International negotiations involving Iran’s nuclear program were extended until November 24, which is good news for Western multinationals. Many companies are preparing to enter or expand in post-sanctions Iran, and 40% of FSG clients surveyed already view it as a priority market. Before committing significant resources to overcome operational challenges in Iran, senior executives must first determine whether their organizations are even willing to take the risk by reassessing market potential, sanctions exposure, and indirect vulnerabilities, such as reputational risk. For companies focused on entering or expanding in post-sanctions Iran, it is imperative to prepare for the top three challenges identified by FSG clients in a recent poll: a lack of access to bank services, compliance risk, and difficulties in becoming a first mover ahead of competition. Budgeting involves planning for the various revenue producing and cost generating activities of an organization. Committed costs refers to the costs associated with establishing and maintaining the readiness to conduct business.
Four types of budgets are used for planning and controlling the various types of costs discussed above. The master budget has two major parts including the operating budget and the financial budget (See Exhibit 9-4). The planning process encourages management to consider alternatives that might improve customer value and reduce costs. The master budget also provides a guide for accomplishing the objectives included in the plan. The master budget provides a method for evaluating and subsequently controlling performance. There are several limitations and problems associated with the master budget that need to be considered by management.
Budgeting includes a considerable amount of forecasting and this activity involves a considerable amount of uncertainty. A second problem involves a variety of behavioral conflicts that are created when the budget is used as a control device.
A third problem or limitation is that budgeting requires a considerable amount of time and effort.
Responsibility accounting is an underlying concept of accounting performance measurement systems.
Conceptually, ROI is some measure of the segment's income divided by some measure of the segment's investment. Managers and workers in an individualistic system tend to be motivated by measurements that emphasize their individual performances. This harsh criticism of accounting control information leads us to a very important controversial question.
These calculations are relatively simple, but where does the budget director obtain this information?
The information needed to develop an equation for collections is provided by the finance department and is normally based on past experience. The quantity of material required per unit of product is determined by the industrial engineers who designed the product. This calculation is more involved than equation 3b appears to indicate because it includes information for two future periods. Fewer calculations are needed for direct labor than for direct materials because labor hours cannot be stored in the inventory for future use. The amount of direct labor time needed per unit of product is determined by industrial engineers.
The budgeted rates per hour for direct labor are provided by the human resource department. The factory overhead budget is based on a flexible budget calculation as described in Exhibit 9-3. This is a cumulative equation that combines the equations for the company's various types of indirect resources. The calculation for cash payments reflects one of the differences between cash flows and accrual accounting. The dollar amount for the ending inventory of finished goods is needed below to determine cost of goods sold. The budgeted or standard unit cost can be calculated at any time after the budgeted quantities per unit and input prices are obtained. Although budgeted unit cost equals standard unit cost, budgeted cost of goods sold is not equal to standard cost of goods sold. The preparation of the selling and administrative expense budgets is very similar to the approach used for factory overhead. As indicated in Exhibit 9-4, the financial budget includes the cash budget, the capital budget and the budgeted balance sheet. The following examples and end of chapter practice problems will help you become familiar with the master budget concepts and techniques. The Expando Company produces entertainment centers from a type of pressed wood referred to as particle board. 2,700 corporate executives, it is the most important accounting knowledge and skill area for those who enter management accounting.
Planning, programming, and budgeting systems were popular for government decision making in the 1960's.
3 Walmart, Levi Strauss and Ford Motor Company have similar relationships with their vendors. An advantage of this approach is that performance is more easily compared from one period to the next. This model is discussed in Chapter 11 and altered to conform to absorption costing in Chapter 12.
Desired ending inventories of materials and finished goods are based on 5% of next periods needs.
Desired ending inventories of materials are based on 10% of the next months materials needed.
Desired ending inventories of materials are based on 4% of the next months materials needed. The Microtable Company produces and sells special wood tables that are used with microcomputers.
Overhead rates are based on a capacity level 500 machine hours per month and overhead is applied on the basis of robot (machine) hours.
Desired ending inventories of materials are based on 10% of the next months materials needed for production. Calculate the budgeted amounts indicated below, then circle the letter for the answer you choose.
By uniting the international community against it, the Islamic State has managed to paper over many of the fault lines that crisscross the Middle East. As the threat from ISIS fades over time, though, these players’ rivalries will resurface and burn hotter than ever.
When the Islamic State swept across Iraq last summer, it startled the region out of its complacency.
