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As an Emergency Case Assistant you would work on emergency cases usually in a hospital or children’s related situation. You will need to be hard working, confident, and thick skinned to deal with some very difficult and traumatic cases. If you have found a role in which you want to apply for, please see the below covering letter which may help you. I have recently seen your role for an Emergency Case Assistant advertised in (where) and (when) and I would like to apply for this role. I have done some work experience in working with children in difficult situations at family centres and feel that with the studies (what) that I have done and combined work experience that I would make a good Emergency Case Assistant. I am very thorough in my work, I communicate well with others and I am very good at managing different projects at once.
I am hard working and committed to my career choice, I am able to work any shift pattern or days and have no commitments that I am unable to change if I were on call for example.
I have a confident attitude and outlook on life and I like to ensure situations are turned around as needed to be improved for the better. I have enclosed my CV which shows my experiences in detail, if you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. A municipal evacuation plan will help streamline the evacuation process by providing an organized framework for the activities involved in coordinating and conducting an evacuation. The aim of an evacuation plan is to allow for a safe, effective, and coordinated evacuation of people from an emergency area. A municipal evacuation plan may be a stand-alone plan or part of a larger, overarching municipal emergency response plan. Municipal Evacuation Plans should outline how needed functions will be performed and by what organization (e.g.
Consider the characteristics of the municipality that may affect the execution of an incident-specific evacuation plan. Is the municipality single, upper, or lower tier and how will that affect responsibilities during an evacuation? Is the location of the municipality and the populated areas likely to impose particular challenges for an evacuation? List hazards that have the greatest potential to require an evacuation (Refer to the municipal Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) or Community Risk Profile). Does the hazard have the potential to migrate outside of municipal boundaries or does it start elsewhere and migrate into the municipal boundaries?
Identify the process for conducting real-time threat assessments and how the real-time threat assessment will inform the decision to evacuate. Since the presence of contaminants in an emergency area will greatly complicate evacuation operations, a municipality’s evacuation plan should take into account procedures and equipment for these situations. In addition to the effects on emergency responders, residents may also be limited in their ability to move through the affected area safely.
In order to prevent the spread of contamination, evacuees may need to be isolated from unaffected locations and populations until being decontaminated. Emergency managers must understand the makeup of the population who are to be evacuated before they can make decisions about transportation modes, route selections, hosting destinations, and the many other elements of an evacuation. For planning purposes it may be advisable to increase the estimate of evacuees to account the evacuation shadow (these are the people who evacuate though they are not officially requested to do so.) This is a spontaneous evacuation, conducted when people feel they are in danger and begin to leave in advance of official instructions to do so or in spite of advice to shelter-in-place. Details on populations that may require special assistance during an evacuation may be obtained from the departments and organizations involved in planning, such as public health, social services, etc.
To ensure that considerations such as advance warning and transportation are factored into the planning, areas with high concentrations of people needing additional assistance to evacuate should be identified. Long-term care residents may require vehicles equipped to serve riders in wheelchairs or medical transportation. An evacuation involving incarcerated individuals would require secure transport and hosting arrangements. In municipalities where the majority of evacuees make their own transportation and shelter arrangements, it may not be necessary to compile lists of evacuees according to categories (Ideally, evacuees would still register to allow for tracking and inquiry). Evacuations may take place prior to (pre-emptive), during (no-notice), or after (post-incident) an incident has occurred. Given adequate warning about a hazard, sufficient resources, and a likely threat, it is advisable to conduct pre-emptive evacuations. It may be advisable to carry out an evacuation even while a threat is affecting a community.
Partial evacuations typically are localized to a specific area of a municipality and may be caused by fires, hazardous materials incidents, etc.
Incidents that precipitate a wide-spread evacuation typically cause far-reaching damage and are therefore more likely to compromise critical infrastructure in a manner that hinders evacuee movement. An internal evacuation is where evacuees are hosted at another location within the same municipality as opposed to being hosted by another municipality. Spontaneous evacuation (self-evacuation) is when people choose to evacuate without explicit direction to do so. If the present location affords adequate protection against the particular incident, emergency managers should consider having people shelter-in-placevii to reduce the number of persons who become part of an evacuation. Once emergency managers have determined the number and geographic distribution of potential evacuees, these statistics can be analyzed against the transportation network. What is the distribution of the evacuating population with respect to roadways and highways?
What planning, operational staff, systems, and activities are needed to implement the chosen tactics during an evacuation? Should lanes be dedicated for high occupancy vehicles and any other special population groups (i.e.
Recognize that different traffic management tactics (and different routes) may be more or less appropriate for certain types of situations.
These figures are average and do not take into consideration an emergency situation or other factors that may be present during an evacuation. Pre-planning assists decision-makers in determining suitable transportation options for inclusion in the incident-specific plan. The traffic management section outlines tactics that may be used to move traffic more efficiently. For incidents of longer duration, these assembly points can serve as collection points for evacuees who have walked or ridden transit from the at-risk area, and who now must wait for transport (buses, etc.) to longer-term sheltering facilities.
The ability of a sheltering facility to accommodate such special needs groups will depend on its on-site design and capabilities.
By comparing shelter capabilities and capacities with the anticipated evacuation population, a jurisdiction can ensure it has made adequate sheltering arrangements, including the appropriate staffing levels for each shelter.
By pre-identifying sheltering facilities, their locations can be evaluated in relation to proposed evacuation routes and other components of the transportation network. In terms of First Nation evacuations, JEMS Service-level Evacuation Standardsx defines short-term shelter services as a period between 1 and 14 days. Municipalities may set-up and support shelters with municipal staff or they may have an agreement with another organization (e.g.
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) can be used to analyze available data, including highlighting key aspects of the potential evacuation populations. Pre-planning can be used to help determine specific evacuation strategies should one of the pre-identified incidents occur. The plan must state who has the authority to initiate the notification process and implement the plan. Evacuation should be considered when other response measures are insufficient to ensure public safety. The urgency of an evacuation is determined based on the immediacy of the threat to the community (life, safety, health, and welfare), the resilience of the community, and (depending on the nature of the threat) the availability of resources for evacuation or shelter-in-place. Pre-planning and analysis conducted in the development of the municipal evacuation plan will be instrumental in creating an incident-specific plan (IAP). Based on the outcome of the real-time threat assessment, consider the type of evacuation required or if shelter-in-place is appropriate. Staging resources and phasing evacuations may alleviate some of the above complicating factors. Information may be pre-scripted and included as part of the Municipal Evacuation Plan or elsewhere (i.e. Consider including information regarding language and communications barriers for at-risk populations. Ongoing communications should be maintained through the length of the evacuation until the return is completed. Detail what departments, organizations, and individuals would have a role in the implementation of the plan and list specific responsibilities. What are the roles and responsibilities of the lead and other response organizations involvedxii?
Who are the partners (additional subject matter experts required in the EOC to provide additional expertise)?
If a third party is contracted by a municipality to provide services in an evacuation, its roles and responsibilities should be outlined within the agreement (e.g. Requests for additional assistance should be made through the PEOC (including requests for Government of Canada assistance). A municipality may choose to identify an Evacuation Coordinator to lead an evacuation with minimum delay and confusion in the event of an emergency. Regardless of the stage of the evacuation operation there are four roles a municipality may assume while involved in an evacuation effort. Identify resources needed to support the evacuation and the process for acquiring them (e.g. When the emergency that prompted the evacuation has been resolved it will be necessary to plan for the return of evacuees.
Since the degree of damage will likely vary within the affected area it might be beneficial to initiate a phased re-entry process. Evacuees who self-evacuated using their own means of transportation should be able to return on their own. What media sources can evacuees use for the most up-to-date information on re-entry procedures? Following the return of evacuees, consider when to terminate the declaration of emergency – reference the Municipal Emergency Response Plan. Discuss who generates the above, when they will be created, to whom they will be presented, and how the lessons learned will be incorporated into the evacuation plan.
Successful efforts for public education include community seminars and preparedness pamphlets distributed to residents and businesses. Based on recommended practices, consider including COOP as part of the risk management process. This municipal evacuation plan will help streamline the evacuation process by providing an organized framework for the activities involved in coordinating and conducting an evacuation.
The aim of this evacuation plan is to allow for a safe, effective, and coordinated evacuation of people from an emergency area in [insert the Name of the Municipality].
