Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism

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FOREWORD BY ELIOT DEUTSCH

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF HAWAII
Honolulu
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D. J. KALUPAHANA, chairman of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii, has carried out, in the tradition of his teacher K. N. Jayatilleke, a masterful articulation, analysis, and interpretation of the doctrines of causation in Buddhist philosophy. Special attention is given to early Buddhist teachings as found in the Pali Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas; and by working with both Pali and Chinese sources Kalupahana has broadened considerably the foundations of scholarship in early Buddhist philosophy.

In early Buddhism, Kalupahana maintains, a cause is defined as "the sum total of several factors that gives rise to a consequent"—the "consequent" being the entire universe as well as a specific thing or event. As with the Greeks (Aristotle in particular), for whom the question of causality was not so much how one thing (efficiently) causes another, but how one thing can become something different from itself, we have in Buddhist thought a concern to account for 'development,' 'process,' 'change' in the whole of our experience. For Buddhism, causality is at once a problem in metaphysics and epistemology, and its resolution in these areas leads to a variety of ethical considerations.

In recent years Western interest in Buddhism has been directed mainly to Mahāyāna traditions, principally to the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna and to Zen. Professor Kalupahana is to be warmly commended for turning our attention back to the philosophical riches of the early schools, where, together with profound
spiritual concerns, a good deal of sharp philosophical analysis is to be found. The author offers us as well a comprehensive historical background to Buddhist 'phenomenalism' and unravels many of the complexities in the schools associated with the so-called Theravāda tradition and in the later Māhāyana developments.

One of the most interesting analyses Kalupahana offers has to do with whether the doctrine of 'dependent origination,' or *paticcasamuppāda* (Skt. *pratītyasamutpāda*), implies determinism. His manner of treating this question shows how nicely he refuses to accept any interpretation of Buddhism that does violence to the original texts for the sake of satisfying one's philosophical preconceptions or predilections.

Professor Kalupahana faces directly the many difficulties in the Buddhist doctrines and presents a hard-headed, no-nonsense, sympathetic but not apologetic, analysis. His work should deepen considerably philosophical interest in Buddhism and appreciation for the distinctive genius of the many extraordinary thinkers associated with it.

Eliot Deutsch
STUDIES ON THE PHILOSOPHY of early Buddhism have so far been confined mostly to the material available in the Pali Nikāyas, which represent only one of the early Buddhist traditions. Some Japanese scholars, such as Ui Hakuji and Akanuma Chizen, have examined the teachings embodied in the Chinese Āgamas. Unfortunately, these treatises are not accessible to the present author because he does not know the Japanese language. Akanuma Chizen as well as Masaharu Anesaki have rendered a great service to those interested in comparative studies of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas by compiling catalogues of the sutras in these two bodies of literature. The present work was undertaken to compare the teachings on the problem of causation in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. The importance of the Chinese Āgamas for the study of early Buddhist thought is twofold. First, they supply corroborative evidence for some of the major concepts in the Pali Nikāyas, whose authenticity has been questioned by many scholars in recent times. Secondly, they throw much light on some of the obscure concepts in the Nikāyas.

Indian thinkers before and during the time of the Buddha put forward a wide variety of views regarding the problem of change and causality. Buddhist theory is a product of criticism, assimilation, and synthesis of these ideas. Most of the earlier theories are examined in the early Buddhist texts, namely, the Pali Nikāyas
and the Chinese Āgamas. In chapter 1 an attempt is made to trace the gradual development of causal theories in the Vedic tradition to establish the historical basis of some of the theories mentioned in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. Here the evidence from the Āgamas is mainly corroborative. An examination of philosophical sections of the Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, and the Upaniṣads has led to the conclusion that the theories of self-causation (sat-kārya) and creation by God (tiṣṭha-nirmāṇa) were two of the major causal theories in the Vedic tradition. These were referred to in the early Buddhist texts as sayāṃ katam (tsū tsao) and issara-nimmāṇa (tsun yu tsao), respectively. Buddhist criticism of these theories appearing in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas is also examined.

Chapter 2 is devoted to an analysis of pre-Buddhist ideas mainly in the non-Vedic tradition. The causal theories of the Materialists, the Ājīvikas, and the Jainas are discussed in detail, especially because of their possible influence on the Buddhist theory of causation. Here the evidence gleaned from the Chinese Āgamas is of immense value in understanding some obscure concepts, such as niyatisaṅgatībhāva of the Ājīvikas. The close similarity between the theories of moral causation put forward in Jainism and Buddhism has confused some scholars who have written on this subject, so the Jaina standpoint is discussed at length. With the help of the commentaries of Śīlāṅka it is possible to determine the relationship between the two schools of thought with some precision. It is pointed out how the philosophical theory of causation formulated in Jainism led to the acceptance of a deterministic theory of moral causation. The influence of some Ājīvika theories on Jainism is not overlooked. Apart from the doctrines of these major schools of thought, we examine several other theories that are mentioned in the early Buddhist texts.

Chapter 3 is an attempt to elucidate the meaning of some of the terms expressing causation in the early Buddhist texts. The different views, classical as well as modern, regarding the use of the terms hetu (yin) and pratyaya (yūan) are discussed. All the evidence from the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas indicates that during the earliest phase of Buddhism the two terms were used synonymously and that they did not express any distinction
comparable to the distinction between ‘cause’ and ‘subsidiary condition.’ Doctrinal as well as textual evidence suggests that that distinction originated with the Sarvâstivâdins.

A discussion of the causal principle involves an examination of the nature of things that are connected by the causal principle. Chapter 4 is therefore devoted to an analysis of the nature of causally conditioned dharma or dhamma. There are many important disquisitions on this subject by modern scholars. Outstanding among them are (i) The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Term ‘Dharma’ by T. I. Stcherbatsky, which is based primarily on the source material in the Abhidharmakośa, and (ii) Pali Dhamma by Wilhelm and Magdalene Geiger, who examined almost every reference to the term dhamma in Pali literature, canonical as well as commentarial, to bring forth the wide variety of meanings the term connotes. A fresh look at this material was found to be necessary especially in the light of the information supplied by the Chinese Āgamas. The conception of dhamma (fa) appearing in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas was found to differ from the conceptions of dharma in some of the major schools of thought, such as the Sarvâstivāda, the Sautrântika, and the later Theravāda. Some scholars have minimized the difference between the teachings of early Buddhism as embodied in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas on the one hand and those of the later schools on the other;¹ we endeavor to show that the difference is far too great to be ignored. For example, the acceptance of a logical theory of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda) instead of an empirical view of change and impermanence (anitya) gave rise to a host of problems, and their solution created significant differences not only among the later schools but also between these and early Buddhism. The Sarvâstivâdins, it is pointed out, accepted an eternal underlying substratum (dravya, svabhāva) in things (dharma). It was this fundamental conception of Sarvâstivāda, a school that gained prominence in India after the third century B.C., that was the target of Nāgârjuna’s dialectic. Thus, with much justification, the Mahāyānists attributed a theory of pudgala-nairatmya (nonsubstantiality of the individual) but not dharma-nairatmya (nonsubstantiality of the elements) to the Sarvâstivâdins and claimed superiority over them for formulating the latter conception. Since the Sarvâstivāda
was then the most prominent of the Hīnayāna schools, the Mahāyānists, without any justification, extended their criticism to all the Hīnayāna schools.

Moreover, with the emergence of different Buddhist schools and the compilation of the Abhidharma literature and ancillary works, the study of the early sutra literature was relegated to the background. As a result, the Abhidharma came to be looked upon as the primary source for the study of early Buddhism. The Sautrāntika school, claiming to base its doctrine on the source material in the sutras (sūrāṇa), may have emerged in reaction to giving such priority to the Abhidharma. But the Sautrāntikas, too, in accepting the theory of momentariness, moved away from the standpoint of early Buddhism.

