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The Allstate Foundation and Points of Light to Hold Disaster Preparedness Event in Light of 10th Anniversary of Hurricane Katrina and recent local storms on Long Island. Research shows 85 percent of Americans are unprepared for disaster and nearly half lack emergency supplies for use in the event of a disaster.
Residents of the town of Babylon and their families will work side-by-side with The Allstate Foundation, local Allstate agency owners, and other crisis management organizations to build free disaster kits they can use to keep safe in the event of a disaster or unforeseen emergency.
This event will also help educate Town of Babylon residents on the importance of preparedness in light of the 10th Anniversary of Hurricane Katrina and recent local storms here on Long Island.
Event details may change at any time, always check with the event organizer when planning to attend this event or purchase tickets. We're generating custom event recommendations for you based on Disaster Preparedness Event right now!
The purpose of the Disaster Preparedness and Safety Element is to reduce the risk of death, injuries, property damage, and economic and social dislocation from natural and man-made hazards and disasters. To maximize its effectiveness, the Disaster Preparedness and Safety Element is intended to complement and support the other General Plan Elements and City documents such as the Multi-Hazard Functional Plan for Emergency Operations. Berkeley, like other Bay Area cities, faces a wide range of hazards ranging from natural hazards, such as earthquakes and fires, to man-made hazards such as the handling and transport of hazardous materials. Given that the community is largely urbanized and densely populated, the challenge for Berkeley is to improve the safety of the existing built environment through a variety of systematic, ongoing, and incremental actions.
Lastly, but most importantly, the community must be prepared if the City is to reduce the risks associated with a major disaster.
In recent years, the Berkeley community has made major accomplishments toward risk reduction in Berkeley. Also in 1992 the Berkeley City Council established the Residential Seismic Retrofitting Incentive Program that provides two types of financial incentives to homeowners to retrofit their homes.
The Seismic Technical Advisory Group (STAG) was approved by City Council on March 14, 1995 to advise on seismic safety matters and assist in the development of a comprehensive seismic hazard mitigation strategy for the City of Berkeley. Overall, the Seismic Technical Advisory Group has provided review for the seismic improvements to many City buildings, including the MLK Civic Center Building and the Public Safety Building.
In September 1996, the Berkeley City Council adopted the Multi-Hazard Functional Plan for Emergency Operations. In 1998, the City of Berkeley won the Western States Seismic Safety Council’s award for Overall Excellence in Hazard Mitigation, the Association of Bay Area Government’s (ABAG) Award for Retrofit Incentive Programs, and recognition as the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) 1998 Project Impact Model Community of the Year. In recent years, the City has been working to improve its website as a source of disaster preparedness and planning information for citizens.
The Berkeley community is faced with several major potential hazards and associated vulnerabilities. In 1990, the Working Group focused on the San Andreas, the Hayward, and the Rodgers Creek faults. The new report assesses the odds of a magnitude 6.7 or higher over the next 30 years as 70% in the San Francisco Bay Area, with an uncertainty of 10%.
These numbers are similar to the 1990 numbers, which yielded 23% for the Southern Hayward, 28% for the Northern Hayward, and 22% for the Rodgers Creek fault. The most significant physical characteristics of a major earthquake in Berkeley will be earthquake-induced ground shaking, which can lead to surface fault rupture, ground failure, and fire. Earthquake-induced ground failure includes liquefaction, settlement, fault rupture, lateral spreading, and landslides.
Figure 13 shows the approximate location of areas vulnerable to a combination of hazards caused by a major earthquake. The combination of earthquake-induced ground shaking, potential lateral spreading, fault rupture and fire is of particular concern in the residential hill areas of Berkeley east of the Hayward Fault line.
In the event of an earthquake, people may be killed by the failure of buildings, transportation structures, or utilities, or by associated hazards such as fire, hazardous material releases, and possible inundation due to dam failure or flooding.
Hazardous Buildings - Buildings constructed before building codes were in effect, and buildings built to earlier building codes, are the most likely to suffer serious damage. In a disaster, the most vulnerable buildings include: unreinforced masonry (URM), concrete frames, tilt- up buildings built before the mid-1970s, and buildings with soft stories. In 1986, Senate Bill 547 required cities to create an inventory of URMs and to develop a mitigation program.
Buildings with "soft" stories (open or irregular structural designs that lack lateral strength), structures made from non-ductile concrete, and buildings improperly anchored to their foundations are highly susceptible to damage. Utilities - Water, gas, storm, and wastewater mains and pipes, electrical systems, and telecommunications are vulnerable to damage.
On September 17th, 1923, a fire started in Wildcat Canyon, just over the ridge from Berkeley. Because of increased development and vegetation growth in the hills, the fire threat continually increases. In the aftermath of the 1991 Fire, the City established the Hill Hazardous Fire Area District. Figure 14 shows the location of the Hill Hazardous Fire Area and the Emergency Access and Evacuation Routes established in the General Plan Transportation Element. Efforts are currently underway to construct a new fire station for the hill areas east of the Hayward fault. The location of the residential hill areas adjacent to regional parklands poses two additional fire prevention challenges.
To fight fires effectively, adequate water pressure, supply, and delivery must be available. A secondary hazard is the potential for massive land sliding on fire-burned hillsides when heavy rains follow firestorms. Hillside Residential Areas Near and Adjacent to Wildland Areas - There are approximately 750 residences in vulnerable hillside areas in Berkeley.
Structures Built with Combustible Materials - The presence of wood siding, shake roofs, and other combustible materials heightens the vulnerability of residences and structures in the hills area. Areas of Heavy or Unmanaged Vegetation - Dense vegetation increases the danger to people and structures from fire. Circulation and Utilities - As demonstrated in the 1991 firestorm, narrow winding roads can become inaccessible and unusable for evacuation or for emergency equipment and personnel.
The Water Delivery System - In an emergency the age of the existing water supply system may cause the system to be unreliable. In Berkeley, the potential for landslide from seismic activity or heavy rain is high in the hill areas and along remnant stream banks in some parks and neighborhoods. Geologists estimate that 45 to 65 percent of the landslide-susceptible areas will experience large, coherent movement in a major earthquake. Areas of the community that are vulnerable to landslide hazards include hundreds of homes, roads, sidewalks, underground utilities (water, wastewater, etc), and aboveground utilities (electricity, telecommunications) that are situated on historic landslide areas. The flood potential in Berkeley is a relatively mild threat in comparison to seismic, landslide, and fire risks. Strawberry Creek - Flowing from the hills through the University campus, Strawberry Creek poses a flood hazard for the area immediately west of Oxford Street, as well as to parts of the campus. Tidal Basin Areas - The Tidal Basin Areas west of Third Street between Codornices Creek and Gilman Street, and Aquatic Park between University Avenue and Ashby Avenue, are potentially vulnerable to flooding and tsunami. Summit and Berryman Reservoirs - Properties below major water reservoirs in the hills may be subject to flooding in the event of an earthquake-induced rupture of the reservoir.