This winter, staff from the Center for GIS and RESI took on a data visualization project for the Johns Hopkins University and the associated anchor institution strategy entitled Homewood Community Partners Initiative (HCPI). To build these dashboards, our team collected and processed data from a variety of sources such as the American Community Survey (Census), Baltimore City Department of Planning, Open Baltimore, the Maryland State Department of Education, and several HCPI partner organizations. The visualizations are dynamic in the sense that as more years of data are added to the underlying spreadsheets, data points and totals will change, and the axes will expand. We can maximize use of space by building charts that contain selectors that allow the user to switch between years, or other aspects of the data, or both. While Tableau’s mapping capabilities are somewhat limited as compared to other mapping-specific software, we were able to build focused, interactive maps into the dashboards.
Every visualization—maps included—has built-in tooltips so users can hover over areas and see numbers and information from the spreadsheets. Creating the dashboards has been an iterative process of exploring the data and experimenting to determine which techniques best illustrate trends in data, or best fit a particular metric. While experimenting with color schemes and switching among the template chart types is quick in Tableau, adding final touches to produce a finished look can be time-consuming. While the HCPI dashboard is intended to be internal, we are excited to share a few screenshots of the work we’ve done to help the partnership track and evaluate progress toward their goals. Our Work From mapping applications to economic impact studies, our diverse project portfolio focuses on ensuring Maryland’s small businesses, government agencies, and non-profit organizations have the tools and data needed to make informed decisions. Our PeopleOur team of GIS specialists, systems engineers, economists, marketers, project managers, curriculum and training developers, business analysts, and programmers work together to create innovative and research-driven solutions for our clients across Maryland’s private and public sectors. The wide scope of online identity fraud has goaded the FBI, FTC, and independent businesses to issue warnings on how to avoid online scams and keep yourself protected. Always question e-mails and opportunities that seem too good to be true, because they almost always are. The Muslim Social Services Agencya€™s (MSSA) mission is to provide care, resources and services to those in need. It is estimated that there are 3,419 men, women, and children who are homeless in Baltimore on any given night. The Army Director of Military Support, Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations and Plans, agreed to institutionalize the functions of the CoMPIO within the DoD.
In response to the mandates contained in Presidential Decision Directive-39 and the Act, DoD established a Tiger Team within the Army. The overall audit objective was to evaluate the program management of CB defense resources in the National Guard and Reserve forces. The special management structure established in January 1998 for the WMD-CST program did not lead to effective management. Doctrine for the WMD-CST was not developed in coordination with the Joint Staff or with the Army's Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel and Soldier process. The CoMPIO draft doctrine lacked specific detail concerning command relationships when the WMD-CSTs are federalized. The mission of the WMD-CSTs and their relationship with other Federal organizations was also not adequately defined.
Unless the roles and missions of the WMD-CSTs are clearly defined in doctrine and coordinated among all agencies with likely involvement in WMD incidents, the Federal response could be hampered significantly.
A clear and concise doctrine should have been promulgated before the establishment and fielding of any WMD-CSTs. The criteria established for certification of the WMD-CSTs were not meaningful and did not meet the requirements of the law. A reserve component rapid assessment element team [CSTJ], and any Reserve assigned to such a team, may not be used to respond to an emergency . The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake many, [but not all,] portions of the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed.
By comparison, Army Regulation 220-1 defines a C1 readiness rating as, "The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime missions) for which it is organized or designed." Using this Army standard readiness reporting rating system, achievement of a C1 rating by each WMD-CST is necessary to meet the requirements of the FY 1999 National Defense Authorization Act. The third requirement was simply a letter of recommendation from the unit commander to their state Adjutant General recommending certification. All 10 WMD-CSTs have reported a C3 readiness rating on their Unit Status Report, undergone an EXEVAL, and as of January 22, 2001, nine WMD-CSTs had submitted a request for certification However, all 10 WMD-CSTs underwent EXEVALs without a MALLS van.
The certification approval process (CoMPIO and the Army's Directorate of Military Support established) went from the states, through the National Guard Bureau and Army, to the Secretary of Defense. As of January 22, 2001, seven of the nine WMD-CSTs that had requested certification had progressed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other two requests were at the secretary of Army for review and approval, but none received have received Secretary of Defense certification. Training programs and materials for WMD-CST personnel were not sufficiently identified, developed, and approved. The School had to draft a special text manual for the course because the course includes material and teaches skills not included in the standard nuclear, biological, and chemical noncommissioned officer military occupational specialty 54B course. Instruction on the MALS as a part of the WMD Emergency Assessment and Detection Course would serve to address some of the personnel issues confronting each of the WMD-CSTs. The training regimen must be finalized and approved as a critical first step toward institutionalizing the individual and unit training of the WMD-CSTs to the desired capability. The ability of the WMD-CSTs to effectively and safely carry out their mission is questionable because of the management and fielding of the teams' TDA equipment. As of August 1, 2000, the TDA was undergoing revisions that will compound equipment disparities between the original 10 teams and the 22 additional teams. Officials at Dugway stated that CoMPIO originally approached them to assist in implementing the WMD-CST program.
SBCCOM became involved in the WMD-CST program when CoMPIO approached subordinate organizations, Edgewood and Natick, to provide program assistance. In November 1998, CoMPIO unofficially designated Natick as the program manager of Utmost Advantage and asked it to carry out various functions (such as equipment acquisition) without a charter, documented requirements, or doctrine. Other sustainment issues were also overlooked when equipment was fielded to the teams, such as refilling the tanks of the self-contained breathing apparatus. Officials at the National Guard Bureau noted that the necessary equipment supply and resupply infrastructure already exists within DoD and creating a new organization, such as the Defense Consequence Management Support Center, is duplicative and wasteful.
Several operational issues that could affect the safety of WMD-CST personnel had not been fully resolved. The glove box was fielded without operations and maintenance manuals and did not perform to specification.
In addition to the operational issues of the HAPSITE, the technology that allows user identification of organic compounds and subsequent sharing of the information became an issue as well. The UCS was intended to provide connectivity between the WMD-CST, the Incident Commander, and DoD assets. The emergency first responder community developed a working group to identify communications requirements, deconflict frequencies to prevent the disabling of public or other responder communications, and enable compatibility of communications equipment.
The UCS plan CoMPIO authorized included two secure telephones, two unclassified telephones, one SIPRNET workstation, and one NIPRNET workstation. CoMPIO handled one portion of the accreditation; it secured temporary accreditation, which expired April 7, 2000, for the use of the Trojan network.
The 10 WMD-CST commanders are dedicated individuals, highly motivated about their positions, and committed to their mission as well as focused on doing the best possible job regardless of the decisions and conditions imposed on them.
You will need to have experience in social work or medical related if working in a hospital situation.
You will need excellent communication skills as you will be liaising with many different people. I understand the importance of dealing with emergency situations especially when it comes to delicate situations concerning children or medical situations. Damage to property or the environment may also trigger an evacuation if it poses a risk to the safety, health, and welfare of people.
The aim is achieved by detailing evacuation considerations, hosting arrangements, transportation management, and return planning.
This includes details on the municipality, hazards that may necessitate an evacuation, and demographics.
Emergency responders may not be able to enter an area without subjecting themselves to an unreasonable level of risk, or they may need to wear and use specialized personal protective equipment (PPE) to protect themselves. Decontamination could necessitate specialized screening and cleaning resources, and expertise, and may be required before people are transported to advanced care and sheltering facilities. All activities and efforts should be focused on moving these people from the at-risk area to places of safety in a timely manner. It has been estimated that between 5 and 20 percent of people will anticipate an evacuation and self-evacuate. This list should contain the names of persons needed to restart systems that must be in place before evacuees can return home (e.g. A pre-emptive evacuation may be undertaken when it is clear that if delayed, conditions (weather or other hazard) would impede evacuation. There is often on-scene activity by emergency response personnel who may direct the evacuation. Evacuations of this type often involve a large number of evacuees, possibly from more than one municipality. Structural damage to the transportation system, such as bridges, tunnels, and highway systems may render them unsafe for use.
While the primary goal of any response action is to save lives, the ability to evacuate people quickly and efficiently should be weighed against the risks of remaining in place. Their understanding of the regional transportation network enables them to identify ways to improve the carrying capacity of roadways and transit systems in a safe manner. In most evacuation scenarios, the majority of evacuee movements will take place on roadways and highways, in both personal vehicles and transit vehicles. The plan may identify a number of options, but requires planners to select and implement only certain tactics based on the specific circumstances during the evacuation.