The view that the Sarvāstivāda school represents the earliest phase of Buddhism seems to have prevailed in the minds of the compilers of the Sandhinirmocana-sūtra (7.30) as well as historians such as Bu-ston.² Taking the various phases of Buddhism as represented by the schools in India during their own time, these Mahāyāna scholars formulated the conception of tricakra-parivartana, “the three swingings of the Wheel of the Law.” That theory completely ignores the sutra literature, which, as we point out, is if not more exalted at least not much different from the ideas expressed and the critical attitude adopted by Nāgārjuna and his followers.

Stcherbatsky’s theory that the earliest form of Buddhism was a Radical Pluralism that eventually led to Monism and finally to Idealism was contested by Schayer, who held the view that Pluralism, Monism, and Idealism were parallel currents of thought in early Buddhism.³ It may be possible to trace the germs of Pluralism, Monism, and Idealism in the Buddhist canon in the same way that one can see different trends of thought in the Upaniṣads. But the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, which are primarily based on the speculations of one individual, unlike the Upaniṣads, should lend themselves to a single interpretation. Our examination of the conception of dhamma (fa) in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas leads us to conclude that the philosophical standpoint of these early texts represents a form of ‘phenomenalism.’

Chapter 5 explains the causal principle in Buddhism. The first part of the chapter examines the nature of the causal nexus, and the second part assesses the validity of the causal principle. The
status of the causal principle in Buddhism is discussed in relation to some of the Western schools of thought that are skeptical of causation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the causal principle is verified.

Chapter 6 elucidates the various problems that are given causal explanations in Buddhism. The operation of the principle of causation in the spheres of inorganic phenomena, organic life, psychology, social and moral life, and spiritual life are examined in detail. The detailed treatment is necessary to eliminate the erroneous belief, created by the writings of some modern critics of Buddhism, that the idea of causation in Buddhism is confined to the twelvefold formula.

A comparison of the theory of causation in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas with later developments (chapter 7) has convinced us that the view of some scholars that Mādhyamika philosophy represents a "Copernican revolution" in Buddhism is unfounded. The Mādhyamika philosophers did develop a critical attitude in philosophy as a result of the metaphysical theories propounded by the later Buddhist schools; but the standpoints adopted by the Buddha and the Mādhyamika philosophers to avoid such metaphysics are radically different. The concluding chapter, in which we try to interpret the Buddha's silence on metaphysical questions, was written to clarify the difference between these two standpoints.

Chapter 8 includes a comparison of the theory of causal correlation (pratyaya) of the Theravāda as enunciated in the Paṭṭhāna with the theories of the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra. Correspondences among these theories are noted.

Our final conclusion is that the Buddha rejected contemporary metaphysical speculations, giving instead a scientific explanation of the phenomenal world, and that without getting unduly engrossed in or obsessed by the mystical aspect of the current religious traditions, he utilized that mystical knowledge and experience to achieve freedom (vimutti, chiai t'o) from the trammels of samsāric existence.
Acknowledgments

THE PRESENT WORK is an outgrowth of the Ph.D. thesis that I submitted to the University of London in 1966. I am greatly indebted to Professors Stanley Weinstein (currently at Yale) and D. L. Friedmann, of the University of London, under whose watchful eyes this work was undertaken and completed. Thanks are also due Dr. K. P. K. Whitaker and Mr. G. F. Weys, of the same institution, for helping me in various ways, and the latter for giving me my first lessons in classical Chinese. My teacher and later colleague, Professor N. A. Jayawickrema, at the University of Ceylon, has always been a source of inspiration and encouragement and was solely responsible for obtaining leave of absence for me to complete this project. The late Professor K. N. Jayatilleke read through the entire original draft and made many useful suggestions. The untimely death of this distinguished scholar is greatly felt by those interested in Buddhist scholarship. I am grateful to my friend and colleague, Professor Eliot Deutsch, for writing the Foreword. Professor Dennis Twichett of the University of London (now of Cambridge University) and Mr. W. Zwalf of the British Museum have helped me in innumerable ways during the period when this research was carried out. Thanks are due
Mrs. Iris M. Wiley of The University Press of Hawaii for the interest she has shown in this work, and to Mrs. Floris E. Sakamoto for her assistance in typing the manuscript. The completion of this research project was made possible by a generous grant from the British Council. My wife Indrani deserves a word of praise for the patience with which she has tolerated the time spent on this work.
Auspicious are the Sun's bay-coloured horses, bright, changing hues, meet for our shouts of triumph.

Bearing our prayers, the sky's ridge have they mounted, and in a moment speed round earth and heaven.

This is the godhead, this the might of Sūrya, he hath withdrawn what spread o'er work unfinished.

When he hath loosed his horses from their station, straight over all Night spreadeth out her garment.³

This conception of a purely physical order appears to have arisen as an inductive inference based on the repeated experience of such phenomena as the daily rising and setting of the sun. As the number of experiences of such phenomena increased, the probability of their repetition approached certainty, and man began to believe in dependable regularities in the external world.

The regularity with which these phenomena function was understood by the Vedic Aryans to be due to the greatness or divinity of the gods.⁴ Thus, order prevails in the world because of the nature of the gods. After experiencing a uniformity a certain number of times, Vedic Aryans came to expect that it would be repeated on future occasions; as a result, they formed expectations about many phenomena, which are expressed in their hymns.⁵ One such expectation is found in the hymn to Parjanya.⁶

The wind blows forth, the lightning falls; the plants shoot up; heaven overflows. Nature is born when Parjanya quickens the earth with seed.

Give us, O Maruts, the rain of heaven; pour forth the streams of your stallion. Hither with this thunder come, pouring down the waters as the divine spirit our father. Bellow towards us; thunder; deposit the germ; fly around with thy water-bearing car. Draw well thy water skin unfastened downwards; let the heights and valleys be level.

Thou hast shed rain; now wholly cease; thou hast made the deserts passable again. Thou hast made the plants to grow for the sake of food; and thou hast found a hymn of praise from [thy] creatures.⁷

The passage above, among a host of others, exemplifies a belief in the uniformity of nature based on a primitive conception of causation. It expresses the idea that rain causes the plants to
shoot up; rain has made the heights and valleys level; and rain has made deserts passable again. These three assertions are good examples of the primitive notion of cause. Three features stand out in them: firstly, the assimilation of causation to agency; secondly, the relation of cause and effect as being one of production; and thirdly, the effect as being regarded as relatively passive. These features characterize the primitive as well as the common-sense notion of cause that derives from our immediate experience, such as the moving of our limbs. Our own efficiency is measured by our volitional actions and consciousness of effort, and it is thus natural for us to interpret external events by ascribing to them actions and volitions that we experience ourselves.

The Vedic Aryans conceived of physical phenomena in the same manner, introjecting their own experiences into external objects. They tried to understand the working of the forces of nature by positing inner wills or agents in them. This comes very close to the activity view of causation, except that the Vedic conception is more anthropomorphic than the activity or the common-sense views of causation.

In the next stage, the regularity observed in the functioning of phenomena was considered to be an unalterable law. This is the conception of ātma, or cosmic order, that we come across in the Rgveda.

It is interesting to note that during the time polytheism was in vogue this universal or cosmic order was considered to be independent of the gods. The gods themselves were said to follow the laws of ātma. Heaven and earth are what they are by reason of ātma. The whole universe is founded on ātma and moves in it. It appears that it was during this stage that Varuṇa came to be considered the guardian (gopā) of ātma; in another context, not only Varuṇa but all the gods are looked upon as the custodians of ātma.

During the period of transition from polytheism to monotheism, and during the period of monotheism itself, this natural order came to be regarded as the creation of the gods Mitra and Varuṇa. It was believed that Mitra and Varuṇa established ātma by means of sacrifice. During the monotheistic stage, when Varuṇa alone attained the position of “the lord of all, including the gods,” the natural law became his will, which is unhesitatingly followed by all the gods.

At this stage, two other conceptions of ātma, or law, appear to
have come into vogue. One is rta as the moral order, and the other is rta as a sacrificial order. The first was a natural development, for we can see how Varuṇa, the god who established the cosmic law, was also looked upon as the righteous ruler of the world, the dispenser of justice. The consciousness of right and wrong issuing out of a belief in the prevalence of a moral order is clearly expressed in the hymns addressed to Varuṇa.

