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Disasters that temporarily or permanently impact people and business can be as small as a fire sparked by a short circuit or as massive as a superstorm like Sandy.
Pharmacies also need to make sure all staff members can be contacted and kept informed during an emergency and its aftermath.
Regional Workshop on Preparedness and Response to Aquatic Animal Health Emergencies in Asia. Transboundary movement of live aquatic animals is one of the principal reasons for increased disease emergencies in the Asia-Pacific Region. Transboundary movement of live aquatic animals in the region is one of the principal reasons for increased occurrence and spread of several serious diseases (Subasinghe, Bondad-Reantaso and McGladdery, 2001; Bondad-Reantaso, 2004).
1 EUS=epizootic ulcerative syndrome, VER=viral encephalopathy and retinopathy, GID=Grouper iridoviral disease, KHV=koi herpes virus, WSD=whitespot disease, TS=Taura syndrome. A disease outbreak emergency exists when a population of aquatic animals is recognized as undergoing severe mortality events, or there is otherwise an emerging disease threat where urgent action is required.
Contingency planning is an agreed management plan and set of operational procedures that would be adopted in the event of an aquatic animal disease emergency. The aim of early warning is to rapidly detect the introduction of an exotic pathogen or a sudden increase in the incidence of any disease.
Australia has developed an effective emergency preparedness and response programme known as The Australian Aquatic Animal Diseases Veterinary Emergency Plan (see AQUAVETPLAN, 2002).
TABLE 2 Assessment of progress made in the Asia-Pacific Region towards implementation of the Technical Guidelines.
Countries in the region are at different stages of development of the national aquatic animal health strategies that contain the action plans of governments and that form the basis for the national-level implementation of the Technical Guidelines. This analysis suggests that contingency planning is one of the weak points where capacity building is required.
For some countries in the region, capacity-building activities should initially focus on developing and implementing simple and practical national aquatic animal health management strategies incorporating the key elements contained in the Technical Guidelines.
Table 3 attempts to provide a general picture of responsibilities at the different levels, and the skills and capacity required to carry out the responsibilities. Provision of adequate resources is crucial for the implementation of an emergency preparedness programme. A regional Advisory Group (AG) on aquatic animal health established by the Governing Council of NACA in 2001 is functioning proactively to move forward the implementation of the Technical Guidelines.
With the aim to maximize the utilization of existing resources in the region, a Regional Aquatic Animal Health Resource Base is being identified under the ongoing NACA regional initiative. Pathogens associated with aquatic animal disease emergencies do not respect borders and can spread very rapidly from country to country. Aquaculture has suffered significant losses due to diseases, and increasing risks are foreseen in the future as aquaculture continues to expand.
TABLE 2 The responsibilities involved at different levels and the capacity building required for contingency planning, early warning and emergency response (the purpose of the table is mainly to show the enormity of capacity building that will be required at different levels to effectively prepare a contingency plan and run an early warning and emergency response system. Infectious disease emergencies may arise within a country in a number of ways, for example: incursions of known exotic diseases, sudden changes in the behaviour of existing endemic diseases, or the appearance of previously unrecognized diseases.
The epidemic spread and devastating impacts of white spot syndrome virus (WSSV) in cultured shrimp in Asia clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of aquaculture systems to wide-scale infectious disease emergencies.
In order to have emergency preparedness planning recognized as an important core function of government services, and to have adequate funding and other resources allocated to these activities, the responsible authority should enlist the support of all interested parties.
Of these, the most important target groups are the government and the farming and fishing communities. The Responsible Officer recognized by the Office International des Épizooties (OIE or World Organisation for Animal Health) for the particular country should have overall technical responsibility with regard to preparedness for and management of aquatic animal health emergencies. A National Emergency Disease Planning Committee (NEDPC) should be appointed to facilitate and coordinate emergency planning. In addition to these senior officials, representatives of other ministries that may have a substantial role in responding to aquatic animal disease emergencies, such as environment, wildlife services, economic planning and finance, should either be full members of the committee or should be co-opted as required.
The planning officer would be both the adviser to, and the executive officer of the National Emergency disease Planning Committee, and would be actively involved in all NEDPC programmes itemized above. A strong case can be made for the official recognition of a disease emergency as a defined natural disaster situation that can be incorporated into the national disaster plan. Risk analysis is something that we all do intuitively in our everyday life as well as in our professional work.
Risk analysis is a tool that can also be used to good advantage for animal disease emergency preparedness planning.
Disease surveillance should be an integral and key component of all government aquatic animal health services.