The real-time threat assessment, type of evacuation, resources available and needed, and the number of people to be evacuated will dictate what transportation options are best.
The challenge lies in identifying those tactics that provide the greatest increase in carrying capacity while being realistic in terms of time and resource requirements. Due to the uncertain nature of incidents that trigger evacuations, the evacuees may be able to return directly to their residence or place of employment from the assembly point once it is safe to do so.
Evacuation planners should determine which special needs groups should be routed to particular shelters, and how to incorporate such direction into the evacuation plan.
Planners should assess shelters’ locations, as well as their capabilities and capacities, facilities and resources, in relation to how evacuee traffic will be routed. Municipalities may use this standard as a guide for selecting shelters and planning for shelter services. Based on the location and type of hazard, a municipality can prioritize which areas (sectors) should evacuate first, and have pre-identified decision points and triggers for declaring an evacuation. That authority may lie with key individuals, such as any member of the Municipal Emergency Control Group or a department head.
For known site-specific risks, incident-specific information may be added to the municipal evacuation plan. Determine the evacuation area given the emergency situation and estimate the time and resources required to safely evacuate the area. In addition, consider public education campaigns to advise the public on plans to re-unify families in the event of separation during an emergency.
For example, once a building has been evacuated make a mark on the front door or most visible location.
These phases include pre-warning, evacuation, ongoing communications, and return (discussed in the Return section). It is important to ensure that they contain realistic expectations of each municipality’s capabilities. The municipality should work with its records management staff to review its registration and inquiry practices to ensure that they permit the disclosure of evacuee information to relevant parties (i.e. The Evacuation Coordinator may be responsible for making arrangements for shelter, food, clothing, and other essentials. This includes restoring the physical infrastructure where possible or desirable as well as addressing the emotional, social, economic and physical well-being of those involved. If a municipality provided transportation to shelters, it may have to organize return transportation for those evacuees.
Consider locations of municipal services, facilities and infrastructure as they may be affected by an evacuation. It assigns responsibilities to municipal employees, by position, for implementation of the [insert Name of the Municipality] Evacuation Plan. The partnership is built around stakeholder engagement with the vision of a “vibrant urban center,” a “livable community,” and ongoing community projects in ten neighborhoods and one commercial district surrounding the Johns Hopkins Homewood campus. Tableau is focused on “making databases and spreadsheets understandable” and allows for the creation of charts, tables, and maps that are dynamic and interactive.
Although the dashboards feature far more charts than maps, GIS played an integral role in the project.
As a GIS Specialist, she works to manage, map and analyze spatial data from a variety of fields. These people will go to great lengths to con a poor, unsuspecting samaritan into giving up their pertinent information, identity, details, or bank account numbers. The first step on this list is always this: Do not respond to unsolicited e-mail, and do not click on any embedded links within those e-mails. We will promote self-sufficiency, social well-being and assistance programs to low income, disadvantaged individuals and families. Four factors are primarily responsible for homelessness: lack of affordable housing, lack of affordable health care, low incomes, and the lack of comprehensive services.
The Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) Program is intended to help prepare the United States against terrorist use of a weapon of mass destruction and is commonly referred to as a homeland defense measure. 39, "The United States Policy on Counterterrorism," directs a number of measures be taken, including reducing the Nation's vulnerability to terrorism, improving deterrence and response to terrorist acts, and strengthening capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, including WMD. Our overall audit objective was to evaluate the program management of chemical and biological defense resources in the Nation al Guard and Reserve forces.
The Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO) did not manage the WMD-CST program effectively. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness seek disestablishment of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office, obtain reassignment of the management oversight responsibilities for the WMD-CST program, and ensure that the actions specified in recommendations below are completed before forwarding any WMD-CST certification requests to the Secretary of Defense for approval. As a result of the issues identified in our draft report, on November 9, 2000, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum regarding the institutionalizing of the CoMPIO functions.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred with the recommendations. The actions directed by the Deputy Secretary and the comments of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs were fully responsive. The team was to produce a comprehensive plan to increase the DoD response capabilities while developing the potential within the Reserve Component units. Originally, 10 WMD-Civil Support Teams (CSTs) were established with a planned initial operation capability date of January 2000.


Other Federal units have already been established to respond to nuclear, biological; and chemical incidents. For this segment of the audit, we evaluated the program management of National Guard units charged with CB defense responsibilities for homeland defense.
Specifically, CoMPIO did not provide adequate guidance, training, and equipment for the teams.
That situation occurred because of insufficient CoMPIO coordination with existing organizations and overly centralized decisionmaking. According to the Tiger Team Report, proximity to air transportation was one of the major factors in determining the stationing of the WMD-CSTs. Another major factor in the stationing decision was placing the teams so that WMD-CSTs would be within 250 miles of 90 percent of the Nation's population. While other organizations in DoD were drafting doctrine for the WMD-CSTs, CoMPIO was writing its own doctrine, independent of the other efforts. The draft doctrine handbook discussed extensively the state emergency management response and Federal assistance roles but contained only limited discussion on coordination with Joint Task Force-Civil Support. The lack of definition occurred because CoMPIO failed to coordinate the mission of the WMD-CSTs with the law enforcement community. The doctrine needs to identify the mission, the employment concepts, and the expected capabilities of the WMD-CSTs as equipped in sufficient detail to be of use to planners.
The use of a C3 readiness rating (4) and the successful completion of an external evaluation (EXEVAL), a training event for the unit, were not meaningful measures of WMD-CST performance or capability.
The resource or training area status will result in a significant decrease in flexibility for mission accomplishment and will increase the vulnerability of the unit under many, but not all, envisioned operational scenarios.
EXEVALs are training events designed to show commanders the strengths and weaknesses of their units for determining future training requirements.
Army Forces Command had sufficient concern about the problem and offered to conduct another mini-EXEVAL on the MALS van. Army Forces Command requested a postponement of the EXEVALs until the WMD-CSTs received the full complement of equipment.
The Assistant Secretary requested the Army provide additional documentation for WMD-CST certification requests forwarded through his office before he recommended approval to the Secretary of Defense.
The unit status report may not be the correct reporting format for the WMD-CSTs unless the positions within the WMD-CST are further defined for mission criticality.
An operational readiness inspection would be a better criteria than an EXEVAL for measuring WMD-CST capability and performance. Although survey team members are required to be military occupational specialty qualified as nuclear, biological, and chemical personnel (military occupational specialty 54B), nonmilitary occupational specialty qualified individuals who were assigned to the WMD-CSTs did not receive military occupational specialty qualification through training at the U.S. CoMPIO identified and developed training courses for WMD-CST personnel without fully coordinating with the Army. Neither the School nor Battelle Corporation had the subject matter experts to teach the course to the first 10 WMD-CSTs.
By splitting the training, however, it is difficult for the WMD-CSTs to sufficiently cross-train personnel and ensure that there will always be personnel available who are proficient on the equipment. The units were also encountering problems with insufficient quantities of training equipment and training aids. The WMD-CSTs must also complete the EXEVALs with all of their equipment and their full complement of personnel. The TDA list also established the funding, personnel and training requirements for the team. Additionally, items fielded to the original 10 teams included several items we were not able to ascertain the rationale for either why the item was included on the TDA or the quantity that was authorized. Edgewood is the Army's principal research and development center for CB defense technology, engineering, and service.
Natick was given an equipment-fielding deadline of June 1, 1999, and made 10 separate requests (between December 1998 and March 1999) for a finalized equipment list. For the acquisition of WMD-CST equipment, CoMPIO bypassed the normal assignment of a program manager by the Army Acquisition Executive. The Tiger Team Report addresses the need for response elements, namely the WMD-CST survey teams, to spend extended time in the hot zone or to make multiple entries. For example, the WMD-CST Life Cycle Management Handbook, produced by the Defense Consequence Management Support Center and CoMPIO, was created to address equipment sustainment and supply issues.
The lack of program management oversight and direction resulted in safety issues and disparity in the equipment readiness of the 10 teams. The Washington WMD-CST did not have any chemical protective suites; it had commercial splash suits instead.
For example, they need to know whether the useful life of a standard issue filter for an M40 gas mask is degraded if used against an agent such as ammonia: Such information is critical for logistical decisions and personal protective measures to prevent unnecessary casualties.