Figure 16 shows the approximate areas of the city that could be vulnerable to inundation from a reservoir failure.
Ensure that the City’s emergency response plans are current and incorporate the latest information on hazards, vulnerability, and resources. Continue to provide education, emergency preparedness training, and supplies to the community at the neighborhood level to support neighborhood- and community-based disaster response planning. Publicize disaster preparedness efforts (such as CERT) and expand public awareness of specific hazards and risks by making available all relevant information including mapping and reports on various hazards, information on vulnerability and risk reduction techniques, evacuation routes, and emergency services, and information on financial and technical assistance resources. Continue to work with the social service community to ensure the safety of special needs populations.
Ensure that the City provides leadership and coordination of the private sector, public institutions, and other public bodies in emergency preparedness.
Protect life and property in the event of an earthquake by evaluating alternate drinking water and fire-fighting water supply in the event of failure of the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) water supply. Establish pre-event planning for post-disaster recovery as an integral element of the emergency preparedness programs of the City Council and each of the City departments.
Encourage and support the long-term protection of historic or architecturally significant structures to preserve neighborhood and community character. Improve the disaster-resistance of utility and transportation systems to increase public safety and to minimize damage and service disruption following a disaster. Identify, avoid and minimize natural and human-caused hazards in the development of property and the regulation of land use.
Maintain construction standards that minimize risks to human lives and property from environmental and human-caused hazards for both new and existing buildings.
Consider changes to the existing residential zoning in high-risk, residential areas, such as the Hill Hazardous Fire Area, to reduce the vulnerability of these areas to future disasters. Maintain existing programs such as the Residential Seismic Retrofitting Incentive Program to facilitate retrofit of potentially hazardous structures.
Establish public information programs to inform the public about seismic hazards and the potential hazards from vulnerable buildings.
Understand and track changes in seismic risk utilizing the best available information and tools.
Pursue all feasible methods, programs, and financing to mitigate potentially hazardous buildings. Develop and enforce construction and design standards that ensure new structures incorporate appropriate fire prevention features and meet current fire safety standards.
Hurricane Katrina was an extraordinary storm that caused destruction on a scale never before seen from a natural disaster in the United States. The preceding chapter outlined in detail fourteen of the seventeen specific lessons the Federal government has learned from our response to Hurricane Katrina; the remaining three will be discussed more fully here.
Preparedness is inextricably intertwined with our national security, counterterrorism, and homeland security strategies. Today there is a national consensus that we must be better prepared to respond to events like Hurricane Katrina. In addition, as described in the narrative section of this report, the response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that our current system is too reactive in orientation. While this approach has worked well in the majority of disasters and emergencies, catastrophic events like Hurricane Katrina are a different matter. A useful model for our approach to homeland security is the Nation’s approach to national security. Perhaps most important, the national security system emphasizes feedback and periodic reassessment.
The lessons of the national security system’s evolution will help us to transform our five-year old homeland security system.
There are significant institutional and intergovernmental challenges to information and resource sharing as well as operational cooperation. The remainder of this section describes the key elements of the National Preparedness System.
We must now translate this Goal into a robust preparedness system that includes integrated plans, procedures, policies, training, and capabilities at all levels of government. The Homeland Security Strategy and HSPD-8 provide the framework for the National Preparedness System.
Our National Preparedness System must also have appropriate feedback and assessment mechanisms to ensure that progress is made and that our goals are being realized. The creation of an effective National Preparedness System will require the Federal government to transform the way it does business. As described in the preceding narrative, the response to Hurricane Katrina required that the Federal government both support State and local efforts while conducting response operations in the field, in addition to making policy or implementing programs. These shortfalls were not due to the absence of top level plans such as the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System.
The imperative, therefore, is to organize coherent, proactive management of responses to catastrophic events. Strengthening DHS institutions to manage the Federal response as well as enhancing DHS regional and field elements.
Since the Department was created in January 2003, the management and personnel of the Department of Homeland Security have undertaken their responsibilities with energy and professionalism. But the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that the energy and professionalism of DHS personnel was not enough to support the Department’s role as the manager of the Federal response. The NOC must be staffed by an experienced, well-trained, and resourced cadre of personnel who are prepared to provide expert strategic and operational management of Federal responses to catastrophic incidents. The DHS headquarters must also possess a robust capability for deliberate operational planning. Below the headquarters level within DHS, we must build up the Department’s regional structures. More broadly, the Department of Homeland Security must possess field personnel with the necessary resources, training, and national support. In order to create robust homeland security response capabilities, we must also transform our Federal interagency processes.
All agencies with responsibility for the incident have an understanding of joint priorities and restrictions.
The combined efforts of all agencies are optimized as they perform their resrespective assignments under a single Incident Action Plan. At the Federal level, the most urgent step in creating unity of effort will be to reinforce the Secretary of Homeland Security as the Federal government’s preparedness and incident manager.
One model for the command and control structure for the Federal response in the new National Preparedness System is our successful defense and national security statutory framework. The model somewhat parallels the original conception of the Federal homeland security response. However, the comparison between the homeland security and defense operations models breaks down in two significant ways. In this vein, we must similarly transform the existing system of Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Beyond changes to DHS and the structure of Federal response, there is still a compelling need to strengthen operational capabilities across the Federal government.
To start, all Federal departments and agencies should have operational command and control structures that comply with the National Incident Management System.
With these new operational planning functions, Federal departments and agencies must build the detailed supporting plans, concepts, and staffing to execute their NRP and emergency response missions. An effective National Preparedness System requires that management and response personnel, especially those in the field, are well versed in their missions. As discussed in the narrative, the response to Hurricane Katrina revealed a lack of familiarity with incident management, the planning discipline, legal authorities, capabilities, and field-level crisis leadership. Beyond current plans and doctrine, we require a more systematic and institutional program for homeland security professional development and education. Over the long term, our professional development and education programs must break down interagency barriers to build a unified team across the Federal government.