Figure 2 provides a conceptual summary of the relationships among the broad components of a surveillance programme.
Early response is identified as all actions that would be targeted at rapid and effective containment of, and then possibly elimination of an emergency disease outbreak, thus preventing it from turning into a serious epidemic.
Countries need to have in place well-documented contingency action plans for specific, high-priority emergency diseases, together with a series of generic plans for activities or programmes common to the various specific disease contingency plans (e.g.
Developing and maintaining an operational capability to effectively and efficiently deal with emergency disease events is a major and continuing challenge.
Manuals should be prepared that provide a management structure and an information flow system for the handling of an emergency disease emergency at national and local levels.
Once the particular disease has been recognized as an emergency, the capability to make both presumptive field diagnoses with subsequent confirmation in the laboratory must be available. All staff should be thoroughly trained in their roles, duties and responsibilities in a disease emergency.
The communication strategies should aim to make stakeholders aware of the nature and potential consequences of important diseases and of the benefits to be derived from their prevention and eradication. If at all possible, professional communicators and extension experts should be enlisted to help design and carry out awareness and publicity campaigns. Simulation exercises are extremely useful for testing and refining contingency plans in advance of any disease emergency. Disease outbreak scenarios that are as realistic as possible should be devised for the exercises, using real data where possible (e.g. A full-scale disease outbreak simulation exercise should only be attempted after the individual components of the disease control response have been tested and proved. The process of recovery following the successful eradication of an emergency disease involves verification and international acceptance of national disease freedom as well as rehabilitation of farming communities. The first and most important aim is to ensure that the causal agent of the disease (and not just the clinical disease) has been eradicated.
It is therefore vital that as disease control measures diminish towards the end of the campaign, there be a shift of emphasis towards active disease surveillance to detect any residual infection. When it is believed that infection has truly been eradicated, a series of verification programmes should be carried out. Reference should be made to the OIE Aquatic Animal Health Code for more specific guidelines on acceptable international disease freedom verification procedures for each disease. Special support mechanisms and programmes should be considered to allow affected farmers and farming communities to get back on their feet after a crippling disease outbreak. Lessons from the disease outbreaks and the campaigns to control and eradicate them should be learned so that the country will be in a better position to stay free of the disease and to respond more quickly and effectively to any further introductions.
A thorough review should be carried out while the events are still fresh in peoples' minds. An epidemiological analysis of how the disease entered the country and the subsequent methods of spread with a view to strengthening quarantine and other preventive measures against the disease. Based on the results of the above and on other experiences, a determination of how disease surveillance and other early warning procedures can be improved and on which geographical areas to concentrate efforts. Having the capability to deal with emergency diseases involves a great deal of planning and training as well as having an appropriate level of resources mainly in the form of appropriately skilled personnel. Canada has a long history of experience with aquatic animal disease management dating back to the 1915 emergence of Malpeque disease in oysters in Prince Edward Island (PEI). The evolution of Canada's federal approach to aquatic animal biosecurity measures is based on these experiences and the increasing recognition of the need to be proactively prepared.
Canada's first experience of a significant aquatic animal disease pre-dates modern aquatic pathology, and aquaculture by almost 60 years. By the mid-1950s, the PEI oyster beds had again recovered, and the first lesson in biosecurity risks was learned: human memory can rarely keep disease risk in perspective when high-risk stocks appear healthy. In conclusion, Canada's introduction to aquatic animal health biosecurity is founded on an aetiological mystery.
Histopathology samples were immediately sent to the Pacific Biological Station (PBS) in Nanaimo, British Columbia, and the Oxford Maryland Cooperative Laboratory.
The model contingency plan outlined at the Aquaculture Canada meeting was converted to a working contingency plan prior to official confirmation of the diagnosis. A critical first step was the appointment of a senior manager to compile the emergency response team (the MSX Task Group) and coordinate all activities. This senior DFO coordinator was essential for permitting science expertise to concentrate on development of appropriate surveillance programmes and laboratory analyses protocols. As soon as MSX was confirmed by the OIE reference laboratory for molluscan diseases at VIMS, the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) for Canada was notified. This model contingency plan doubled in size over the period of October 2002 to February 2003 from a six page document to the current plan, as results and tracking of stock movements evolved. A meeting was arranged close to the affected site with Cape Breton oyster growers, First Nations, and provincial and federal fisheries and seafood authorities.
Based on an absence of evidence that MSX had been present historically (DFO surveillance of oyster mortalities since the 1930s), the hypothesis was of a recent introduction; however, surveillance data were needed to determine if this was linked to a point-source or to a wider-spread introduction.
