Purpose of emergency planning process,basic disaster kits reviews,earth magnetic pole shift 2015,post apocalyptic world sims 3 - 2016 Feature

Threats and risks to Canadians and Canada are becoming increasingly complex due to the diversity of natural hazards affecting our country and the growth of transnational threats arising from the consequences of terrorism, globalized disease outbreaks, climate change, critical infrastructure interdependencies and cyber attacks. A key function of the Government of Canada is to protect the safety and security of Canadians. Effective EM results from a coordinated approach and a more uniform structure across federal government institutions. A SEMP establishes a federal government institution's objectives, approach and structure for protecting Canadians and Canada from threats and hazards in their areas of responsibility and sets out how the institution will assist the coordinated federal emergency response. The development and employment of a SEMP is an important complement to such existing plans, because it promotes an integrated and coordinated approach to emergency management planning within federal institutions and across the federal government. Federal government institutions in the early stages of developing a SEMP may find it useful to read the material in Sections One and Two, while other institutions with more established plans may wish to proceed directly to Section Three. Supporting templates and tools can contribute to effective emergency management planning and are provided with this Guide.
The Emergency Management Planning Guide uses a step-by-step approach and provides instructions that are supplemented by the Blueprint and the Strategic Emergency Management Plan (SEMP) template provided in Annexes A and B, respectively.
The Emergency Management Planning Unit, Public Safety Canada, is responsible for producing, revising and updating this Guide. The purpose of this Guide is to assist federal officials, managers and coordinators responsible for emergency management (EM) planning. The EM plans of federal government institutions should address the risks to critical infrastructure within or related to the institution's areas of responsibility, as well as the measures for protecting this infrastructure. The SEMP is the overarching plan that provides a comprehensive and coordinated approach to EM activities. Given this variety of EM planning documents, the distinctions between them are summarized in the following table. A SEMP establishes a federal government institution's objectives, approach and structure for protecting Canadians and Canada from threats and hazards in their areas of responsibility, and sets out how the institution will assist the coordinated federal emergency response. It outlines the processes and mechanisms to facilitate an integrated Government of Canada response to an emergency and to eliminate the need for departments to coordinate a wider Government of Canada response. It includes 13 emergency support functions that the federal government can implement in response to an emergency.
Operational plans may be based on all four pillars of EM planning, or focus on the specific activities of a single pillar.
The National Strategy and Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure establishes a public-private sector approach to managing risks, responding effectively to disruptions, and recovering swiftly when incidents occur.
Implementation of the Strategy will feature targeted and accurate information products, such as security briefings for each critical infrastructure sector. Emergency management (EM) refers to the management of emergencies concerning all hazards, including all activities and risk management measures related to prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. The Emergency Management Continuum is depicted in a wheel diagram where all four risk-based functions of emergency management are interconnected and interdependent in a system from prevention and mitigation to preparedness, response, and recovery. In the center of the wheel are the main elements that influence the development of a Strategic Emergency Management Plan (SEMP). Figure 1 highlights the four interdependent risk-based functions of EM: prevention and mitigation of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from emergencies.
The SEMP should ideally be reviewed on a cyclical basis as part of a federal government institution's planning cycle, as presented in Figure 2 below. This figure represents the optimal planning cycle federal institutions should consider for undertaking their emergency management planning activities. May: Senior Institutional Management reviews year-end reports from the previous year's activities. September: Senior Institutional Management conducts mid-year check on progress of key performance objectives. February: Senior Institutional Management makes decision regarding the institution's strategic priorities for the upcoming fiscal year. This section of the Guide outlines a recommended approach for developing a tailored SEMP and is supported by a blueprint and a SEMP template provided in Annexes A and B, respectively.
Please note that Step 5 is presented under Section Four: Implementing and Maintaining the SEMP. Each step identifies inputs or considerations at the outset and concludes with the associated outputs. This step involves starting the formal planning process in recognition of the responsibility to prepare a SEMP. Consider having members of the EM planning team designated by your institution's senior management. One of the most crucial steps in the EM planning process is to identify appropriate members for the EM planning team.
Consider including a member of your institution's corporate planning area on the EM planning team in order to help align the EM planning cycle with the institution's overall business planning cycle.
