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The Army Director of Military Support, Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations and Plans, agreed to institutionalize the functions of the CoMPIO within the DoD. In response to the mandates contained in Presidential Decision Directive-39 and the Act, DoD established a Tiger Team within the Army. The overall audit objective was to evaluate the program management of CB defense resources in the National Guard and Reserve forces. The special management structure established in January 1998 for the WMD-CST program did not lead to effective management.
Doctrine for the WMD-CST was not developed in coordination with the Joint Staff or with the Army's Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel and Soldier process. The CoMPIO draft doctrine lacked specific detail concerning command relationships when the WMD-CSTs are federalized. The mission of the WMD-CSTs and their relationship with other Federal organizations was also not adequately defined. Unless the roles and missions of the WMD-CSTs are clearly defined in doctrine and coordinated among all agencies with likely involvement in WMD incidents, the Federal response could be hampered significantly. A clear and concise doctrine should have been promulgated before the establishment and fielding of any WMD–CSTs. The criteria established for certification of the WMD-CSTs were not meaningful and did not meet the requirements of the law.
A reserve component rapid assessment element team [CSTJ], and any Reserve assigned to such a team, may not be used to respond to an emergency .
The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake many, [but not all,] portions of the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed. By comparison, Army Regulation 220-1 defines a C1 readiness rating as, "The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime missions) for which it is organized or designed." Using this Army standard readiness reporting rating system, achievement of a C1 rating by each WMD-CST is necessary to meet the requirements of the FY 1999 National Defense Authorization Act. The third requirement was simply a letter of recommendation from the unit commander to their state Adjutant General recommending certification. All 10 WMD-CSTs have reported a C3 readiness rating on their Unit Status Report, undergone an EXEVAL, and as of January 22, 2001, nine WMD-CSTs had submitted a request for certification However, all 10 WMD-CSTs underwent EXEVALs without a MALLS van. The certification approval process (CoMPIO and the Army's Directorate of Military Support established) went from the states, through the National Guard Bureau and Army, to the Secretary of Defense. As of January 22, 2001, seven of the nine WMD-CSTs that had requested certification had progressed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other two requests were at the secretary of Army for review and approval, but none received have received Secretary of Defense certification. Training programs and materials for WMD-CST personnel were not sufficiently identified, developed, and approved. The School had to draft a special text manual for the course because the course includes material and teaches skills not included in the standard nuclear, biological, and chemical noncommissioned officer military occupational specialty 54B course. Instruction on the MALS as a part of the WMD Emergency Assessment and Detection Course would serve to address some of the personnel issues confronting each of the WMD-CSTs. The training regimen must be finalized and approved as a critical first step toward institutionalizing the individual and unit training of the WMD-CSTs to the desired capability. The ability of the WMD-CSTs to effectively and safely carry out their mission is questionable because of the management and fielding of the teams’ TDA equipment.
As of August 1, 2000, the TDA was undergoing revisions that will compound equipment disparities between the original 10 teams and the 22 additional teams. Officials at Dugway stated that CoMPIO originally approached them to assist in implementing the WMD-CST program.
SBCCOM became involved in the WMD-CST program when CoMPIO approached subordinate organizations, Edgewood and Natick, to provide program assistance.
In November 1998, CoMPIO unofficially designated Natick as the program manager of Utmost Advantage and asked it to carry out various functions (such as equipment acquisition) without a charter, documented requirements, or doctrine.
Other sustainment issues were also overlooked when equipment was fielded to the teams, such as refilling the tanks of the self-contained breathing apparatus.
Officials at the National Guard Bureau noted that the necessary equipment supply and resupply infrastructure already exists within DoD and creating a new organization, such as the Defense Consequence Management Support Center, is duplicative and wasteful. Several operational issues that could affect the safety of WMD-CST personnel had not been fully resolved. The glove box was fielded without operations and maintenance manuals and did not perform to specification. In addition to the operational issues of the HAPSITE, the technology that allows user identification of organic compounds and subsequent sharing of the information became an issue as well. The UCS was intended to provide connectivity between the WMD-CST, the Incident Commander, and DoD assets.
The emergency first responder community developed a working group to identify communications requirements, deconflict frequencies to prevent the disabling of public or other responder communications, and enable compatibility of communications equipment. The UCS plan CoMPIO authorized included two secure telephones, two unclassified telephones, one SIPRNET workstation, and one NIPRNET workstation.
CoMPIO handled one portion of the accreditation; it secured temporary accreditation, which expired April 7, 2000, for the use of the Trojan network. The 10 WMD-CST commanders are dedicated individuals, highly motivated about their positions, and committed to their mission as well as focused on doing the best possible job regardless of the decisions and conditions imposed on them.
A reserve component rapid assessment element team, and any Reserve assigned to such a team may not be used to respond to an emergency described in paragraph (I) unless the Secretary of Defense has certified to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives that the team, or that Reserve, possess the requisite skills, training, and equipment to be proficient in [all] mission areas.
The Section 511 requirement is clearly more stringent than that denoted by a readiness rating of C3. 1 - National Guard units operate under the command and control of the Governor and Adjutant General of their respective states (referred to as 32 U.S. 2 - The FY 1999 National Defense Authorization Act states that a team may not be used to respond to an emergency unless the team, or that Reserve, possesses the requisite skills, training and equipment to be proficient in all mission requirements, and the Secretary of Defense has certified to that effect to Congress.
3 - TDA units are nondeployable units organized to fulfill missions, functions, and workload obligations of a fixed support establishment in the continental United States or overseas. 4 - Combat Readiness Rating Codes are: C 1 Fully Combat Ready, C2 Substantially Combat Ready, C3 Marginally Combat Ready, and C4 Not Combat Ready. 5 - Those issues include problems cited later in this report, for example, that the Army had not tested and certified the safety of the coupling between the M40 mask and M48 blower and that all personnel assigned to WMD-CSTs had not completed requisite training, briefed to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) by the audit team on August 9-10, 2000. 6 - Hot Zone-The area immediately surrounding a hazardous material incident that extends far enough that personnel outside the zone do not experience adverse effects from hazardous material releases.
7 - Warm Zone-The area of hazardous material incident where personnel and equipment, decontamination, and hot zone support takes place. 10 - Equipment Readiness Code A (ERC-A) identifies principal weapon systems and equipment, critical to accomplishing primary doctrinal mission tasks and critical mission support items. The TILA-RESPA integrated disclosure rule replaces four disclosure forms with two new ones. Ensures compliance with Federal consumer financial laws by supervising market participants and bringing enforcement actions when appropriate.
Provides, through a variety of initiatives and methods, information to consumers that will allow them to make decisions that are best for them. The CFPB is a 21st century agency that helps consumer finance markets work by making rules more effective, by consistently and fairly enforcing those rules, and by empowering consumers to take more control over their economic lives.
Inform the public, policy makers, and the CFPB’s own policy-making with data-driven analysis of consumer finance markets and consumer behavior. Strategies and investments that lay out the actions we will take to accomplish our outcomes. Prior to Congress enacting the Dodd-Frank Act, consumer financial protection had not been the primary focus of any one federal agency, and no agency could set the rules for the entire financial market. Industry structure is always changing, and therefore, so too will the number of institutions that fall under the CFPB’s supervisory authority. Develop and maintain an efficient fact-based approach to developing, evaluating, revising, and finalizing regulations. Develop a rule-writing team with highly advanced skills in relevant and specialized legal and business areas.