Pending collection of more data, it was important to contain spread from the known affected areas and areas that had direct oyster transfer links. Using the information on hand, surveillance was aimed at determining how far the disease could have spread outward from the known infection area.
Sampling procedures and collection design were developed by the NSDAF in consultation with the DFO Shellfish Health Unit at the Gulf Fisheries Centre (GFC).
Due to winter temperatures being associated with lighter levels of infection in oysters in endemic waters along the eastern United States, confidence in negative results from routine microscopic examinations was low - especially those collected from beds close to known positive sites or with direct links to affected sites.
The remaining outstanding 30 oysters from samples that were negative after the low and high-power sweep were examined to confirm the absence of MSX from the tissue examples submitted. Throughout each analysis stage, a central logbook tracked sample possession and sample step.
Conference calls were held on a daily basis over the first few weeks while Harvest Protocols were finalized and surveillance collections were being made. The results from the initial emergency surveillance were completed in November 2002 and released according to a media communications plan. Tests performed using the PCR primer for sea side organism (SSO) disease of oysters caused by Haplosporidium costale, a close relative of the MSX organism, confirmed the presence of the SSO parasite in oysters from PEI and the north shore of Cape Breton outside Bras d'Or Lakes. Disease emergencies may arise within a country in a number of ways: introductions of known exotic diseases, changes in the pattern of known endemic diseases or the appearance of unknown diseases.
Examples of diseases and pathogens introduced to new areas and hosts leading to serious consequences in the Asia-Pacific Region include epizootic ulcerative syndrome (EUS) in fresh- and brackishwater fishes, white spot syndrome virus (WSSV) and Taura syndrome virus (TSV) in cultured shrimp and viral encephalopathy and retinopathy (VER) in grouper. Infectious disease emergencies may arise within a country in a number of ways, for example: introductions of known exotic diseases, sudden changes in the pattern of existing endemic diseases or the appearance of previously unrecognized diseases. For mounting an effective emergency response, governments should have the capability to develop contingency plans and build the required operational capacity (e.g. For establishing an effective early warning programme, a strong technical capability at the national level is fundamental in the areas of disease diagnostics, risk analysis, disease surveillance, zoning, epidemiological analysis, aquatic animal health information systems, national and international disease reporting, and information communication and sharing. The responses may be of different types depending on the disease agent and the likely impact. It comprises a series of manuals outlining national emergency preparedness and response and control strategies. Within Asia, the Technical Guidelines provide the basic framework and guidance for national and regional efforts in reducing the risks of diseases due to transboundary movement of live aquatic animals.
Despite the considerable progress accomplished in the region, there are still areas that need to be seriously addressed. For countries already having practical national strategies, it should be easier to target resources and build specialist capacity for early warning and early response to tackle aquatic animal disease emergencies. A wide range of capacity and awareness building is required to effectively manage aquatic animal disease emergencies. Countries should target resources to develop simple and practical contingency plans to deal with high-risk diseases (e.g.
Severe lack of resources at the level of policy development and at the operations level could significantly reduce the effectiveness of the response in the event of an aquatic animal disease emergency. NACA provides institutional support, while FAO, OIE and the identified experts provide technical guidance.

The resource base in aquatic animal health is being identified at three levels: regional resource experts (RRE), regional resource centres (RRC) and regional reference laboratories (RRL).
Countries in the region are starting to cooperate more closely in their efforts to minimize the impact of aquatic animal diseases. Enabling governmental policies and commitment among stakeholders will help in managing aquatic animal disease emergencies. More recently, the widespread mass mortalities of koi and common carp in Indonesia have re-emphasized the impact that new diseases can have on local economies.
Early warning and early response are critical to the effective management of such disease emergencies. These will include the relevant minister and senior ministry officials, other government departments and agencies including national economic development planning authorities, farming and fishing communities and organizations, seafood marketing authorities, processors, traders and exporters.
In presenting a strong case for support for emergency preparedness planning, the identified disease risks should be described together with the potential socio-economic consequences of an incursion of the disease. This may be the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) or equivalent, such as the Director of Fisheries of the country. This committee should be directly accountable to the relevant minister such as the Minister of Fisheries and should be charged with the responsibility for developing and maintaining a high state of preparedness for animal disease emergencies.