Federal government institutions should consider identifying the range of experience and skill sets required in the EM planning team. The team members should have the skills and training required to adequately carry out their assigned duties. The team members should have the skills and training required to adequately carry out their assigned duties. The composition of the EM planning team will vary depending on institutional requirements; however, it is important that clear terms of reference (TOR) for the team be established and that individual assignments be clearly defined. After the EM planning team has clear authority and direction, the next step is to review any relevant existing legislation and policies.
Consider giving a team member the responsibility of analyzing the legislative and policy obligations applicable to the development of the SEMP. As noted in Section Two, the EM planning process should be carried out as part of an institution's overall strategic and business planning processes—this will support their alignment. Developing the SEMP can be supported by a formal work or project plan to ensure that established timelines for plan development are met.
As a next step, federal government institutions should consider developing a comprehensive understanding of the planning context. Additional supporting planning tools and templates as well as an EM glossary are provided in Annexes C and D, respectively. An environmental scan involves being aware of the context in which an institution is operating so as to understand how it could be affected. As part of the environmental scan, the institution defines the internal and external parameters to be taken into account when managing the risk and setting the scope and risk criteria for the remaining risk assessment process. Additionally, federal government institutions are responsible for conducting mandate-specific risk assessments, including risks to critical infrastructure.
The Planning Context is represented in a target diagram that consists of three circles representing the factors federal institutions should consider in order to understand the context in which it operates and how it could potentially be affected. The outer and middle circles represent the external context in which the institution seeks to achieve its objectives. Understanding the internal context is essential to confirm that the risk assessment approach meets the needs of the institution and of its internal stakeholders.
Understanding the external context is important to ensure that external stakeholders, their objectives and concerns are considered. Consider reviewing your federal government institution's most current environmental scan, as well as the most current RCMP Environmental Scan (which can be found on the RCMP Web site), in order to develop a better understanding of pressures and issues facing your institution. Once all documentation is identified, consider conducting a gap analysis to determine whether the institution is currently meeting its obligations as identified in Step 1. During this process, consider conducting a full review and analysis of stakeholder documentation and reports. An inventory of critical assets and services will assist the planning team in identifying the associated threats, hazards, vulnerabilities and risks unique to their institution.
If a business impact analysis (BIA) has already been completed for your federal government institution's BCP, this analysis can greatly inform your criticality assessment. When conducting a criticality assessment, it is important to be objective when prioritizing the importance of institutional assets, as not all assets are critical to an institution's operations. Adopting the current Treasury Board Policy related to material and asset management and coding criteria will help structure an effective approach. A comprehensive but non-exhaustive list of hazards and threats relevant to the Canadian context can be found in Annex C, Appendix 3.
Traditionally, a threat assessment is an analysis of intent and capabilities in the occurrence of a threat.
A vulnerability assessment looks at an inadequacy or gap in the design, implementation or operation of an asset that could enable a threat or hazard to cause injury or disruption.
In order to identify vulnerabilities, an institution should first identify and assess existing safeguards associated with critical assets and activities. Risk assessment is central to any risk management process as well as the EM planning cycle. The output of the risk assessment process is a clear understanding of risks, their likelihood and potential impact on achieving objectives. The all-hazards risk assessment (AHRA) process should be open and transparent while respecting the federal institution's context. In this section, risks translate into events or circumstances that, if they materialize, could negatively affect the achievement of government objectives.
Once the institution's context is clearly understood (refer to the environmental scan in Step 2-1), the next step is to find and recognize hazards, threats and possibly trends and drivers, and to describe them in risk statements. Risks can be identified though several mechanisms: structured interviews, brainstorming, affinity grouping, risk source analysis, checklists and scenario analysis.
A risk register or log is used to record information about identified risks and to facilitate the monitoring and management of risks.
The objective of risk analysis is to understand the nature and level of each risk in terms of its impact and likelihood.