These Federal professional development and education programs must integrate participants from other homeland security partners—namely, State and local governments as well as the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and faith-based organizations.
The success of the National Preparedness System over time will depend upon the quality of its metrics-based assessment and feedback mechanisms.
With common goals and performance metrics, the new National Preparedness System must first provide us with the capacity to create a national preparedness baseline that, at a minimum, serves as an inventory of our capabilities. LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland Security should establish specific requirements for training, exercise, and lessons learned programs linked through a comprehensive system and common supporting methodology throughout the Federal, State and local governments.
An integrated National Preparedness System must identify and share lessons learned and best practices both within departments and agencies and across jurisdictions. Finally, we must ensure that problems identified in our training, exercises, and lessons learned programs are corrected.
Moreover, Congress has not yet embraced a purely risk-based funding approach to homeland security priorities. Finally, our experience in building an effective national security system demonstrates that Congress will be an essential partner as we continue to transform our homeland security system.
An age-old question for national security and, now, homeland security planning is how much is enough?
In order to help identify the range of future plausible risks, the Department of Homeland Security has produced a set of fifteen National Planning Scenarios (see Figure 6.2). The Scenarios, which were meant to be illustrative of a wide variety of hazards, generally do not specify a geographic location, and the impacts are meant to be scalable for a variety of population considerations. While the National Planning Scenarios have been effective tools for generating dialogue on response capabilities, they do not fully anticipate some of the worst disaster scenarios. Scenario 1, the detonation of a ten-kiloton nuclear device in an American city by a terrorist group, suffers from similar limitations and fails to fully challenge our plans and preparation skills.
While the National Planning Scenarios represent a good start for our national process of capabilities-based planning for homeland security, we must orient the National Preparedness System towards still greater challenges. Figure 6.3 provides an illustration of how our existing homeland security strategy, doctrine, and capabilities can be unified into a single National Preparedness System. The National Preparedness System graphic additionally highlights the constituent elements of operational capabilities: deliberate planning, resources, logistics, training, and education. As described above, the National Preparedness System must be dynamic, flexible, and responsive to new developments. Key inputs to the System include the current national vision for preparedness, laws, and policies and the use of capability-based planning that prioritizes investments to fill gaps identified by needs assessments. Finally, our planning and operational documents should define the critical roles played by all of our homeland security partners in the Preparedness System.
The second element of our continuing transformation for homeland security perhaps will be the most profound and enduring—the creation of a Culture of Preparedness. The roles of each level of government and the private sector in creating a prepared Nation.
The first principle for a Culture of Preparedness must be a shared acknowledgement that creating a prepared Nation will be a continuing challenge.
Despite reforms that encourage a proactive, anticipatory approach to the management of incidents, the culture of our response community has a fundamental bias towards reaction rather than initiative. Our preparedness culture must also emphasize the importance of citizen and community preparedness.
LESSON LEARNED: The Federal government, working with State, local, NGO, and private sector partners, should combine the various disparate citizen preparedness programs into a single national campaign to promote and strengthen citizen and community preparedness.
In addition, DHS and other Federal agencies should identify both the individual skills and capabilities that would help citizens in a disaster as well as the types of messages from trusted leaders that would encourage citizens to be better prepared. We must build upon our initial successful efforts to partner with other homeland security stakeholders—namely the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and faith-based groups.
Private sector companies own and operate 85 percent of our Nation's critical infrastructure. Companies are responsible for protecting their systems, which comprise the majority of critical infrastructure. Non-governmental organizations play essential roles in preparedness by complementing and supporting preparedness efforts.

Today, we operate under two guiding principles: a) that incident management should begin at the lowest jurisdictional level possible, and b) that, for most incidents, the Federal government will generally play a supporting role to State and local efforts. The National Preparedness System must also recognize the role of the Federal government for monitoring and guiding national preparedness efforts.
Furthermore, in the new culture of preparedness, State and local governments must continually seek to work with their neighboring jurisdictions.
Finally, in our new Culture of Preparedness, all required response assets and resources of the Federal government must integrate and synchronize to ensure an effective national response to a crisis. The objectives of this dialogue must be first to establish reasonable expectations of what government can and cannot do in response to catastrophes. Identifying the circumstances under which the Federal government will push capabilities independent of request. Learn how to develop disaster recovery strategies as well as how to write a disaster recovery plan with these step-by-step instructions. Formulating a detailed recovery plan is the main aim of the entire IT disaster recovery planning project. Once this work is out of the way, youa€™re ready to move on to developing disaster recovery strategies, followed by the actual plans.
Once you have identified your critical systems, RTOs, RPOs, etc, create a table, as shown below, to help you formulate the disaster recovery strategies you will use to protect them.
Youa€™ll want to consider issues such as budgets, managementa€™s position with regard to risks, the availability of resources, costs versus benefits, human constraints, technological constraints and regulatory obligations. Once your disaster recovery strategies have been developed, youa€™re ready to translate them into disaster recovery plans. From Table 2 you can expand the high-level steps into more detailed step-by-step procedures, as you deem necessary. In addition to using the strategies previously developed, IT disaster recovery plans should form part of an incident response process that addresses the initial stages of the incident and the steps to be taken.
Note: We have included emergency management in Figure 2, as it represents activities that may be needed to address situations where humans are injured or situations such as fires that must be addressed by local fire brigades and other first responders.
The following section details the elements in a DR plan in the sequence defined by ISO 27031 and ISO 24762. Important: Best-in-class DR plans should begin with a few pages that summarise key action steps (such as where to assemble employees if forced to evacuate the building) and lists of key contacts and their contact information for ease of authorising and launching the plan. In parallel to these activities are three additional ones: creating employee awareness, training and records management. Are you really ready?  Remember, when the disaster strikes, it's too late to start planning. The free kits will include items proven to keep people safe and prepared, such as a whistle, trash bag, dust mask, hand sanitizer, first aid kit, water bottle, rain poncho and hand-crank flashlight.
Earthquakes, fires, landslides, floods, and hazardous materials releases are the primary hazards confronting the Berkeley community and are therefore the focus of this Element1. Integrating safety as a consideration into all City decisions will ensure a safer and more sustainability community.
