Earthquake safety with anna wainscott,captain america 2 the winter soldier full movie free download,can ticks live in cold,disaster preparedness day 2014 67th - Step 3

Playrific makes childrens apps with exciting, intelligent, educational & fun content from around the world. I worked with radioactive isotopes known as radionuclides in laboratory research for almost three decades in my professional career. At Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS, operators were able to recover recordings of ground motion from only one third of roughly 100 recording locations [7]. Peak ground acceleration (PGA) on the reactor building base mats exceeded the design basis for all seven units. The apparent disassociation between earthquake magnitude, observed peak ground acceleration and damage led to the search for new indicators better predicting quake damage.
Standardized cumulative absolute velocities [g-sec] are plotted against the magnitude of quakes that shook nuclear power stations before 2011.
Foreshadowing the reactor catastrophe at Fukushima, however, in tests during the restart of Kashiwasaki-Kariwa Unit 7 in May 2009 the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system, or RCIC for short, did not perform as expected because of valve failure. RCIC steam entered a pressure control chamber at the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel, and the cooling water in the chamber rose. TEPCO insists that the total station blackout, caused by the loss of emergency diesel power through tsunami inundation, precipitated the reactor fuel core meltdowns at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS [13]. Of the six reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, units 5 and 6 were least affected by the tsunami and exhibited the smallest PGA exceedance [13]. In fact, the lessons learned from both earthquakes in Japan stipulate that ground motion in exceedance of the design basis may impact nuclear power station systems, structures and components (SSC) in subtle ways. According to the findings in Japan discussed above, this peak ground acceleration merely touches the threshold at which damage to systems, structures and components must be expected at nuclear power stations.
In addition, VEPCO provided the peak ground accelerations (PGA) the company used to calculate the design basis spectra for North Anna NPS. Stipulated peak ground acceleration limits for rock (reactor building foundation) and soil (foundation of turbine buildings and ancillary structures) by direction of the ground motion for Operating Basis Earthquake and Design Basis Earthquake (VEPCO, Sep.
The stipulated PGAs vary for ground motion direction and ground type, that is rock and soil on which the reactor buildings and ancillary structures are built, respectively. The two graphs above show the seismic response spectra constructed from the data VEPCO recovered from the base mat seismometers of the North Anna NPS Unit 1 reactor building. However, VEPCO reasoned that the anticipated damage might not have been detrimental to the safety of North Anna NPS, because quake duration and DBE exceedance were short in comparison with other known damaging quakes. Standardized cumulative absolute velocities [g-sec] calculated by three expert companies from the observed North Anna NPS Unit 1 reactor building base mat accelerations for ground motion in the three directions.
Standardized cumulative absolute velocities [g-sec] calculated from recordings and modeled for the three directions of motion on the North Anna NPS Unit 1 reactor building base mat.
The standardized cumulative absolute velocities determined for recorded North-South ground motion on the base mat of North Anna NPS Unit 1 reactor building exceeded OBE, necessitating the shutdown of both units. By contrast, the greatest recording-based CAV at Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS reached 2.8 g-sec, 16-times the highest CAV at North Anna NPS.
North Anna NPS lost offside power because of a disruption in the switchyard, necessitating the startup of emergency diesel generators.
Moisture separator drain pipe support moved in Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 5 turbine building (TEPCO). Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 6 concrete pedestal of feed water heater in the turbine building (TEPCO). The above similarities suggest that it may be imprudent to underestimate the possibility of damage to North Anna NPS comparable to that observed at nuclear power stations in Japan after a 6-upper quake, because of similar differences between ground motion anticipated in design and ground motion actually occurring.
The reactor core decay heat persisting after a scram must be transferred to the ultimate heat sink. According to CBS Channel 6 News, Richmond, VA, the water level of Lake Anna had fallen roughly two feet after the quake [17].
All SSC of the emergency core cooling system, including condensate storage tanks, are important to seismic safety and should be tested structurally and functionally. Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety -The Accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations- submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency Jun 7, 2011.