Work with consumers and industry stakeholders on developing regulations to implement existing Federal consumer financial laws effectively.
Develop ways to provide financial product disclosure information to consumers electronically.
Section 1022(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the CFPB to assess each significant rule the Bureau adopts and publish a report of the assessment within five years of the effective date. The Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended by SBREFA and the Dodd-Frank Act, requires the Bureau to convene a Small Business Review Panel before proposing a rule that will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Acquire and analyze qualitative and quantitative information and data pertaining to consumer financial product and service markets and companies. GeoHub is a portal of open location-based data from city departments that empowers both the public and city employees to explore, analyze and build on the data. Youths are highly enthusiastic about starting their own businesses in order to realize their dreams. Hundreds of runners and walkers gathered in the afternoon of November 8, 2015 at Ap Lei Chau for the 12th CyberRun for the Rehabilitation with the theme of “Sunset Jogging to Cyberport”. Esri China (HK) participated in the 20th Anniversary Ceremony of our long-term business partner NetCraft Information Technology (Macau) Co. Esri User Conference (Esri UC) 2015 was once again successfully held in San Diego from July 18-24. In Esri User Conference every year, Esri presents hundreds of organizations worldwide with Special Achievement in GIS (SAG) Awards. GIS professionals, users and friends who open the website of Esri China (Hong Kong) every day may have a pleasant surprise in early August. Smart City promises to enhance the quality of city living by using Information and Communication Technology and related initiatives are generating interests among different sectors in the city. The revamped Statutory Planning Portal 2 (SPP2) of Town Planning Board launched last fall has quickly become one of the most popular website providing public information. The 7.8 magnitude earthquake occurred in Nepal on 25 Apr 2015 has taken over 8,000 lives and injured over 19,000 people.
Esri is supporting organizations that are responding to earthquake disasters with software, data, imagery, project services, and technical support. The Hong Kong Council of Social Service in 2002, the Caring Company Scheme aims at cultivating good corporate citizenship. The Esri Asia Pacific User Conference (APUC) has finally returned to Hong Kong after a decade and the 10th Esri APUC was successfully held in 27-28th January 2015.
This year, about 600 delegates from 20 countries of Asia, Oceania, Europe and North America descended upon the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre. The James' new primary care doctor explained Lawrence's prostate cancer diagnosis and every procedure that followed until they understood each of them. The Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) Program is intended to help prepare the United States against terrorist use of a weapon of mass destruction and is commonly referred to as a homeland defense measure.
39, "The United States Policy on Counterterrorism," directs a number of measures be taken, including reducing the Nation's vulnerability to terrorism, improving deterrence and response to terrorist acts, and strengthening capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, including WMD. Our overall audit objective was to evaluate the program management of chemical and biological defense resources in the Nation al Guard and Reserve forces. The Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO) did not manage the WMD-CST program effectively. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness seek disestablishment of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office, obtain reassignment of the management oversight responsibilities for the WMD-CST program, and ensure that the actions specified in recommendations below are completed before forwarding any WMD-CST certification requests to the Secretary of Defense for approval. As a result of the issues identified in our draft report, on November 9, 2000, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum regarding the institutionalizing of the CoMPIO functions. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred with the recommendations. The actions directed by the Deputy Secretary and the comments of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs were fully responsive.
The team was to produce a comprehensive plan to increase the DoD response capabilities while developing the potential within the Reserve Component units. Originally, 10 WMD-Civil Support Teams (CSTs) were established with a planned initial operation capability date of January 2000.
Other Federal units have already been established to respond to nuclear, biological; and chemical incidents. For this segment of the audit, we evaluated the program management of National Guard units charged with CB defense responsibilities for homeland defense. Specifically, CoMPIO did not provide adequate guidance, training, and equipment for the teams. That situation occurred because of insufficient CoMPIO coordination with existing organizations and overly centralized decisionmaking. According to the Tiger Team Report, proximity to air transportation was one of the major factors in determining the stationing of the WMD-CSTs. Another major factor in the stationing decision was placing the teams so that WMD-CSTs would be within 250 miles of 90 percent of the Nation's population. While other organizations in DoD were drafting doctrine for the WMD-CSTs, CoMPIO was writing its own doctrine, independent of the other efforts. The draft doctrine handbook discussed extensively the state emergency management response and Federal assistance roles but contained only limited discussion on coordination with Joint Task Force-Civil Support. The lack of definition occurred because CoMPIO failed to coordinate the mission of the WMD-CSTs with the law enforcement community. The doctrine needs to identify the mission, the employment concepts, and the expected capabilities of the WMD-CSTs as equipped in sufficient detail to be of use to planners. The use of a C3 readiness rating (4) and the successful completion of an external evaluation (EXEVAL), a training event for the unit, were not meaningful measures of WMD-CST performance or capability. The resource or training area status will result in a significant decrease in flexibility for mission accomplishment and will increase the vulnerability of the unit under many, but not all, envisioned operational scenarios. EXEVALs are training events designed to show commanders the strengths and weaknesses of their units for determining future training requirements. Army Forces Command had sufficient concern about the problem and offered to conduct another mini-EXEVAL on the MALS van.
Army Forces Command requested a postponement of the EXEVALs until the WMD-CSTs received the full complement of equipment. The Assistant Secretary requested the Army provide additional documentation for WMD-CST certification requests forwarded through his office before he recommended approval to the Secretary of Defense. The unit status report may not be the correct reporting format for the WMD-CSTs unless the positions within the WMD-CST are further defined for mission criticality.
An operational readiness inspection would be a better criteria than an EXEVAL for measuring WMD-CST capability and performance.
Although survey team members are required to be military occupational specialty qualified as nuclear, biological, and chemical personnel (military occupational specialty 54B), nonmilitary occupational specialty qualified individuals who were assigned to the WMD-CSTs did not receive military occupational specialty qualification through training at the U.S. CoMPIO identified and developed training courses for WMD-CST personnel without fully coordinating with the Army.
Neither the School nor Battelle Corporation had the subject matter experts to teach the course to the first 10 WMD-CSTs. By splitting the training, however, it is difficult for the WMD-CSTs to sufficiently cross-train personnel and ensure that there will always be personnel available who are proficient on the equipment. The units were also encountering problems with insufficient quantities of training equipment and training aids.