The City must strive to understand the risks that these hazards pose and devise strategies that attain a reasonable degree of safety for the community. These actions to reduce risk should be based on sound analysis of hazardous conditions and should include economically realistic interventions and incentives. Neighborhood and business groups need to be trained on how to prepare for and respond to a major disaster. In 1992, the Berkeley community approved Measures G and A, which provided funds for the seismic retrofitting of all City fire stations and public schools, the creation of an emergency operations center, and improvements to the water system. The City will waive up to one-third of the transfer tax on a home sale, if the funds are used for seismic upgrades of the property.
Currently, the Group is reviewing the seismic upgrades of other public buildings and providing guidance for the Soft Story Assessment Project. Coordinated and prepared by the City's Office of Emergency Services, this comprehensive citywide Plan outlines the critical functions and responsibilities of City departments and agencies in responding to an emergency. This initiative commits the City to creating, in partnership with the private sector, a risk-based, cost-effective, multi-hazard, community-supported long-term strategy to provide a heightened level of protection from natural hazards.
The following sections of this Element identify the major hazards confronting the community, and those aspects or areas of the community that are most vulnerable to those hazards. A system of parallel faults, including the Hayward, Rodgers Creek, Calaveras, San Andreas, and numerous other faults, exists in the area and poses a potential threat to the community. Using information on the slip rates of each fault, the date of previous large events, and assumptions about fault geometry, the report concluded that the chance of one or more large earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay Area in 30 years was approximately 67%.
Although these results are very similar to the 1990 study, the Working Group believes that the new numbers are more robust and reliable. While the previous studies concentrated on the San Andreas and Hayward fault systems, this report makes it clear that the hazard extends beyond the Peninsula and the East Bay. Liquefaction is the loss of soil strength due to shaking on water-saturated granular soils. Fire following an earthquake is a particular concern because of the likelihood of numerous simultaneous ignitions, broken mains, and demands on fire personnel. In these areas, many homes are on steep slopes, and access to many of these areas is difficult for emergency vehicles due to narrow, winding roads, some of which are cul-de-sacs. Additionally, buildings with termite damage, dry rot, poor construction quality or other structural conditions can further exacerbate seismic vulnerability, even if the structure was properly designed. Residential uses are threatened particularly by soft story conditions because of parking below multi-unit buildings and by homes built on cripple walls and those not anchored to their foundations. Especially at risk are systems that have non-ductile pipes, or systems located in areas subject to ground failure. Susceptibility to fire is heightened due to Berkeley’s dense development pattern, characterized by older structures including high rise buildings, multi-storied residential units, and a variety of warehouse, manufacturing, and commercial properties. It was a warm day, with a strong northeast wind, which blew the flames up over the ridge into northeast Berkeley. Abundant dead brush and vegetation, and non-fire-resistant building materials, fueled the 1991 firestorm, which ignited in the Oakland Hills. The objective of the current efforts is to develop a facility that will be able to respond to major disasters in these neighborhoods. First and foremost, these parklands are heavily wooded providing ample fuel for a major wildland fire that can easily move into the Berkeley neighborhoods. While water pressure is generally adequate throughout the city, fire-fighting capability can be hampered by supply and pressure limitations in particular water pressure zones. Landslide-prone areas include several large residential areas below Grizzly Peak Boulevard, south of Marin Avenue and east of The Alameda.
The range of movement depends upon whether slopes are wet or dry when ground shaking occurs. The probability is greater in steeply sloped areas, although landslides may occur on slopes of 15 percent or less.
Several collector streets that are critical for emergency access and evacuation are located in areas historically susceptible to landslides - including sections of Arlington, Marin, Spruce, Euclid, Shasta, La Loma, and Keith.
Flooding events may occur as flash floods, local storm drain blockages, or tidally influenced events. The North Fork of Strawberry Creek in particular, which captures a significant amount of urban runoff, is subject to flash flood conditions in periods of intense rainfall. Reservoir inundation is caused by structural failure, possibly from an earthquake or rain overflow. Establish and maintain an effective emergency response program that anticipates the potential for disasters, maintains continuity of life-support functions during an emergency, and institutes community-based disaster response planning, involving businesses, non-governmental organizations, and neighborhoods. Improve and develop City mitigation programs to reduce risks to people and property from natural and man-made hazards to socially and economically acceptable levels.
Plan for and regulate the uses of land to minimize exposure to hazards from either natural or human-related causes and to contribute to a "disaster-resistant" community.
Reduce the potential for loss of life, injury, and economic damage resulting from earthquakes and associated hazards. Reduce the potential for loss of life, injury, and economic damage resulting from urban and wildland fire. Test, maintain, and revise the City’s disaster response plan(s) consistent with the California Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and establish clear coordination of roles and expectations with the County Office of Emergency Services, the University of California, the Berkeley Unified School District, neighboring jurisdictions, and other agencies.
Designate and publicize evacuation routes, shelter locations, and emergency service locations (hospitals, fire stations, etc.) within the city and sub region.
City departments shall conduct an appropriate level of staff training addressing emergency readiness, evacuation routes, first aid, staging areas and procedures, continuity of services, and response and recovery operations and including CERT training for all City employees. Establish facilities and provide equipment that may be used by citizens during the first days immediately after a major disaster until such time as City services become available. Prepare an annual report in consultation with the Fire Safety Commission and other relevant Commissions and Boards on the state of preparedness in Berkeley. Conduct coordinated planning and training between local and regional police, fire, and public health agencies in preparation for natural and man-made disasters, and ensure that the City’s disaster response communication technologies are compatible with regional agency communication technologies. Enhance the Community Emergency Response Training (CERT) program to provide disaster preparedness training to the community at the neighborhood level. Work with neighborhood associations and other community groups to organize disaster preparedness and other training activities on a block-by-block basis. Map existing neighborhood disaster preparedness groups and seek to fill gaps with new or extended groups. Explore implementation of a siren system, combined with reverse calling and other methods as a way to warn neighborhoods about problems.
Continue to provide emergency preparedness and planning information to citizens through libraries, the City website, radio, and other locations. Explore possible programs that would enable, encourage, or require landlords, property managers, and realtors to provide information to new tenants and new homeowners about emergency preparedness, evacuation routes, and home safety. Encourage partnerships between public safety, public health, and community services providers to develop and implement community safety and community service programs. Work closely with area hospitals to encourage hospital preparation and coordinate disaster recovery plans.