Measures taken by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency concerning the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, affected by the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake (2nd Interim Report), June 29, 2009, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency. TEPCO Press Release (Jul 30, 2007) The (First) Report on the Analysis of Observed Seismic Data Collected in Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station on the Occasion of the Niigata-Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake in 2007. Naeim F, Kircher CA (2001) On the damping adjustment factors for earthquake response spectra. Antaki G, Johnson J (2011) Seismic design and retrofit of essential systems in nuclear power plants. Ochiai, K, Kobayashi K, Chigama A (2010) Damage Indicating Parameters and Damage Modes of Mechanical Components. Additional Report of Japanese Government to IAEA - Accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations Transmitted by Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, Government of Japan, 15 Sep. Campbell KW, Bozorgnia Y (2010) Analysis of cumulative absolute velocity (CAV) and JMA instrumental seismic intensity (IJMA) using the PEER-NGA strong motion database. PEER 102.
Dominion is one of the nation’s largest producers and transporters of energy and routinely prepares for threats to service.
On the morning of August 24, North Anna downgraded from an Alert to a Notice of Unusual Event, the lowest of the four emergency classification levels, while the reactor cool-down and inspections of plant equipment and systems continued. Due to additional seismic activity, North Anna declared a second Unusual Event on August 25 following a reported magnitude 4.5 aftershock. It is important to recall that the Central Virginia temblor occurred six months after the devastating earthquake and tsunami that crippled Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear station. Dominion soon realized the company would need to develop and obtain approval from the NRC for the appropriate process to restart the two units. Within 24 hours, the company’s North Anna Power Station restored off-site power and exited the emergency plan after completing all walkdown inspections of equipment most susceptible to seismic damage. Using an NRC-endorsed document prepared by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the company assessed the overall impact on the station.
Additionally, the company immediately brought in some of the top external seismic experts to walk down the station and put eyes on important adjacent structures to make sure the station was safe and that the company was not overlooking anything. In the days and weeks that followed, a special NRC inspection team, with full cooperation from Dominion, thoroughly evaluated the company’s response to the earthquake, including initial actions by control room operators to place the unit in a safe and stable condition. Additional inspections and analysis were performed by the NRC, and the company thoroughly documented its own inspections and analysis and responded to every question posed to it by NRC inspectors, engineers, and seismic experts. Examples of minor damage included nonstructural concrete cracking, insulation that was shaken off some pipes, and broken seals on electrical insulators attached to the main station transformers. As the reactors were returned to service, various measurements were taken each step of the way toward full-power operations to ensure that the equipment was operating as designed. Dominion placed its greatest emphasis on delivering the highest margin of safety and reliability as the North Anna units were returned to service. The company and the NRC conducted thousands of inspections and exhaustive safety analyses, including of structural components, low-margin components, electrical systems, the Lake Anna Reservoir, the Waste Heat Treatment Facility, the North Anna Dam, the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation concrete pads and steel casks, and fuel and reactor vessel internal inspections. The overall effort to inspect and analyze the thousands of structures, systems, and components prior to returning the units to service required more than 110,000 person-hours and an expenditure of more than $21 million to fully ensure safety, repairs, and a station that was demonstrated to be ready for restart and continued safe operation.
Over the past several years, a project jointly funded by the NRC, the Department of Energy, and EPRI developed new methodologies and data to determine the seismic hazard for this region.
When the quake occurred, between the time that the earthquake hit Japan and the growing realization that the seismic hazard for some U.S. Dominion took the initiative to determine the process, communicate the details to the NRC and the public, systematically carry out the plan, and, finally, present the results in a clear, convincing manner. In Dominion’s management of the restoration effort, safety was never compromised and electrical service to customers was never interrupted, even though the large generation station was out of service for nearly three months.
Dominion followed extensive safety verifications in restarting the units and worked very closely with the NRC and other organizations to involve them in the restart process and keep them informed step by step.
