the plant to a safe shut down condition.
For this and other reasons, the Monitoring Committee is encouraging TEPCO to be as transparent and proactive as possible in communicating the many intermediate milestones and achievements on the road to ultimate success. The most immediate challenge involves the management of water at the Daiichi site, which sits directly between the mountains and the sea. However, we all recognize how sensitive the issue of contaminated water is in Japan and the entire world.
Contaminated water continues to accumulate at the rate of about 300-400 tons per day, a rate that must be reduced. In addition, the restart of the nuclear plants will reduce the extremely high volume of fossil fuel imports. A nuclear safety culture is more than just the sum of all the physical improvements that have been made to KK or elsewhere within TEPCO.
And I think all of you would agree that changing the culture of any company, especially one with TEPCO’s long and proud traditions, is difficult.


President Hirose has on many occasions underscored and demonstrated his commitment to a nuclear safety culture.
It is an important component of a successful safety culture; good morale and good safety go hand in hand. Dale Klein and other international advisors held a meeting with TEPCOa€™s executives on October 27, 2014. Dale Klein and other international advisors exchanged opinions on Nuclear Safety Culture and the situation of Fukushima Daiichi. Sakurai inspected the site after receiving explanations from TEPCO about Unit 4 fuel removal, contaminated water treatment and improvements to the workers’ environment.
Professor Gerry Thomas explained about the effects of radiation and the results of a thyroid screening test in a manner that the residents could readily understand. Sakurai received explanations on the progress of TEPCO's Nuclear Safety Reform Plan from TEPCO's Nuclear Reform Special Task Force.
Lake Barrett (Decommissioning member) held a meeting with the Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination & Decommissioning Engineering Company on July 17, 2014. Barrett received explanations on the Water Management Plan and the root cause analysis of the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) issues.
Lake Barrett (Decommissioning member) held a follow-up seminar on management procedure for the executives of TEPCOa€™s Decontamination & Decommissioning Engineering Company on July 16, 2014.
Lake Barrett (Decommissioning member) inspected Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on July 15, 2014.
Barrett received reports from TEPCO staff on measures for contaminated water (ALPS, Groundwater Bypass, Ice Wall, etc.) and conducted an on-site inspection.
Barrett (Decommissioning member) visited various places in Fukushima and spoke with local residents. Barrett visited various places in Fukushima with his wife, Lynn, and grand-daughter, Jessica, and spoke with local residents from May 26th to 28th, 2014. In 1980, when I was a young government official, I moved my wife and two young sons to Central Pennsylvania, near the Three Mile Island facility, when I was given a leading role in managing its cleanup. The people we met in the small, primarily agricultural towns near the Fukushima Daiichi plant impressed us with their sophisticated questions, and humbled us with their resilience and determination. The plume of radioactive contamination released at the time of the accident ran generally to the northwest, affecting individual communities differently. They wanted to know where the contaminated soil removed from their towns will be deposited. Surely a solution can be found that respects Japanese fishing traditions while doing something to ensure a future for these resilient people whose culture and economy are so closely linked to the sea. But it is clear to me that proactive outreach from the government, TEPCO, and others are essential to address their need for information and emotional support. Klein: "Although most people justly remember then-Senator Baker for his gift at conciliation and great leadership, I was privileged to see him bring the same great personal qualities to other aspects of his public life. Klein also noted that Senator Baker believed in the importance of nuclear power as part of the strategy of both our countries to achieve energy security.