It is also highly desirable to have members drawn from the private sector, such as representatives of major fishing, farmer, processing and trading organizations. An epidemic of an emergency aquatic animal disease, for example, has the same characteristics as other natural disasters: it is often a sudden and unexpected event, has the potential to cause major socio-economic consequences of national dimensions and even threaten food security, and requires a rapid national response. It embraces all initiatives, mainly based on risk analysis and disease surveillance that lead to improved awareness and knowledge of the distribution and behaviour of disease outbreaks (and of infection) and which allow forecasting of the source and evolution of the disease outbreaks and the monitoring of the effectiveness of disease control campaigns. Only recently has it developed into a more formal discipline and is increasingly used in many fields of endeavour.
International standards for import risk analysis are contained in the Aquatic Animal Health Code of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE, 2004) and a regional manual has recently been finalized (Arthur et al.,2004). Initial eradication of disease with eventual total elimination of the pathogen from the country, including silent infections, if they occur. Containment of the disease and pathogen to specified zones with control within infected zones and prevention of spread to uninfected areas of the country.
Reduction of the impacts of the pathogen by implementing control measures at the farm level which reduce the occurrence and severity of disease.
It is simply not possible to be prepared for all possible contingencies, but countries should aim to have an immediate capability for small to moderate outbreaks. It should describe the operations of control centers, providing principles for the chain of command, functions of sections and role descriptions. For disease threats that are a high priority, this capability must be in place in advance of disease outbreaks. Obviously more intensive training will need to be given to those who will be in key positions.
Furthermore they should always have an element of rallying the community to the common cause of fighting a disease epidemic. Optimally, personal visits and discussions with farming and fishing communities, processors, traders etc are preferable, but media outlets such as newspapers, radio and television can reach a large target audience quickly. Relationships among different components of a National Aquatic Animal disease Contingency Plan. If vaccination has been used, this should be stopped so that there is no masking of infection.
An important aim of these will be to provide objective proof to other countries and the international community as a whole that the country has regained freedom from the disease. Although a comprehensive capability in many countries will take a long time to achieve, foundations can be laid within the framework of whatever resources presently exist. The first came in the early 1900s before recognition of disease and the need for control activities was clearly understood for aquatic animals.
In the 1970s, Canada developed fish health protection regulations to provide health certification for the developing salmonid aquaculture industry. The odds against successful disease eradication from open- or flow-through systems are low, but proactive response plans provide some assurance that the odds for a successful outcome are optimized. Mass mortalities of Eastern (American) oysters (Crassostrea virginica) occurred in Malpeque Bay, one of the major oyster-producing beds on Prince Edward Island (PEI) in 1915 (Needler and Logie, 1947). The jump of Malpeque disease from PEI to mainland Atlantic Canada in 1957 is attributed to unsanctioned transfers of oysters for processing in southwestern New Brunswick. Spread of the disease to neighbouring New Brunswick and Nova Scotia oyster beds was considered to be unpreventable because of southern Gulf of St. Lawrence now produces ~7000 tonnes of healthy, Malpeque disease-tolerant oyster populations, worth approximately CAD$ 10–15 million. Furthermore, the single generation inheritance of tolerance in offspring of the few survivors of initial exposure and the lack of a microscopically evident or culturable microbial agent have both complicated understanding of the disease. This was aimed at defining roles, responsibilities and resource requirements to address a disease emergency within the context of Canada's proposed National Aquatic Animal Health Partnership (NAAHP). Patrick's Channel, Bras d'Or Lake (Figure 1), submitted to the DFO Shellfish Health Unit in Moncton due to reports of increasing levels of mortality over 2002, revealed plasmodia-like inclusions that had not been found previously in Canadian oysters. Histopathology and tissue samples preserved for molecular analyses were also sent to the OIE reference laboratory at the Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences (VIMS), Williamsburg, Virginia. This person was selected on the basis of their knowledge of the industry and given the authority to make decisions and discuss options and recommendations directly with senior management (DFO regional and national management, as well as provincial aquaculture managers).
The Office of the CVO immediately prepared an advisory note that was sent to OIE Headquarters in Paris. Revisions are ongoing as results from positive, buffer and negative zones (established following the emergency targeted surveillance programme) continue to emerge.
An overview of what was known about MSX was presented and the possible scenarios for introduction of the disease were discussed. The appearance of MSX within the Bras d'Or Lakes system, which is more or less completely land-locked, suggested a link to human activities rather than climate change or oceanographic influences.
Since the detection coincided with the peak period for harvest for the Christmas market, control of these activities was a priority. Surveillance priorities focused on current and recent oyster transfers within and out of Cape Breton waters. Lastly, mussels (Mytilus edulis) close to oyster beds known to be positive for MSX were also included.