Qualitative analysis is conducted where non-tangible aspects of risk are to be considered, or where there is a lack of adequate information and the numerical data or resources necessary for a statistically significant quantitative approach. Consider consulting your institution's subject matter experts when evaluating quantitative likelihood through historical data, simulation models and other methods. Consequences can be expressed in terms of monetary, technical, operational, social or human impact criteria. The purpose of risk evaluation is to help make decisions about which risks need treatment and the priority for treatment implementation. Risk criteria are based on internal and external contexts and reflect the institution's values, objectives, resources and risk appetite (over-arching expression of the amount and type of risk an institution is prepared to take).
Risks can be prioritized by comparing risks in terms of their individual likelihood and impact estimates. The risk-rating matrix allows for decisions to be made about which risks need treatment and the priority for treatment implementation. Risk treatment options can be prioritized by considering risk severity, effectiveness of risk controls, cost and benefits, the horizontal nature of the risk, and existing constraints. Consider gathering a list of institutional risks and cross-referencing the existing plans (as identified in Step 2-1c) that address each risk. This step will contribute to the concept that sound EM decision-making can be based on an understanding and evaluation of hazards, vulnerabilities and related risks. This step focuses on developing an informed EM approach for your institution based on the four pillars of EM. Each institution should establish an EM governance structure to oversee the management of emergencies. In identifying members of your institution's EM governance structure, keep in mind the relationship between your institution's mandate and the four pillars of EM. It is important that the planning team confirm the strategic priorities of the institution and of senior management so that they can be reflected in the SEMP.
Consider developing an overview of these priorities and identifying potential areas for attention given risk probabilities and vulnerabilities. The planning team should aim to clearly identify the planning constraints and institutional limitations that will influence the SEMP building blocks and the subsequent development of the SEMP.
The cross-reference table of existing plans by identified institutional risks provided in Annex C, Appendix 4, can assist in cross-referencing your most prevalent risks and the tools in place to address them (such as existing plans).
A SEMP should inform each federal government institution's overall priorities and tie into its business and strategic planning activities.


The objective of planning activities associated with prevention and mitigation efforts is to reduce risk. The objective of planning activities associated with preparedness is to have an effective and coordinated approach to EM and operational readiness.
Federal government institutions should consider personnel surge capacity requirements in their plans to support sustained operations, as well as the ability to react to any additional hazard or event that may occur while the response and recovery operations are taking place. The objective of planning activities associated with institutional responses to changing threats, hazards or specific incidents is to have an effective and integrated response in accordance with established strategic priorities.
Think about engaging your communications branch so that they are aware of internal and external communications requirements. The objective of planning activities associated with the recovery component of EM is to provide for the restoration and continuity of critical services and operations. Once the event is over and response operations are completed, federal institutions should participate in any whole-of-government reviews as appropriate.
The SEMP establishes a federal government institution's objectives, approach and structure for protecting Canadians and Canada from threats and hazards in their areas of responsibility, and sets out how the institution will assist the coordinated federal emergency response.
The Planning Section is responsible for the State Emergency Operations Plan, State Disaster Recovery Plan, Continuity of Operations Plans, other operational plans, procedures manuals, and assisting other state agencies in their planning efforts.
The State Emergency Operations Center Procedures Manuals are also maintained by the Planning Section.
The Pre-Incident Procedures Manual is a tool designed by SDOEM to refine hazard-specific preparedness activities. The State Disaster Recovery Plan is structured much like the State Emergency Operations Plan, but its purpose it to ensure the most efficient and effective state coordination to assist local jurisdictions in the recovery phase of any disaster. The Continuity of Operations Plan prepares stakeholders to continue completing their essential functions during any incident or emergency that may disrupt normal operations. The Planning Section considers all of the aforementioned plans and manuals living documents. Slideshare uses cookies to improve functionality and performance, and to provide you with relevant advertising.
Clipping is a handy way to collect and organize the most important slides from a presentation. Purpose: The Resource Assignment List (IMS 204) informs Operations Section personnel of incident assignments.
Preparation: The IMS 204 is normally prepared by the Resources Unit, using guidance from the Incident Objectives (IMS 202), Operational Planning Worksheet (IMS 215-G), and the Operations Section Chief. Distribution: Duplicated and distributed as part of the Incident Action Plan (version IMS 1001 or IMS 202). Since 2003, the Department has worked in partnership with the states, other federal Departments, and the U.S.