Promote information sharing and seek to coordinate and implement collaborative mitigation and response planning and information gathering efforts with neighboring cities, Alameda and Contra Costa Counties, the East Bay Regional Park District, other agencies, non-profit organizations, businesses and industries, educational institutions, and residents. Promote information sharing and seek to coordinate and implement collaborative mitigation and response planning and information gathering efforts. Formulate and adopt damage assessment protocols, and train appropriate inspection and other personnel to implement these protocols. Establish plans including such aspects as emergency supplies sufficient to carry out assigned disaster responsibilities. Establish a framework and process for recovery planning that specifies roles, priorities, and responsibilities of various departments within the City organization, and that outlines a structure and process for policy-making involving elected officials and appointed advisory committee(s). Prepare a basic Recovery Plan that outlines the major issues and tasks that are likely to be the key elements of community recovery. Analyze and evaluate the benefits of formulating City plans and programs for short-term and long-term mitigation. Perform appropriate seismic analysis based on current and future use for all city-owned facilities and structures.
Request and encourage neighboring cities, other agencies, non-profit organizations, neighborhood and citizen groups, business organizations, and the University of California also to formulate and implement complementary mitigation action plans.
Create incentives for owners of historic or architecturally significant structures to undertake mitigation to levels that will minimize the likelihood of demolition and maximize the ability to repair or avoid damage in the event of a natural disaster. Consistent with public safety and acceptable risk determinations, seek all feasible means to avoid demolition of historic or architecturally significant structures following a disaster by pursuing repair, rehabilitation, and preservation of structures, facades, or other features. Support and encourage efforts undertaken by Caltrans, the East Bay Municipal Utility District, Pacific Gas & Electric, telephone and telecommunications companies, Amtrak, the Union Pacific Railroad, AC Transit, and the Bay Area Rapid Transit System to plan for and finance seismic retrofit and other disaster-resistance measures. Urge the Public Utilities Commission, utilities, and oil companies to strengthen, relocate, or otherwise safeguard natural gas and other pipelines where they extend through areas of high liquefaction potential, cross potentially active faults, or traverse potential landslide areas, or areas that may settle differentially during an earthquake. Maintain and make publicly available up-to-date hazard maps identifying areas subject to heightened risk from potential seismic hazards (including fault rupture, ground failure, ground shaking, and liquefaction), and fire, flood, landslide, and other hazards, such as toxic contamination and radioactive release. Improve the understanding of identified hazards and mitigation needs via area-specific studies such as microzonation studies.
Encourage owners to evaluate their buildings’ vulnerability to earthquake hazards, fire, landslides, and floods and to take appropriate action to minimize the risk. Develop criteria for disaster-resistant land use regulations to ensure that new construction reduces rather than increases risk of all kinds. Periodically update and adopt the California Building Standards Code with local amendments to incorporate the latest knowledge and design standards to protect people and property against known fire, flood, landslide, and seismic risks in both structural and non-structural building and site components. Consider zoning amendments to prevent future development, including the prohibition of new second units, in these areas or sites in these areas that are particularly vulnerable to natural disaster.
Consider fire safety, evacuation, and emergency vehicle access when reviewing secondary unit or other proposals to add residential units in these areas.
Expand public awareness of the program and take other actions to publicize and improve the effectiveness of the program. Encourage building owners (including public sector agencies and local jurisdictions) to install instruments to record earthquake shaking in conjunction with the State’s Strong Motion Instrumentation Program. Implement an effective Un-Reinforced Masonry (URM) Program to retrofit all remaining non-complying buildings.
Create a program similar to the URM Program to reduce risks to people and property for all potentially hazardous buildings in Berkeley, with a priority on multi-family soft-story buildings. Consider requiring disclosure of potential hazards to occupants and residents of potentially hazardous buildings, along with mitigation and safety information and technical assistance.
Investigate and adopt financial, procedural, and land use incentives and provide technical assistance for owners of potentially hazardous structures, such as soft-story buildings, to facilitate retrofit.
Investigate and adopt retrofit guidelines and building codes that address structural and nonstructural mitigation to facilitate the retrofit of all types of existing buildings.
Evaluate the ability of essential public facilities to maintain structural integrity and remain operational in the event of a strong earthquake. Establish a prioritized program for seismic retrofit of the remaining unreinforced public structures.
Promote the installation of built-in fire extinguishing systems and early warning fire alarm systems. Maintain City standards for minimum width and vertical clearance, and ensure that new driveways and roadways meet minimum standards of the Uniform Fire Code or subsequent standards adopted by the City. Provide adequate water for fire suppression for new development in accordance with City standards for minimum volume and duration of flow. Establish criteria for the installation of gas shutoff valves in new and existing construction, to reduce the risk of post-earthquake fires.
Develop proposals to make developed areas more accessible to emergency vehicles and reliable for evacuation.
At the most fundamental level, the current system fails to define Federal responsibility for national preparedness in catastrophic events. Our decades-old system, built on the precepts of federalism, has been based on a model whereby local and State governments wait to reach their limits and exhaust their resources before requesting Federal assistance.
Programs and forces are assessed for readiness and the degree to which they support their assigned missions and strategies on a continuing basis. These barriers stem from a multitude of factors—different cultures, lack of communication between departments and agencies, and varying procedures and working patterns among departments and agencies. These include the guiding vision for preparedness as well as clarification of the Federal government’s central role in organizing the national efforts of our homeland security partners.
The System must also incorporate the private sector, non-governmental organizations, faith-based groups, and communities, including individual citizens. From this guidance comes the requirement for risk-based capabilities at the Federal, State and local levels that must enable the Nation to respond to a range of disasters—both man-made and natural. As called for in the Interim National Preparedness Goal, we must establish a readiness baseline for capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels.
Most of the capabilities necessary for responding to natural disasters are also vital for responding to terrorist incidents. Put another way, the Federal government must develop common doctrine and ensure alignment of preparedness plans, budgets, grants, training, exercises, and equipment. DHS must also identify how State, local, regional, and private-sector preparedness activities support the national strategy.
The most important objective of this Federal transformation must be to build and integrate operational capability. Rather, the problem is that these plans lack clarity on key aspects and have operational gaps, as discussed in previous chapters, and have not been effectively integrated and translated into action. Virtually all elements of the Federal government must be operational—to respond to catastrophic events with unified effort. Their courage and commitment to their mission have improved the security of all Americans.