The WMD-CSTs must also complete the EXEVALs with all of their equipment and their full complement of personnel. The TDA list also established the funding, personnel and training requirements for the team. Additionally, items fielded to the original 10 teams included several items we were not able to ascertain the rationale for either why the item was included on the TDA or the quantity that was authorized. Edgewood is the Army's principal research and development center for CB defense technology, engineering, and service. Natick was given an equipment-fielding deadline of June 1, 1999, and made 10 separate requests (between December 1998 and March 1999) for a finalized equipment list. For the acquisition of WMD-CST equipment, CoMPIO bypassed the normal assignment of a program manager by the Army Acquisition Executive. The Tiger Team Report addresses the need for response elements, namely the WMD-CST survey teams, to spend extended time in the hot zone or to make multiple entries. For example, the WMD-CST Life Cycle Management Handbook, produced by the Defense Consequence Management Support Center and CoMPIO, was created to address equipment sustainment and supply issues. The lack of program management oversight and direction resulted in safety issues and disparity in the equipment readiness of the 10 teams. The Washington WMD-CST did not have any chemical protective suites; it had commercial splash suits instead. For example, they need to know whether the useful life of a standard issue filter for an M40 gas mask is degraded if used against an agent such as ammonia: Such information is critical for logistical decisions and personal protective measures to prevent unnecessary casualties. CoMPIO did not ensure issuance of medical chemical defense materiel to the teams or take into account Army policy on maintaining medical chemical defense materiel. Equipment variations were the result of the lack of management oversight and the lack of requirements definition, testing, and configuration control.
Two pacing items, the MALS and the UCS, provide additional evidence of the lack of program management in engineering, design, testing, evaluation, and fielding. The design of major components of the MALS has adversely affected the ability of the WMD-CSTs to conduct their mission. These problems were validated when SBCCOM deployed a team to repair or replace the glove boxes at each WMD-CST. Operational issues affecting usefulness to the WMD-CSTs have been identified with the HAPSITE (9). The HAPSITE is connected to a filter installed on the outside of the MALS van, which filters air leaving the HAPSITE. A laptop computer was issued with a software interface to the HAPSITE, but lacked sufficient random access memory to allow for proper operation of software necessary for other MALS components. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases as the "gold standard" of identification technology for three biological agents on the high probability list. According to National Guard Bureau officials, tactical communications suites from other research and development programs could have been used, to the benefit of the Army and an option that would have been a low-cost temporary solution while the WMD-CST program determined the communications equipment and capability requirements.
According to the CoMPIO operations handbook, once the WMD-CSTs arrive at the scene, they are to establish a KU-Band satellite link with the Trojan Spirit team located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to enable NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and voice and messaging services. CoMPIO could have ensured SIPRNET and NIPRNET connectivity of the UCS through the National Guard through GUARDNET, an existing National Guard system.
CoMPIO established a system of communications equipment without regard to the established Army-required accreditation of the complete system.
The reachback capability of the teams and their ability to run communications for the Incident Commander on the scene were doubtful.
However, the special management structure established for the WMD-CST program in January 1998 did not lead to effective program management. Seek reassignment of the program management oversight responsibilities for the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team Program to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs as appropriate. Recommendation was revised to correspond to management oversight responsibilities delineated by the Under Secretary. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs concurred with the recommendation.
The comments of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs are responsive.
We recommend that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support coordinate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to determine the exact roles and missions that the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams are expected to fulfill in response to weapons of mass destruction incidents.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred with the recommendation.
We recommend that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) issue guidance prescribing certification standards and delineating the specific mission, duties, and responsibilities for the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, as part of the program review directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense's November 9, 2000, memorandum, is evaluating the mission, duties, and responsibilities for the WMD-CSTs as well as the certification standards and should result in new guidance being issued. We recommend that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), in coordination with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, and the Chemical Branch of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations and Plans, conduct a thorough program review of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Team Program. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Director of Military Support, Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, concurred with the recommendation. The warm zone includes control points for access to the hot zone, thus assisting in reducing the spread of contamination institutional controls.
The Fox vehicle is based on a six-wheeled, all-wheel-drive armored vehicle capable of crosscountry operations at speeds up to 65 miles per hour.
We reviewed applicable Presidential Decision Directives, Public Law, Defense Reform Initiative Directives, and DoD directives and plans from January 1993 through January 1998 for the authorization, underlying WMD-CST concept, and establishment of this WMD defense resource. In response to the Government Performance and Results Act, the Secretary of Defense annually establishes DoD-wide corporate level goals, subordinate performance goals, and performance measures. We take in data, manage it, store it, share it appropriately, and protect it from unauthorized access. This means developing and leveraging technology to enhance the CFPB’s reach, impact, and effectiveness.
Therefore, we invest in world-class training and support in order to create an environment that encourages employees at all levels to tackle complex challenges.
We serve our colleagues by listening to one another and by sharing our collective knowledge and experience.


We believe in investing in the growth of our colleagues and in creating an organization that is accountable to the American people. The result was a system without sufficiently effective rules or consistent enforcement of the law. The CFPB is designed to be agile and adjust its approach to supervising the financial industry in order to respond rapidly to changing consumer needs. Working with industry groups, develop data standards so that private enterprise can create new tools that help consumers understand the financial products they buy. The assessment addresses, among other factors, the rule’s effectiveness in meeting the purposes and objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act, Title X and the specific goals the Bureau states for the rule. Other public outreach efforts, such as meetings with consumers and industry stakeholders in the development of a proposal, inform and otherwise assist the Bureau in crafting more effective rules. Originally, 10 WMD-CSTs were established with a planned initial operational capability date of January 2000. For this segment of the audit, we evaluated the program management of National Guard units charged with chemical and biological defense responsibilities for homeland defense. Specifically, CoMPIO failed to provide adequate guidance, training, and equipment for the 10 CSTs. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) coordinate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to determine the exact roles and missions that the National Guard WMD-CST are expected to fulfill in response to WMD incidents, and issue guidance prescribing certification standards and delineating the specific mission, duties, and responsibilities for the WMD-CST.
The Deputy Secretary directed that the Army continue to manage the WMD-CST program, but with the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs providing specific policy guidance and oversight consistent with the broader policies of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support.
The Under Secretary stated that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support is responsible for coordinating and integrating the domestic consequence management program.
The Director maintained that the criteria established by the Army adequately attested to the ability of the WMD-CSTs to conduct their mission. 25, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Army to establish the Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO). The CSTs were located in alignment with the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions in California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. Two examples are the Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Hazardous Materials Response Unit. Subsequent segments of the audit will address the financial management of the CoMPIO and the management of CB defense resources in the National Guard and Reserve forces in support of deployed forces.
Deficiencies occurred because of insufficient CoMPIO coordination with existing organization, overly centralized decisionmaking, and program execution independent of established military structures, organizations, and guidance. The criteria established for certification of the WMD-CSTs were not meaningful and did not meet the requirements of the law (2).
As of September 15, 2000, with 10 WMD-CSTs established, 17 beginning initial training, and 5 more being established, CoMPIO had not finalized doctrine for the WMD-CSTs. The second draft of the doctrine handbook states that the primary method of deployment for the WMD-CSTs is self-deployment with their own vehicles. The draft doctrine handbook stated only that, if federalized, the operational control of the WMD-CSTs transfers to Joint Task Force-Civil Support and the Joint Task Force-Civil Support should monitor WMD-CST reports and communications. For example, CoMPIO has heavily marketed the ability of the WMD-CSTs to provide on-site identification of a potential agent through collection and sampling. The WMD-CSTs should have standardized procedures with respect to both their Title 32 and Title 10 status and the WMD-CST personnel in those capabilities. Most of the WMD-CSTs underwent EXEVAL without critical personnel and personal protective equipment, and they all passed. Once approved by the National Guard Bureau, the requests are forwarded to the Army's Directorate of Military Support, who also reviews and approves the requests. With only 22 personnel, the WMD-CSTs lack the depth and breadth of personnel to easily reconstitute their forces.