This coalition includes many former enemies with conflicting interests, enemies who have managed to put aside their differences only because the threat posed by the Islamic State is so great. As the Islamic State retreats and fractures, the coalition’s avowed and implicit members will turn back to the conflicts and animosities that once divided them. Second, coalition members will be tempted by new opportunities to strike out alone for their own advantage. The balance of power in the Middle East has shifted in the wake of the Second Gulf War, the Arab Spring, and the rise of the Islamic State—but no one knows by how much.


President Obama started the fight against the Islamic State with great reluctance, not wanting to embroil the United States in yet another Middle Eastern conflict.
In order to avoid this dismal outcome, Washington needs to act now to establish a long-term strategy that accounts for the region’s new and more dangerous circumstances. Washington confronts a much harder quandary when it comes to the division between Iran and its Shia clients, on the one hand, and the United States and its Arab allies, on the other. There are no easy answers here, but to start, American policy makers should try to mitigate their predicament by decreasing the coalition’s dependence on Iran.
In terms of its effect on the balance-of-power quandary, President Obama’s deal with Iran has come at a bad time and may need to be modified. This is not the first time in history that a common threat has united erstwhile enemies—think of World War II, with the Soviet Union and the West waging war against Nazi Germany, and Mao’s Communists and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists battling together against Imperial Japan. Sean Mirski is a third-year student at Harvard Law School, where he is Supreme Court Chair of the Harvard Law Review. Tensions between Seoul and Pyongyang led South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff to announce Sunday that its chairman had put off a visit to Washington. His description suggests that the missile could be the Musudan missile, capable of striking American bases in Guam with its estimated range of up to 4,000 kilometers.
During a meeting with other South Korean officials, the official, Kim Jang-Soo, also said the notice to diplomats and other recent North Korean actions are an attempt to stoke security concerns and to force South Korea and the U.S. The roughly two dozen countries with embassies in North Korea had not yet announced whether they would evacuate their staffs. Indonesia’s foreign affairs ministry said it was considering a plan to evacuate its diplomats. Seoul and Washington, which lack diplomatic relations with the North, are taking the threats seriously, though they say they have seen no signs that Pyongyang is preparing for a large-scale attack. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel decided to delay the test at an Air Force base in California until sometime next month, the official said Saturday. Three Global Hawk surveillance planes are deployed on Guam and one of them is being considered for deployment in Japan, the official said on condition of anonymity because the official was not authorized to speak about the issue. North Korea successfully shot a satellite into space in December and conducted its third nuclear test in February.
North Korea also raised tensions Wednesday when it barred South Koreans and supply trucks from entering the Kaesong industrial complex, where South Korean companies have employed thousands of North Korean workers for the past decade.
North Korea is not forcing South Korean managers to leave the factory complex, and nearly 520 of them remained at Kaesong on Sunday. Nine more firms, including food and textile companies, have stopped operations at Kaesong, bringing to 13 the total number of companies that have done so, South Korea’s Unification Ministry said in a statement Sunday.
Senior executives should use this extra time to lay out plans for entering or expanding in the Iranian market. A comprehensive nuclear deal and the subsequent opening of the Iranian market would represent the biggest shake-up to the MENA portfolio since the Arab Spring erupted between late 2010 and early 2011.
FSG clients can read our report on post-sanctions Iran to learn about actions for overcoming these challenges and many others. Outline the main parts of a master budget including the sequence in which they are developed. Describe responsibility accounting and discuss the controversy associated with this concept. Prepare the various schedules or sub-budgets included in a master budget or financial plan. Examples include employee training, advertising, sales promotion, legal advice, preventive maintenance, and research and development. In the next section, we consider the purposes, benefits, limitations and assumptions of the master budget. Thus, the budgeted sales price is usually determined after the budgeted unit cost has been calculated (see 6b. Normally the budget should reflect a situation where the company pays promptly to take advantage of all cash discounts allowed, thus 3e may be equal to 3c.
Bad debt expense is based on the expected proportion of uncollectibles stated in the information related to cash collections. Desired ending inventories are 10% of next periods material needs for direct material and 5% of next periods sales for finished goods.
What factors should be considered in determining the desired ending inventory of finished goods? To be consistent with the matching concept, what should be the basis of the amount of bad debts that appears on the income statement? You might also find it useful to review the discussion of the behavioral aspects of inventory valuation in Chapter 8.
Appropriation budgets are used to set the maximum amounts for many types of discretionary expenditures.
Increase net income in future months as well as decrease cash outflows in the current and future periods.
Communication to managers of how their efforts add value to the organization's products or services.