Klein chairs is a group of international experts formed to advise the plant's owner, the Tokyo Electric Power Co., on the efforts to reform nuclear safety culture and to decontaminate and decommission the Fukushima Daiichi facility. Sakurai inspected an emergency drill at TEPCO Emergency Response Headquarters, held with Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Lake Barrett (Decommissioning member) held a seminar on management procedure for the executives of TEPCOa€™s Decontamination & Decommissioning Engineering Company on April 30, 2014, based on his experience dealing with the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI). Lake Barrett held a meeting with the Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination & Decommissioning Engineering Company on April 29, 2014. Barrett received explanations on the status of TEPCO’s activities based on advice which it was given in the telephone conference on April 4, and the water management plan. Sakurai received explanations on the Social Communication Office’s 2013 performance and future plans from its executives. Sakurai inspected an emergency drill at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station held with TEPCO’s headquarters. Sakurai, a member of the Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee, discussed with the TEPCO Nuclear Reform Special Task Force on March 14, 2014. Dale Klein observed silence at 14:46 on the third anniversary of the Great East Japan Earthquake. Dale Klein discussed the activity plan of TEPCOa€™s Decommissioning Company, to be established on April 1, and the fuel debris removal plan with an officer of TEPCOa€™s Decommissioning department on March 11, 2014. As I think you know, I’ve spent quite a bit of time in Japan over the last few years, and I have come to feel very close to this country and to the Japanese people.
They will continue to face many challenges, and as some recent experiences demonstrate, improvements must continue to be made.
But they also know that public confidence in that nuclear power can be enhanced, or diminished, by what happens here. The safe removal of fuel from the spent fuel pool at Unit 4 was made possible by a combination of innovative design and meticulous execution by the workers of TEPCO and its partners. And they are making progress, though not yet enough, on the long-term challenge posed by groundwater. As most of you know, removing the kind of molten fuel that exists at Fukushima Daiichi has never been done before.
Everything I have learned about your values, your commitment to the environment, and your determination to meet this challenge tells me this. In its new business plan, TEPCO has set a goal of removing the fuel from at least one of the three reactors by the first half of FY2020. As TEPCO President Hirose has said, this will provide for greater focus on Fukushima, it will provide for greater accountability, and it will incorporate at high-levels organizations like Hitachi and Toshiba that have broad technical resources and a considerable stake in a successful outcome.
So much of what the D&D team will encounter will be things no one has ever encountered before, and it will require people with a wide range of technical abilities, diagnostic skills, and critical thinking ability. While continued safe progress at Fukushima is vital to restoring public confidence, it cannot by itself restore Japan’s other 50 or so nuclear power stations to again operate (and, not coincidentally, put back into standby the old fossil fuel burning plants pressed into service in their place). They include greater redundancy in the methods to keep cooling water on the spent fuel pools and reactor cores in the event of a failure, more robust capabilities in the event of an electrical blackout, more portable emergency equipment. It represents the first major step in actual removal of nuclear material after the accident, and at the same time demonstrates the extent to which the safety culture is taking hold.
It is an umbrella emergency response plan for the coordination of provincial response to any emergency.
It also serves as the foundation for the development and coordination of provincial plans with those of municipalities, First Nations, and the Government of Canada and its agencies.
Prevention measures are broadly classified as either structural or non-structural and include capital improvements, regulations, building codes and public education programs. Similar to prevention, mitigation measures are broadly classified as either structural or non-structural and include capital improvements, regulations, building codes and public education programs. When an emergency occurs, the immediate focus of operations is on meeting the emergency needs of people, saving lives, and protecting property and the environment. Recovery measures include environmental clean-up, return of evacuees, emergency financial assistance, and critical incident stress counseling. They do this either as a matter of routine by emergency responders (including police, fire and Emergency Medical Service (EMS)), or by implementing their emergency response plan, with or without declaring an emergency. The orders or regulations made by the Governor in Council should not unduly impair the ability of the province to take measures, under provincial legislation, for dealing with the emergency.
However, where the effects of a public welfare emergency are confined to one province, the federal government will not issue a declaration of a public welfare emergency or take other steps unless the Lieutenant Governor of the province has indicated to the federal Governor in Council that the emergency exceeds the capacity of the province to deal with it. Services provided by both upper and lower tiers, as well as municipal boards, should be included. 0.3(2) (b) of the Act, during a declared emergency the Premier, by order, may require any municipality to provide necessary assistance to an emergency area outside the jurisdiction of said municipality, and may also direct and control the provision of such assistance. If an emergency that has not been identified within the OIC occurs, MCSCS will be the primary ministry. The concepts and procedures for use by provincial and municipal officials in their respective emergency response plans are outlined in this plan. Those that have been assigned, under the OIC, the responsibility for a type of emergency, are expected to ensure that their emergency response plans are consistent with the PERP and coordinated in so far as possible with the emergency plans of other ministries. In addition, all Agencies, Boards and Commissions (ABCs) and any other branch of government would also be expected to provide a supporting role within their competencies. It is designed to integrate the efforts and resources of the Province of Ontario, municipalities, the private sector, and other nongovernmental organizations. Additionally, MAGs and MECGs must conduct an annual practice exercise for a simulated emergency incident in order to evaluate the respective ministry and municipal emergency response plan and their own procedures.