The NRC conducted and Dominion participated in four public meetings—two in Louisa County and two at NRC headquarters in Rockville, Md. All in all, Dominion’s rapid and effective response to the record Central Virginia quake prevented an unreasonably extended outage.
Clearly, the events of August 23 presented a challenge not only to Dominion but also to the entire nuclear power industry. POWERnews is a weekly e-newsletter that keeps you informed about the latest developments in the electric power industry. Since three reactor fuel cores have melted down at the Fukushima Dai-ichi (number one) Nuclear Power Station (NPS) owned by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) in the aftermath of theTohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake and Tsunami on March 11, 2011 [1], I am concerned about the safety of nuclear power reactors. Reactor fuel core cooling could not be maintained, the fuel began to melt, and radioactive material could not be contained.
No doubt Japanese engineers have collected in-depth theoretical and empirical knowledge on the effects of seismic waves on industrial systems, structures and components, particularly in nuclear engineering.
Fortunately, recordings could be retrieved from the bottom floors of the seven reactor buildings, known as base mats.


Radioactive gaseous effluent was released into the atmosphere because of a malfunction of the HVAC system.
For example, cracks were found in the rotor shaft and blades of power-generating low pressure main steam turbines. The currently used measurements of magnitude and ground motion do not adequately appreciate the temblor’s duration.
Magnitude is expressed as seismic intensity on the IJMA scale used by the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA). They were disconnected from the power grid when the quake struck, undergoing tests fully loaded with fuel.
Although quake damage may mainly be detected on less quake-resistant SSC categorized B (SBC-II) and C (SBC-III), they warrant in-depth inspections for potential hidden damage of all SCC, regardless of class.
21 meeting, VEPCO presented accelerograms retrieved from the reactor building base mat of North Anna NPS Unit 1. According to Antaki and Johnson (2011)[11], NPS systems, structures and components are designed to withstand ground motion based on the operation basis earthquake, or OBE for short, which is anchored at half the PGA used to determine the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), that is at the ground motion at which the reactors are to be shut down to protect their safety. The operator reasoned that cumulative absolute velocity (CAV), which takes the duration of the quake into account, represents a more accurate damage predictor than PGA, as discussed in context with the NCO Earthquake and the Tohoku Earthquake. Note that North-South direction motion exceeded the NRC prescribed limit of 0.16 g-sec below which a nuclear power reactor can be operated safely (VEPCO, Sep. The observed velocities did not exceed the modeled design base earthquake (DBE) and the limits modeled in the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) (VEPCO, Oct. Yet, the values remained below the cumulative absolute velocities calculated for DBE as well as the higher limits calculated in the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) stipulated by the NRC. For ground motion predictions, Campbell and Bozorgnia (2011) plotted the standardized cumulative absolute velocity against IJMA, that is the quake intensity the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) uses (Fig. This event arguably represents the most consequential impact of the Virginia quake on the NPS known to date.
Notably, differences in ground motion between the reactors built on rock and ancillary structures and components built on soil may exacerbate quake impact on their connections. For example, North Anna NPS uses Lake Anna, a dammed lake created for the purpose, as ultimate heat sink in a one-through design. Particular attention must be paid to SDC-II and III SSC built on soil that are connected with SDC-I SSC built on rock, because soil ground motion is commonly greater than rock ground motion.
Like at Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS Unit 7, function tests of ECCS components during restart will show whether the reactors can be operated safely.
1st Kashiwazaki International Symposium on Seismic Safety of Nuclear Installations and Embedded Topical Meetings: C-13. 1st Kashiwazaki International Symposium on Seismic Safety of Nuclear Installations and Embedded Topical Meetings: C-24.
After 80 days of extensive evaluation and inspection by plant staff and representatives from the U.S. Immediately, the company focused on ensuring that station workers and the public were safe. The plant exited the Unusual Event that afternoon, after completing all walkdown inspections of the equipment that is most susceptible to seismic activity. The Japanese accident caused governments around the world to reevaluate their nuclear energy policies, and public interest in nuclear energy greatly intensified.