CoMPIO did not ensure issuance of medical chemical defense materiel to the teams or take into account Army policy on maintaining medical chemical defense materiel. Equipment variations were the result of the lack of management oversight and the lack of requirements definition, testing, and configuration control.
Two pacing items, the MALS and the UCS, provide additional evidence of the lack of program management in engineering, design, testing, evaluation, and fielding. The design of major components of the MALS has adversely affected the ability of the WMD-CSTs to conduct their mission. These problems were validated when SBCCOM deployed a team to repair or replace the glove boxes at each WMD-CST. Operational issues affecting usefulness to the WMD-CSTs have been identified with the HAPSITE (9). The HAPSITE is connected to a filter installed on the outside of the MALS van, which filters air leaving the HAPSITE. A laptop computer was issued with a software interface to the HAPSITE, but lacked sufficient random access memory to allow for proper operation of software necessary for other MALS components. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases as the "gold standard" of identification technology for three biological agents on the high probability list.
According to National Guard Bureau officials, tactical communications suites from other research and development programs could have been used, to the benefit of the Army and an option that would have been a low-cost temporary solution while the WMD-CST program determined the communications equipment and capability requirements. According to the CoMPIO operations handbook, once the WMD-CSTs arrive at the scene, they are to establish a KU-Band satellite link with the Trojan Spirit team located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to enable NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and voice and messaging services. CoMPIO could have ensured SIPRNET and NIPRNET connectivity of the UCS through the National Guard through GUARDNET, an existing National Guard system. CoMPIO established a system of communications equipment without regard to the established Army-required accreditation of the complete system. The reachback capability of the teams and their ability to run communications for the Incident Commander on the scene were doubtful. However, the special management structure established for the WMD-CST program in January 1998 did not lead to effective program management. Seek reassignment of the program management oversight responsibilities for the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team Program to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs as appropriate. Recommendation was revised to correspond to management oversight responsibilities delineated by the Under Secretary. The guideline presents evacuation planning concepts that may be applied for various scales of evacuations and sizes of municipalities. The plan also sets out the procedures for notifying the members of the Municipal Emergency Control Group, municipal and other responders, the public, the province, neighbouring communities, and as required, other impacted and interested parties, of the emergency. Decisions should be made on the review and revision cycle of the plan, and who is responsible for it.
Evacuations are often multi-jurisdictional activities, making extensive coordination amongst numerous departments and governments necessary. More research and analysis will likely be undertaken in the pre-planning phase than is reported in the plan. Sectors may also be established by using census or enumeration areas, or natural geographic barriers. The nature of the contaminants will vary and different contaminants may require different approaches to decontamination and treatment. As a result, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) procedures should be incorporated into the evacuation plan. In such scenarios, sheltering in place must be considered as a strategy for protecting public safety (see the Shelter-in-Place section 2.5). The size and demographics of the population are significant factors in determining how to conduct an evacuation. A partial evacuation is most often internal – that is the evacuees are hosted elsewhere within the municipality, rather than being hosted in a separate municipality. Decision-makers must be willing to make decisions with whatever information is available at the time. This will require intensive effort by emergency management personnel to coordinate, transport, and shelter the affected populations, and will place greater demands on staff and resources. If these sites are located on evacuation routes, those routes may be unavailable, and alternatives will need to be identified. Partners that could be involved include the local police service, Ontario Provincial Police, Ministry of Transportation, municipal transportation departments, etc. Given the potentially large numbers of vehicles that will be accessing the roadway network at the same time, it is important to consider what can be done to increase the capacity of roadways.
If possible, transportation staff should employ traffic modeling to test the routes and tactics to be included in the evacuation plan.
Assembly points are typically well-known landmarks that have the capacity to handle large numbers of people, have bus access, and an indoor sheltering area. As part of the planning process, planners should estimate the number of evacuees that may require shelter compared to those who will make their own arrangements. If shelters are run by another organization, it is advisable for municipal staff to work closely with shelter operators to provide regular updates on the emergency situation and for the municipality to be aware of the status of evacuation operations.
Significant evacuee populations may be mapped against the proposed evacuation transportation and sheltering network to determine projected demand levels on their chosen travel routes. The person responsible for maintaining the notification list for internal personnel and external partners should be clearly indicated.
Determine the population requiring evacuation based on the type of evacuation required, the delineation of the evacuation area, and the population statistics compiled and analysed during pre-planning.
Public alerting may be the responsibility of the Community Emergency Management Coordinator, the Emergency Information Officer, an Evacuation Coordinator, or other as identified by the municipality and outlined in the plan. The agreement should also define the anticipated costs or fees associated with the delivery of the services. Evacuation operations will remain under the overall direction of the Municipal Emergency Control Group. As with the initial evacuation, numerous resources, especially personnel and transportation related resources will be required to successfully return evacuees to the affected area. This plan also sets out the procedures for notifying the members of the Municipal Emergency Control Group, municipal and other responders, the public, the province, neighbouring communities, and as required, other impacted and interested parties, of the emergency. For this effort, HCPI wanted to create themed dashboards that reflect the conditions, trends, and progress toward goals in several focus areas: public education, commercial development, the housing market, quality of life, and JHU community influence. In many cases, we obtained tabular data for Baltimore City or Maryland and then geocoded the records to determine which fell inside our specific interest area, or to make calculations by specific neighborhood. As long as people are falling for these too-good-to-be-true opportunities, the prevalence of these scams will only increase.
To provide resources, aid and comfort to women and children who are victims of domestic violence. Originally, 10 WMD-CSTs were established with a planned initial operational capability date of January 2000.
For this segment of the audit, we evaluated the program management of National Guard units charged with chemical and biological defense responsibilities for homeland defense. Specifically, CoMPIO failed to provide adequate guidance, training, and equipment for the 10 CSTs. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) coordinate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to determine the exact roles and missions that the National Guard WMD-CST are expected to fulfill in response to WMD incidents, and issue guidance prescribing certification standards and delineating the specific mission, duties, and responsibilities for the WMD-CST. The Deputy Secretary directed that the Army continue to manage the WMD-CST program, but with the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs providing specific policy guidance and oversight consistent with the broader policies of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support. The Under Secretary stated that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support is responsible for coordinating and integrating the domestic consequence management program.
The Director maintained that the criteria established by the Army adequately attested to the ability of the WMD-CSTs to conduct their mission. 25, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Army to establish the Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO). The CSTs were located in alignment with the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions in California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. Two examples are the Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Hazardous Materials Response Unit.
Subsequent segments of the audit will address the financial management of the CoMPIO and the management of CB defense resources in the National Guard and Reserve forces in support of deployed forces.
Deficiencies occurred because of insufficient CoMPIO coordination with existing organization, overly centralized decisionmaking, and program execution independent of established military structures, organizations, and guidance. The criteria established for certification of the WMD-CSTs were not meaningful and did not meet the requirements of the law (2). As of September 15, 2000, with 10 WMD-CSTs established, 17 beginning initial training, and 5 more being established, CoMPIO had not finalized doctrine for the WMD-CSTs. The second draft of the doctrine handbook states that the primary method of deployment for the WMD-CSTs is self-deployment with their own vehicles. The draft doctrine handbook stated only that, if federalized, the operational control of the WMD-CSTs transfers to Joint Task Force-Civil Support and the Joint Task Force-Civil Support should monitor WMD-CST reports and communications.
For example, CoMPIO has heavily marketed the ability of the WMD-CSTs to provide on-site identification of a potential agent through collection and sampling.
The WMD-CSTs should have standardized procedures with respect to both their Title 32 and Title 10 status and the WMD-CST personnel in those capabilities.
Most of the WMD-CSTs underwent EXEVAL without critical personnel and personal protective equipment, and they all passed.
Once approved by the National Guard Bureau, the requests are forwarded to the Army's Directorate of Military Support, who also reviews and approves the requests. With only 22 personnel, the WMD-CSTs lack the depth and breadth of personnel to easily reconstitute their forces. An operational readiness inspection would provide an objective basis for validating, on a recurring basis, that WMD-CST personnel possess the necessary skills and proficiency to safely conduct their operations. Requirements for periodic recertifications must be determined for operational readiness inspections. This occurred because of insufficient CoMPIO coordination with existing training organizations, and program execution independent of the oversight of established military structures, organization, and guidance.