An operational readiness inspection would provide an objective basis for validating, on a recurring basis, that WMD-CST personnel possess the necessary skills and proficiency to safely conduct their operations. Requirements for periodic recertifications must be determined for operational readiness inspections.
This occurred because of insufficient CoMPIO coordination with existing training organizations, and program execution independent of the oversight of established military structures, organization, and guidance.
Most of the classroom instruction WMD-CST personnel receive is from established curricula from various civilian emergency first responder and Army schools. Rather than developing the course under an existing contract between the School and Battelle Corporation, CoMPIO took charge to draft a new contract with Battelle Corporation for the course. As part of its contract, Battelle Corporation sent two employees to training courses to become subject matter experts. In addition to lacking a program of instruction, the School had no training aids other than individual protective equipment which were reclaimed by CoMPIO during the training of the first 10 WMD-CSTs.
Cross-training is vital to organizations such as WMD-CSTs, where the entire complement of the team is only 22. One WMD-CST attempted to purchase training aids directly from the vendor to conduct what they felt was required proficiency training on commercial-off-the shelf equipment.
If that is not done, the proficiency level of the WMD-CSTs cannot be adequately determined. During the initial months of the standup and funding of the CoMPIO, the TDA had grown without evaluation by subject matter experts within the Army.
The development and establishment of the initial 10 WMD-CSTs was done on an accelerated timetable that was imposed by CoMPIO. CoMPIO established a program called Utmost Advantage to equip, supply, and sustain the WMD-CSTs with state-of the-art technology by leveraging Government-to-Government unique skills, industry support, and areas of specialization. Dugway officials stated that they required a work order and funding to participate in the WMD-CST program. Natick provides life-cycle management of soldier and related support systems though centralized development, procurement, integration, and management of individual soldier items and organizational items. Changes to the requirements and equipment were made by CoMPIO as late as April 1, 1999, leaving Natick to procure 10,000 pieces of equipment by the June 1, 1999, deadline.
As a result, CoMPIO made equipment decisions without adequately clarifying the mission requirements.
CoMPIO did not address the need for on-site air refills and did not issue a portable refill mechanism. As oversight responsibility for the WMD-CSTs is transferred, the necessity of the Life Cycle Management Handbook or the Defense Consequence Management Support Center was at best questionable in light of the longstanding Army sustainment capability.
Also, it was unclear whether personal protective items had been tested by an independent third party before purchase or whether purchase decisions had been based solely on the assertions of the manufacturer or assertions of first responders because the equipment met their needs. The safety of the WMD-CSTs depends on reliable information on the performance of their equipment in the environment within which they will operate. The Army maintains medical chemical defense materiel in 5,000 soldier blocks, which are not to be broken out except for a contingency. The lack of a formal lessons learned process led the WMD-CSTs to individually identify various issues and methods of correction. According to CoMPIO officials, the MALS was intended to be a platform for currently fielded lab equipment as well as emerging technology.
The MALS is equipped with a glove box and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter system for handling and preparing samples. The WMD-CST personnel identified that the glove box filtration system also bad design flaws which could endanger the users should they attempt to change the HEPA filters after use in a contaminated environment.
The WMD-CSTs identified that the filter, an M40 mask filter; is installed backwards, as though to filter coming into the van rather than leaving the HAPSITE. Additionally, the connectivity between the MALS HAPSITE computer and the UCS information system does not address the needs of the team. The MALS vans issued to the WMD-CSTs lacked the florescent microscope, the polymerase chain reaction technology [DNA fingerprinting], and the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), although CoMPIO advertised having these items in May 2000. As of September 15, 2000, the biological detection and identification capability of the fielded MALS is limited to bio-immunoassay tickets [bio-tickets] produced by the Joint Program Office for Biological Defense.
The handbook points out, however, that establishing communications from the UCS will be situation dependent and require detailed planning efforts by the WMD-CST. Telephone connectivity could have also been obtained through the existing National Guard structure. CoMPIO officials disregarded recommendations and assistance from the National Guard Bureau to obtain UCS accreditation. The authorization also did not allow for any peripherals (such as the MALS) to be attached to the system. Infrastructure to conduct reachback operations to the identified subject matter experts for agent identification, verification or assistance did not exist. The Under Secretary stated that the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum on November 9, 2000, initiating the disestablishment of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office.
The Under Secretary stated that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support is responsible for the coordination and integration of the consequence management program.
The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support stated that they believe the WMD-CSTs should be certified once they met the criteria designated in Section S 11 of the FY 1999 Defense Authorization Act. The comments of the Director of Military Support did not provide any factual information with which any alternative conclusions could be determined. The Under Secretary stated that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support is responsible for the coordination and integration of the consequence management program and that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs would work closely to ensure appropriate interagency coordination is made for the employment of the WMD-CSTs.
At a minimum, the review should include areas such as the operational concept, doctrine, equipage, sustainment, personnel assignments and rotations, funding, and the certification process. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs stated that a thorough program review is already underway, in accordance with the Deputy Secretary of Defense's November 9, 2000, memorandum. They usually include civilian manpower, whereas a modified table of organization and equipment unit generally will not. We reviewed and analyzed the draft doctrine, draft mission training plan, draft operational handbook, medical handbook, and Life-Cycle Management Handbook (interim guidance). Transform the force by exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs, and reengineer the Department to achieve a 21st century infrastructure. The Bureau is developing targeted outreach to groups that face particular challenges, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act. Our aim is to use data purposefully, to analyze and distill data to enable informed decision-making in all internal and external functions.
We strive to be recognized as an innovative, 21st century agency whose approach to technology serves as a model within government. The Bureau is also interested in exploring ways to increase general consumer involvement in the rulemaking process. After he died in the spring, the couple's doctor alerted specialists treating JoAnna James, in case her health deteriorated.The individualized model of care, called "person-centered care" or "patient-centered care," is based on the concept that costs can be reined in by preventing expensive emergency room visits. 25 tasks the Army to establish a program for integration of Reserve Components into the domestic WMD response and provide DoD support to civilian authorities within the United States. Future reports will deal with the financial management of the WMD-CST program and the management of chemical and biological defense resources of National Guard and Reserve forces scheduled to deploy in the event of a major theater war. Additionally, the Army process for certification of the teams lacked rigor and would not provide meaningful assurance. We also recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), in coordination with the Chemical Branch of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations and Plans, conduct a thorough program review of the WMD-CST program (which at a minimum should include areas such as the operational concept, doctrine, equipage, sustainment, personnel assignments and rotations, funding, and certification process). The Deputy Secretary also directed that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs initiate a comprehensive review of the WMD-CST program and advise him of any corrective actions needed. The Under Secretary stated that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs would work closely with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support to ensure the appropriate interagency coordination is made for employment of the WMD-CSTs. We continue to find that the Army criteria for certification has little resemblance to the criteria specified in Section 511 of the FY 1999 Defense Authorization Act. Presidential Decision Directive-39, "The United States Policy on Counterterrorism," was issued in June 1995. In March 1998, CoMPIO was established under the Army’s Director of Military Support and was tasked with implementing Tiger Team recommendations for integration of Reserve Components into the domestic WMD response. CBI was established in 1996 in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive-39 to deploy domestically or overseas, when directed, to provide force protection or mitigation in the event of a WMD incident and be prepared to initially respond to no-notice WMD incidents with a rapid response force.