According to the 1996 National Survey of Homeless Assistance Providers and Clients, 34 percent of all persons using homeless services were members of a homeless family (Burt et al 1999), though more recent studies (Shinn, et.
Emergencies can quickly escalate in scope and severity, cross jurisdictional lines, take on international dimensions and result in significant human and economic losses. Federal government institutions are increasing their focus on emergency management (EM) activities, given the evolving risk environment in their areas of responsibility. This is why Public Safety Canada has developed this Emergency Management Planning Guide, which is intended to assist all federal government institutions in developing their all-hazards Strategic Emergency Management Plans (SEMPs).
Many federal government institutions already have specific planning documents or processes to deal with aspects of emergency management that relate to their particular mandates; many also have a long track record of preparing and refining BCPs. An All-Hazards Risk Assessment Framework and associated tools are also under development and will be included in a subsequent version of the Guide. As a matter of process, the Emergency Management Planning Guide will be reviewed annually or as the situation dictates, and amendments will be made at that time. The Guide includes a Blueprint (see Annex A), a Strategic Emergency Management Plan (SEMP) template (see Annex B), and supporting step-by-step instructions, tools and tips to develop and maintain a comprehensive SEMP—an overarching plan that establishes a federal government institution's objectives, approach and structure, which generally sets out how the institution will assist with coordinated federal emergency management, including response. As such, federal institutions are to base EM plans on mandate-specific all-hazards risk assessments, as well as put in place institutional structures to provide governance for EM activities and align them with government-wide EM governance structures.
It reflects leading practices (such as those provided by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and Canadian Standards Association) and procedures within the Government of Canada, and should be read in conjunction with the Federal Emergency Response Plan, the Emergency Management Framework for Canada and the Federal Policy for Emergency Management. It should integrate and coordinate elements identified in operational plans and business continuity plans (BCPs). Each of these functions addresses a need that may arise before or during an emergency. It is intended that governments and industry partners will work together to assess risks to the sector, develop plans to address these risks, and conduct exercises to validate the plans. This work at the sector level will inform, and will be informed by, work at the organizational level such as EM plans and their component parts.
Those elements are as follows: Environmental Scan, Leadership Engagement, All-Hazards Risk Assessment, Training, Exercise, Capability Improvement Process, and Performance Assessment. These functions can be undertaken sequentially or concurrently, and they are not independent of each other.
In order to effectively depict the cycle, the four seasons are placed in a wheel diagram showing how spring, summer, fall, and winter are interconnected and continuously flow into one circle.
The upcoming year's critical objectives are indentified with input from the various Working Groups and the appropriate Business Lines. Emergency Management resource requirements should be identified as early as possible to integrate into plans. Inputs should ideally be assembled, reviewed and well understood prior to engaging in each distinct planning activity as they form an important foundation for the work to be completed. The SEMP should be central to the federal government institution's EM activities and provide clear linkages for integrating and coordinating all other intra-departmental and inter-departmental emergency management plans.
The size and composition of the team may vary between federal government institutions; however, the planning team should ideally have the skill and experience necessary to develop the SEMP. This team should be established under the authority of the institution's governance framework and have clear directions, including objectives. Training is available to address EM requirements at the Canadian Emergency Management College (CEMC) and the Canada School of Public Service. Training is available to address EM requirements at the Canadian Emergency Management College (CEMC) and the Canada School of Public Service. These TOR can identify the responsibilities assigned to each team member and the requirements to allow that member to carry out the assigned function.
This is also an ideal time to involve institutional legal advisors to determine whether legislative requirements are being met. Update the analysis regularly, as legislation and policies can change and have an influence on the scope of your SEMP. After completing the above steps, the planning team should consider developing a detailed work plan that includes a schedule with realistic timelines, milestones that reflect the institutional planning cycle, and a responsibility assignment matrix with assigned tasks and deadlines. It entails a process of gathering and analyzing information and typically considers both internal and external factors (see Figure 3: The Planning Context for additional information on the factors to consider). It sets the time, scope and scale and contributes to adopting an approach that is appropriate to the situation of the institution and to the risks affecting the achievement of its objectives. The key to any emergency planning is awareness of the potential situations that could impose risks on the organization and on Canadians and to assess those risks in terms of their impact and potential mitigation measures.