Most of the classroom instruction WMD-CST personnel receive is from established curricula from various civilian emergency first responder and Army schools. Rather than developing the course under an existing contract between the School and Battelle Corporation, CoMPIO took charge to draft a new contract with Battelle Corporation for the course. As part of its contract, Battelle Corporation sent two employees to training courses to become subject matter experts. In addition to lacking a program of instruction, the School had no training aids other than individual protective equipment which were reclaimed by CoMPIO during the training of the first 10 WMD-CSTs.
Cross-training is vital to organizations such as WMD-CSTs, where the entire complement of the team is only 22. One WMD-CST attempted to purchase training aids directly from the vendor to conduct what they felt was required proficiency training on commercial-off-the shelf equipment. If that is not done, the proficiency level of the WMD-CSTs cannot be adequately determined.
During the initial months of the standup and funding of the CoMPIO, the TDA had grown without evaluation by subject matter experts within the Army.
The development and establishment of the initial 10 WMD-CSTs was done on an accelerated timetable that was imposed by CoMPIO. CoMPIO established a program called Utmost Advantage to equip, supply, and sustain the WMD-CSTs with state-of the-art technology by leveraging Government-to-Government unique skills, industry support, and areas of specialization. Dugway officials stated that they required a work order and funding to participate in the WMD-CST program.
Natick provides life-cycle management of soldier and related support systems though centralized development, procurement, integration, and management of individual soldier items and organizational items. Changes to the requirements and equipment were made by CoMPIO as late as April 1, 1999, leaving Natick to procure 10,000 pieces of equipment by the June 1, 1999, deadline. As a result, CoMPIO made equipment decisions without adequately clarifying the mission requirements. CoMPIO did not address the need for on-site air refills and did not issue a portable refill mechanism. As oversight responsibility for the WMD-CSTs is transferred, the necessity of the Life Cycle Management Handbook or the Defense Consequence Management Support Center was at best questionable in light of the longstanding Army sustainment capability. Also, it was unclear whether personal protective items had been tested by an independent third party before purchase or whether purchase decisions had been based solely on the assertions of the manufacturer or assertions of first responders because the equipment met their needs.
The safety of the WMD-CSTs depends on reliable information on the performance of their equipment in the environment within which they will operate. The Army maintains medical chemical defense materiel in 5,000 soldier blocks, which are not to be broken out except for a contingency. The lack of a formal lessons learned process led the WMD-CSTs to individually identify various issues and methods of correction. According to CoMPIO officials, the MALS was intended to be a platform for currently fielded lab equipment as well as emerging technology. The MALS is equipped with a glove box and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter system for handling and preparing samples. The WMD-CST personnel identified that the glove box filtration system also bad design flaws which could endanger the users should they attempt to change the HEPA filters after use in a contaminated environment.
The WMD-CSTs identified that the filter, an M40 mask filter; is installed backwards, as though to filter coming into the van rather than leaving the HAPSITE. Additionally, the connectivity between the MALS HAPSITE computer and the UCS information system does not address the needs of the team.
The MALS vans issued to the WMD-CSTs lacked the florescent microscope, the polymerase chain reaction technology [DNA fingerprinting], and the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), although CoMPIO advertised having these items in May 2000.
As of September 15, 2000, the biological detection and identification capability of the fielded MALS is limited to bio-immunoassay tickets [bio-tickets] produced by the Joint Program Office for Biological Defense. The handbook points out, however, that establishing communications from the UCS will be situation dependent and require detailed planning efforts by the WMD-CST.
Telephone connectivity could have also been obtained through the existing National Guard structure. CoMPIO officials disregarded recommendations and assistance from the National Guard Bureau to obtain UCS accreditation.
The authorization also did not allow for any peripherals (such as the MALS) to be attached to the system.
Infrastructure to conduct reachback operations to the identified subject matter experts for agent identification, verification or assistance did not exist. The Under Secretary stated that the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum on November 9, 2000, initiating the disestablishment of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office. The Under Secretary stated that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support is responsible for the coordination and integration of the consequence management program. The detail required in a Municipal Evacuation Plan may vary according to the needs of the municipality.
The plan should identify lead departments and considerations for the development of incident-specific plans (Incident Action Plans). They may have little or no time to wait for additional information because any delay may have a significant impact on public safety. Emergency responders may require personal protective equipment, as responder safety will be critical.
In cases where the transportation network is severely restricted by such damage, sheltering in place may be a safer short-term alternative. This will provide data to help quantify the benefits of different strategies and support an informed decision as to the best ones for the particular region and transportation network.
Pre-identifying sufficient assembly points in relation to the transportation network and evacuation routes will allow these locations to be incorporated into the evacuation plan. In addition, planners should consider special needs that may need to be accommodated within a shelter (e.g. A clear and succinct notification process must show who is responsible for making the notification contacts and list the primary and secondary notification methods.
List details of the population to be evacuated including numbers of evacuees and special requirements. It may be necessary to establish agreements with other communities when an emergency is threatening or occurring if mutual assistance agreements are not in place or may be insufficient to address the emergency. If the municipality contracts registration to a third party, the municipality is still responsible for disclosure of the evacuee information. This plan also identifies lead departments and outlines considerations for the development of incident-specific plans (Incident Action Plans). HCPI plans to use these dashboards to share information with their partners and as an aid in planning and decision-making. Using GIS capabilities in conjunction with Tableau allowed a great degree of flexibility and customization in the data presentation. While the Internet and online security become more and more advanced as the years pass, so to do the tactics of these e-scams. 25 tasks the Army to establish a program for integration of Reserve Components into the domestic WMD response and provide DoD support to civilian authorities within the United States. Future reports will deal with the financial management of the WMD-CST program and the management of chemical and biological defense resources of National Guard and Reserve forces scheduled to deploy in the event of a major theater war.
Additionally, the Army process for certification of the teams lacked rigor and would not provide meaningful assurance. We also recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), in coordination with the Chemical Branch of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations and Plans, conduct a thorough program review of the WMD-CST program (which at a minimum should include areas such as the operational concept, doctrine, equipage, sustainment, personnel assignments and rotations, funding, and certification process).
The Deputy Secretary also directed that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs initiate a comprehensive review of the WMD-CST program and advise him of any corrective actions needed. The Under Secretary stated that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs would work closely with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support to ensure the appropriate interagency coordination is made for employment of the WMD-CSTs. We continue to find that the Army criteria for certification has little resemblance to the criteria specified in Section 511 of the FY 1999 Defense Authorization Act. Presidential Decision Directive-39, "The United States Policy on Counterterrorism," was issued in June 1995. In March 1998, CoMPIO was established under the Army's Director of Military Support and was tasked with implementing Tiger Team recommendations for integration of Reserve Components into the domestic WMD response. CBI was established in 1996 in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive-39 to deploy domestically or overseas, when directed, to provide force protection or mitigation in the event of a WMD incident and be prepared to initially respond to no-notice WMD incidents with a rapid response force.
See Appendix A for a discussion of the audit scope and methodology and our review of the management control program. As a result, the program schedule slipped significantly and none of the teams were ready for certification. Training programs and materials for WMD-CST personnel were not sufficiently identified, developed, approved, and implemented. The three primary missions the WMD-CSTs listed in the WMD-CST Doctrine Handbook (second draft), June 2, 2000, are assess, advise, and facilitate. Joint Task Force-Civil Support believed part of its charter was to provide oversight of the U.S. However, this should have been coordinated with law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
This occurred because of insufficient CoMPIO coordination with existing organizations, and program execution independent of the oversight of established military structures, organizations, and guidance. The EXEVALs conducted with the first 10 WMD-CSTs were of marginal value because of the absence of major items of equipment and personnel. Army Forces Command was instructed by the Army's Directorate of Military Support (the higher headquarters of CoMPIO) to administer the EXEVALs even though the WMD-CSTs did not have the MALS van and had only a limited capability with the Unified Command Suite (UCS). Subsequently, they were issued the rest of their equipment, including personal protective equipment and pacing items. The requests are forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for approval, who then forwards the requests to the Secretary of Defense for final approval. Most of the critical military occupational specialty positions, such as the nuclear medical science officer, are only one deep.
CoMPIO did not establish a requirement for refresher training on either an individual or unit basis other than the training that unit personnel receive when assigned to the unit. Additionally, criteria must be established to determine when a WMD-CST would be nondeployable because personnel in the critical occupational specialties are absent or in a rotation status, and, whether those conditions would require additional inspections. The first, 10 WMD-CSTs were in the process of requesting certification, even-though training courses were still under development and major pieces of equipment had not been exercised. However, a new course required of all WMD-CST personnel is the WMD Emergency Assessment and Detection course, a 3-week course under development by the Battelle Corporation. This precluded a collaborative effort between the School and Battelle Corporation, slowing development of the course. Battelle Corporation was to teach a first two iterations of the course using a draft program of instruction. With the exception of the MALS van (the MALS van is used to identify a chemical or biological agent), the lack of training aids has been rectified.