See Appendix A for a discussion of the audit scope and methodology and our review of the management control program.
As a result, the program schedule slipped significantly and none of the teams were ready for certification. Training programs and materials for WMD-CST personnel were not sufficiently identified, developed, approved, and implemented.
The three primary missions the WMD-CSTs listed in the WMD-CST Doctrine Handbook (second draft), June 2, 2000, are assess, advise, and facilitate. Joint Task Force-Civil Support believed part of its charter was to provide oversight of the U.S.
However, this should have been coordinated with law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This occurred because of insufficient CoMPIO coordination with existing organizations, and program execution independent of the oversight of established military structures, organizations, and guidance. The EXEVALs conducted with the first 10 WMD-CSTs were of marginal value because of the absence of major items of equipment and personnel. Army Forces Command was instructed by the Army's Directorate of Military Support (the higher headquarters of CoMPIO) to administer the EXEVALs even though the WMD-CSTs did not have the MALS van and had only a limited capability with the Unified Command Suite (UCS). Subsequently, they were issued the rest of their equipment, including personal protective equipment and pacing items. The requests are forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for approval, who then forwards the requests to the Secretary of Defense for final approval.
Most of the critical military occupational specialty positions, such as the nuclear medical science officer, are only one deep.
CoMPIO did not establish a requirement for refresher training on either an individual or unit basis other than the training that unit personnel receive when assigned to the unit. Additionally, criteria must be established to determine when a WMD-CST would be nondeployable because personnel in the critical occupational specialties are absent or in a rotation status, and, whether those conditions would require additional inspections.
The first, 10 WMD-CSTs were in the process of requesting certification, even-though training courses were still under development and major pieces of equipment had not been exercised. However, a new course required of all WMD-CST personnel is the WMD Emergency Assessment and Detection course, a 3-week course under development by the Battelle Corporation. This precluded a collaborative effort between the School and Battelle Corporation, slowing development of the course.
Battelle Corporation was to teach a first two iterations of the course using a draft program of instruction. With the exception of the MALS van (the MALS van is used to identify a chemical or biological agent), the lack of training aids has been rectified. Insufficient cross-training of personnel could degrade the ability of the WMD-CST to fully perform its mission and be of value to the emergency first responder community. The vendor contacted CoMPIO, which instructed the vendor not to provide the equipment or CoMPIO would cancel the contract. Finally, the WMD-CST training must be institutionalized within the existing infrastructure of the Army, to Army standards.
CoMPIO, despite lacking acquisition certified personnel familiar with chemical and biological defense systems, retained acquisition decision authority.
According to the timetable presented in the Tiger Team Report, the initial 10 teams were to be certified by FY 2002. Development of the TDAs is an area where experienced organizations, such as the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, the Army's Force Development Branch, or the Defense Logistics Agency, could have provided invaluable experience and expertise. Although intended to establish cooperation through working groups to derive recommendations and execute decisions, the program resulted in one person in CoMPIO who determined the requirements in the form of a draft TDA and orchestrated equipment acquisition, logistics, and resource management. CoMPIO provided neither and, as a result, Dugway was bypassed and told that SBCCOM was the single voice for testing and evaluation of equipment. Despite the assistance and recommendations of Edgewood and Natick, CoMPIO officials overly relied on work done by the Interagency Board. CoMPIO never officially delegated any authority to Natick and, by the first quarter of September 1999, had removed Natick's unofficial program manager status and phased Natick out completely. CoMPIO funded creation of a new sustainment support organization, the Defense Consequence Management Support Center, under the Special Operations Forces Support Activity located at Lexington, Kentucky.
That leaves most of the WMD-CSTs having to rely on responding firefighters for refills, and, in some cases, WMD-CST personnel who are not trained on how to fill the tanks.
In an attempt to supply the teams with powered air-purifying respirators, CoMPIO issued the M48 blower to use with the M40 mask, even though the pair were not originally designed to function together. To ensure an acceptable level of safety with personal protective items, commercial-off-the-shelf equipment such as Level-A suits, need to be tested against militarized agents by a trusted source. The WMD-CST commanders and personnel lack confidence in the unknown, untested, and unsubstantiated reliability of the equipment that they were issued by CoMPIO.
While that may instill confidence in the public and emergency first responder personnel, the stated mission is totally devoid of operational parameters.
The policy exists partly because medical chemical defense materiel items are potency-dated, consist of controlled substances, and require a high level of stock maintenance and management.
According to the Tiger Team Report, the WMD-CSTs would rapidly respond to a WMD incident, conduct detection, assessment and hazard prediction, and provide technical advice concerning WMD incidents and agents. The platform that was chosen, however does not provide adequate physical space for the currently designated components or laboratory operations conducted by two people wearing chemical protective gear deemed necessary by the WMD-CST MALS operators. Officials at SBCCOM stated that the ability to prepare, refrigerate, an deliver a sample to the nearest health organization afforded by the glove box and on-board refrigeration unit provides an essential and capability.
Additionally, there were ongoing issues related to the user's confidence level related to the use of the glove box with an agent.
One issue identified by the WMD-CSTs is that the HAPSITE does not heat the sample sufficiently to identify a vast number of compounds, especially heavier, persistent agents.
Although an SBCCOM official noted that “it should work,” we did not find anyone in the CB community who knew with any certainty whether the filter would perform properly the way it was installed. Combined, those items provide the biological detection capability of the vehicle and team, as each component has detection strengths and weaknesses.
The Joint Program Office for Biological Defense has management responsibility for all DoD biological defense acquisition programs.
The UCS also serves as a prime example of where CoMPIO failed to leverage existing Government assets and made acquisitions without regard to sustainment.
A concept of operations document for the UCS dated January 21, 1999, states, "The UCS provides a replacement for existing capabilities that are limited to nonsecure cellular phones and military tactical radios that are often incompatible with those of other responding agencies." However, the concept of operations does not demonstrate the need for secure communications or compatible military tactical radios, making the UCS an unnecessary system.
Under ideal situations, the team will have established infra-agency communications 4 hours after arrival at the scene, not taking into account the various contingencies that may add up to another 3 hours of configuring. The use of GUARDNET would have spared the teams from using scarce resources to send personnel for information security training at Fort Dix, New Jersey. As of September 15, 2000 none of the UCS communications was accredited to operate under Army policy. The reachback capability is one of the cornerstones of the CST capability as developed and promoted by CoMPIO.
The Under Secretary also stated that the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs recommended that program oversight of all chemical and biological defense research, development, and acquisition as it pertains to the WMD-CST program be assigned to that office. The Director of Military Support, Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, nonconcurred with the recommendation. The criteria established by the Director of Military Support for requesting certification are not as stringent as the criteria contained in Section 511.
The Principal Deputy also stated that this review had already set in motion many administrative actions which would address most of the findings and recommendations of the draft audit report. We reviewed the TDA issued to the initial 10 CSTs to determine, in conjunction with various matter experts, if the equipment was adequate for the mission. We seek input from and collaborate with consumers, industry, government entities, and other external stakeholders.