In particular, DHS lacked both the requisite headquarters management institutions and sufficient field capabilities to organize a fully successful Federal response effort. First and most important, Federal government response organizations must be co-located and strengthened to manage catastrophes in a new National Operations Center (NOC). For example, these personnel must include logistical experts with the management tools to track moving resources anywhere across the Nation and ensure timely delivery of aid to affected areas. Rather than waiting for the next disaster, DHS planners must apply lessons learned as well as develop detailed operational plans that anticipate the requirements of future responses and what capabilities can be matched to them in what timeframe. As noted above, the integration of State and local strategies and capabilities on a regional basis is a homeland security priority. As a start, we must improve and emphasize plans that stress a proactive DHS role—in particular, the Catastrophic Incident Annex and Catastrophic Incident Supplement of the NRP. 46 Transportation, electricity, banking, telecommunications, food supply, and clean water are examples of services relying on infrastructure that have become basic aspects of our daily lives.
48 While these principles suffice for the vast majority of incidents, they impede the Federal response to severe catastrophes.
It is in these plans that you will set out the detailed steps needed to recover your IT systems to a state in which they can support the business after a disaster.
Then, youa€™ll need to establish recovery time objectives (RTOs) and recovery point objectives (RPOs). Here wea€™ll explain how to write a disaster recovery plan as well as how to develop disaster recovery strategies. Areas to look at are availability of alternate work areas within the same site, at a different company location, at a third-party-provided location, at employeesa€™ homes or at a transportable work facility.
Youa€™ll need to identify and contract with primary and alternate suppliers for all critical systems and processes, and even the sourcing of people. Be prepared to demonstrate that your strategies align with the organisationa€™s business goals and business continuity strategies. Procedures should ensure an easy-to-use and repeatable process for recovering damaged IT assets and returning them to normal operation as quickly as possible. This process can be seen as a timeline, such as in Figure 2, in which incident response actions precede disaster recovery actions. The next section should define roles and responsibilities of DR recovery team members, their contact details, spending limits (for example, if equipment has to be purchased) and the limits of their authority in a disaster situation.
During the incident response process, we typically become aware of an out-of-normal situation (such as being alerted by various system-level alarms), quickly assess the situation (and any damage) to make an early determination of its severity, attempt to contain the incident and bring it under control, and notify management and other key stakeholders.

Based on the findings from incident response activities, the next step is to determine if disaster recovery plans should be launched, and which ones in particular should be invoked.
A section on plan document dates and revisions is essential, and should include dates of revisions, what was revised and who approved the revisions.
Once the plan has been launched, DR teams take the materials assigned to them and proceed with response and recovery activities as specified in the plans. Located at the end of the plan, these can include systems inventories, application inventories, network asset inventories, contracts and service-level agreements, supplier contact data, and any additional documentation that will facilitate recovery. These are essential in that they ensure employees are fully aware of DR plans and their responsibilities in a disaster, and DR team members have been trained in their roles and responsibilities as defined in the plans. If you reside outside of the United States, you consent to having your personal data transferred to and processed in the United States.
However, implementation of policies and actions included in this Element will make Berkeley more resistant to all kinds of hazards and disasters that may occur in Berkeley.
For example, the Disaster Preparedness and Safety Element supports Land Use Element goals for neighborhood protection, Urban Design and Preservation Element goals for the protection of architecturally and historically significant buildings, and Housing Element goals for preserving and maintaining housing stock and increasing residential disaster preparedness. Although threats cannot be eliminated, their level of damage can be minimized through individual and community preparedness, individual and community action to reduce or eliminate long-term risks (mitigation efforts), and sound development practices. The ability of the University of California, the Berkeley Unified School District, and the City of Berkeley to prepare for, and respond to, a major disaster in a coordinated manner is essential to the health and safety of the Berkeley community.
If the citizens of Berkeley are prepared, the risk to life and property from a major disaster will be significantly reduced. Measure S was approved in 1996 and provided funds for seismic retrofit of the Central Library and the Civic Center Building (City Hall). The Seismic Technical Advisory Group's varied expertise makes them a unique asset to Berkeley in the development of a comprehensive approach to addressing the significant risk the community faces from earthquake hazards.
The cornerstone of this commitment involves an aggressive public education effort aimed at strengthening and inspiring community mitigation actions. On October 14, 1999, the United States Geological Survey’s Working Group on Earthquake Probabilities issued the following information assessing the likelihood of large earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay Area. This is particularly relevant for the rapidly growing regions of Contra Costa, Alameda, Solano, Santa Clara, San Benito, and Napa counties.
Because it can damage or collapse buildings and other structures, it is the most serious and direct hazard produced by an earthquake.
The potential for liquefaction in Berkeley exists primarily to the west of the railroad tracks in low-lying areas adjacent to San Francisco Bay.
Ruptured or disrupted gas service lines and mains, power lines, water heaters, wood, gas or electric stoves, and other gas or electrical appliances and equipment cause most earthquake-induced fires. The eastern edge of the city is heavily wooded, which provides fuel for earthquake-induced fire. The Association of Bay Area Governments estimates that 13,372 units in Berkeley will be uninhabitable after a major earthquake, resulting in a total shelter population of 8,530.
Then in 1991, the City adopted an ordinance mandating that URM buildings built before 1956 (except for residential buildings with fewer than five units) be posted immediately with a warning and seismically retrofitted to certain "performance standards" by deadlines based on the risk category assigned each building.
Overhead power lines may fall as a result of severe ground shaking, blocking streets for emergency access and evacuation, creating safety hazards, causing fires, and further complicating communication and emergency response.
Berkeley also faces a significant wildland fire danger along its hillsides where the wildland and residential areas interface. Firefighters were able to do little to slow the fire as flying embers spread it rapidly from block to block. The combination of fuel, drought, hot and dry weather, wind conditions, poor accessibility, and insufficient water pressure in some areas proved devastating. Hazardous fire area inspections are conducted annually by fire companies, between May and September. Second, these areas are managed by the East Bay Regional Park District and serviced by the California Department of Forestry (CDF). When heavy rains fall on denuded slopes, soil saturation occurs rapidly and the danger of landslides in susceptible areas is great, posing a risk to life, structures, and infrastructure. Slope steepness and nature of underlying soils are the most important factors affecting the landslide hazard. Seismically induced reservoir failure and inundation is unlikely, but such an event should be considered.
Inundation could affect those areas downhill, or west, of the Berryman and Summit Reservoirs. Include existing city pathways and other pedestrian right-of-ways in the published designated evacuation route map. Prioritize undergrounding of utilities to enhance reliability of emergency access routes and minimize conflagration hazards from fallen power lines.