Depreciation and other non-cash fixed costs are: manufacturing = $100,000, selling and administrative = $75,000. For the remainder of this problem ignore your answer to question 3 and assume that the budgeted units to be produced for February are 5,030. Assume 100 additional units of production are budgeted for February with no change in budgeted unit sales.
This manufactured unity has underwritten the coalition of states and nonstate actors that have coordinated their military action against ISIS—a coalition that includes Iran and Saudi Arabia, the United States and Bashar al-Assad, and Iraq and the Kurds. To avoid a regional conflagration, the United States must recognize its responsibility to ensure a stable balance of power in the Middle East and articulate a firm commitment to doing so. For example, Saudi Arabia and Iran have struggled for decades for regional leadership, a rivalry riddled with sectarian tensions.
According to the head of CENTCOM, American airstrikes have killed over eight thousand militants, destroyed key sources of revenue and mangled ISIS’ command-and-control network. The State has proved incapable of administering the territories it supposedly “governs,” undermining its authority over its subjects. For example, Iran has been one of ISIS’ most dedicated opponents, contributing copious resources to defend the governments of Iraq and Syria.
Already, sectarian proxy wars have broken out in Syria and Yemen, and Iraq itself is perched on the edge of a civil war between its Shia majority and Sunni minority. In its appalling rise and inevitable decline, the Islamic State has reshuffled the Middle East deck by disrupting the balance of power. But as the coalition against ISIS falls apart, the region will hit an inflection point with incredible potential for escalation. President Obama has said that his goal is to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State. In Iraq, for example, Washington can and should act as a broker between the Kurds and Baghdad in order to build the confidence necessary for continued cooperation between the two.
President Obama must be careful not to lose sight of the broader American strategy for the region: together, Tehran and Washington could easily defeat the Islamic State, but victory would come at the cost of a significant step toward Iranian regional hegemony and a potential sectarian crisis of unparalleled proportions. By stressing the danger posed by Tehran’s extensive militia network, Washington should be able to secure a more serious commitment against ISIS from Arab allies, who have shown their willingness recently to commit men and material when faced with a perceived Iranian threat.
True, it aims to scuttle Tehran’s nuclear ambitions—a key part of any American balancing strategy.
But these examples underscore the danger: once the common enemy faded from view, allies of convenience became bitter enemies once again.


Kirkuk’s Kurdish governor, Najmiddin Karim, has commented that Iraq needs visionary leadership to avoid a sectarian collapse. But he added that the North’s clearest objective is to extract concessions from Washington and Seoul. A statement released by the ministry on Saturday said that its embassy in Pyongyang has been preparing a contingency plan to anticipate the worst-case scenario, and that the Indonesian foreign minister is communicating with the staff there to monitor the situation.
Since 2010, when attacks Seoul blames on North Korea killed 50 people, South Korea has vowed to aggressively respond to any future attack.
Defense Department has delayed an intercontinental ballistic missile test that had been planned for this week because of concerns the launch could be misinterpreted and exacerbate the Korean crisis, a senior defense official told The Associated Press. The official was not authorized to speak publicly about the test delay and requested anonymity.
But the entry ban at the park, the last remaining inter-Korean rapprochement project, is posing a serious challenge to many of the more than 120 South Korean firms there because they are running out of raw materials and are short on replacement workers. Today, FSG released a report for our clients that outlines actions to take in order to prepare for major challenges and capitalize on huge opportunities in post-sanctions Iran.
Iran’s population is the second largest in MENA, and its oil and gas reserves are the 4th and 2nd largest in the world, respectively. However, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and consumer goods companies are especially likely to prioritize post-sanctions Iran given its attractive demographics and future spending power. All of these erstwhile rivals have been willing to cast their differences aside to meet the common threat posed by the Islamic State’s horrifying success. ISIS must be defeated, but that defeat must not come at the cost of chaos or Iran’s destabilizing rise to regional preponderance. Tehran moved to protect its client state in Syria; the United States did the same for the Kurds and the new government in Baghdad. Since 1979, Iran and its allies have challenged American influence in the region through a variety of means, including proxy battles, oil embargoes, advanced weapons programs and state-sponsored terrorism.
Worse, serious fissures have developed between the organization’s foreign and domestic fighters, leading to widespread disaffection, desertion, and dissent. First, and most obviously, the Islamic State will present less of a threat to its opponents as it grows weaker. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has intervened against the Houthi advance in Yemen in order to counter Iranian influence, even though Riyadh and Tehran are ostensibly on the same side in their fight against the Islamic State. Insecure and overconfident by turns, this motley collection of actors is united only in their campaign against ISIS. It will not take much for hostilities to break out, and the most likely locus is the campaign against the Islamic State. Although different players have incurred heavy costs, there have been relative winners and losers, and the groundwork has been laid for more conflict between them. Without a prescient strategy, the United States may find itself entangled in a fresh set of enduring conflicts.