The association of rta with the moral order of the universe was developed further when rta came to be considered as the truth in the world and anṛta as falsehood. However, Heinrich Lüders, who made an exhaustive study of the conception of Varuṇa and rta, maintains that in the Vedas rta is never an adjective but always a noun and has only one meaning, 'truth.'

The conception of rta as a sacrificial order would have arisen only after the originally simple sacrifices of the Vedic Aryans had developed into an elaborate institution under the priestly architects. With the development of monotheism and the gradual emphasis of sacrifices as the cause of the origin of the world, rta, in the form of the sacrifice, became the eternal law governing the universe. The smooth, orderly functioning of nature was ensured by the sacrifice, and thus sacrificial acts were looked upon as rta.

In the Atharvaveda, however, the order of the universe was considered to be more of a magical character. "Order (rta), truth (satya), creative fervor (tapas), sovereignty, asceticism, law and works; past, future, strength and prosperity are in the ucchiṣṭa." This ucchiṣṭa, which was considered the foundation or the basis of the universal order, was thought of as a 'force of force.' Ucchiṣṭa, or the remnants of the sacrificial food, was thus considered to have the magical power of determining everything in the world.

In the Brāhmaṇas, too, the order of the universe was mechanical but magical. Rta was identified with Brahman (Bṛhaspati), the creator of the universe. This appears to be a continuation of the conception of order found during the stage of monotheism in the Rgveda. Rta, which denoted merely the regularity of events or the natural law was looked upon by the Brahman priests as no more than the customary mode of divine action as exemplified in the sacrifice; hence its magical character.

This, in brief, is the gradual development of the conception of the uniformity of nature or the natural law. During the earliest
period, belief in a natural law was purely a product of observation and inference. It was taken for granted by the later speculative thinkers, whose main preoccupation was to explain how this universe, in which orderliness prevails, originated and developed to its present form. This speculative thought, starting as early as the time of the tenth book (mandala) of the Rgveda, continued unabated during the periods of the Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, and the Upaniṣads, giving rise to a multiplicity of conflicting theories, most of which are referred to in the early Buddhist texts. An examination of these various theories will throw much light on the Buddhist theory of causality and enable a proper appreciation and evaluation of it, for they form the context in which the Buddha preached his doctrine of causality.

Four Pre-Buddhist Causal Theories

The theories mentioned in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas may be classified into four main types as follows:

1. Self-causation (sayam katam, attakatam, tsū tsao, tsū tso), a metaphysical theory that was intimately connected with two concepts, the concept of self or soul (ātman, P. atta) and the conception of evolution. In the Upaniṣadic system, it was closely associated with the concept of ātman, both in the theories of evolution and in the theories of creation. The basic assumption of this metaphysical postulate was that the cause and the effect are identical in essence.

2. External causation (param katam, t’a tsao, t’a tso), which includes several different theories. Śīlāṅka, the Jaina commentator, defining the term annakaṭām (anyakṛtam, P. parakatam) occurring in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, lists the following theories under this category:
   - Time (kāla).
   - Creation by God (tīvarakṛtaka).
   - Inherent nature (svabhava).
   - Action or behavior (karma).
   - Fate (niyati).

3. Internal as well as external causation (sayam katan ca param katan ca, tsū tso t’a tso), which is a combination of the first two theories.

4. Neither internal nor external causation (asayamkāram
aparamkāram,\textsuperscript{36} fei tsū fei t’a tso),\textsuperscript{37} therefore indeterminism (adhiccasamuppanna,\textsuperscript{38} wu yin tso,\textsuperscript{39} yadṛcchā\textsuperscript{40}). It denies any form of causation.

These four types of theories may be broadly divided into Vedic and non-Vedic. The theories of self-causation and of divine creation included under external causation are found in the mainstream of the Vedic tradition. The rest may be considered non-Vedic because they were developed by schools that were generally opposed to the Vedic tradition although, of course, the germs of these theories are found in the Vedic tradition itself.

**THEORY OF SELF-CAUSATION**

The theory of self-causation can be traced to the time of the tenth book (mandala) of the Rgveda. A very important feature of the philosophical hymns of the Rgveda is that they partake of ideas of mechanical as well as creative evolution. In their attempt to trace the origin and gradual development of the universe into its present form, the Vedic thinkers posited various primeval substances such as water and abstract principles such as “year” (samvatsara) and then explained the universe as a product of the gradual evolution of these original substances. The conception of evolution is one of self-causation or self-origination, where one phenomenon gives rise to or produces another phenomenon by its own inherent power (svadhaya)\textsuperscript{41} in an orderly sequence.

According to Aghamarṣaṇa, who is considered the first philosopher in India,\textsuperscript{42} warmth (tapas) is the first creative principle, and in it originated law (ṛta) and truth (satya). These, in turn, produced darkness (tamas), and from darkness was produced water (āpas). Water gave rise to the year (samvatsara) or the time principle, and the year produced in due course the sun and the moon, the heaven and the earth, the firmament and the light, and ordained the days and nights.\textsuperscript{43} In a similar fashion, Prajāpati Paramēśṭin, who is called the Thales of India,\textsuperscript{44} advanced a theory of natural evolution based on water (salīla) as the primeval substance. From water sprang, in due course, everything in the universe, animate as well as inanimate.\textsuperscript{45}

According to these theories, chance has no place in the evolution of the world. The principle of movement or development is inherent in matter itself, and the world evolves from the immanent
energy (svadhā) of nature; the movement as a whole is self-determined. Herein we also find the germs of the theory of Natural Determinism (svabhāvavāda), which later developed into a systematic philosophy of nature under the Materialists.

In some of the Vedic hymns and especially in the Brāhmaṇas, this concept of immanent or inherent energy (svadhā) in phenomena was given a theological twist. There was a tendency to identify the various principles suggested by the earlier thinkers as the ultimate world-ground, with the personal God, Prajāpati, considered to be the creator of the universe. Thus, theories of evolution came to be associated with theories of creation, giving rise to a form of pantheism. It was often said that Prajāpati created the world out of himself, the inherent power of phenomena to evolve thus being considered the power of Prajāpati. Prajāpati is not merely a creator of beings but part and parcel of them, for he reduces them to order from their chaos by entering them with form (rupa) and name (nāman). The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa says: “Verily, in the beginning, Prajāpati alone was here. He desired, ‘May I exist, may I be generated.’ He wearied himself and performed fervid devotions: from him thus wearied and heated, the three worlds were created—the earth, the air and the sky.” It is interesting to note that this idea of self-causation was used to explain the origin of a sacrificial oblation, the grāha (a substance such as soma or ghee that is held in a sacrificial spoon or ladle). A passage in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa runs thus: “He [the Adhvaryu] offers [the grāha] with [the words], ‘Self-made thou art (svāmkṛto’si),’ for, this grāha being his [Yajna’s] out-breathing, it is indeed made by itself, born of itself. Hence he says, ‘Self-made thou art’—for all powers, divine and earthly—for it is born of itself for all creatures.” Moreover, the epithet svayambhū (“self-originating”), applied to the creator God in many places in the Brāhmaṇas, suggests that self-causation was widely accepted at this time.

The idea of self-causation appears in a more refined form in the philosophy of Mahādāsa Aitareya in the Aitareya Āranyaka. There the problem of causation is presented with the problem of change. Mahādāsa appears to have been aware of the problem presented by the ‘unceasing mutability of existence,’ which is considered one of the earliest as well as one of the most persistent problems in all philosophy. He seems to have conceived the idea
that within the unity of one thing there is a succession of different states. He believed that all change and diversity in the world have an immutable ground of unity. This is implied in his statement: "That body into which goes the indestructible [the breath] which we have joined [in meditation], proceeding from the indestructible [the highest Brahman], that body which the harnessed horses [the senses] draw about, that body where the true of the true follows after—in that body all gods become one."54

Instead of the conception of change enunciated in some of the Upaniṣads, change that is merely an illusion of our deceptive senses because it is incompatible with a permanent reality, Mahīdāsa conceived of change as the transformation of a single bodily reality, transition from the potential to the actual, a concept that is quite similar to the Śaṅkhyān view. This conception of change determined to a great extent the theory of causation in the philosophy of Mahīdāsa that is set forth in the following passage.