Insufficient cross-training of personnel could degrade the ability of the WMD-CST to fully perform its mission and be of value to the emergency first responder community.
The vendor contacted CoMPIO, which instructed the vendor not to provide the equipment or CoMPIO would cancel the contract.


Finally, the WMD-CST training must be institutionalized within the existing infrastructure of the Army, to Army standards. CoMPIO, despite lacking acquisition certified personnel familiar with chemical and biological defense systems, retained acquisition decision authority. According to the timetable presented in the Tiger Team Report, the initial 10 teams were to be certified by FY 2002. Development of the TDAs is an area where experienced organizations, such as the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, the Army's Force Development Branch, or the Defense Logistics Agency, could have provided invaluable experience and expertise. Although intended to establish cooperation through working groups to derive recommendations and execute decisions, the program resulted in one person in CoMPIO who determined the requirements in the form of a draft TDA and orchestrated equipment acquisition, logistics, and resource management. CoMPIO provided neither and, as a result, Dugway was bypassed and told that SBCCOM was the single voice for testing and evaluation of equipment. Despite the assistance and recommendations of Edgewood and Natick, CoMPIO officials overly relied on work done by the Interagency Board. CoMPIO never officially delegated any authority to Natick and, by the first quarter of September 1999, had removed Natick's unofficial program manager status and phased Natick out completely. CoMPIO funded creation of a new sustainment support organization, the Defense Consequence Management Support Center, under the Special Operations Forces Support Activity located at Lexington, Kentucky. That leaves most of the WMD-CSTs having to rely on responding firefighters for refills, and, in some cases, WMD-CST personnel who are not trained on how to fill the tanks. In an attempt to supply the teams with powered air-purifying respirators, CoMPIO issued the M48 blower to use with the M40 mask, even though the pair were not originally designed to function together.
To ensure an acceptable level of safety with personal protective items, commercial-off-the-shelf equipment such as Level-A suits, need to be tested against militarized agents by a trusted source. The WMD-CST commanders and personnel lack confidence in the unknown, untested, and unsubstantiated reliability of the equipment that they were issued by CoMPIO. While that may instill confidence in the public and emergency first responder personnel, the stated mission is totally devoid of operational parameters. The policy exists partly because medical chemical defense materiel items are potency-dated, consist of controlled substances, and require a high level of stock maintenance and management. According to the Tiger Team Report, the WMD-CSTs would rapidly respond to a WMD incident, conduct detection, assessment and hazard prediction, and provide technical advice concerning WMD incidents and agents. The platform that was chosen, however does not provide adequate physical space for the currently designated components or laboratory operations conducted by two people wearing chemical protective gear deemed necessary by the WMD-CST MALS operators. Officials at SBCCOM stated that the ability to prepare, refrigerate, an deliver a sample to the nearest health organization afforded by the glove box and on-board refrigeration unit provides an essential and capability. Additionally, there were ongoing issues related to the user's confidence level related to the use of the glove box with an agent. One issue identified by the WMD-CSTs is that the HAPSITE does not heat the sample sufficiently to identify a vast number of compounds, especially heavier, persistent agents. Although an SBCCOM official noted that "it should work," we did not find anyone in the CB community who knew with any certainty whether the filter would perform properly the way it was installed. Combined, those items provide the biological detection capability of the vehicle and team, as each component has detection strengths and weaknesses. The Joint Program Office for Biological Defense has management responsibility for all DoD biological defense acquisition programs.
The UCS also serves as a prime example of where CoMPIO failed to leverage existing Government assets and made acquisitions without regard to sustainment. A concept of operations document for the UCS dated January 21, 1999, states, "The UCS provides a replacement for existing capabilities that are limited to nonsecure cellular phones and military tactical radios that are often incompatible with those of other responding agencies." However, the concept of operations does not demonstrate the need for secure communications or compatible military tactical radios, making the UCS an unnecessary system. Under ideal situations, the team will have established infra-agency communications 4 hours after arrival at the scene, not taking into account the various contingencies that may add up to another 3 hours of configuring. The use of GUARDNET would have spared the teams from using scarce resources to send personnel for information security training at Fort Dix, New Jersey. As of September 15, 2000 none of the UCS communications was accredited to operate under Army policy. The reachback capability is one of the cornerstones of the CST capability as developed and promoted by CoMPIO. The Under Secretary also stated that the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs recommended that program oversight of all chemical and biological defense research, development, and acquisition as it pertains to the WMD-CST program be assigned to that office.
By providing information about planning techniques, strategies, and tactics, the guideline aids emergency management staffi in determining what information should be considered when creating an evacuation plan. Different types of hazards may dictate variations in the criteria for these categories (e.g. The Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC) should be notified of an evacuation as soon as possible.
Make sure to research a link: A legit, secure URL will redirect to an ‘HTTPS’ address, not just ‘HTTP.’ If you feel that you must open a link, open it manually into your browser, just don’t click any links! In FY 1999 Congress established Secretary of Defense certification requirements for the WMD-CSTs.
The Under Secretary also stated that the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs recommended that program oversight for chemical and biological defense research, development, and acquisition pertaining to the WMD-CST program be assigned to that office. We met on several occasions with Army representatives, including the Under Secretary of the Army, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support, the Director of Military Support, and the Deputy Director of Military Support, to discuss the audit results. Presidential Decision Directive-39 directs a number of measures be taken, including reducing the Nation's vulnerability to terrorism, improving deterrence and response to terrorist acts, and strengthening capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Director of Military Support serves as the Secretary of the Army's action agent for planning and executing the DoD support mission to civilian authorities within the United States.
The CSTs are organized into six functional areas - administration and logistics, command, communications, medical, operations, and survey.
To enable the WMD-CSTs to perform those three missions, they were to receive an impressive array of training and equipment. The original concept called for the WMD-CSTs to be stationed near Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve bases. That location places the WMD-CST more than 350 miles from Miami but within 250 miles of Atlanta and the Georgia WMD-CST. On September 14, 2000, the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a memorandum to all of its field offices discussing the role of the WMD-CSTs. Army Training and Doctrine Command has personnel experienced in the development of doctrine, including missions such as CB reconnaissance and decontamination, the training command was not requested to develop the doctrine.
For example, none of the first 10 WMD-CSTs had received a Mobile Analytical Laboratory Systems (MALS) van at the time of the EXEVALs.
Army Forces Command major subordinate commands that conducted the EXEVALs, reported that only 5 of the 10 WMD-CSTs had their full complement of personnel.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), who is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for overall supervision of matters which involve the Reserve Components, including the National Guard, has inserted himself into the .review process and has requested that the Secretary of the Army forward the requests to his office for review and approval prior to submission to the Secretary of Defense. We believe the WMD-CSTs should have a Cl readiness rating to be eligible for certification because of the small unit size and stated response time. The certification requirements established by the Army's Directorate of Military Support, and implemented by CoMPIO, are not in consonance with the requirements or intent of the law.
The various types of nuclear, biological, and chemical agents that WMD-CST personnel may encounter require that the training they receive provide them with a sufficient level of proficiency in all mission areas. After the first two iterations, the School was to begin a review of the program of instruction for the course. Additionally, by splitting the training between two geographic locations, the WMD-CSTs will have to budget for more travel costs for their personnel.
Later, CoMPIO officials contradicted that action by stating that procurement of such items was the responsibility of the individual state's Directorate of Logistics.