This was in keeping with the company’s formal Corporate Emergency Response Plan, which includes an extensive public communications program. In fact, the extensive engineering analysis completed by the company demonstrated that it could have safely withstood a quake well above that experienced. On a scale from zero (where no functional damage is observed) to three (where very significant damage has occurred), the company’s detailed inspections determined that the earthquake ranked as zero impact for North Anna. Before the NRC allowed the units to restart, the company had provided the NRC with more than 1,000 pages of documentation (Figure 2). This process required significantly increased staffing, with representation from Engineering, Operations, Outage and Planning, Maintenance, and Management onsite 24 hours a day, seven days a week. It indicated that virtually no damage to safety-related systems and structures should be expected and that only very minimal damage should occur to other components. 8: At the first of what will be four public meetings, Dominion makes an initial presentation on the earthquake and its impact on North Anna Power Station to NRC staff in Rockville, Md. 21: Dominion makes its third public meeting appearance with the NRC, this time in front of the NRC commissioners at NRC headquarters in Rockville. 1: The NRC has its fourth public meeting, this time in Louisa County, to present its Restart Readiness Inspection Team report. 11: Dominion receives NRC letter granting it permission to restart North Anna Power Station.
Ongoing communications efforts included daily internal updates through conference calls as well as coverage in the company’s employee online Connect Today news service, in its newsmagazine Connect, and in internal briefings. The company hosted North Anna tours for local and national news media to show them the station and the small amount of minor of damage incurred at the site and to counteract any criticism and misinformation by anti-nuclear organizations.
The company worked with the NRC to establish the protocol for recovering from a nuclear station shutdown caused by an earthquake.
The Government of Japan reports that 15,687 people lost their lives and 4,757 are still missing as of Aug. After powerful hydrogen explosions, still unknown amounts of radioactive material were released into the air and the sea.
All nuclear power stations in Japan are equipped with seismometers that record ground motion in three dimensions and automatically scram nuclear reactors at predetermined set-points.
As typical examples, the accelerogram for the East-West ground motion recorded on the base mat of Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS Unit 2 is shown below as well as the observed acceleration response spectrum (thick line) and the design-basis (S2, thin line) acceleration response spectrum for the same location. At Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, the RCIC systems of the two operating reactors outfitted with this system would fail last March, profoundly impeding the operator’s efforts of preventing the reactor fuel cores from melting down. TEPCO’s interpretation is supported by the ground motion recorded on the base mats of the reactor buildings.
Combined with the findings at Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS after the NCO Earthquake, the seismic impact uncovered at these units may provide valuable lessons for predictions of future quake damage at nuclear power stations. By and large minor damage was found at monuments, as well as at governmental, residential and commercial buildings, extending over a surprisingly large area. Damage was to be expected at class B and C systems, structures, and components, that is SSCs unimportant for reactor safety. So far, the station inspection uncovered minor damage to SDC-II and SDC-III systems, structures, and components unimportant to reactor safety. The heat transfer to the ultimate sink is crucial to cooling the reactors, preventing fuel core meltdowns with disastrous consequences as the reactor accidents at Fukushima 1 NPS last March strikingly demonstrate.
8 meeting in Rockville, VEPCO stated that an inspection of the dam provided no evidence of quake damage. Differences in ground motion between rock and soil may result in damage to the connections between SSC built on either substrate.
I thank MJ Racer whose cogent post on physicsforums (comment number 10945) provided the lead for this essay. Then it began a thorough plant inspection process and proactively and transparently communicated with internal and external stakeholders that the reactors were in a safe and stable condition. North Anna again declared an Unusual Event on the morning of September 1 for an aftershock, exiting the event shortly after noon that day. Apart from North Anna, each of the affected stations notified the NRC of the unusual event and that they had not sustained any plant damage, interruption of service, or public safety issues. However, to be extra thorough and safe, the company proceeded to evaluate the station as if the quake had an impact of one on the scale. Dominion visually inspected 100 feet of safety-related buried pipe with wall thickness verified by ultrasonic measurements.