Tissue samples from all oysters for the initial emergency surveillance were preserved for PCR using sterile technique to prevent cross-specimen contamination, prior to collection of tissues destined for both light and electron microscopy.
Thus, 30 oysters from each sample of 60 were examined at low and low-medium magnification - considered sufficient to detect heavy infections. Lastly, subsamples of tissues preserved in 95 percent ethanol from negative oysters, along with all oysters showing inconclusive plasmodia-like tissue inclusions, were examined using PCR. Positive infections indicated a positive sample, but further analysis for prevalence and intensity was deferred until all samples had been analysed. Separate conference calls were needed for internal briefing of DFO (Ottawa and Area offices in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and PEI); and for provincial and industry stakeholders.
These infections were all light (1–3 plasmodia per tissue section) (Figure 3) and had no obvious links to the MSX outbreak in Cape Breton. That document must be updated with each staff addition and departure, then distributed to each staff member.Each pharmacy -- especially independent community, consultant and home health pharmacy practice -- also must have a business continuity plan that specifically addresses how the store or practice will resume operations when dangers have passed and repairs have been made. Diseases caused by transboundary pathogens pose serious threats to aquaculture in many parts of the Asia-Pacific Region. Contingency planning, early warning and early response are critical to the effective management of such disease emergencies.
The manuals provide guidance based on sound analysis, linking policy, strategies, implementation, coordination and emergency management plans. The main elements of the Technical Guidelines are: guiding principles, pathogens to be considered, disease diagnosis, health certification and quarantine measures, disease zoning, disease surveillance and reporting, contingency planning, import risk analysis, national strategies and policy frameworks, regional capacity building and an implementation strategy.
An assessment of the progress made in the Asia-Pacific in the implementation of the various elements contained in the Technical Guidelines shows the present status and highlights the regional capacity building needs (see Table 2). Early warning and early response programmes embrace all initiatives, mainly based on risk analysis, disease surveillance, reporting and epidemiological analysis.
It is clear from experience that for most countries in the region, it is going to be a very difficult challenge to develop an ideal emergency preparedness and response programme. Awareness building at the level of policy-makers is essential to improve their understanding of the seriousness of aquatic animal disease problems to secure adequate priority at the national level. The following section briefly highlights some of the key capacity and awareness building initiatives in the region that assist countries in dealing with aquatic animal disease emergencies. Capacity on aquatic animal health management, particularly risk analysis, was enhanced, which could lead to improved aquatic animal health policies and practices in the region.
The AG meets annually, and through its meeting recommendations (NACA 2004) provides specialist advice, especially on emerging diseases of concern to governments in the region.
RRE is the first level of resource, and the identified experts will provide specialist advice to the region in their fields of expertise, assist in developing diagnostic manuals and disease cards, and provide diagnostic assistance on disease emergencies in the region.
Many countries in the region still face significant challenges in the practical implementation of health management strategies, especially in the areas of surveillance, reporting, zoning, contingency planning and risk analysis. Health management issues in the rural livestock sector: useful lessons for consideration when formulating programmes on health management in rural, small-scale aquaculture for livelihood. Asia regional technical guidelines on health management for the responsible movement of live aquatic animals and the Beijing consensus and implementation strategy. National contingency plans for aquatic animal disease emergencies: the way forward for developing countries. A strong national approach is required to ensure that the necessary operational capability is in place so that early detection and effective responses are efficiently achieved. Hopefully, the lessons learned from these experiences will result in better preparedness for, and improved responses to similar events when they occur in the future. Additionally, the benefits that will result from more rapid containment and eradication of the disease outbreak through preparedness should be forcefully presented. If circumstances warrant it, a small unit of professionals should also be appointed to assist the NEDPO.
Such plans may also allow these essential services to be given special powers to act in the emergency.
In aquatic animal health, it has perhaps been most widely applied in international trade to evaluate disease risks associated with imports. A comprehensive disease surveillance system provides a reliable picture of the health status of aquatic animal populations on an ongoing basis. It should also be borne in mind that any staff member, from the Responsible Officer downwards, may be absent or may need to be relieved during a disease emergency for one reason or another. The Asia regional technical guidelines on health management for the responsible movement of live aquatic animals and the Beijing consensus and implementation strategy. Manual of procedures for the implementation of the Asia regional technical guidelines on health management for the responsible movement of live aquatic animals.