Then comes the creation of the seed. The seed of Prajāpati is the gods; the seed of the gods is rain; the seed of rain is herbs; the seed of herbs is the food; the seed of food is the living creatures; the seed of living creatures is the heart; the seed of the heart is the mind; the seed of the mind is the speech; the seed of speech is action; the act done is this man, the abode of Brahman."55

The use of the term "seed" (retas) is very significant in that it affords a clue to the meaning of causation in the philosophy of Mahīdāsa. Just as a sprout is produced by a seed, so Prajāpati produced the gods; the gods in turn produce rain, and so on. Thus, a chain of causation is established, each link in the chain producing the one following. Speculating on the origin of the universe, Mahīdāsa says:

Was it water? Was it water? This world was water. This was the root (mūla); that the shoot (tūla). This the father; those the sons. Whatever there is of the son’s, that is the father’s; whatever of the father’s, that is the son’s."56

This statement further illustrates the connection between two links in the chain of causation. Sayana maintains that there is unity or oneness between the cause and the effect and that there is no
complete division or distinction between the two, as between clay and a jar made of clay.\(^{57}\) It is interesting to note that this is the first reference to the division of the causal process into two compartments, cause and effect. According to Mahādāsa’s view, the cause (the root, mūla) passes its characteristics on to the effect (the shoot, tūla), just as a father bestows some of his characteristics, physical as well as mental, on the son, or as the son inherits the characteristics of the father.

Mahādāsa attempted to explain the nature of causality in accordance with his theory of evolution and change. The theory of self-evolution or self-causation formulated by Aghamarṣaṇa finds detailed and more systematic treatment in the philosophy of Mahādāsa. Yet his analysis is so tempered by speculative metaphysics that he shows greater zeal for First and Final Causes than for a rational explanation of things and their interrelation.

During the time of the Upaniṣads, greater emphasis was laid not so much on the theory of change, which would have given rise to a theory of causality, but on the theory of permanence. Almost all the thinkers of this period concentrated on demonstrating and proving the permanence of the self (ātmā), the reality underlying the phenomenal world. Thus, the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad says: “That eternal should be known as present in the self (ātmasaṃstha). Truly there is nothing higher than that to be known. When one recognizes the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment, and the universal Actuator, all has been said. This is the threefold Brahma.”\(^{58}\)

The keynote of all the Upaniṣads, in fact, was the immutable or imperishable nature of Brahman. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad says: “The wise one (ātmā) neither is born nor dies. It has not come from anywhere, has not become anyone. Unborn, constant, eternal, primeval, it is not slain when the body is slain.”\(^{59}\) The Upaniṣadic thinkers recognized two forms of knowledge, the higher (parā) and the lower (aparā), and emphasis was laid on the higher form of knowledge, understanding the imperishable Brahman.\(^{60}\)

From these few instances, it is clear that the Upaniṣadic thinkers aimed foremost at understanding the ‘Absolute’ (Brahman or Ātmā), which is celebrated as the ‘imperishable’ (akṣara).\(^{61}\) Because that aim was incompatible with investigating the nature of causality, the Upaniṣadic contribution to the theory of causality was a negligible one. Upaniṣadic thinkers only systematized some
of the theories inherited from the earlier period. These systematizations are found in all theories of evolution, which to some extent make use of the notion of causality. In these ātman is considered the chronologically antecedent cause and the manifold universe, the effect. Yet these come under the category of metaphysical speculation because they represent investigations into First Causes rather than empirical causal events.

The theories of evolution in the Upaniṣads seem to follow a pattern similar to the theories of self-causation enunciated by Aghaṃarṣaṇa and elaborated by Mahādāsa. One of the most important theories of evolution is that of Uddālaka Āruṇī, set forth in the following passage from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

In the beginning, . . . this world was just Being (sat), one only, without a second. To be sure, some people say: “In the beginning this world was just non-Being (asat), one only, without a second; from that non-Being Being was produced.” But verily, . . . whence could this be? said he. How from non-Being could Being be produced? On the contrary, . . . in the beginning this world was just Being, one only, without a second. It bethought itself: “Would that I were many! Let me procreate myself!” It emitted heat. That heat bethought itself: “Would that I were many! Let me procreate myself!” It emitted water . . . That water bethought itself: “Would that I were many! Let me procreate myself!” It emitted food. Therefore, whenever it rains, there is abundant food. So food for eating is produced just from water. Uddālaka then explains how beings are produced from elements that evolve in this manner, and later enumerates this process of evolution in reverse order.

On this point, . . . understand that this [body] is a sprout (suṅga) that has sprung up. It is not without a root (mūla). What else could its root be than food? Even so, . . . with food as a sprout, look for water as the root. With water . . . as a sprout, look for heat as the root. With heat . . . as the sprout, look for Being as the root. All creatures here . . . have Being as their root, have Being as their home, have Being as their support.

Here the words mūla and suṅga are used, whereas the philosophy of Mahādāsa used the terms mūla and tūla.
Śaṅkara makes a distinction between the conception of Being (sat) in Uddālaka’s philosophy and the conception of matter (prakṛti) in the Sāṅkhya philosophy. According to him, the Sāṅkhya accepts a primordial substance that is insentient, while in Uddālaka’s theory Being (sat) is sentient because it is able to make a wish, namely, a wish to procreate, which sets the whole chain of causation in motion. The persistent endeavor by Vedic and Upaniṣadic thinkers to attribute sentience even to material things seems to be the result of an attempt to explain the functioning of phenomena by the analogy of human behavior. It was observed earlier that the primitive notion of cause attributes causation to personal agency. Uddālaka’s conception of causation is not much different from this.

**Criticism of the theory of self-causation.** Commenting on the word “Being” (sat) occurring in the description of evolution given by Uddālaka, Śaṅkara says that it stands for the entity that is “mere esse” (astitāmātram). In the Samyukta, the Buddha rejects the conception of ‘Being’ (atthi, jo yu = astitā) as an extreme view, because it is an unobservable entity, hence a metaphysical postulate. He says, “To one who observes with proper understanding the passing away of things of the world, there would not be the belief in Being [existence].” According to the commentator Buddhaghosa, Being (atthitā) connotes permanency (sassatam). Moreover, the Buddha maintained that the theory of self-causation also leads to the belief in permanency. Thus, both the conception of Being (sat) and the theory of self-causation, which are knit together in the philosophy of Uddālaka, lead to one result, the belief in permanency. The pre-Buddhist thinkers maintained the theory of self-causation by assuming an immutable basis such as ātman; hence they considered cause and effect as being identical in essence. This view of cause and effect was accepted by the Sāṅkhya school and came to be known as the satkāryavāda. The Buddha rejected this view because it has a metaphysical basis that is not verified by observation. On similar grounds, Nāgārjuna criticized it on a later occasion.

In the Pāśādika-suttanta, a list of wrong views concerning the beginning of things (pubbantakappāna, pên shêng pên chien) is given. One of them refers to the self-causation of the self (atta) and the world (loka). This certainly is a reference to such cosmological speculations as those of Uddālaka and his predecessors.
The Buddhist counterpart of Uddalaka’s theory of evolution is found in the Aggañña-suttaṇa of the Dīgha Nikāya.\textsuperscript{76} The keenness of the Indian mind for cosmological speculation was so great that even the Buddhists, who for empirical reasons abstained from discussing the problem of the origin of the world,\textsuperscript{77} were compelled at least to give a rational explanation of the problem of evolution. But unlike the theories of Uddalaka and his predecessors, where the principle of evolution is one of self-causation, the Buddhist theory applies the general formula of causation to explain the process of evolution.\textsuperscript{78}

The causality of the individual self or soul (ātman) is discussed in the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad. But this has to be supplemented by the discussion of the origin of the self found in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad: “In the beginning this [world] was nonexistent. Therefrom, verily, Being (sat) was produced. That made itself (svayam akuruta) a Soul (ātman). Therefore, it is called the well-done (sukṛta).”\textsuperscript{79} Here the idea of self-causation is clearly exemplified. The causality of the universal, rather than the individual, self is described.