The Dodd-Frank Act increased accountability in government by consolidating consumer financial protection authorities that had existed across seven different federal agencies into one, the newly formed Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. In FY 1999 Congress established Secretary of Defense certification requirements for the WMD-CSTs. The Under Secretary also stated that the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs recommended that program oversight for chemical and biological defense research, development, and acquisition pertaining to the WMD-CST program be assigned to that office. We met on several occasions with Army representatives, including the Under Secretary of the Army, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support, the Director of Military Support, and the Deputy Director of Military Support, to discuss the audit results. Presidential Decision Directive-39 directs a number of measures be taken, including reducing the Nation's vulnerability to terrorism, improving deterrence and response to terrorist acts, and strengthening capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Director of Military Support serves as the Secretary of the Army's action agent for planning and executing the DoD support mission to civilian authorities within the United States. The CSTs are organized into six functional areas - administration and logistics, command, communications, medical, operations, and survey.
To enable the WMD-CSTs to perform those three missions, they were to receive an impressive array of training and equipment. The original concept called for the WMD-CSTs to be stationed near Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve bases. That location places the WMD-CST more than 350 miles from Miami but within 250 miles of Atlanta and the Georgia WMD-CST. On September 14, 2000, the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a memorandum to all of its field offices discussing the role of the WMD-CSTs.


Army Training and Doctrine Command has personnel experienced in the development of doctrine, including missions such as CB reconnaissance and decontamination, the training command was not requested to develop the doctrine.
For example, none of the first 10 WMD-CSTs had received a Mobile Analytical Laboratory Systems (MALS) van at the time of the EXEVALs.
Army Forces Command major subordinate commands that conducted the EXEVALs, reported that only 5 of the 10 WMD-CSTs had their full complement of personnel. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), who is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for overall supervision of matters which involve the Reserve Components, including the National Guard, has inserted himself into the .review process and has requested that the Secretary of the Army forward the requests to his office for review and approval prior to submission to the Secretary of Defense. We believe the WMD-CSTs should have a Cl readiness rating to be eligible for certification because of the small unit size and stated response time.
The certification requirements established by the Army's Directorate of Military Support, and implemented by CoMPIO, are not in consonance with the requirements or intent of the law. The various types of nuclear, biological, and chemical agents that WMD-CST personnel may encounter require that the training they receive provide them with a sufficient level of proficiency in all mission areas.
After the first two iterations, the School was to begin a review of the program of instruction for the course.
Additionally, by splitting the training between two geographic locations, the WMD-CSTs will have to budget for more travel costs for their personnel. Later, CoMPIO officials contradicted that action by stating that procurement of such items was the responsibility of the individual state's Directorate of Logistics.
The Interagency Board is a mufti-governmental organization created at the recommendation of the Army's Directorate of Military Support, the higher headquarters of CoMPIO, and cochaired by representatives of CoMPIO and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
CoMPIO involved the Marine Corps Systems Command in equipment procurement because it had equipped the Marine Corps' CBIRF and held many of the General Services Administration equipment contracts CoMPIO wanted for the teams.
As a result, even if the WMD-CSTs can reach the responding firefighters and those firefighters have a refill capability and are not themselves casualties, the WMD-CSTs might not be able to refill their self-contained breathing apparatus tanks. The WMD-CSTs raised safety concerns because test data was not available that would assure them the specific combination of blower and mask would work in a contaminated environment. Similarly, military chemical defense equipment should be tested against toxic industrial compounds and toxic industrial materials. Conversely, such an abstract mission statement, without amplifying doctrine and established conditions, tasks, and standards, has resulted in a constantly changing training regimen and TDA. CoMPIO should have recognized the logistical problems presented by medical chemical defense materiel and leveraged existing DoD supply chains to ensure the teams were initially fielded with medical chemical defense materiel, which is a basic requirement for soldiers who could potentially deploy to a CB environment. The two pacing items fielded to the WMD-CSTs to meet this mission, the MALS and the UCS, provide the WMD-CSTs with a limited unique capability. Discussions with officials form the organizations involved in developing the MALS that CoMPIO fielded revealed that engineering of the MALS was not adequately managed to produce a system capable of meeting mission requirements. SBCCOM engineered the glove box similar to one engineered for the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Hazardous Materials Response Unit.
An upgrade for the HAPSITE has been identified and purchased, and is supposed to correct the deficiencies.
The WMD-CST personnel were also concerned about the way the HAPSITE was connected to the filter. That variance in operating platforms does not accommodate transfer of data from the MALS to the UCS, thereby negating reachback capability of identifying a compound. According to officials at SBCCOM, the florescent microscope purchased for each of the MALS required a space of 27 to 28 inches deep by 30 inches high and 45 inches wide. According to officials at the West Desert Test Center at Dugway, experienced and trained personnel who teach courses on the proper use of bio-tickets had difficulty with the bio-tickets because of high rates of false positive and false negative readings. If they want to do the accreditation they will need to come up with a plan, a timeline, and the funding to do so. Accreditation would not be an issue if CoMPIO had leveraged existing asset to the fullest before developing the UCS. Further, the Deputy Secretary of Defense November 9, 2000, memorandum directed the Army to continue to manage the program with the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) providing policy guidance and oversight consistent with the broader policies of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support. The Director maintained that the criteria established by the Army attested to the ability of the WMD-CSTs to conduct their mission.
Specifically, one of the criteria established by the Army was a readiness rating of at least C3-marginally combat ready. We reviewed the training of WMD-CST team personnel to determine whether they received adequate, uniform training to achieve full mission capability. These authorities include the ability to issue regulations under more than a dozen Federal consumer financial laws. As a result, the program had slipped significantly and none of the teams were fully operational As of January 2001, the certification requests were still being evaluated by the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and none of the 10 WMD-CSTs had received Secretary of Defense certification.
The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs stated that the recommended program review was underway in accordance with the Deputy Secretary of Defense's November 9, 2000, memorandum. Subsequent to the issuance of Presidential Decision Directive-39, Congress enacted Public Law 104-201, the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (the Act).
CoMPIO was under the leadership of an active duty colonel and was composed of eight active Guard and Reserve military personnel, six DoD civilians, and five contractor personnel. Of the 22 personnel, 10, including all survey team members, require a military occupational specialty for nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare. The CBIRF can be tailored to the threat or mission and deploys with external and internal communications, protective equipment, detection and identification equipment, personal decontamination equipment, medical treatment capability, and a mobile laboratory. The absence of finalized doctrine has encouraged and promoted an environment of persistent change to operational concepts and mission requirements, and a focus on short-term actions. The fixed-wing air assets of the Air National Guard and Air Force at those installations were to provide transportation to the incident site.
Such stationing provides overlapping coverage of 250 miles but places one of the largest cities in the United States outside of the desired coverage area. Joint Forces Command, the Joint Task Force Civil Support, was recently activated by direction of the Secretary of Defense to serve as the U.S. To accomplish coordination with the WMD-CSTs is a necessity to provide a unified military effort. The MALS van contains the major items necessary for a thorough on-site assessment and identification of a potential agent.
Critical personnel, such as the medical officer, nuclear medical science officer, or survey team members, were missing from some of the CSTs at the time of the EXEVALs.