It is the environment in which the institution operates to achieve its objectives and which can be influenced by the institution to manage risk.
If gaps are identified, these should ideally be gathered and presented as part of Step 3 when developing the EM Planning Framework and confirming the institution's strategic EM priorities. Assets can be both tangible and intangible and can be assessed in terms of importance, value and sensitivity. All available threat assessments should ideally be reviewed by analyzing the assessment's evaluation of hostile capability, intentions and activity, the environment influencing hostile and potentially hostile groups, and environmental considerations, including natural, health and safety hazards.
For further information, you may wish to consult the Canadian Disaster Database, which contains detailed disaster information on over 900 natural, technological and conflict events (excluding war) that have directly affected Canadians over the past century. A threat awareness collection process should ideally link to the federal institution's information requirements and available resources. As appropriate, more specific terrorist threat and hazard information can be obtained from ITAC.
With respect to known threats and hazards, a vulnerability exists when there is a situation or circumstance that, if left unchanged, may result in loss of life or may affect the confidentiality, integrity or availability of other mission-critical assets. It is a formal, systematic process for estimating the level of risk in terms of likelihood and consequences for the purpose of informing decision-making.
It provides improved insight into the effectiveness of risk controls already in place and enables the analysis of additional risk mitigation measures.
A risk assessment should generate a clear understanding of the risks, including their uncertainties, their likelihood and their potential impact on objectives.
It should be tailored to the institution's needs and should identify any limitations such as insufficient information or resource constraints. Risks should be described in a way that conveys their context, point of origin and potential impact. Characterization of risks should use an appropriate breadth and scope; it can be difficult to establish a course of action to treat risks if the scope is too broad, while a scope that is too narrow will create too much information, thereby making it difficult to establish priorities. A risk register will typically describe each risk, assess the likelihood that it will occur, list possible consequences if it does occur, provide a grading or prioritization for each risk, and identify proposed mitigation strategies. Probabilistic methods provide more information on the range of risks and can effectively capture uncertainty, but require more data and resources. It is usually used for analyzing threats with less tangible intent (judgements on terrorism, sabotage, etc.). Subject matter experts can also assist in evaluating likelihood from a qualitative perspective, for instance by using a Delphi technique (a group communication process for systematic forecasting).
Additional information on analyzing likelihood and impact is provided in the Treasury Board Integrated Risk Management Framework Guidelines. Prioritization can be shown graphically in a logarithmic risk diagram, risk-rating matrix or other forms of visual representations. In order to prioritize risks, comparison is made based on their likelihood and impact estimates.
Treatments that deal with negative consequences are also referred to as risk mitigation, risk elimination, risk prevention, risk reduction, risk repression and risk correction. These treatment options, forming recommendations, would be used to develop the risk treatment step in the risk management or emergency management cycle. A sample cross-reference table of existing plans by identified institutional risks is provided in Annex C, Appendix 4. The resulting SEMP building blocks will reflect strategic priorities—the desired balance between developing measures that respond to emergencies versus mitigating the risk. The EM planning governance structure may include representatives of an institution's senior management team, from all functional areas (such as programs) and all corporate areas (including communications, legal services and security). It is also crucial that roles and responsibilities, lines of accountability and decision-making processes be aligned and well understood by all concerned. For example, an institution can be constrained by the availability of training for EM planning team members and by the number of EM positions they have staffed. A further cross-referencing can then be undertaken with the four pillars of EM to help target specific activities in one or more of the following areas.
The ICS helps to promote clear lines of authority, is scalable to large or small events, and is widely used by first responders such as police or fire departments in various jurisdictions.
The cross-reference table provided in Annex C, Appendix 5, as stated above, can serve as a tool to complete this task. It should be strategic and be designed to have safeguards and processes to trigger appropriate actions in response to changing threats and hazards, as well as in response to specific incidents and events. The Planning Section works with multiple state agencies and non-governmental entities in the planning process to ensure the most efficient and effective state response to any situation. It documents the policies, concept of operations, organizational structures, and specific responsibilities of state agencies in their response to provide for the safety and welfare of its citizens. These manuals contain position descriptions, checklists, and other supporting materials to ensure the State Emergency Operations Center runs smoothly and efficiently.