A copy of the Provincial Glossary of Terms is included as Annex D, with a list of Acronyms at Appendix 1.
Duplication and confusion can be kept to a minimum and the ability to conduct comprehensive, coordinated operations may be enhanced through the implementation of multi-disciplined actions that may be carried out irrespective of the hazard involved.
They can escalate more rapidly than individuals or community response organizations are able to handle. In responding to an emergency, a ministry may implement provisions from its ministry emergency response plan formulated for the type of emergency assigned to it.
Where reliable prediction is possible, action can be taken before the onset of an emergency.
Figure 3.1 depicts the normal two-way flow of emergency information between communities, ministries, other organizations and the PEOC. Therefore, an emergency could be declared if operational information indicates that immediate action is needed because of danger to individuals or property.
Rather, it merely requires that the decision-maker give consideration to the reasonableness of an emergency order in relation to other options that may be available. The CCEM is the only Cabinet Committee for which membership has been specified by portfolio. Sakurai visiting Fukushima Daiichi NPS on March 29, 2016, and receiving an explanation from TEPCO about improvements in water management, radiation reduction, working conditions, and progress in decommissioning. I have visited on a number of occasions before, and each time I see steady progress being made in what we all realize is a very long-term process.
Sakurai attending a briefing session on implementation guidelines of self-assessment for nuclear safety reforms from TEPCO’s Nuclear Reform Special Taskforce on February 4, 2016.
We meet on a regular basis to review TEPCO’s progress and provide our views, providing praise for progress when it has been earned, and pressing for more progress when we believe TEPCO needs to be pushed a little harder. Both accidents ultimately involved a failure of cooling systems, but the road to that failure was quite different. One thing led to another and a small amount of water found its way into an instrument airline. At my time as NRC Chairman, and more recently in my role as chair of the Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee, we have placed a great deal of emphasis on training. That is a considerably less significant factor here, and I am hopeful that the scientific rigor and discipline necessary for effective regulation will prevail. But the plant operator did not share this information with the industry and therefore operators at TMI were not aware and not trained to recover from this type of failure sequence. One of the results of the Three Mile Island accident was an evolution in the way we think about how and why things go wrong. But I will say that there are significant economic, environmental and security implications of that decision, and they are not limited to Japan.
Sakurai advised that TEPCO should make easy-to-understand materials showing its efforts on nuclear reform over the past two years. He also said that it is important that TEPCO creates an approach to self assessment on nuclear safety based on opinions from the sites. When the accident at Three Mile Island happened; I was chosen and told to go do cleanup work. You are on the cutting edge of the most advanced challenging technology activities in the world. It really is a highlight of my career to be able to play a role in helping TEPCO and the people of Japan cope with the challenges that were posed by the Great Japan Earthquake, the tsunami, and the accident at Fukushima Daiichi.
It will speed the revival of Japan’s nuclear power industry, which is essential to the continued reinvigoration of the Japanese economy. For the first two or three years after the accident, the focus was primarily on stabilization. This hydrogen originated in Unit 3 and there were initial incorrect claims that the spent fuel in Unit 4 had melted.
To their great credit, TEPCO and the government of Japan have, in fact, developed a long-term plan designed not only to clean up Fukushima but also restore TEPCO to economic health and ensure that it can continue to do its main job of providing safe electricity to fuel economic growth and enhance people’s lives. I believe he is bringing the vision, the leadership and focus that the work at Fukushima Daiichi requires. The major challenge for TEPCO is to manage the water safely and to communicate accurately the risks of this water. Each of those three categories involves multiple approaches – groundwater bypass, physical barriers, treatment facilities, and more.