Army Forces Command offer to conduct an unforecasted and unfunded mini-EXEVAL for the 10 WMD-CSTs must be viewed as a significant decision to support a critical requirement.
Because they had already met two of the three criteria established by CoMPIO, the commanders of the WMD-CSTs felt undue pressure to recommend certification. Additionally, the identification and staffing of critical positions should be required for reporting purposes. That is another area where there are several organizations within the Army that could have provided thorough, detailed training on the identification, handling, and disposal of suspected agents. Approximately 65 personnel recruited into the WMD-CSTs who required military occupational specialty 54B qualification received some of their training from National Guard Bureau programs and attended a compressed 3-week nuclear, biological, and chemical noncommissioned officer course of instruction instead of the standard 16-week nuclear, biological, and chemical noncommissioned officer course.
Army Training and Doctrine Command course and is not part of a standard soldier training program, which applies to military occupational specialty training courses. After the review is completed, the draft program of instruction will be staffed (expected to begin during FY 2001). The Directorate of Logistics serves as the logistician for National Guard units in a particular state. The equipment fielded to the teams was not subject to testing and evaluation or the rigors of an Operational Requirements Document to ensure that it would provide the needed capabilities or could be sustained within the Service infrastructure.
Subsequently, CoMPIO developed a drat TDA and fielded equipment before clarifying the mission requirements.
However their role was ambiguous, unfunded, and without a formal documented agreement with CoMPIO. Because of the composition of the Interagency Board, it is difficult to distinguish between the decisions and opinions of the Interagency Board from those of CoMPIO. Officials at the Marine Corps Systems Command stated that although Natick was providing direction on acquisitions to them, CoMPIO retained final decision authority on selection of equipment.
Identifying limitations and operating parameters of personal protection equipment issued for use in situations that could involve toxic industrial compounds, toxic industrial materials, or militarized chemical or biological agents would allow for better informed decisionmaking by the WMD-CST commanders. Establishment of the WMD-CSTs did not follow the normal Army protocol for establishing a mission statement, drafting a doctrine, and equipping to mission requirements. Doing so would have complied with the CoMPIO concept of "total unit fielding." Instead, it was left to the states' National Guard Headquarters to furnish the medical chemical defense materiel. Further, no analysis was conducted to compare the capabilities provided by the MALS with those of other existing military or commercial systems.
The glove box was installed in a vehicle not chosen by personnel at SBCCOM and occupies almost half of the usable space. According to SBCCOM officials, they were not sure how effective the upgrade is because they have not been given the opportunity to test it.
The connectivity problem is a prime example of the lack of program management oversight in the engineering and fielding of the equipment that could have been provided by experienced personnel in the Army. The available space inside the MALS is 24 inches deep by 26 inches high and 39 inches wide. In their opinion, the requisite skills required to use the bio-tickets and obtain trusted results are perishable and require constant training.
A minimum of two people from each WMD-CST were required to receive the accreditation standards training. Army who was involved with five CSTs during the EXEVALs, without established protocols and communications infrastructure the reachback concept will not work. This situation was especially debilitating to the California WMD-CST because they were located in Los Alamitos, California, and the assigned radio frequency was for their initial home station in the Sacramento, California, area.
We interviewed personnel from each of the 10 existing WMD-CSTs, inspected the equipment issued to them, and discussed their concerns with that equipment. Its wonky name makes people think it's just a gimmick to cut services, experts say.A poll of Americans age 40 and over conducted this year by The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research revealed some skepticism among those who have not tried this new kind of care. We found no justification for making significant changes to our report and we stand by its facts. The Act mandates enhancement of domestic preparedness and response capabilities for terrorist attacks involving nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons. The bulk of the CST mission lies with the survey team members who would enter a contaminated area to gather air, soil, and other samples for on-site evaluation by the nuclear science medical officer and various laboratories across the United States by way of electronic transmission (reachback). The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Hazardous Materials Response Unit was established in 1996 to respond to the threat of terrorism involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and to an expanding caseload of environmental crimes.
Although those issues may seem to be minor, the absence of a finalized doctrine affects the training and equipping of the WMD-CSTs and also impacts their capabilities and readiness.
That concept allowed the WMD-CSTs to comply with another Tiger Team concept - a 4-hour response time. The 10 original WMD-CSTs now approach a time period when personnel will be rotating to other assignments and their successors will not have an institutionalized doctrine upon which to rely. The WMD-CSTs have not, however, been trained and evaluated on all of the equipment they will use for a mission. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), and the Joint Program Office-Biological Defense expressed concern about the lack of an identified requirement for refresher training or proficiency certification. The School did not award certification of military occupational specialty qualification because the personnel did not attend the entire 16-week program of instruction.
The problems related to training equipment and training aids encountered by the School and the units were other areas where the Army, such as the U.S. Sustainment of fielded systems was instituted in a specialized facility that did not draw on existing resources. In addition, while the Interagency Board appears to involve the Federal Bureau of Investigation into DoD's WMD-CST program, this involvement appears limited to identification of equipment only. The Defense Consequence Management Support Center was supposed to provide sustainment support for specialized, nonstandard items of equipment issued to the WMD-CSTs by conducting stock management, warehousing, technical services, integrated logistics support, industrial operations, and coordination and monitoring of forward support for area resupply and sustainment. The consensus among the WMD-CSTs is that they would use the M40 mask without the M48 blower because the combination was untested, resulting in further degradation of their mission capability. An example of the lack of safety concerns lies in how the mission was drafted to be conducted. We were not able to locate any memorandums of agreement at the state level to provide medical chemical defense materiel to the WMD-CSTs on a recurring basis. Although the California WMD-CST believed they should add the hood for the safety of the operator, CoMPIO had the hood and other team-initiated safety modifications removed. The MALS was intended to provide the teams with an ability to analyze end observe agent samples and share that vital information to the UCS through a digital transmission link. SBCCOM subsequently identified the need for additional training on the use and maintenance of the equipment. Additionally, some of the WMD-CSTs have identified that the HAPSITE is unreliable, noting a failure of the ion pump that the system pressure reads too high. Each joint presented a possible point of failure, capable of contaminating the MALS and its occupants.
Additionally, the entire microscope package, including the microscope, digital camera, processor, power source for the burner, keyboard, screen, and laptop computer, requires five electrical outlets.
Without all the originally planned equipment in the MALS, such as ELISA, and training to operate it, the WMD-CSTs will not be able to provide timely and effective biological agent identification to incident commanders and will not be able to protect public health and safety. From a management standpoint, procedures were not agreed on to establish the framework for a reachback capability. With the consolidation of existing and new authorities under one roof, the CFPB is now focused and equipped to prevent financial harm to consumers while promoting practices that benefit consumers across financial institutions. More than half of people receiving or providing care without a single health care manager, an aspect of person-centered care, didn't think their care would improve much if they had one, while more than three quarters of those who had one said it improved things a lot.Lynda Crandall, executive director of Pioneer Network, a nonprofit promoting a culture change in nursing homes, said some nursing facilities have adopted person-centered care measures on paper, but in reality, the concept is not being put in place.