These lessons were blended with Dominion’s already robust restart review and monitoring process. According to EPRI, CAV provides a better measure of the potential for damage to plant systems and structures for a specific earthquake than does a comparison of the experienced accelerations to the design response spectra.
The intensity of the earthquake was high but exceeded the plant’s design basis for only about 3 seconds. Dominion was able to demonstrate that the proposed startup plan would lead to safe and successful restoration of the station. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sends an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) to North Anna.
The NRC also announces that it will dispatch a Restart Readiness Inspection team to the station.
The company confirms no functional damage was found after more than 100,000 hours of inspection and units are ready to restart, pending NRC approval.


Dominion confirms no functional damage was found, and units are ready to restart, pending NRC approval. Company representatives made presentations to civic organizations about the earthquake and activities undertaken to return the units to service. Coverage was local, regional, national, and international, with company representatives issuing no fewer than four formal media announcements and participating in several hundred interviews. The company went above and beyond regulatory requirements and in short, efficient order established the safety of its units and had them back online to produce low-cost, emissions-free power for its customers. The substantial assistance provided by many Dominion employees in the preparation of this article is gratefully acknowledged.
Roughly 80,000 people living in immediate proximity of the power station were evacuated and have not been able to return home, except for brief visits [2].
Unit 4 was shutdown for service at the time of the earthquake and tsunami (source cryptome.org). The quake automatically tripped the four reactors that were operating.Kayen and others (2007) [6] examined the geotectal causes for the quake in great detail and compiled a comprehensive account on land failure and the damage to infrastructure in the region.
Note 5% damping is assumed in the calculations, because the structures absorb quake energy [9]. Visual inspection during extensive post-quake walkdowns, pressure and function tests were carried out on about 20,600 components, instruments, panels and valves and 155,000 meters of pipe [10]. Though PGAs broadly exceeded design basis in the horizontal East-West direction at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, the greatest exceedance was roughly a third of that found at Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS after the NCO Earthquake, that is the greatest exceedance was only 1.26-fold at Unit 2. Unit 1 closest to the water front is the oldest commercial nuclear power reactor of Japan completed in 1971.
VEPCO is determined to restart the reactors as soon as the inspections are completed, and the NRC approved the results. The figure below as well as other North Anna NPS data shown in this post were released for the two NRC meetings. The plot shows a close direct proportionality between the logarithm of cumulative absolute velocity and the JMA quake intensity scale. 8 meeting revealed that the control room operators at North Anna NPS lacked information on containment motion when they needed it most, because at the time of the quake seismic instruments had lost power. The preservation of the ultimate heat sink and its use via residual heat removal systems are of existential importance to reactor safety.
At Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, efforts to prevent the meltdowns of the fuel cores of units 2 and 3 were rendered ineffective by the failure of reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems and high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) systems. If you wish to reproduce any of our content in full or in more than a phrase or quote, please contact us first to obtain permission. Although the plant did not experience any permanent damage, the process to gain approval for restart of the two units took 80 days. As a result of the earthquake, the plant lost off-site power from the switchyard, but back-up power from diesel generators picked up the load within 8 seconds, as designed. Over several weeks after the initial earthquake, the plant experienced a number of aftershocks, none resulting in any impact to plant structures, systems, or components.
There was never any doubt that the company’s first priority was to ensure public safety.
System Engineering and Operations physically observed and monitored the systems as they were placed in service, as well as the containment building, to make sure all components were working properly and as expected. In fact, the company went beyond established protocol to first convince itself that the station sustained no functional damage and could be restarted safely before presenting its finding to the NRC, which had to give permission for the units to return to service. The AIT finds that Dominion responded appropriately to protect the public and that the units are safe. The company states that while some ground force acceleration frequencies exceeded the station’s design basis for about 3 seconds, the overall impact to the station was well below the design basis, and the minor damage found bears this out. McDonnell and House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, whose Seventh Congressional District includes the site. In contrast, repairs to the Washington Monument are scheduled to begin late this year and are expected to require 12 to 18 months to complete, even though a local philanthropist donated half the cost of repairs shortly after the quake.