As Lake will explain, we have a very high degree of confidence that the water can be cleaned to the point where it can be very safely returned to the ocean.
But I am confident that science and the need for a balanced energy policy, one that enables Japan to meet its commitments under the Kyoto protocols, will prevail. A new approach to management accountability has been put in place that emphasizes a safety culture throughout the company.
They communicated with the residents to relieve their anxiety by giving them correct information.
He related his family’s experience of the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant accident (they lived near the TMI nuclear power plant for three years following the accident) in order to contribute to the reconstruction of Fukushima. While the two situations are not identical, and the Fukushima event is more complex and will take longer to remediate, there are important psychological parallels for the people who live nearby: the anxiety, the unknowns, and the nagging feeling that they are being used as pawns in political and policy battles over the future of nuclear energy. Hearing their stories rekindled vivid memories of what we experienced 34 years ago at Three Mile Island. Like mothers anywhere, they are concerned for their children, and they are hungry for real information.
We know more about the carcinogenic effects of radiation than the effects of almost anything else, and it’s clear the exposure levels will be safe. The rice farmer wanted to know if his rice fields will become more contaminated by water flowing down the mountains.
TEPCO has undertaken a long-term commitment to support the revitalization of the Fukushima area, and I urge them to include these kinds of outreach as part of that revitalization effort.
A concerted outreach effort to the people of these communities, done in a way that respects Japanese culture and sensibilities, is essential if these determined but anxious people are to regain their confidence and their vision of a safe, prosperous, and happy future. Nuclear Regulatory Commission who currently chairs TEPCO's Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee, today remembered Ambassador Howard Baker as a great friend to Japan and a supporter of nuclear energy. Senator from Tennessee, Majority Leader, and served as White House chief of staff under President Ronald Reagan, died June 26 at age 88.
The Howard Baker Forum (howardbakerforum.org) has, in fact, played a role in educating the public about nuclear energy and counteracting the misinformation that has followed the accident at Japan's Fukushima nuclear plant.
Lake Barrett (Decommissioning member) held a meeting with the Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination & Decommissioning Engineering Company on May 2, 2014.
Barrett exchanged opinions on the formulation of the comprehensive and integrated water management plan.
Lake Barrett (Decommissioning member) held a telephone conference with the Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination & Decommissioning Engineering Company on April 4, 2014.
Barrett received explanations on the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) and the operating method of the groundwater bypass. He then listened to speeches by the President of TEPCO and the representative of the Fukushima Revitalization Headquarters. I remain concerned about the technical talent to manage the water issues and the lack of a long-term plan for the disposition of the filtered water currently stored in the tanks at Fukushima. Success will come as the result of many small learnings, and through the persistence of many individuals acting together. That is six years away, yet it is an ambitious goal given the fact that no one has ever faced such a challenge before. It is essential that TEPCO staff the new entity with people who have those attributes, and if you do not find the necessary technical talent in Japan that you look world-wide for the necessary talent to do it right and to do it safely.
The Japanese members of the Nuclear Reform Committee have been very helpful in providing suggestions for improvement.
Especially, it is a greater emphasis on communication within the organization, not just from the top down but even more from the bottom up and among all the employees. And so, as a result, some precautions weren’t taken against flooding the emergency generators. But I believe TEPCO’s leadership is committed to making it happen, and that they understand the necessity of succeeding. This effort may last from a few hours to several days or longer, depending on the situation.
Recovery activities usually begin almost as soon as the response begins and continue after the response activities cease.
Provincial resources deployed to deal with a significant hazardous materials incident could fall under the Provincial Counter-Terrorism Plan (PCTP)7 and the Supporting Plan for Terrorism Consequence Management (SPTCM)8, should there be a subsequent determination that the incident is terrorist related. This plan includes planning assumptions, roles and responsibilities, concept of operations, and plan maintenance instructions. Ministry plans generally require their Minister’s approval whereas municipal non-nuclear plans require passage of a by-law by council.