But because the individual self was considered to be a basic part of the universal self,\textsuperscript{80} what is said of the latter may be true of the former to some extent. Referring to the reincarnating individual self, the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad says: “Coarse and fine, many in number, the embodied one chooses forms (rupa) according to his qualities.”\textsuperscript{81} Thus, the nature of the physical form is determined by the actions or qualities of the soul or self (deha = ātman).

This theory is referred to and criticized in the Samyukta, where the question of who made this body is raised, and bhikkhunī Sela says that it is neither self-made nor wrought by another. Rejecting the use of a metaphysical principle to explain the causation of the human personality, the Buddhists, after a perusal of observable facts, explained it as being due to a concatenation of causes.\textsuperscript{82}

Applying the theory of self-causation to the sphere of moral responsibility, the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad says: “Whoever has qualities is the doer of deeds that bring recompense, and of such action surely he experiences the consequences. Undergoing all forms characterized by the three qualities, treading the three paths, the individual self wanders along according to its deeds.”\textsuperscript{83} Both
Mahāvīra and the Buddha opposed this conception of moral responsibility.

In the Sūtrakṛtāṅga, Mahāvīra is represented as rejecting the view that suffering is self-caused (na tāṃ sayam kadaṁ dukkhaṁ). The commentator Śīlānka says: “‘Caused by oneself’ (sayam kadaṁ) means ‘caused by one’s own effort’ (atmanā puruṣa kartāreṇa kṛtam),” and he adduces empirical arguments for the rejection of this view by Mahāvīra. He points out, “If one experiences happiness, etc., caused by one’s own effort, then why should there be disparity in, or even absence of, results reaped by servants, traders, farmers and others when they exert equal effort. Some, even those who do not have a profession, such as servants, appear to enjoy great gains. Therefore, nothing can be achieved by one’s own effort.” This line of argument leaves room for the introduction of another agency to which the effect (phala) can be attributed when one’s own exertion does not seem to be the determining factor. Thus, according to the Jaina theory of causation, it is not human exertion alone but some other agency that combines to produce the effect.

The early Buddhist literature makes numerous references to the theory of self-causation of suffering (and happiness). The Samyukta records an interesting dialogue between a man called Acela Kassapa and the Buddha. Kassapa raises the question whether suffering is self-caused, to which the Buddha gives a negative answer. The Buddha argues thus: “A person acts and the same person experiences [the result]—this, Kassapa, which you emphatically call ‘suffering self-wrought,’ amounts to the eternalist theory.” This explanation shows that the Buddha was aware that the problem of personal identity was connected with the theory of moral responsibility. For the Buddha the Upaniṣadic solution was not the least satisfactory. Commenting on the foregoing explanation of the Buddha, C. A. F. Rhys Davids says: “We fare no better in the editorial hands over the way in which the Founder is shown teaching another important application of the causal law. We mean the statement of continuous identity.”

This criticism may lose its force if we carefully consider the argument in light of the Buddha’s attitude toward metaphysical concepts. The Buddha is represented as rejecting the theory of self-causation of happiness and suffering because he was aware, as
pointed out earlier, that acceptance of the theory of self-causation results in the adoption of a metaphysical entity such as a permanent self or soul, and therefore does not solve the problem of personal identity. His empirical attitude prevented him from accepting a permanent and immutable self (ātman) serving the functions of both the agent (kartā) and the enjoyer (bhoktā) of consequences.

This is evident from a conversation the Buddha had with a monk named Moliya Phagguna, who raised the question, Who feeds on consciousness-sustenance? The Buddha pointed out: “It is not a proper question. I am not saying [someone] feeds on it. If I were to say, ‘[Someone] feeds on it,’ then the question, ‘Lord, who feeds on it?’ would be a fitting one. But I do not say so. And since I do not say so, if some one were to ask me: ‘Of what, Lord, is consciousness the sustenance?’ this would be a fitting question.”91 This does not mean that the Buddha despised the beliefs of common sense. His attitude is comparable to that of a modern Logical Positivist, who is suspicious of the “unreflecting analysis of those beliefs, which takes the grammatical structure of the sentence as a trustworthy guide to its meaning.”92 Therefore, the Buddha reformulates the question without leaving room for the introduction of any substantive ego, an ātman.

Taking up the question of the self-causation of suffering, the Buddha says: “Even those who believe that [happiness and] suffering are self-caused depend on contact (phassa, ch’u) [with the world], for it is impossible to have any experience without contact.”93 The inference is that the Buddha reduced the substantive ego (ātman) of the Upaniṣadic thinkers to what may be described in Humean terms as “a bundle or collection of different perceptions.”94 To say something about the self, according to the Buddha, is to say something about sense experiences. In making these arguments, the Buddha rejected the Upaniṣadic conception of moral responsibility, which in turn was based on the theory of self-causation.

The inherent conflict in the Upaniṣadic theory of self-causation could not lie dormant forever. Evolution or transformation of an immutable and permanent self (ātman) was a paradox. The Upaniṣadic thinkers, therefore, gradually came to consider change as a mere illusion of our deceptive senses because it could not be reconciled with a permanent and homogeneous bodily reality.95 They were led to a complete denial of plurality.96 Although the
search for an essential unity of things was crowned with success, philosophy suffered a severe setback as a result of this transcendentalism. As Deussen puts it: “This unity excluded all plurality, and therefore, all proximity in space, all succession in time, all interdependence as cause and effect, and all opposition as subject and object.”

Reality was considered to be beyond space, time, change, and therefore causality. Change is a mere matter of words, nothing but a name (vācārambhānam vikaro nāmadheyān). After this, metaphysical speculation took the upper hand, and any serious attempt to give a rational explanation of the things of experience is lacking in the Upaniṣads.

**THEORIES OF DIVINE CREATION**

We now come to the second category of pre-Buddhist theories of causation: external causation. The theories in that category that belong to the Vedic tradition are those asserting the creation of the world by an omniscient and omnipotent God (issara, tsun yu).

Many theories of creation are mentioned in the pre-Buddhist literature. They appear to be the product of reasoning as well as of religious experience. Of the two methods, it was by the former that the concept of God and creation, as it appears in the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas, seems to have been arrived at. The argument from religious experience was mostly adduced during the period of the later Upaniṣads.

The process of reasoning by which the conception of God was arrived at in the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas involved two types of arguments, namely, the cosmological and the teleological, or the argument from design.

The cosmological argument is based on the assumption that the infinite regression of time is meaningless. The problem of the infinite regression of time is hinted at in the Nāṣadiya-sūkta. The conception of the infinity of time (and of space) seems to have been personified in the form of Aditi. But the Vedic thinkers could not reconcile themselves to the idea of infinite regression. Prajāpati Paramēśṭin appears to have been aware of the problem of the infinite regression of contingent phenomena, and he raised genuine doubts as to whether anybody could say what the beginning of the universe was. But even he had to fall back upon something that he described with attributes that are the opposite of those of
existence: “That One, breathless, breathed by its own nature.” 103
This is a clear indication of an attempt to avoid the infinite regression of contingent phenomena by resorting to a noncontingent factor. 104

While the reluctance to accept the infinite regression of phenomena contributed to the development of the idea of God, it was further supported by the theory of self-causation. According to the theory of self-causation, a phenomenon produces from within itself another phenomenon. Tracing observable phenomena backwards, the Vedic thinkers posited primordial substances such as the (heavenly) waters (āpas). But this is only a material cause that is insentient and inanimate, although the later Upaniṣadīc thinkers attempted to explain such primordial substances as being sentient. Therefore, the necessity of positing an intelligent being as the creator of the universe may have been felt even at an early date.