Soil and sea near the NPS are highly contaminated with radioactive material, and long-lived radionuclides have been found foods like rice [3] and beef [4] at levels too high for consumption. I have explained fundamental wave concepts underlying earthquakes in the context of the Great Haiti Earthquake of Jan. Nuclear power station systems, structures and components (SSC) are classified in three groups of importance for seismic safety.
Because of the broad exceedance of the design basis earthquake at the seven units, additional safeguards were installed, and new spectra were computed to ensure that the implemented measures strengthened the design basis.
Standardized cumulative absolute velocities are filtered for non-damaging ground motion frequencies. Units 5 and 6, set apart on the upper right, are the youngest reactors (source cryptome.org). In sum, the reactors are supposed to be shut down at peak ground accelerations much below DBE.
The alarms that would have informed the operators whether the ground motion warranted a shutdown failed.
21 meeting, VEPCO elaborated that Lake Anna and its main dam do not represent the ultimate heat sink for the station, but that this function is served by a smaller body of water separated from the lake by another dam. But Dominion also knew that in this time of extreme sensitivity to nuclear energy, the company’s response could very well set the tone for the future of nuclear energy policy. That decision went a long way to establish up front that the company would be conservative and systematic.
At various phases, power escalation was stopped so additional testing could be performed to validate that equipment used to measure reactor power was all working precisely.
This was because comparatively little was known at the time about the seismology of the eastern half of the U.S. SSCs in the most important group did not appear to have incurred any damage at Kashiwasaki-Kariwa NPS. Therefore, VEPCO’s cumulative absolute velocities may underrate the possible extent of the damage. Combined with the failure of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system primarily attributed to tsunami damage, these shortcomings contributed in no small part to the failure of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS).
Dominion has since been lauded by nuclear safety experts as a prime example of an excellent nuclear safety culture. This group is known as class A in Japan and seismic design category I, or SDC-I for short, in the U.S (Antaki and Johnson, 2011) [11]. 28, VEPCO informed the NRC that negative power flux rates at the station caused the scrams.
Regardless of this barrier, the lake represents the ultimate heat sink, if only indirectly. The inspections at North Anna NPS must ensure that all SSC of the ECCS conform to the highest seismic safety level and can withstand the ground motion the station is anticipated to incur by substantial margin. The costs of this crisis and its long-term consequences are unfathomable, but will be in the hundreds of billion yen. In this essay, I shall attempt to explain in more detail measurements of ground motion, projections of observations, and their relationship with quake damage at nuclear power stations. Damage, deformation, and impeded function were uncovered only on class B (SDC-II) and C (SDC-III) systems, structures and components deemed unimportant to reactor safety.
Seismic recordings were obtained from the Unit 1 reactor containment base mat as well as the turbine buildings and sent out for evaluation in the days after the incident by the station’s operator, (Dominion) Virginia Electrical and Power Company, or VEPCO for short.
Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that recorded peak ground motions were greater than assumed in the DBE.
The question what might have precipitated the reported rapid loss of water from the lake remains to be answered. In addition, VEPCO immediately carried out walkdowns, visually inspecting the station’s systems, structures and components (SSC) for damage. Automatic seismic scram systems may have benefitted the operators in shutting down the station’s two reactors more expediently. Uncovering the cause for such drastic water level diminution, should it be confirmed, might be of profound importance for the seismic safety of North Anna NPS, because the Lake Anna constitutes the ultimate heat sink for the decay heat of the reactor fuel cores during shutdown.
VEPCO should be asked to evaluate whether state-of-the-art automated seismic scram systems would reduce current levels of seismic risk.
Moreover, it seems prudent to independently retrofit all seismically important instrumentation with 24 hour-lived batteries.



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