In South Dakota, all state agencies are required to create and maintain a Continuity of Operations Plan for their agencies. This means all of the documents are continually revised to incorporate lessons learned in past disaster experiences, training opportunities, and exercises.


Once the Command and General Staffs agree to the assignments, the assignment information is given to the appropriate Divisions, Groups and Sectors (often via the Incident Telecommunications Centre).
It must be approved by the Incident or EOC Commander, but may be reviewed and initiated by the Planning Section Chief and Operations Section Chief as well. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH) to coordinate the federal response to homelessness across twenty federal departments and agencies, and to create a national partnership at every level of government and the private sector, with the goal of reducing and ending homelessness across the nation.  The final development of major significance came in the release of the Administration’s budget for fiscal year 2003, where President George W.
Conference of Mayors, National Association of Counties, National Conference of State Legislatures, National Governors Association, National Council of State Governments, National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors, etc.). EM can save lives, preserve the environment and protect property by raising the understanding of risks and by contributing to a safer, more prosperous and resilient Canada. It does not lay out the requirements for preparing related EM protocols, processes, and standard operating procedures (SOP) internal to the institution; however, these should be developed in support of the SEMP and related plans. As outlined in the Preface, many federal government institutions already have specific plans or processes to deal with aspects of emergency management; many also have a long track record of preparing and refining BCPs, which endeavour to ensure the continued availability of critical services. Each season has its own wheel quadrant describing the activities usually undertaken in each month of the year. Planning can be triggered by the EM planning cycle or it can be initiated in preparation for, or in response to, an event that is induced either by nature or by human actions. Consideration should be given to having representation from several program and corporate areas, including (if applicable) regional representation. Those federal government institutions that have mandated emergency support functions (ESFs) under the FERP should have these clearly identified. Notwithstanding the blueprint provided, this step is not proposed as a linear process, but rather as a set of related components and activities that can be undertaken in the sequence that best suits the institution. Scanning can be done on a regularly scheduled basis, such as annually, or on a continuous basis for environmental factors that are dynamic or that are of greatest interest to the institution. The following diagram illustrates the external and internal environmental factors to consider.
This process will add the extra assurance that your institution is linked in with partner agencies and others to assist in developing the broader environmental picture and in identifying EM-related interdependencies. Each institution has its own strategic and operational objectives, with each being exposed to its own unique risks, and each having its own information and resource limitations. An all-hazards approach to risk management does not necessarily mean that all hazards will be assessed, evaluated and treated, but rather that all hazards will be considered. The aim is to generate a comprehensive list of risks based on those events that might prevent, degrade or delay the achievement of objectives. Risks should be realistic, based on drivers that exist in the institution's operating environment. It can be a useful tool for managing and addressing risks, as well as facilitating risk communication to stakeholders. Descriptive scales can be formed or adjusted to suit the circumstances, and different descriptions can be used for different risks. Risk evaluation is the process of comparing the results of the risk analysis against risk criteria to determine whether the level of risk is acceptable or intolerable. The one most commonly used is the risk matrix (Figure 4), which normally plots the likelihood and impact on the x- and y-axes (the measured components of risks). Similarly, certain assumptions will be made that influence the development of the SEMP building blocks.
Although planning considerations will vary from institution to institution, the following identifies the most common planning considerations associated with the four pillars of EM planning.
Normal functions that do not contribute to the emergency operation may be suspended or redirected for the duration of the emergency.
It addresses the need for preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities to enhance the state's overall capability to cope with potential hazards. Planners with the South Dakota Office of Emergency Management coordinate planning efforts, host continuity training opportunities, and manage the state continuity planning software to ensure all state agencies and several other entities are able to continue completing their essential functions when any array of circumstances might otherwise interfere with normal operations. EM planning, in particular, aims to strengthen resiliency by promoting an integrated and comprehensive approach that includes the four pillars of EM: prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.
In addition, there are other existing EM planning documents and initiatives that apply to a range of federal government institutions, such as the Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP) and deliverables under the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure. This is also an ideal time to develop an initial budget for such items as training, exercises, research, workshops and other expenses that may be necessary during the development and implementation of the SEMP. Stakeholders may include First Nations, emergency first responders, the private sector (both business and industry), and volunteer and non-government organizations.