This theoretic desire to determine the first cause of the world grew keener and keener, and we find several hymns devoted to it, Nārāyana’s “Hymn of Creation” (Puruṣa-sūkta) being one of the best-known. 105 Although the so-called cosmological argument led to a belief in an original Being (sat) that possessed characteristics opposite to those of the world of experience, the concept of a personal God as the creator of the universe did not appear. Barua has rightly remarked that it was the conception of Hiranyagarbha and of Viśvakarman that showed a considerable advance toward the idea of God.” 106 In one of the hymns of the Rgveda, things of the world are traced back to their causes. 107 The sun, which was called the Golden Germ (hiranyagarbha), was looked upon as the great power of the universe, from which all other powers and existences, divine and earthly, are derived. It represented the ‘origin of life.’ 108 The sun, which denotes fire or the generating principle, was the solar essence. But it was itself contained in the (heavenly) water. The author of the hymn was not satisfied by explaining the origin and development of the world using water as the first principle, for there conceivably was a higher principle behind it. It was Prajāpati, the God of gods, who brought forth water and provided the generating principle and the ordaining power of things. This was the theory posed in reply to the question, “What God should we adore with our oblations?” 109

The other argument, the teleological argument, or the argu-
ment from design, appears to be the basis of the conception of the creator God found in the hymn addressed to Viśvakarman. The question raised there is, “What was the tree, what wood in sooth produced, from which they fashioned the earth and heaven?”

The critics of the teleological argument have tried to show that the argument does not prove that the God is a creator but only an architect who arranges the material. But this criticism does not hold in the case of the Vedic conception, for according to the hymn, the original substance out of which the universe was fashioned derives its being from the creator God. The commentator Sāyana says that there is no contradiction in applying the attributes ‘created’ and ‘creator’ to the same being because of the ability to assume both these attributes by the power of tapas. Thus, the creator is one with the creation, although he is the maker, disposer, and the omniscient one.

Most of the theories of creation in the Rgveda include mechanical and organic views of creation. But in the hymns addressed to Viśvakarman we come across, for the first time, the idea of a personal creator God, which became a favorite topic of speculation during the period of the Brāhmaṇas.

In the sacrificial metaphysics of the Brāhmaṇas, theological speculation centers on Prajāpati, who replaces various other concepts found in the philosophic hymns of the Rgveda and the Atharvaveda. In the Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa, Prajāpati is identified with Viśvakarman. Continuity in the cycle of creation is hinted at when it is said, several places in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, that Prajāpati, after creating beings, became exhausted and was healed by the gods (his offspring) by the power of the sacrifice. Although Prajāpati was the creator, his ability for continuous procreation was dependent on the sacrifice. In the Brāhmaṇas there are only a few instances where the theory of creation is presented independent of sacrificial metaphysics. Once it is said that Prajāpati, who alone was at the beginning (agra) and who thought of procreation, created the three worlds by the power of heat (tapas). An attempt is also made to explain how Prajāpati created living beings of various species.

Side by side with the conception of Prajāpati, we find the conceptions of Brahman (neuter) and of Brahmā (masculine) serving the function of creator God. This is evident in a statement
repeated in several texts belonging to different periods. In the *Pancavimsa*, or *Tandya Mahâ Brâhmaṇa*, Brahman (neuter) is said to be the “first born of the divine order.” In the *Taittirîya Brâhmaṇa*, the same is said in identical words with regard to Prajâpati. This suggests that the concepts of Brahman (neuter), Brahmā (masculine), and Prajâpati were used without much discrimination during the period of the Brâhmaṇas, which may be considered a formative stage in the conception of a personal God.

The rational justification of the existence of God and of the creation of the world by him continued during the time of the *Aitareya Āranyaka*. There we find the amalgamation of the two arguments, the cosmological and the teleological, for the existence of God. We have already seen how Mahidāsa Aitareya explained the causality of phenomena. Things arise as effects (tûla) from causes (mûla). Tracing these causes backward, one arrives at the conception of water (āpas), the first root of which the universe is the shoot. This primordial matter, which was passive and which served as the substratum of change, had to be energized; hence the idea of God brooding over matter.

The principle of motion by which passive matter was set in motion was considered to be something other than matter. This was God, the highest truth (satyasya satyam). This argument is extensively used by Uddyotakara in his *Nyaya Varttika* to prove the existence of God. He maintains that “Just as an axe, not being intelligent itself, acts [only] after having been directed by an intelligent carpenter, in the same manner do unconscious pradhâna, atoms, and karma act. Therefore, they are also directed by an intelligent cause.”

Speculative theories based on rational explanations rather than mystical experience seem to be a characteristic of thought during the period of the Vedas and the Brâhmaṇas. Such speculative theories about the existence of God and the creation of the world by him continued during the time of the early and middle Upaniṣads. In the *Brhadâranyaka Upaniṣad* we find a speculative theory that partakes of most of the ideas expressed in the Vedas, Brâhmaṇas, and the Āranyakas but tries for the first time to explain how the original unitary Being gave rise to the world of manifold variety. As is evident, the belief was that the Self (ātmâ), which served the
function of a creator God, was solely responsible for the creation of the world of diversity. With the disappearance of the distinction between ātman and brahman, on the one hand, and the synonymous use of brahman and brahmā, which are not strictly distinguished in the early Upaniṣads, on the other, Brahmā assumed the role of a personal creator God. It is this stratum of thought that is preserved in the Munḍaka Upaniṣad when it says: “Brahmā arose as the first among the gods, the maker of the universe, the protector of the world.” It is an echo of the statements made about Brahma and about Prajāpati in the Brāhmaṇas referred to earlier.

The intuitional method of verifying the existence of God appears to have been adopted during the time of the later Upaniṣads. During this period more and more importance was attached to yogic concentration and the mental powers attained by such methods. Meditation was considered the proper means of beholding God. The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad says: “By making one’s own body the lower friction stick and the syllable ‘Om’ the upper friction stick, by practicing the friction of meditation (dhyāna), one may see the God (deva) who is hidden, as it were.”

In the same Upaniṣad, the following question is posed: “Presided over by whom do we live our different conditions in pleasure and pain?” Having rejected some of the theories of causation such as time (kāla), nature (svabhava), necessity or fate (niyati) posited by contemporary thinkers, the Upaniṣad replied thus: “Those who have followed after meditation and abstraction saw the self-power of God hidden in his own qualities. He is the one who rules over all these causes, from ‘time’ to the ‘soul’.”

The repeated occurrence of the terms ṛś and ṛśvara in the sense of an omnipotent God is a significant feature of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. Also, the word deva occurs in almost every stanza in this Upaniṣad and indicating that the idea of God as a personal being was the predominant conception. This God (ṭśvara) is the creator of all and receives the appellation of viśvakarmā. He is the supreme Lord of Lords, the highest deity of deities. The function of the creation of the world attributed to Brahmā in the earlier Upaniṣads is transferred to ṭśvara in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. This appears to be the formative stage of the conception of ṭśvara, which was to dominate the theological speculations of a later time.
Criticism of the theories of creation. Side by side with this new concept of īśvara we find the continuation of the earlier concept of Brahmā (masculine). Therefore, when the Buddhist texts refer at times to Brahmā as a personal creator God and, at other times, to īśvara (issara, tsun yu) playing the same role, they are not referring to fanciful accounts of their own imagination but are presenting genuine conceptions found in the mainstream of the Vedic tradition.

As we have already seen, the terms brahmā and īśvara were used synonymously in the later Upaniṣads. This is reflected in the early Buddhist texts, where it is often said: “yo kho so bhavaṁ brahmā mahābrahmā abhibhu anabhībhūto aṇṇadattadhadoso vasavatī issaro kattā nimmātā seṭṭho saṅjitā vasi pitā bhūtabhavyānam” (“That illustrious Brahmā, the Supreme One, the Mighty, the All-seeing, the Ruler, the Lord of all, the Maker, the Creator, the Chief of all, appointing to each his place, the Ancient of days, the Father of all that are and are to be”). The Chinese Āgamas preserve this statement and there, too, the terms ta fan and tsū tsai are used synonymously. Moreover, in the Pāṭika-suttanta, the Buddha refers to some teachers who advocated the traditional doctrine of creation of the world by Īśvara, by Brahmā, and the commentator believes that there the two terms Īśvara and Brahmā are used synonymously.