We are continuing to work closely with the involved organizations to ensure that valid certifications can be made as soon as possible. One of the first initiatives undertaken by CoMPIO was to coordinate establishing and fielding National Guard teams to assume a WMD consequence management mission as a part of homeland defense. The Hazardous Materials Response Unit has specialized sampling, detection, and identification capabilities for nuclear, biological, and chemical agents in addition to a variety of personal protective and rescue equipment.
Problems in several areas occurred because CoMPIO did not finalize doctrine, including transportation, stationing, and integration. Additionally, rotary-wing assets were to be tasked to provide airlift to, and around the incident sight. Army included shortages of personal protective equipment (10 of 10 teams), hand-held assay tickets with code books used to detect biological agents (8 of 10 teams), and the lack of a reachback capability (9 of 10 teams).
Army Forces Command was willing to accept the costs and provide the personnel because, as they stated, "It was a moral obligation to properly tram these teams before sending them off to do this most dangerous mission." CoMPIO had not identified the frequency of EXEVALs for unit certification or if it was a one-time-only requirement. The military occupational specialty qualification was awarded by the National Guard Bureau. Army Training and Doctrine Command, has the experience and could have assisted, had CoMPIO requested the Army to assist. The dedicated facility raised the cost to support the WMD-CSTs and is outside of either the Army or National Guard Bureau chain of command.
As of September 15, 2000, those functions still need to be developed at the Defense Consequence Management Support Center, while the National Guard Bureau and the Army already have the expertise and infrastructure in place to maintain the military equipment fielded to the WMD-CSTs. The Georgia WMD-CST identified the possibility that survey missions into the hot zone could require greater air supply than available because of distances involved. According to the CoMPIO draft doctrine, communications connectivity of the MALS with the UCS and other response elements is key in the operational capability of the WMD-CST to support the on-site incident commander. CoMPIO chose a commercial Ford panel van for the MALS, despite more adaptable platforms in DOD inventories (8).
Another concern identified by the WMD-CSTs was that there is no way to fully decontaminate the filtration ducts after exposure to a contaminant. One WMD-CSI repeatedly identified their HAPSITE as a deadlined Equipment Readiness Code A (ERC-A (10)) item, inhibiting mission capability. Those teams, composed of full-time members of the National Guard, were intended to assist the emergency first responder community (such as the local fire department or hazardous materiel response unit) under Title 32 (1), or respond under Title 10 as a subordinate Component of the Joint Task Force-Civil Support. Those CSTs will be established in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California (creating a second team), Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia. Throughout 1998, the Federal Bureau of Investigation continued to acquire the required equipment and instrumentation to support an enhanced deployable laboratory to provide collection, preservation, and screening capabilities of potential evidentiary materials collected at major WMD events. The air transportation guidance was not included in the latest draft doctrine handbook and significantly increases the response time of the teams. Joint Task Force-Civil Support officials stated that they requested the CoMPIO draft doctrine for review and inclusion in their efforts. Army Forces Command, "All units require additional training and experience to improve proficiency in mission execution" and that "current certification does not measure WMD-CST mission readiness in objective terms." If, in the opinion of the Army, the WMD-CSTs must improve their proficiency to meet Army standards, the WMD-CSTs do not comply with the certification requirements of the law and should not be certified.
As of August 1, 2000, Army instructors had not received the training to become subject matter experts.
The lack of a structured acquisition program magnified the risk of unit fielding and sustainment. Equipment for the teams supplies 2 hours of fresh air when equipment that provides a 4-hour air supply could have been purchased.
The John Deere Corporation donated a six-wheel utility vehicle to the team to help alleviate that problem. The MALS and the UCS were delivered to the WMD-CSTs at a cost of approximately $1.6 million per team. Commercial generators, batteries, and air conditioning units were added to the platform, although available through traditional DoD acquisition channels. This factor had various ramifications related to the handling of the contaminated equipment, depending on which state a MALS is in. DNA fingerprinting was not fielded to the teams because the technology is still evolving to a real-time, hand-held application considered better suited for the WMD-CST mission. Compounding the problem were the constraints and lack of allotted frequencies to conduct reachback operations. To establish those teams, CoMPIO spent approximately $73 million and $70 million in procurement and operations and maintenance funds in FY 1999 and FY 2000, respectively.
The change seriously degrades the ability of the WMD-CSTs to provide a timely regional response. However, they had not been contacted by CoMPIO for an exchange of information, even though the CoMPIO draft doctrine identifies Joint Task Force-Civil Support as its higher headquarters when the WMD-CSTs are federalized under Title 10.
Army requested that those WMD-CSTs obtaining additional training (at state expense) from the West Desert Test Center, Dugway Proving Ground (Dugway), Utah, obtain a letter certifying their capability with biological agents.
Army Training and Doctrine Command, was still writing the individual tasks for the course, but was removed from collaborating with Battelle Corporation on the program of instruction. The requirements developed by the CoMPIO did not match those in the Tiger Team Report and depended heavily on the input of the Interagency Board.
According to the WMD-CST operations manual, the survey teams are to suit up, conduct predeployment checks, walk a minimum of 500 meters into the hot zone (6), conduct survey operations, redeploy back 500 meters, and then go through decontamination procedures. CoMPIO had considered adding similar vehicles to the other teams, but had not included them on the TDA or in funding. The MALS and UCS were briefed as mission-necessary equipment; however, during a meeting with the auditors on August 9, 2000, the Director of CoMPIO stated that the WMD-CSTs did not need the MALS or the UCS to accomplish their mission of assess, advise, and facilitate. In this regard, CoMPIO failed to consider the impact inoperable commercial-off-the-shelf equipment would have on the operational readiness of a team and where and from whom a WMD-CST would receive commercial maintenance support on such equipment in time of crisis or during a training event. For example, according to WMD-CST personnel, under California standards the MAL,S would be $400,000 consumable item because introduction of a hazardous sample would make it a new hot zone. Marshall Chin, a professor of medicine and health care ethics at the University of Chicago who focuses on health disparities.
The use of the Interagency Board led to a case where DoD operational requirements were developed and vetted outside of Department and Service processes. The operations are likely to exceed 2 hours, even under ideal conditions when the MALS is located directly on the edge of the warm zone (7).
Again, this is an area where experienced Army personnel could have provided valuable insight and raises the question of how many other items fielded to the CSTs may not be necessary. Sustainment of the WMD-CST major end items and commercial-off-the-shelf systems becomes a long-term consequence of the CoMPIO approach, as support for the Defense Consequence Management Support Center in Lexington, Kentucky, facility comes at an additional cost rather than leveraging existing Service or National Guard resources. The MALS could be parked in the hot zone to shorten the distances, but doing so presents a different and equally dangerous set of circumstances. While CoMPIO officials stated that such issues would be a state problem, identification of state-by-state anomalies should have been identified and agreements worked in conjunction with the WMD-CST regional mission. Issues that affect the safety of the WMD-CSTs should have been fully resolved before establishing and equipping the teams. Some residents get a cup of coffee as soon as they wake up, while others sleep late into the morning. Army Frequency Management Office officials stated they could work out a solution but had not been asked. Every month, a resident gets to decide how to decorate the activities' calendar.Neal Glein, the facilities administrator, said the center runs a deficit of $36 per day for each of its 30 residents on Medicaid, or about one-quarter of its residents.



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