The Interagency Board is a mufti-governmental organization created at the recommendation of the Army's Directorate of Military Support, the higher headquarters of CoMPIO, and cochaired by representatives of CoMPIO and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. CoMPIO involved the Marine Corps Systems Command in equipment procurement because it had equipped the Marine Corps' CBIRF and held many of the General Services Administration equipment contracts CoMPIO wanted for the teams. As a result, even if the WMD-CSTs can reach the responding firefighters and those firefighters have a refill capability and are not themselves casualties, the WMD-CSTs might not be able to refill their self-contained breathing apparatus tanks. The WMD-CSTs raised safety concerns because test data was not available that would assure them the specific combination of blower and mask would work in a contaminated environment. Similarly, military chemical defense equipment should be tested against toxic industrial compounds and toxic industrial materials. Conversely, such an abstract mission statement, without amplifying doctrine and established conditions, tasks, and standards, has resulted in a constantly changing training regimen and TDA. CoMPIO should have recognized the logistical problems presented by medical chemical defense materiel and leveraged existing DoD supply chains to ensure the teams were initially fielded with medical chemical defense materiel, which is a basic requirement for soldiers who could potentially deploy to a CB environment. The two pacing items fielded to the WMD-CSTs to meet this mission, the MALS and the UCS, provide the WMD-CSTs with a limited unique capability.
Discussions with officials form the organizations involved in developing the MALS that CoMPIO fielded revealed that engineering of the MALS was not adequately managed to produce a system capable of meeting mission requirements. SBCCOM engineered the glove box similar to one engineered for the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Hazardous Materials Response Unit. An upgrade for the HAPSITE has been identified and purchased, and is supposed to correct the deficiencies.
The WMD-CST personnel were also concerned about the way the HAPSITE was connected to the filter.
That variance in operating platforms does not accommodate transfer of data from the MALS to the UCS, thereby negating reachback capability of identifying a compound. According to officials at SBCCOM, the florescent microscope purchased for each of the MALS required a space of 27 to 28 inches deep by 30 inches high and 45 inches wide. According to officials at the West Desert Test Center at Dugway, experienced and trained personnel who teach courses on the proper use of bio-tickets had difficulty with the bio-tickets because of high rates of false positive and false negative readings.
If they want to do the accreditation they will need to come up with a plan, a timeline, and the funding to do so. Accreditation would not be an issue if CoMPIO had leveraged existing asset to the fullest before developing the UCS. Further, the Deputy Secretary of Defense November 9, 2000, memorandum directed the Army to continue to manage the program with the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) providing policy guidance and oversight consistent with the broader policies of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support. This guideline aligns with the Template for the Development of a Municipal Evacuation Plan (Appendix 1). As a result, the program had slipped significantly and none of the teams were fully operational As of January 2001, the certification requests were still being evaluated by the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and none of the 10 WMD-CSTs had received Secretary of Defense certification. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs stated that the recommended program review was underway in accordance with the Deputy Secretary of Defense's November 9, 2000, memorandum. Subsequent to the issuance of Presidential Decision Directive-39, Congress enacted Public Law 104-201, the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (the Act). CoMPIO was under the leadership of an active duty colonel and was composed of eight active Guard and Reserve military personnel, six DoD civilians, and five contractor personnel. Of the 22 personnel, 10, including all survey team members, require a military occupational specialty for nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare.
The CBIRF can be tailored to the threat or mission and deploys with external and internal communications, protective equipment, detection and identification equipment, personal decontamination equipment, medical treatment capability, and a mobile laboratory. The absence of finalized doctrine has encouraged and promoted an environment of persistent change to operational concepts and mission requirements, and a focus on short-term actions.
The fixed-wing air assets of the Air National Guard and Air Force at those installations were to provide transportation to the incident site. Such stationing provides overlapping coverage of 250 miles but places one of the largest cities in the United States outside of the desired coverage area.
Joint Forces Command, the Joint Task Force Civil Support, was recently activated by direction of the Secretary of Defense to serve as the U.S. To accomplish coordination with the WMD-CSTs is a necessity to provide a unified military effort. The MALS van contains the major items necessary for a thorough on-site assessment and identification of a potential agent. Critical personnel, such as the medical officer, nuclear medical science officer, or survey team members, were missing from some of the CSTs at the time of the EXEVALs. Army Forces Command offer to conduct an unforecasted and unfunded mini-EXEVAL for the 10 WMD-CSTs must be viewed as a significant decision to support a critical requirement.
Because they had already met two of the three criteria established by CoMPIO, the commanders of the WMD-CSTs felt undue pressure to recommend certification. Additionally, the identification and staffing of critical positions should be required for reporting purposes. That is another area where there are several organizations within the Army that could have provided thorough, detailed training on the identification, handling, and disposal of suspected agents. Approximately 65 personnel recruited into the WMD-CSTs who required military occupational specialty 54B qualification received some of their training from National Guard Bureau programs and attended a compressed 3-week nuclear, biological, and chemical noncommissioned officer course of instruction instead of the standard 16-week nuclear, biological, and chemical noncommissioned officer course. Army Training and Doctrine Command course and is not part of a standard soldier training program, which applies to military occupational specialty training courses. After the review is completed, the draft program of instruction will be staffed (expected to begin during FY 2001).
The Directorate of Logistics serves as the logistician for National Guard units in a particular state. The equipment fielded to the teams was not subject to testing and evaluation or the rigors of an Operational Requirements Document to ensure that it would provide the needed capabilities or could be sustained within the Service infrastructure. Subsequently, CoMPIO developed a drat TDA and fielded equipment before clarifying the mission requirements.
However their role was ambiguous, unfunded, and without a formal documented agreement with CoMPIO. Because of the composition of the Interagency Board, it is difficult to distinguish between the decisions and opinions of the Interagency Board from those of CoMPIO.
Officials at the Marine Corps Systems Command stated that although Natick was providing direction on acquisitions to them, CoMPIO retained final decision authority on selection of equipment. Identifying limitations and operating parameters of personal protection equipment issued for use in situations that could involve toxic industrial compounds, toxic industrial materials, or militarized chemical or biological agents would allow for better informed decisionmaking by the WMD-CST commanders. Establishment of the WMD-CSTs did not follow the normal Army protocol for establishing a mission statement, drafting a doctrine, and equipping to mission requirements.
Doing so would have complied with the CoMPIO concept of "total unit fielding." Instead, it was left to the states' National Guard Headquarters to furnish the medical chemical defense materiel. Further, no analysis was conducted to compare the capabilities provided by the MALS with those of other existing military or commercial systems. The glove box was installed in a vehicle not chosen by personnel at SBCCOM and occupies almost half of the usable space. According to SBCCOM officials, they were not sure how effective the upgrade is because they have not been given the opportunity to test it. The connectivity problem is a prime example of the lack of program management oversight in the engineering and fielding of the equipment that could have been provided by experienced personnel in the Army. The available space inside the MALS is 24 inches deep by 26 inches high and 39 inches wide. In their opinion, the requisite skills required to use the bio-tickets and obtain trusted results are perishable and require constant training. A minimum of two people from each WMD-CST were required to receive the accreditation standards training. Army who was involved with five CSTs during the EXEVALs, without established protocols and communications infrastructure the reachback concept will not work.
This situation was especially debilitating to the California WMD-CST because they were located in Los Alamitos, California, and the assigned radio frequency was for their initial home station in the Sacramento, California, area. We found no justification for making significant changes to our report and we stand by its facts. The Act mandates enhancement of domestic preparedness and response capabilities for terrorist attacks involving nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons. The bulk of the CST mission lies with the survey team members who would enter a contaminated area to gather air, soil, and other samples for on-site evaluation by the nuclear science medical officer and various laboratories across the United States by way of electronic transmission (reachback). The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Hazardous Materials Response Unit was established in 1996 to respond to the threat of terrorism involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and to an expanding caseload of environmental crimes.
Although those issues may seem to be minor, the absence of a finalized doctrine affects the training and equipping of the WMD-CSTs and also impacts their capabilities and readiness. That concept allowed the WMD-CSTs to comply with another Tiger Team concept - a 4-hour response time.
The 10 original WMD-CSTs now approach a time period when personnel will be rotating to other assignments and their successors will not have an institutionalized doctrine upon which to rely. The WMD-CSTs have not, however, been trained and evaluated on all of the equipment they will use for a mission. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), and the Joint Program Office-Biological Defense expressed concern about the lack of an identified requirement for refresher training or proficiency certification. The School did not award certification of military occupational specialty qualification because the personnel did not attend the entire 16-week program of instruction. The problems related to training equipment and training aids encountered by the School and the units were other areas where the Army, such as the U.S.
Sustainment of fielded systems was instituted in a specialized facility that did not draw on existing resources.
In addition, while the Interagency Board appears to involve the Federal Bureau of Investigation into DoD's WMD-CST program, this involvement appears limited to identification of equipment only. The Defense Consequence Management Support Center was supposed to provide sustainment support for specialized, nonstandard items of equipment issued to the WMD-CSTs by conducting stock management, warehousing, technical services, integrated logistics support, industrial operations, and coordination and monitoring of forward support for area resupply and sustainment.