This part of the process consists of three main activities: risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. It involves the identification of risk sources, areas of impact, events and their causes, as well as potential consequences. A risk portfolio or profile can be created from the register, helping to compile common risks in order to assess interdependencies and to prioritize groups of risks. Existing controls, the cost of further risk treatment and any policy requirement implications are considered when deciding on additional mitigation measures.
Based on a risk diagram or rating matrix, a clustering of risks can be shown, leading to decisions on priorities. The aim is to develop a SEMP that integrates and coordinates elements identified in hazard-specific plans and BCPs.
For example, an assumption might be made that the resources required to develop the SEMP will be paid out of the current fiscal year's budget. It is the responsibility of each state agency to respond in a manner consistent with its capabilities as identified and agreed to in this plan. Institutions may choose to assess a portfolio of risks, as opposed to specific individual risks, which enables a holistic review of risk treatment decisions. Information can be gleaned from historical data, theoretical analyses, and informed and expert judgements.
Qualitative analysis is often simpler, but also results in high uncertainty in the results. Such a plot can help establish acceptable or intolerable risk levels, and establish their respective actions. THESE VERY SAME ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, WHO HAVE SWORN TO PROTECT AND SERVE, OUR COUNTRY, AND CITIZENS ,ARE BUT SOME, OF THE CORRUPT,GREEDY TRAITORS .ENGAGED IN THE TYRANNY AND TORTURE. The school district has moved to a biometric identification program, saying students will no longer have to use an ID card to buy lunch.A  BIOMETRICS TO TRACK YOUR KIDS!!!!!i»?i»?A TARGETED INDIVIDUALS, THE GREEDY CRIMINALS ARE NOW CONDONING THEIR TECH! Paul Weindling, history of medicine professor at Oxford Brookes University, describes his search for the lost victims of Nazi experiments. The chairman of the board at ESL a€” then proprietor of the desert wasteland in Nevada known as a€?Area 51a€? a€” was William Perry, who would be appointed secretary of defense several years later.
EUCACH.ORG PanelIn a 2-hour wide-ranging Panel with Alfred Lambremont Webre on the Transhumanist Agenda, Magnus Olsson, Dr.
Henning Witte, and Melanie Vritschan, three experts from the European Coalition Against Covert Harassment, revealed recent technological advances in human robotization and nano implant technologies, and an acceleration of what Melanie Vritschan characterized as a a€?global enslavement programa€?.Shift from electromagnetic to scalar wavesThese technologies have now shifted from electromagnetic wave to scalar waves and use super quantum computers in the quantum cloud to control a€?pipesa€? a reference to the brains of humans that have been taken over via DNA, via implants that can be breathed can breach the blood-brain barrier and then controlled via scalar waved on a super-grid. Eventually, such 'subvocal speech' systems could be used in spacesuits, in noisy places like airport towers to capture air-traffic controller commands, or even in traditional voice-recognition programs to increase accuracy, according to NASA scientists."What is analyzed is silent, or sub auditory, speech, such as when a person silently reads or talks to himself," said Chuck Jorgensen, a scientist whose team is developing silent, subvocal speech recognition at NASA Ames Research Center in California's Silicon Valley. We numbered the columns and rows, and we could identify each letter with a pair of single-digit numbers," Jorgensen said. People in noisy conditions could use the system when privacy is needed, such as during telephone conversations on buses or trains, according to scientists."An expanded muscle-control system could help injured astronauts control machines.