In many cases, these multi-disciplined actions parallel the normal day-to-day responsibilities and functions of provincial ministries and communities. Assistance may expand to the provision of personnel, equipment and other resources to assist a community in dealing with the cause of an emergency.
The answer must be a sustained informational programs that involve the government, universities, and the utilities themselves. They are not sharing as much information as they should and will not benefit from each other’s lessons learned. We discussed the actual importance of what you do here every single day and the importance of it to all the people in Japan and all the people in the world.
TEPCO is keenly aware of its responsibility to make progress while at the same time ensuring that the athletes and others who converge on Japan – and of course the people themselves who live near Fukushima -- will have complete confidence in their health and safety.
A distinct entity would assemble the right skills, have the necessary long-term focus, and provide the essential accountability to get the job done safely. But we also recognize this is a deeply divisive and sensitive issue for the people of Japan, and while we can advise on the science, only the Japanese people can decide the ultimate course of action. I have visited KK several times and have been impressed by the safety enhancements implemented at this site. Chairman Sudo, who comes to TEPCO from the steel industry, brings a commitment both to safety and the need to meet high international expectations. To paraphrase President Kennedy’s inaugural address, the work will not be finished in a thousand days, nor even perhaps in our lifetime.
Lynn, who at the time was a childbirth nurse in the local hospital, shared the concerns of many mothers. It won’t, partly because whatever was deposited in the soil three years ago is already decaying substantially and will continue to do so.
Of all of the many issues facing us, this is perhaps the simplest to solve but creates the most public anxiety. I am encouraged by the fact that their Nuclear Reform Plan incorporates extensive changes in management structure as well as training and communications, all with the focus on establishing this safety culture.
As response activities begin to taper off, the operational focus begins to shift from response to recovery. The plan description should include the term Approved Plan and the date approved for implementation, e.g. The most important aspect after the accident was to keep both the fuel in the reactors and the spent fuel pools cooled and TEPCO achieved this task. An example of this was a total work stoppage after several spent fuel assemblies were removed to evaluate what went well and where safety enhancements might be recommended. It is extremely important for TEPCO to have a timely communication program both within Japan and internationally. Lake Barrett will describe these to you in greater detail, from the perspective of someone who experienced some of these challenges when he was the senior government official involved in cleaning up Three Mile Island after the accident in Pennsylvania.
And I have previously expressed my reservations about how effective the frozen soil wall will be in keeping water out of the reactor building basements.
TEPCO and the government of Japan will need to educate the public on the real risks and they will have to counter considerable misinformation. Those now engaged in D&D work can justly take pride in the progress they are making in fuel removal, implementing water management strategies, and in other aspects of the cleanup. But it has begun, and I have every confidence that the Japanese people, whose rich and ancient culture measures time on a much longer scale than we impatient Americans, will see it through to the end. And although Jessica wasn’t yet born in 1980, her father grew up and went to school near the shadow of the Three Mile Island cooling towers. All the residents, whether evacuated or not, also had to contend with the effects the Great Japan Earthquake that generated the tsunami and destroyed or damaged thousands of their homes.
In fact, these people who bore the brunt of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident are now being hurt a fourth time by those whose agenda is served by portraying the residents as perpetual victims. Fisherman worried that even though their fish is rigorously tested and proven safe; there is a stigma to the name Fukushima that will discourage purchasers. But I remain hopeful that the improvements to treatment capacity along with other strategies to reduce that rate of accumulation will reduce the quantity of contaminated water. That re-examines conventional wisdom and recognizes that ensuring safety is an unending process that requires constant diligence and critical thinking. These same unfortunate questions burdened the good farmers near Three Mile Island, however they faded with time as the public recognized the quality and safety of the Central Pennsylvania food products. Similar preparations are underway for the removal of spent fuel from the other three damaged Units. Every worker at a nuclear plant needs to think safety in all the actions they take, every day, every hour and every minute. But for every valve, every pump, and every switch, there have to be people who understand what each one means to plant safety and operation. In the end, it is the people who will make the difference, technology will only help them do their jobs better.



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