The consensus among the WMD-CSTs is that they would use the M40 mask without the M48 blower because the combination was untested, resulting in further degradation of their mission capability. An example of the lack of safety concerns lies in how the mission was drafted to be conducted.
We were not able to locate any memorandums of agreement at the state level to provide medical chemical defense materiel to the WMD-CSTs on a recurring basis. Although the California WMD-CST believed they should add the hood for the safety of the operator, CoMPIO had the hood and other team-initiated safety modifications removed.
The MALS was intended to provide the teams with an ability to analyze end observe agent samples and share that vital information to the UCS through a digital transmission link. SBCCOM subsequently identified the need for additional training on the use and maintenance of the equipment. Additionally, some of the WMD-CSTs have identified that the HAPSITE is unreliable, noting a failure of the ion pump that the system pressure reads too high.
Each joint presented a possible point of failure, capable of contaminating the MALS and its occupants. Additionally, the entire microscope package, including the microscope, digital camera, processor, power source for the burner, keyboard, screen, and laptop computer, requires five electrical outlets. Without all the originally planned equipment in the MALS, such as ELISA, and training to operate it, the WMD-CSTs will not be able to provide timely and effective biological agent identification to incident commanders and will not be able to protect public health and safety.
From a management standpoint, procedures were not agreed on to establish the framework for a reachback capability. We are continuing to work closely with the involved organizations to ensure that valid certifications can be made as soon as possible. One of the first initiatives undertaken by CoMPIO was to coordinate establishing and fielding National Guard teams to assume a WMD consequence management mission as a part of homeland defense.
The Hazardous Materials Response Unit has specialized sampling, detection, and identification capabilities for nuclear, biological, and chemical agents in addition to a variety of personal protective and rescue equipment. Problems in several areas occurred because CoMPIO did not finalize doctrine, including transportation, stationing, and integration. Additionally, rotary-wing assets were to be tasked to provide airlift to, and around the incident sight. Army included shortages of personal protective equipment (10 of 10 teams), hand-held assay tickets with code books used to detect biological agents (8 of 10 teams), and the lack of a reachback capability (9 of 10 teams). Army Forces Command was willing to accept the costs and provide the personnel because, as they stated, "It was a moral obligation to properly tram these teams before sending them off to do this most dangerous mission." CoMPIO had not identified the frequency of EXEVALs for unit certification or if it was a one-time-only requirement.
The military occupational specialty qualification was awarded by the National Guard Bureau.
Army Training and Doctrine Command, has the experience and could have assisted, had CoMPIO requested the Army to assist. The dedicated facility raised the cost to support the WMD-CSTs and is outside of either the Army or National Guard Bureau chain of command.
As of September 15, 2000, those functions still need to be developed at the Defense Consequence Management Support Center, while the National Guard Bureau and the Army already have the expertise and infrastructure in place to maintain the military equipment fielded to the WMD-CSTs.
The Georgia WMD-CST identified the possibility that survey missions into the hot zone could require greater air supply than available because of distances involved. According to the CoMPIO draft doctrine, communications connectivity of the MALS with the UCS and other response elements is key in the operational capability of the WMD-CST to support the on-site incident commander.
CoMPIO chose a commercial Ford panel van for the MALS, despite more adaptable platforms in DOD inventories (8). Another concern identified by the WMD-CSTs was that there is no way to fully decontaminate the filtration ducts after exposure to a contaminant.
One WMD-CSI repeatedly identified their HAPSITE as a deadlined Equipment Readiness Code A (ERC-A (10)) item, inhibiting mission capability. Those teams, composed of full-time members of the National Guard, were intended to assist the emergency first responder community (such as the local fire department or hazardous materiel response unit) under Title 32 (1), or respond under Title 10 as a subordinate Component of the Joint Task Force-Civil Support. Those CSTs will be established in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California (creating a second team), Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia.
Throughout 1998, the Federal Bureau of Investigation continued to acquire the required equipment and instrumentation to support an enhanced deployable laboratory to provide collection, preservation, and screening capabilities of potential evidentiary materials collected at major WMD events.
The air transportation guidance was not included in the latest draft doctrine handbook and significantly increases the response time of the teams. Joint Task Force-Civil Support officials stated that they requested the CoMPIO draft doctrine for review and inclusion in their efforts. Army Forces Command, "All units require additional training and experience to improve proficiency in mission execution" and that "current certification does not measure WMD-CST mission readiness in objective terms." If, in the opinion of the Army, the WMD-CSTs must improve their proficiency to meet Army standards, the WMD-CSTs do not comply with the certification requirements of the law and should not be certified. As of August 1, 2000, Army instructors had not received the training to become subject matter experts.
The lack of a structured acquisition program magnified the risk of unit fielding and sustainment. Equipment for the teams supplies 2 hours of fresh air when equipment that provides a 4-hour air supply could have been purchased. The John Deere Corporation donated a six-wheel utility vehicle to the team to help alleviate that problem. The MALS and the UCS were delivered to the WMD-CSTs at a cost of approximately $1.6 million per team. Commercial generators, batteries, and air conditioning units were added to the platform, although available through traditional DoD acquisition channels.
This factor had various ramifications related to the handling of the contaminated equipment, depending on which state a MALS is in. DNA fingerprinting was not fielded to the teams because the technology is still evolving to a real-time, hand-held application considered better suited for the WMD-CST mission.
Compounding the problem were the constraints and lack of allotted frequencies to conduct reachback operations.
To establish those teams, CoMPIO spent approximately $73 million and $70 million in procurement and operations and maintenance funds in FY 1999 and FY 2000, respectively. The change seriously degrades the ability of the WMD-CSTs to provide a timely regional response. However, they had not been contacted by CoMPIO for an exchange of information, even though the CoMPIO draft doctrine identifies Joint Task Force-Civil Support as its higher headquarters when the WMD-CSTs are federalized under Title 10.
Army requested that those WMD-CSTs obtaining additional training (at state expense) from the West Desert Test Center, Dugway Proving Ground (Dugway), Utah, obtain a letter certifying their capability with biological agents. Army Training and Doctrine Command, was still writing the individual tasks for the course, but was removed from collaborating with Battelle Corporation on the program of instruction. The requirements developed by the CoMPIO did not match those in the Tiger Team Report and depended heavily on the input of the Interagency Board. According to the WMD-CST operations manual, the survey teams are to suit up, conduct predeployment checks, walk a minimum of 500 meters into the hot zone (6), conduct survey operations, redeploy back 500 meters, and then go through decontamination procedures. CoMPIO had considered adding similar vehicles to the other teams, but had not included them on the TDA or in funding. The MALS and UCS were briefed as mission-necessary equipment; however, during a meeting with the auditors on August 9, 2000, the Director of CoMPIO stated that the WMD-CSTs did not need the MALS or the UCS to accomplish their mission of assess, advise, and facilitate. In this regard, CoMPIO failed to consider the impact inoperable commercial-off-the-shelf equipment would have on the operational readiness of a team and where and from whom a WMD-CST would receive commercial maintenance support on such equipment in time of crisis or during a training event. For example, according to WMD-CST personnel, under California standards the MAL,S would be $400,000 consumable item because introduction of a hazardous sample would make it a new hot zone. The use of the Interagency Board led to a case where DoD operational requirements were developed and vetted outside of Department and Service processes.
The operations are likely to exceed 2 hours, even under ideal conditions when the MALS is located directly on the edge of the warm zone (7).
Again, this is an area where experienced Army personnel could have provided valuable insight and raises the question of how many other items fielded to the CSTs may not be necessary. Sustainment of the WMD-CST major end items and commercial-off-the-shelf systems becomes a long-term consequence of the CoMPIO approach, as support for the Defense Consequence Management Support Center in Lexington, Kentucky, facility comes at an additional cost rather than leveraging existing Service or National Guard resources.
The MALS could be parked in the hot zone to shorten the distances, but doing so presents a different and equally dangerous set of circumstances. While CoMPIO officials stated that such issues would be a state problem, identification of state-by-state anomalies should have been identified and agreements worked in conjunction with the WMD-CST regional mission. Issues that affect the safety of the WMD-CSTs should have been fully resolved before establishing and equipping the teams. Army Frequency Management Office officials stated they could work out a solution but had not been asked.




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