If an astronaut is suffering from muscle weakness due to a long stint in microgravity, the astronaut could send signals to software that would assist with landings on Mars or the Earth, for example," Jorgensen explained. These are processed to remove noise, and then we process them to see useful parts of the signals to show one word from another," Jorgensen said.After the signals are amplified, computer software 'reads' the signals to recognize each word and sound. Our Research and Development Division has been in contact with the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the California Department of Corrections, the Texas Department of Public Safety, and the Massachusetts Department of Correction to run limited trials of the 2020 neural chip implant. We have established representatives of our interests in both management and institutional level positions within these departments. Federal regulations do not yet permit testing of implants on prisoners, but we have entered nto contractual agreements with privatized health care professionals and specified correctional personnel to do limited testing of our products. We need, however, to expand our testing to research how effective the 2020 neural chip implant performs in those identified as the most aggressive in our society. In California, several prisoners were identified as members of the security threat group, EME, or Mexican Mafia. They were brought to the health services unit at Pelican Bay and tranquilized with advanced sedatives developed by our Cambridge,Massachussetts laboratories. The results of implants on 8 prisoners yielded the following results: a€?Implants served as surveillance monitoring device for threat group activity.
However, during that period substantial data was gathered by our research and development team which suggests that the implants exceed expected results.
One of the major concerns of Security and the R & D team was that the test subject would discover the chemial imbalance during the initial adjustment period and the test would have to be scurbbed. However, due to advanced technological developments in the sedatives administered, the 48 hour adjustment period can be attributed t prescription medication given to the test subjects after the implant procedure. One of the concerns raised by R & D was the cause of the bleeding and how to eliminate that problem. Unexplained bleeding might cause the subject to inquire further about his "routine" visit to the infirmary or health care facility.
Security officials now know several strategies employed by the EME that facilitate the transmission of illegal drugs and weapons into their correctional facilities. One intelligence officier remarked that while they cannot use the informaiton that have in a court of law that they now know who to watch and what outside "connections" they have. The prison at Soledad is now considering transferring three subjects to Vacaville wher we have ongoing implant reserach.
Our technicians have promised that they can do three 2020 neural chip implants in less than an hour. Soledad officials hope to collect information from the trio to bring a 14 month investigation into drug trafficking by correctional officers to a close. Essentially, the implants make the unsuspecting prisoner a walking-talking recorder of every event he comes into contact with. There are only five intelligence officers and the Commisoner of Corrections who actually know the full scope of the implant testing. In Massachusetts, the Department of Corrections has already entered into high level discussion about releasing certain offenders to the community with the 2020 neural chip implants. Our people are not altogether against the idea, however, attorneys for Intelli-Connection have advised against implant technology outside strick control settings. While we have a strong lobby in the Congress and various state legislatures favoring our product, we must proceed with the utmost caution on uncontrolled use of the 2020 neural chip.
If the chip were discovered in use not authorized by law and the procedure traced to us we could not endure for long the resulting publicity and liability payments. Massachusetts officials have developed an intelligence branch from their Fugitive Task Force Squad that would do limited test runs under tight controls with the pre-release subjects. Correctons officials have dubbed these poetnetial test subjects "the insurance group." (the name derives from the concept that the 2020 implant insures compliance with the law and allows officials to detect misconduct or violations without question) A retired police detective from Charlestown, Massachusetts, now with the intelligence unit has asked us to consider using the 2020 neural chip on hard core felons suspected of bank and armored car robbery.
He stated, "Charlestown would never be the same, we'd finally know what was happening before they knew what was happening." We will continue to explore community uses of the 2020 chip, but our company rep will be attached to all law enforcement operations with an extraction crrew that can be on-site in 2 hours from anywhere at anytime. We have an Intelli-Connection discussion group who is meeting with the Director of Security at Florence, Colorado's federal super maximum security unit.
The initial discussions with the Director have been promising and we hope to have an R & D unit at this important facilitly within the next six months. Napolitano insisted that the department was not planning on engaging in any form of ideological profiling. I will tell him face-to-face that we honor veterans at DHS and employ thousands across the department, up to and including the Deputy Secretary," Ms.
Steve Buyer of Indiana, the ranking Republican on the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, called it "inconceivable" that the Obama administration would categorize veterans as a potential threat.



American movies 1930s
Electromagnetic pulse news desktop
2012 survival football picks ats


Comments to “Purpose of emergency planning process”

  1. shahrukhkhan writes:
    Sign up for soft-story and pre-1976, brittle-concrete economical and technical evolution we are. Brando hated memorizing lines.
  2. Anonim writes:
    Wikipedia is to present details, not to train your company, the less complicated it will.
  3. FASHION_GIRL writes:
    Case you are in desperate want for they.