But a grand strategy requires more, and so the United States must pair that immediate objective with a longer-term goal: engineering a relative balance of power throughout the region that can forestall Iran’s rise to regional hegemony and the region’s descent into sectarian chaos. Compromise is difficult but possible: Iraq does not want Kurdish secession, and the Kurds do not want to fight a civil war against the central government. At the same time, though, it is clear that Iran is a key part of the battle against ISIS, bearing the brunt of the on-the-ground fighting crucial for victory. That backing should be matched with increased American support to Iraq’s central government, which is straining uneasily under Iran’s influence and would appreciate the added independence offered by having alternative options on the table. But the deal has also raised the prospect of an Iranian-American rapprochement that accentuates the security dilemma faced by Arab allies (not to mention Israel). James Thurman, will not make a planned trip to Washington this week to testify before Congress because of tensions with North Korea. It has sent nuclear capable B-2 and B-52 bombers and stealth F-22 fighters to participate in the drills. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt acted on their fears that ISIS could expand into their own territory. The Kurds have long clashed with state authorities in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran over their aspirations of autonomy or even independence. Through this campaign, the coalition has inflicted defeats that, for reasons I’ve explained elsewhere, will be difficult to reverse, are likely to accelerate over time and may jeopardize the State’s legitimacy in the eyes of potential recruits. As the threat it poses fades, so, too, does the common interest that binds the coalition together. It has augmented its role in Baghdad’s decision-making process, increased the strength of its proxy Shia militias, and cultivated relations with other actors in the country—including former Prime Minister Maliki and the Kurds—in order to diversify its power base. For now, Saudi Arabia and its allies will continue to bomb ISIS in tacit cooperation with Iranian-backed militias on the ground. As ISIS collapses, today’s reluctant allies will grasp for influence as they seek to reorient themselves in a changing region. Sparks are already flying in the form of local commanders initiating skirmishes against peer groups and community residents. Having shed blood for their gains, winners like Iraq’s Kurds, for instance, will be loathe to give up their hard-won independence. And as Saudi Arabia and Iran square off at the heads of sectarian coalitions, it is easy to imagine that the humanitarian consequences of a regional ethnic and religious conflict could surpass even those of the Syrian civil war. Prime Minister al-Abadi is asking the United States for help; he should get it, conditional on decreasing his country’s reliance on its eastern neighbor. Therefore, President Obama must offset the security dangers posed by an Iran deal with conventional support to American allies throughout the Middle East.
And as in most areas of the world, the Middle East is marked by confessional nationalism that often stifles even positive-sum cooperation. While the Islamic State was racing toward Baghdad, Saudi Arabia perceived it to be a grave security threat.
But soon enough, Saudi Arabia may decide that there is little point in continuing to provide air cover for what amounts to an Iranian advance into the Iraqi heartland of Riyadh’s Sunni co-religionists. This is the security dilemma at work: a situation where each actor tries to protect itself against potential threats with a defensive measure—say, forming sectarian alliances—that inadvertently threatens others, leading to a dangerous, escalatory spiral.
Over time, these sparks will increase in frequency and intensity, and at some point, one may ignite a broader inferno. Ongoing attempts to sideline the Shia militias in the campaign to retake the Anbar province are a step in the right direction. Many nations are deciding what to do about the notice, which said their diplomats’ safety in Pyongyang cannot be guaranteed beginning this Wednesday. But tensions on the Korean Peninsula are so high that Jung cannot take a long trip away from South Korea, so the meeting will be rescheduled, a South Korean Joint Chiefs officer said Sunday.
Faced with a new and savage enemy, these disparate actors entered—sometimes expressly, other times only tacitly—into an ad hoc coalition dedicated to ISIS’ marginalization and ultimate defeat.
But once ISIS has been reduced to a rump enclave in Syria, Riyadh may recalculate that Iran, which backs rebels, militias and minor despots across the region, is actually the bigger threat. After all, a nuclear deal matters only insofar as it can contain Iran’s expansionist activities, and if Tehran can win regional primacy by conventional means at the cost of eschewing its nuclear ambitions, then the United States has failed to meet its objectives and might, instead, have laid the groundwork for regional conflict.



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