This set the foundation for Canada's aquatic animal health learning curve that has increased exponentially over the last 20 years as aquaculture activities have intensified and diversified into new species and environments. Parallel work was conducted with the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) on wild fish diseases, on the management of outbreaks of infectious salmon anaemia (ISA) in the 1990s in New Brunswick and infectious haematopoietic necrosis (IHN) in Atlantic salmon in the Pacific, and on the study of aquaculture-wild disease interactions; up to Canada's most recent biosecurity challenge, returning once again to the oysters of Atlantic Canada, with the emergence of MSX disease caused by the protistan parasite Haplosporidium nelsoni. However, the mortalities were not recognized as being due to an infectious disease until it spread to neighbouring oyster beds on PEI via transplant activities in the 1930s.
Lawrence hydrography and an inability to differentiate healthy carriers from uninfected oysters. Recent transmission experiments, however, have demonstrated that the causative agent remains virulent for naïve oysters 40 years after the last clinical outbreaks (McGladdery and Stephenson, 1999). The high levels of infection (prevalence and intensity) along with intense haemocyte infiltration indicated that this was the likely cause of the mortalities being reported. The report provided the known geographic extent of infection, mortality levels being reported, the contingency plan, and surveillance plans for delineating the exact geographic extent of the distribution of MSX in Canadian oysters.
This was considered to be an essential first step in getting to know the local faces involved and letting them know who the emergency response team were. Further, the known affected area is adjacent to a mining operation using cargo vessels carrying ballast from the eastern United States where MSX is endemic. The commercial fishery was already closed for conservation purposes, so the only harvesting activity was by lease-holders and First Nations. This was due to concerns about the potential for non-oyster transfers with other Cape Breton aquaculture-related activities, notably those of mussels where leases are located in the same bays as oyster beds or aquaculture operations.
Two teams of personnel trained by the provincial veterinarian visited a maximum of two sites per day, using on-site wet gear, boats and harvesting equipment.
Once all samples had been screened at this level, all negative samples were re-examined at high-dry magnification for light infections that could have been missed at the lower microscope magnifications.

One was the classic MSX infection with plasmodial proliferation throughout the connective tissues and digestive tubules, some of which also showed spore development (Figure 3).
PCR analysis of the first samples submitted from Cape Breton in late September used both MSX and SSO primers. The Federal Emergency Management Administer offers this business continuity planning guide to help out in this regard.Do Not Reinvent the WheelBusiness owners and pharmacy managers need not reinvent the wheel when drawing up disaster plans for their drugstores, clinics or practices. Capacity building for developing national and regional emergency prevention systems for transboundary aquatic animal diseases. Transboundary animal diseases are defined as epidemic diseases that are highly contagious or transmissible, with the potential for very rapid spread irrespective of national borders and which cause significant socio-economic and possibly public health consequences (Baldock, 2002). In simple terms, emergency response involves implementation of a well thought out and agreed technical response plan to identify and deal with an aquatic animal disease emergency event.
The Control Centers Management manual outlines the organizational response during an aquatic animal disease emergency event, addressing legislative, management and resource issues.
The framework provided by the Technical Guidelines is a comprehensive one that includes all major requirements for managing aquatic animal disease emergencies associated with transboundary pathogens. Mere establishment of emergency preparedness programmes and frameworks without appropriate skill and capacity development would be of little value.
The capacity is inadequate in many countries in Asia due to several factors, such as limited diagnostic capacities, lack of information, insufficient human resources and infrastructure, and lack of financial resources.
Management of an aquatic animal disease emergency will require a collaborative and team approach. Equally important is improving the understanding by both governments and industries of the benefits from investing in emergency response systems. The OIE International Aquatic Animal Health Code (2004) lists 35 diseases of finfish, molluscs and crustaceans based on three criteria (i.e. The recommendations serve as an early warning to countries in the region with susceptible species. The second level of resource, the RRC, will not be specific for a single disease but will have good experience in diagnosing and studying aquatic animal diseases and pathogens. Unless this is done, the disease control efforts of individual countries will be continually frustrated.
Recovery from an emergency disease response must be followed by measures to ensure that freedom from the particular disease is again maintained. Recovery from an emergency disease response is followed by measures to ensure that freedom from the particular disease is again maintained.
The case should preferably be supplemented by a formal socio-economic cost-benefit analysis. Import risk analyses are used in reaching decisions as to the most appropriate health certification and quarantine and other measures to be applied for imports into a particular country to produce an acceptable level of risk. For large outbreaks, it may not be possible to confirm the field diagnosis on every occasion once control and eradication measures are underway. The earliest Canadian aquatic animal disease case-history is presented, along with Canada's most recent experience in 2002 with the first-time detection of the oyster disease MSX, caused by the microscopic parasite , and a reportable disease listed by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE - Office International des Épizooties). The first losses of over 99 percent of market-size oysters in Malpeque Bay occurred 12–18 months following the transplant.