Examine issues such as debris removal, provision of shelter, interim housing, restoration of services, interim business resumption facilities, protection of historic resources, standards for replacement of non-conforming structures and uses, and restoring neighborhood and community character. Identify possible roles for community organizations, business representatives, and neighborhoods in the recovery process. Work with owners of potentially hazardous buildings to obtain structural analyses of their buildings and to undertake corrective mitigation measures to improve seismic resistance or to remove the buildings and replace them with safer buildings.
Those facilities unable to remain operational should be modified to bring them into conformance. Identify, prioritize, and implement capital improvements and acquire equipment to improve the supply and reliability of water for fire suppression.
Nor does it establish clear, comprehensive goals along with an integrated means to measure their progress and achievement. This system is built on deliberate planning that assesses threats and risks, develops policies and strategies to manage them, identifies specific missions and supporting tasks, and matches the forces or capabilities to execute them. Beginning with the National Security Act of 1947-mandated creation of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council (NSC), this system has evolved substantially through the years.7 It has taken time to create a strong NSC that has integrated interagency policies and efforts.
Equally problematic, there is uneven coordination in pre-incident planning among State and local governments. The desired end-state of our National Preparedness System must be to achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major events in order to minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy. This baseline should include an inventory of our preparedness assets as well as a metrics-based assessment of current capabilities. Yet for a variety of reasons, much of the Federal government, Congress, and the Nation at large have continued to think about terrorism and natural disasters as if they are competing priorities rather than two elements of the larger homeland security challenge. Prior training, exercising, and equipping proved inadequate to the task of effectively responding to Hurricane Katrina. Within the Department, therefore, it is essential to strengthen the DHS headquarters elements to direct the Federal response while also providing appropriate resources to DHS field elements so that they can make an impact on the ground. The mission of the NOC must be to coordinate and integrate the national response and provide a common operating picture for the entire Federal government.
This staff must also include operations experts who understand how to combine existing resources into effective response packages for any scenario. Using these operational plans and capability inventories as baseline data, the Headquarters planning staff can conduct national readiness assessments, highlighting priorities for subsequent preparedness investments, training, and exercising. Homeland security regional offices should be the means to foster State, local and private sector integration.
Then consider site security, staff access procedures, ID badges and the location of the alternate space relative to the primary site. Key areas where alternate suppliers will be important include hardware (such as servers, racks, etc), power (such as batteries, universal power supplies, power protection, etc), networks (voice and data network services), repair and replacement of components, and multiple delivery firms (FedEx, UPS, etc). Then define step-by-step procedures to, for example, initiate data backup to secure alternate locations, relocate operations to an alternate space, recover systems and data at the alternate sites, and resume operations at either the original site or at a new location. Here we can see the critical system and associated threat, the response strategy and (new) response action steps, as well as the recovery strategy and (new) recovery action steps. If staff relocation to a third-party hot site or other alternate space is necessary, procedures must be developed for those activities. This section should specify who has approved the plan, who is authorised to activate it and a list of linkages to other relevant plans and documents. If DR plans are to be invoked, incident response activities can be scaled back or terminated, depending on the incident, allowing for launch of the DR plans. The more detailed the plan is, the more likely the affected IT asset will be recovered and returned to normal operation. And since DR planning generates a significant amount of documentation, records management (and change management) activities should also be initiated. The Disaster Preparedness and Safety Element provides the policy framework to support the City’s mitigation, emergency preparedness, disaster response, and future recovery efforts.
A major focus of the City’s mitigation efforts must be the preparation and training of the community to help itself.
The seismically reinforced Ronald Tsukamoto Public Safety Building, housing Police and Fire administrative staff, opened in 2000. The City will waive permit fees for seismic retrofitting of non-strengthened homes and unreinforced masonry structures.
Thomas Tobin, former Executive Director of the California Seismic Safety Commission, replaced Professor Comerio upon her departure. An Emergency Management Organization defined in the Plan consists of a formal structure detailing the functions and responsibilities of each department in an emergency situation. Settlement is the vertical consolidation of loose soils and alluvium caused by ground shaking or liquefaction. As demonstrated in the San Francisco Marina District in 1989 and in the 1995 Kobe earthquake, modern cities are vulnerable to devastation from multiple fires, which, coupled with road blockages and damage to the water delivery system, can greatly exacerbate the initial damage from the seismic forces. These areas are entirely residential and do not have easy access to any City emergency services.
By the time the winds finally changed in the late afternoon, the fire had burned all the way to the northern edge of the University campus and as far west as Shattuck Avenue. The fire destroyed 62 homes in Berkeley and more than 3,000 homes in Oakland, consuming one house every 11 seconds in the first three hours. Vegetation removal programs, including the chipper and debris box programs, continue with funding provided by a surcharge on the refuse bills for residents in the hill area. Therefore coordination between the City of Berkeley and the adjacent jurisdiction is essential. Several areas in the East Bay Hills can produce flame fronts that cannot be controlled with water from hydrants, fire truck hoses, or helicopter buckets, or with retardant drops from air tankers, until the winds die down in the late afternoon. Efforts to minimize landslide potential occur as part of the development review process and can involve grading, soil strengthening, structural engineering components, and landscape methods (all of which are subject to City inspection services). However, factors such as the surface and subsurface drainage patterns, improper grading, alteration of drainage patterns, and removal of vegetation can also increase landslide hazards.
There exists some potential for wave damage along the Berkeley waterfront, but tsunami waves (triggered by earthquakes, underwater landslides, or volcanic eruptions) have historically resulted in little damage around San Francisco Bay. Require that all private access roads be maintained by a responsible party to ensure safe and expedient passage by the Fire Department at any time, and require approval of all locking devices by the Fire Department.
Continue to improve the water supply for fire fighting to assure peak load water supply capabilities.
Similarly, it took decades to build first the Office of the Secretary of Defense and then the Joint Staff as the central management elements for the Department of Defense. For example, our States and territories developed fifty-six unique homeland security strategies, as have fifty high-threat, high-density urban areas.9 Although each State and territory certainly confronts unique challenges, without coordination this planning approach makes the identification of common or national solutions difficult.
This interagency center should ensure National-level coordination of Federal, State, and local response to major domestic incidents. Furthermore, DHS regional structures are ideally positioned to pre-identify, organize, train, and exercise future Principal Federal Officials and Joint Field Office staffs.