The intuitional method of verifying the existence of God is referred to and criticized in the Brahmajīla-suttanta. There, the Buddha does not adopt the negative approach that treats all forms of religious experience as illusions or hallucinations. He adopts a more sober attitude, comparable to that held by Broad and Stace in our day. According to that view, human beings do, in some religious experiences, come in contact with “an aspect of reality” not encountered in more ordinary types of experience, but that aspect of reality is probably misdescribed by the use of theological language. This method of refutation was adopted by the Buddha in criticizing the claims of the sages who maintained that they had witnessed God in their trances. The Buddha’s argument is put forward in the form of a parable. He says:

At the dissolution of the world process, some of the beings are born in the realm of Brahmā, and of these, the being who is to be born in that realm first comes to be of long life,
good complexion and is powerful. Beings who follow him are inferior. It so happens that one of the beings who came later, having passed away from that realm, is reborn in this world. After being reborn here he adopts the life of a religious mendicant and by practicing mental concentration is able to reach such rapture of thought that he can recollect his past births up to some moment [of his life in the Brahma-world] and not beyond. Then with regard to the being who was first born in the realm of Brahmā, he maintains that “he is the great Brahmā, the supreme one, the mighty, the all-seeing, the ruler, the lord of all, appointing to each his place, the ancient of days, the father of all that are and are to be, and we must have been created by him.”

This fanciful account is intended merely to refute the idea of creation. At the same time, it testifies to the existence of people who depended on religious experience to make assertions about the existence of a creator God. The Buddha seems to have been aware of the difficulty into which these religious teachers had fallen. As the parable shows, he rejected their views not because they were illusions or hallucinations but because they were misdescriptions of an aspect of reality that pertains to extrasensory perception. Further, the view that the origin of the world was due to the creative activity of God was refuted by a counter-theory that appears to reject each of the salient features of pre-Buddhist theory. First, the view that the world process had a conceivable beginning is rejected when it is suggested that the process is one of dissolution (samvattā, huai) and evolution (vivattā, pien), without a beginning. Second, the Upaniṣadic idea that the first being became as big as a man and woman embracing each other and that the parting of this very body into two resulted in the appearance of man and wife is rejected. The Buddhist text maintains instead that just like the first being, another being appeared in this world, having disappeared from the world of Brahmā. Then it explains how the being who came first misconstrued that he was the creator of other beings who came later. Because the first being hoped for the company of another, he interpreted the appearance of the second being as a response to his wish. As for the other beings who came later, they thought that the being who appeared first was their creator. This story exposes the fallacy of the idea of creation of the world
by an almighty God and perhaps also indicts the view that the prior or the preceding is always the cause of the subsequent.

The Buddha’s objection to the view that the world of beings, with their happiness and suffering, is created by an omnipotent and omniscient God is based mainly on two grounds. First, it denies the doctrine of the moral responsibility of man, and second, it is detrimental to the religious life.

According to the Mahābodhi Jātaka, “If God (issara) were to determine the life of all beings, including their happiness and misery, virtue and vice, then man is carrying out the commandments of God. Therefore, it would be God who would be smeared by their actions.” This argument, which makes use of the idea of creation itself to refute the theory of creation, is compared to the bringing down of a mango by striking it with another mango. Another argument is adduced to the same effect: “If beings experience pleasure and pain because of theistic determination, then the Niganṭhas, for example, are created by an evil God because they experience extreme forms of pain; and the Buddha, because he, being freed from defilements, enjoys extreme happiness, would be a creation of a beneficent God.” From these arguments it is evident that the Buddha objects to the idea of creation because it tends to undermine the idea of moral responsibility.

On the other hand, if we were to hold that evils such as murder or theft are due to theistic determination, it would destroy the very foundation of religious life. The Aṅguttara says: “For those who fall back on the idea of creation by God as the essential reason, there is neither desire nor effort, nor the sense of ‘ought’ and ‘ought not.’ Thus in the absence of such [disposition and discrimination] in truth and verity, the term ‘recluse’ cannot be applied [to such a person] because he lives in a state of bewilderment with the faculties unguarded.” The doctrine of creation (issaranimmanañahetu, yin tsun yu tsao), along with two other views, namely, that everything is due to past action (pubbekatahetu, yin su ming tsao) and that everything is due to chance occurrence (ahetu appaccayā, wu yin wu yīan), are considered to be sectarian tenets (titthiyatanā, tu ch’u) that lead to a traditional doctrine of inaction (akiriya, wu tso).
II. Pre-Buddhist Theories of Causation: The Non-Vedic Tradition

THE VARIOUS THEORIES of external causation, except the theory of creation by a personal God, are predominantly non-Vedic, although the germs of these theories may be found in the Vedic tradition itself. Most of these theories may be classified under the broad category of Naturalism.

Theories of Naturalism

In the history of Indian thought, three types of Naturalism have arisen. The first type is synonymous with Materialism, which regards all facts of the universe as sufficiently explained by a theory of matter. Matter is considered the ultimate fact of the universe, and all phenomena, including the phenomenon of consciousness, are reduced by the theory to transformations of material molecules. The transformation of material molecules takes place according to inherent nature (svabhāva). This school of thought is represented in Indian philosophy by the Čārvākas, the Lokāyata, or the Bārhaspatya.

The second type of Naturalism is the one advocated by the Ājīvikas, who, while accepting the Materialist conception of the universe, laid emphasis on the theory of complete natural determinism (niyati). Being influenced by the biological speculations of the time, however, they, unlike the Materialists, believed in transmigration. The third type of Naturalism limits itself to what is
natural or normal in its explanation of the universe, instead of appealing to what is supernatural. Its scope is not limited to physical nature but takes in mental phenomena, which are also considered fundamental constituents of the universe. It may be this type of Naturalism Riepe had in mind when he said: "Every school that is materialistic is also naturalistic although it is by no means true that all naturalistic schools are materialistic."²

**MATERIALISM**

Let us consider the first type of Naturalism, namely, Materialism. Materialism is generally thought to be a product of the incipient rational temper pervading the pre-Buddhist philosophical atmosphere,³ and especially a revolt against the ritualism of the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas and some of the idealistic metaphysics of the Upaniṣāds. Systematic treatment of Materialism is found quite late in the history of Indian philosophy. The sources by which the teachings of this school can be reconstructed fall into three broad categories. (1) The references to Materialistic teachings in the orthodox as well as the Jaina and Buddhist literature. These accounts are tinged with partiality, since only the aspects of Materialistic teaching that are opposed to the doctrines of the school quoting them are emphasized, to the neglect of other aspects. (2) Accounts in the histories of philosophical systems such as the Saḍdarśanasamuccaya and Sarvadarśanasamgraha, which, though their authors may belong to a particular faith, present the views of the Materialists as a comprehensive whole. In this category may be included the account of Materialism found in the Śānti-parvan of the Mahābhārata.⁴ (3) The Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa is a unique work, being the only treatise on Materialism belonging to a Materialistic school.

There is no doubt that the information supplied by the sources of the first category is the earliest. Yet it would be unfair to depend on them for a true picture of the materialistic philosophy. On the contrary, it would be more fitting to evaluate the information gathered from the sources of the first category in the light of the information afforded by those of the second and third, for the latter present a systematic treatment of Materialism.

There are several important discussions by modern scholars of Indian Materialism.⁵ Some have traced the origins of Materialism...
rialist thinking to the early Upaniṣadic period. Jayatilleke has pointed out that “the Materialists themselves seem to trace their doctrines to the early Upaniṣads when they quote a statement attributed to Yājñavalkya in the Upaniṣads in support of their doctrines”. Discussing the ontological speculations of Uddālaka in the Chandogya Upaniṣad, Ruben calls them a form of “hylozoistische Monismus,” and traces the germs of Materialism to the thought of Uddālaka. On the other hand, we find Śaṅkara making an effort to distinguish Uddālaka’s theory from the more materialistic Śāṅkhya and to interpret it as a form of Idealism (see chapter 1). For Uddālaka and his predecessors, as in the case of the Milesians, the union of matter and spirit in a primordial substance was an unquestioned assumption. But as time went on, matter and spirit tugged more and more strongly at the bonds that united them until the emergence of completely materialistic as well as naturalistic schools on the one hand and the idealistic schools on the other. Therefore, it is possible to trace the origins of Materialism as well as of Idealism to the hylozoistic tendencies in the thought of Uddālaka and his predecessors.