Therefore, Malpeque disease-tolerant oysters from PEI were actively spread throughout the southern Gulf of St. These transplant experiments, however, were abruptly halted in 2002 when MSX disease (caused by Haplosporidium nelsoni) was detected for the first time in oysters from inner Cape Breton waters. This advisory made Canada positive for MSX until the emergency surveillance could demonstrate which oyster stocks were not infected (Stephenson and McGladdery, 2002). It was also an important discussion for putting the outbreak into a socio-economic as well as epidemiological context.
Fisheries and Oceans and the Nova Scotia Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (NSDAF) agreed to withdraw harvest licenses and develop protocols that would permit oysters that were fit for market to be harvested safely. Lawrence and to PEI in the previous two years for live-holding, processing or depuration relay were also identified. All materials transferred between sites by the collection team, including vehicles, were disinfected between sites. A third examination was made by another pathologist on any subclinical or inconclusive infections, for confirmation purposes. These infections were found exclusively in oysters that had direct contact with the infected oysters in St. Pharmacy departments in retail stores, drugstores in chains, hospital pharmacies and pharmacy schools have access to broader plans developed for their organizations.
This paper examines the capacity and awareness building needs of countries in the Asia-Pacific Region to deal with aquatic animal health emergencies and provides details of some of the key capacity and awareness building initiatives in the region.
Careful examination of the history and spread of transboundary pathogens indicates how lack of effective surveillance systems and contingency plans can impact aquaculture and wild fisheries resources. The Enterprise manual describes the emergency response options available for control and eradication of aquatic animal diseases. RRL is the third level of resource that would be identified for diseases of regional concern not listed by the OIE but included in the QAAD list. Part of this cooperation should be the rapid sharing of information on new disease occurrences and the spread of existing epidemic diseases to new areas, particularly near shared watersheds. Both are discussed in the context of theory and reality in dealing with aquatic animal disease emergencies that span multi-stakeholder interests and governmental jurisdictions.
The history of who was working with whom, and moving which stock where, was an essential foundation for developing the surveillance programme required.
An attempt to eradicate MSX from the affected sites was also discussed, but considered premature until the actual extent of infection was better known. New Brunswick and PEI provincial fisheries and aquaculture authorities assisted with collections from their provinces. Some inconclusive samples were also sent to the OIE reference laboratory and Dr Susan Ford of the Haskin Shellfish Research Laboratory at Rutgers University, who was invited to meet with Cape Breton stakeholders by First Nations early in November 2002 to provide a first-hand account of dealing with MSX in the United States.
Since March 2003, the calls have been limited to updates on results every few months or when new information is found.
Also, thousands of general and pharmacy-specific plans can be reviewed online.No single disaster plan fits every setting and circumstance, however.
Further, the paper attempts to provide a general picture of responsibilities at the different stakeholder levels to implement effectively a contingency plan, and identifies the skills and capacity required to carry out the responsibilities. It also provides a framework for assessing which strategy to use, taking into account several factors (e.g.
A cohesive networking among RREs, RRCs and RRLs in the region will provide an effective, strong and broad network of diagnostic support that will assist to build capacity for implementation of the Technical Guidelines.
Therefore, there is a need to continue the strong regional cooperation in aquatic animal health in the Asia-Pacific Region. As development and implementation of an effective emergency preparedness and response strategy is a long-term process, continuous efforts to motivate and support governments and private industry in initiating their health management programmes is required.
Bondad-Reantaso, (eds.) Capacity and awareness building on import risk analysis for aquatic animals.
Between 1935 and 1937, the oyster stocks in Malpeque Bay recovered to a level where they could be commercially fished again, and seed were transplanted into neighbouring bays. This was considered to be the most effective way of accelerating recovery of oyster stocks that were inevitably going to succumb to the disease. It was also useful for identifying key stakeholder representatives to participate in the plethora of conference calls required to keep as many key people informed in as timely a manner as possible. These collections extended into winter months, despite the challenge of remote winter travel and sampling at sub-zero temperatures through ice. A second type of infection, showing isolated plasmodia with no sign of proliferation or haemocyte infiltration response, was also detected.
Adapting an existing plan to address the particulars of where and how a pharmacy and its staff operate is the best approach to preparing for emergencies.