In the event of a surprise contingency, battlefield commanders should not have to wait for the release of funds to execute their pre-assigned missions. This section defines the criteria for launching the plan, what data is needed and who makes the determination. Technology DR plans can be enhanced with relevant recovery information and procedures obtained from system vendors. If your organisation already has records management and change management programmes, use them in your DR planning. Between 1992 and 1999, approximately $1,079,000 in permit fees was waived for 4,100 permits under the Residential Seismic Retrofitting Incentive Program.
The Fire Department's fire and rescue operations would continue to carry out the same functions (including fire fighting, rescue operations, hazardous materials management, and emergency medical treatment and triage) as in non-emergency periods. For example, the 1990 report estimated probabilities for the rupture of the Rodgers Creek fault, the Northern Hayward and the southern Hayward as individual segments.
Figure 12 shows the approximate location and intensity of ground shaking that might be expected in a magnitude 7.3 earthquake on the Hayward fault. The ground surface can range from a drop of a few inches to several feet, and may occur many miles from the epicenter.
If the northern Hayward Fault were to rupture, many of the roads leading from the City’s emergency service facilities (police and fire stations) to these residential areas could be made impassible and the areas would then be isolated. Buildings with the highest occupancy such as theaters, or structures housing essential services, are assigned to the highest risk categories and had the shortest deadlines for retrofit. In 1997, the City Council-approved assessment district in the Berkeley hills area ended; however, the danger from a wildfire has not. Major issues that must be addressed are: 1) the benefits and implications of establishing and maintaining a firebreak between the wildland areas and the residential areas of Berkeley, and 2) joint response plans to fires in the area. Compounding this threat is the fact that evacuation can be difficult, slow, and dangerous due to winding and narrow roadways in the hills. Most of the Berkeley hillside development, however, predates current best practices and codes and therefore remains vulnerable to the threat of landslides. The Berryman Reservoir, adjacent to Codornices Park, could potentially inundate a large portion of the city, including neighborhoods near Hopkins and Cedar Streets and in West Berkeley, particularly at Aquatic Park and other areas east of the I-80 freeway.
The possibility of inundation from the Berryman Reservoir is short-term as EBMUD has an approved project underway for replacement of the reservoir with one 4.6-million-gallon steel tank or two smaller tanks depending on the geotechnical conditions encountered once the reservoir is drained.
Ensure that all public pathways are maintained to provide safe and accessible pedestrian evacuation routes from the hill areas.
Furthermore, our current approach to response planning does not sufficiently acknowledge how adjoining communities and regions can and do support each other. The section concludes with a discussion of the essential role of Congress in supporting the National Preparedness System and related transformation. A unified effort from all homeland security stakeholders to commit the requisite resources, training, and exercising must support these targets and asset requirements.
It must combine and co-locate the situational awareness mission of the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), the operational mission of the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), and the strategic role currently assigned to the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG). Each DHS regional organization should possess the capacity to establish a self-sufficient, initial JFO on short notice anywhere in its region. Included within this part of the plan should be assembly areas for staff (primary and alternates), procedures for notifying and activating DR team members, and procedures for standing down the plan if management determines the DR plan response is not needed. Check with your vendors while developing your DR plans to see what they have in terms of emergency recovery documentation.
These incentives are credited with giving Berkeley one of the highest residential retrofit rates in the state. The 1999 report accounts for the possibility that these individual segments may rupture together and cause larger earthquakes. Along the Berkeley waterfront the potential for settlement exists due to underlying weak bay mud fill typical of the area. There is currently only one fire station east of the Hayward Fault and it is not capable of servicing this whole area without assistance in the event of a major disaster. Many businesses may not be able to recover financially from the physical damage and the loss of sales revenue during the recovery period. Smaller buildings and buildings with lesser hazards, such as brick parapets, are assigned to the lower categories.
The risk of fire is most common during the dry months of May through October, and can become extreme when the warm, dry Diablo winds blow out of the northeast. Next, the plan’s requirements should be matched to the human and physical assets of each responsible department, agency, or organization.
During an incident, all department and agency command centers, as well as the Joint Field Office (JFO) at the disaster site, must provide information to the NOC, which develops a National common operating picture capable of being exported in real time to other Federal operations centers. Other municipalities, public and private utilities and transportation systems, hospitals, and special districts provide vital resident-serving services that are highly vulnerable to earthquakes and other hazards. For example, the Fire Department would be responsible for all fire suppression and rescue operations, but would coordinate with the Office of Emergency Services (OES), Police Department, and Department of Public Works in alerting and warning the general public of dangers and in providing mass casualty treatment and transportation.
By allowing for the occurrence of larger earthquakes, the computed probabilities decrease since the larger events are less frequent. Lateral spreading is the horizontal movement or spreading of soil toward an open face such as a stream bank or the open sides of fill embankments. Other hazards initiated by ground shaking include hazardous material releases and inundation due to reservoir failure. A total of 727 properties containing potentially hazardous URM buildings were originally placed on the list. When the winds blow strongly, fires occurring in the densely vegetated hill areas are extremely difficult to control.
This regional interdependence of medical, transportation, communications, emergency response, and other systems necessitates active coordination and a consistent level of mitigation and preparedness.
Problems can be exacerbated further and emergency response hindered due to the loss of critical facilities, and disruption of transportation and communication links.
Of those, 230 properties remain on the URM list with deadlines for all except category VI having now passed. A wildfire can move with breathtaking speed, down from the ridge in 30 minutes, expanding to one square mile in one hour, and then consuming hundreds of residences in a day. In a major earthquake, Berkeley can expect lurch cracking to result in extensive rippling and fracturing of pavement and curbs, and damage to sewer, gas, and water lines. Starting in FY 2001, the City has targeted bringing the remaining buildings into compliance, with the higher-use buildings as a priority. In the Berkeley and Oakland Hills there have been 14 wildland fires since 1923, which collectively have burned 9,000 acres and destroyed more than 3,500 structures.
In the case of the 1906 earthquake, the movement of the San Andreas acted to reduce the stress on the Hayward fault.
Seismic activity can also trigger landslides, primarily in the hill areas, which can result in significant property damage, injury, and loss of life. Finally, new studies have shown that the 1868 earthquake was larger than previously thought, both in terms of the length of the rupture and the amount of slip. A larger rupture results in a larger strain release and contributes to lowering the probability.

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