When there is an emergency, the response should proceed according to the plans that have been developed. At the regional level, countries with experience should be encouraged to share information with other countries and help bridge the development gap. The envisaged resource base within the Asia Region would provide national agencies with assistance in the diagnosis of key diseases on the regional disease list, provide more generalized support, assist in emergency response to new disease outbreaks and act as contact centers for advice and capacity building in close cooperation with institutions having a mutual interest in improving aquatic animal health. Capacity and awareness building activities to suit the regional aquatic animal health management needs should be continuously undertaken to sustain the good momentum built in the region.
Simulation exercises may be carried out purely as a paper exercise or through mock activities - or a combination of both approaches. Malpeque disease re-emerged, virtually wiping out the remaining PEI oyster fishery, and indicating that an infectious agent was being carried by the apparently healthy oysters from Malpeque Bay.
The samples were examined by shellfish pathologists at the DFO laboratory in Moncton and PBS Nanaimo.
In practical terms, this means a Walmart pharmacy manager should review his or her store's plan and the overall plan for the discount chain, then introduce necessary additions or changes that protect staff, stock and patients.
The Destruction manual guides the decision to destroy the stock, and the choice and application of appropriate techniques based on several considerations (e.g. Countries can also use regional reporting systems to be more aware of the new diseases that may pose risk. The information generated through the regional reporting system provides up-to-date information on important diseases in the Asia-Pacific Region, serves as an early warning system for emerging diseases (e.g. In particular, further support to national and regional initiatives for capacity building is essential. Regional workshop on preparedness and response to aquatic animal health emergencies in Asia. At the completion of each simulation exercise there should be a review to identify areas where plans need to be modified and further training is needed. The first Canadian aquatic biosecurity control measure was put into place - a complete prohibition of any oyster transfers out of PEI (Needler and Logie, 1947). Sample receipt, processing, histopathological screening (Figure 2), data recording and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) subsample analyses were undertaken in accordance with detailed guidelines prepared in advance by the GFC Shellfish Health Unit.
Negative PCR results had also been obtained from lighter MSX infections, so the possibility of false negatives as well as false positives needed further analysis. Through a well-documented contingency action plan agreed upon by all major stakeholders, it should be possible to minimize the impact of an aquatic animal disease emergency. Equipment was standardized to ensure that effort and results between different inspectors and analysts were consistent.
The significance of the suspect infections was that they were outside Cape Breton, but in oysters that had transfer links (direct and indirect) with Cape Breton oysters.
The Disposal manual provides guidance for safe transport and disposal of carcasses, animal products and wastes.
MacRae, (eds.) Primary aquatic animal health care in rural, small-scale, aquaculture development.
This included microscope objective magnifications, the number of runs through automatic staining machines for optimal counter-stain contrast and the reagents used for DNA extraction from tissue homogenates for PCR and for in situ hybridization analyses. Occupational Health and Safety Administration Building Emergency Action Plan for the Biological Pharmaceutical Complex at the University of KentuckyRun the PlanMilitary units, emergency responders and government agencies regularly run drills to gauge the sufficiency, practicality and scope of disaster plans, as well as the performance of personnel charged with implementing plan provisions. These manuals are aimed at government and industry personnel who may be involved in emergency disease preparedness and response. Pharmacies rarely have the people, time and financial resources needed to stage such productions, but staff can gain invaluable experience by volunteering for events like first aid emergency drills coordinated by the American Red Cross.On smaller scales, fire drills and regular emergency management meetings can help pharmacy staff learn and hone their disaster response responsibilities. Closer examination of these manuals helps to understand the extent of technical capacity building, infrastructure and financial resources that are required to support an ideal national emergency preparedness and response programme. The National Fire Protection Association offers good advice for organizing and carrying out such exercises.Continually Improve the PlanPlan to update and revise the pharmacy disaster plan regularly and as needed. Major revisions should rarely be necessary, but getting a reminder of what the plan calls for, ensuring that all necessary emergency equipment and supplies are on hand and in working order, and ensuring appropriate people are assigned to and up to speed on key responsibilities benefits everyone.Last, any implementation of a disaster plan should be followed by detailed assessments of how the plan worked. At a minimum, and after the pharmacy is back to running at full strength and normal speed, conducting individual interviews and group meetings with staff can identify plan elements that proved difficult to implement or insufficient to address needs.
Reviewing communications with, and responses to and from, other businesses, patients, first responders, utilities, suppliers, insurers and government agencies can also point to needed improvements.

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