Causation through inherent nature (svabhāva). It was pointed out that a theory of self-causation was at the basis of the philosophy of change accepted by Uddālaka (see chapter 1). The material elements, which were considered sentient, were able to produce out of themselves succeeding elements. Even the Śāṅkhya, which, according to Śaṅkara, considered material elements to be insentient, accepted a theory of self-causation. But being unable to explain how movement can be initiated in insentient matter (prakṛti), the Śāṅkhya school posited an external spiritual principle, puruṣa, that creates the movement in matter. Therefore, in the ultimate analysis, it is the spirit or puruṣa that sets the chain of causation moving. The Materialists rejected the spiritual principle as accounting for movement and instead attributed change to inherent nature (svabhāva).

Although no separate work of the Materialists in the pre-Buddhist period has come down to us, there is no doubt that the school existed independently, fighting against the ritualistic and the idealistic schools of thought current at that time. This is borne out by the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, which refers to several contemporary theories of change and causation, two of which are the “theory of elements” (bhūtāni) and the “theory of inherent nature”
There is a tendency to indentify Materialism with the theory of elements, but not with the theory of inherent nature. In the later sources of the Materialist school, we find that Materialism, or the theory of elements, is inextricably connected with the theory of inherent nature. Jayatilleke believes that in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha the Materialists have adopted the theory of inherent nature. But in the Mahābhārata we have an earlier reference to the close connection between Materialism and svabhāva. Unfortunately, the early Jaina and Buddhist texts make no reference to this aspect of Materialism even though it is mentioned in the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad. But is this silence on the part of the Buddhists and the Jainas a proof of the nonacceptance of the theory of inherent nature by the Materialists? If Natural Determinism (svabhāvavāda) was adopted by the Materialists at some point, what was their position before its adoption? Did they propose a theory of chance (yadṛcchā)? This is not plausible, because even the Nihilist school of Materialists, as will be pointed out later, accepted a theory of inherent nature. We are inclined to believe that svabhāvavāda was part and parcel of Materialism, even in pre-Buddhist times.

Two types of Materialism. All accounts of Materialism admit the plurality of elements. Even the Tattvopaplavasimha, which purports to 'upset all realities' (tattva-upaplava) including the material elements, admits, at the level of conventional truth, the reality of the four elements, earth, water, fire, and air. Scholars have generally agreed that the Materialists saw the material or the physical world as the only reality and considered nonmaterial phenomena, such as consciousness, unreal. But this is not so. The Tattvopaplavasimha testifies to the existence of a slightly different philosophy of Materialism.

Comparing the conceptions of reality given in the sources mentioned above, it is possible to classify the Materialists into two schools, (1) those who upheld a theory of evolution (parināti) of physical objects and ascribed reality to them, denying the reality of mental phenomena, and (2) those who upheld a nihilistic theory denying the reality even of physical objects.

Group 1 is certainly the best-known. Both the Saddarśaṇasamuccaya of Haribhadra and the Sarvadarśanasamgraha of Mādhava present this theory. The Saddarśaṇasamuccaya states it thus: "As a result of the evolution (parināti) of body (deha) by the
Non-Vedic Theories of Causation

The combination of elements of earth, etc., consciousness arises." The same theory is set out in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha: "Here the elements, earth, etc. are the four realities; from the evolution of bodily form (dehākāra) from these [realities], consciousness is produced." Thus, according to this theory, body (deha) and such other physical things are real in that they have evolved directly from real material elements. But these bodies are distinguished from consciousness, which arises in the bodies once they have evolved (parinatebhyaḥ). This implies that the physical bodies are as real as the material particles that constitute them, but consciousness is only a by-product and is therefore unreal. Because Materialists of group 1 accepted perception (and also inference in a limited sense) as a valid form of knowledge, they were able to grant the reality of physical bodies, but they rejected consciousness, etc. as unreal since these are not subject to perception (adṛśta).

Belief in the evolution of the physical personality (deha = rūpa) from material elements, and the granting of a greater degree of reality to objects that have evolved in this manner than to consciousness, may have led these Materialists to accept a personality lasting as long as life. This gave rise to a school of Materialists who believed that the soul is identical with the body (tattvavatācchāraṇavāda), a theory referred to in the Buddhist as well as the Jaina texts.

The teachings of group 2 are represented in the Tattvopaplavasimha. There the constitution of the phenomenal world is described in a slightly different way. It does not speak of evolution but maintains that "earth, water, fire and air are the realities, and as a result of their combination [arise] body, senses, objects and consciousness." The important feature in this statement is that even the body, the senses, and external objects—without distinction—are put into the same category as consciousness. Consciousness is considered by all Materialists as unreal, and therefore the conclusion that this school believes that even physical bodies are unreal is irresistible. Such a theory is quite plausible when we consider the epistemological standpoint of this school of Materialists. As Jayatilleke has pointed out, they denied even perception, and thus there was no ground for a belief that physical bodies are real.

Dialectical arguments were adduced by this school of Materialists to refute the conception of causality (hetuphalabhāva). Jayarāsi rejected the idea of production (janakatva) as well as
concomitance (sahotpāda).\(^{23}\) That rejection led him to deny the idea of destruction (vināśa).\(^{24}\) Denial of any form of production appears to be the result of the acceptance of the a priori premiss that “What is does not perish, and from nothing comes nothing,”\(^{25}\) which is attributed by Śīlāṅka to one of the schools of Materialism.\(^{26}\) Having rejected destruction (vināśa), Jayarāśi had to admit the permanence of all realities.\(^{27}\) This he did without any hesitation when, after criticizing the conception of causality, he concluded that “anterior or posterior activity is not generated by immovable or static matter (avicalitarūpa).”\(^{28}\) This means that the Nihilist school of Materialists upheld a theory of motionless permanence (avicalita-nityatvam). With the acceptance of the principle of motionless permanence, these Materialists were compelled to maintain the unproductivity or barrenness of phenomena. This idea was certainly hinted at by Jayarāśi when he said: “The wise do not query about causation or absence of causation in the case of a barren woman’s child who is nonexistent.”\(^{29}\)

Conception of svabhāva. Of all the doctrines of the Materialists, the one that is most relevant to our study is their conception of Natural Determinism (svabhāvavāda). Without doubt it was the Materialists who first put forward a systematic theory of inherent nature (svabhāva). Both Rāmatūrtha Svāmī\(^{30}\) and Nṛśimha Āśrama,\(^{31}\) commenting on the Saṁkṣepaśārīrikā\(^{32}\) of Sarvajñātma Muni, attributed svabhāvavāda to the Materialists.

It was noted above that according to the first school of Materialists there is a plurality of elements and the phenomenal world is the product of the evolution of these material elements. The most popular school of Materialists, we are informed, denied the validity of inference.\(^{33}\) If so, how did they explain evolution? What was the principle by which the plurality of elements formed the world of experience? Jayatilleke states the problem that the second school of Materialists, according to his classification, faced as a result of their change of epistemological outlook, but he leaves it unsolved. He says: “It is difficult to say whether this school asserted that there was a necessary connection between cause and effect or merely held that concomitance or sequence was only probable and therefore the inference was only probable.”\(^{34}\) Having changed its epistemological outlook, this school of Materialists would be expected to propound a theory of causation. But it must be remem-
bered that these Materialists changed for practical reasons and as a result of the criticism of the other schools of thought. Though they accepted the validity of inference in a limited sense, they emphasized that the inferable was confined to the sphere of the verifiable. Thus, it was difficult for them to go beyond the school of Materialists that accepted sense perception only as a valid means of knowing and put forward a theory of causation based on the inductive principle.

According to the best-known school of Materialists, "a universal proposition is not established even by the observation of several instances because of the possibility of error, even after a thousand instances have been observed. Though, by the observation of several instances, we come to the conclusion that smoke and fire are concomitant, we cannot know that there is no smoke in the absence of fire, even after repeated observation." This denial of the validity of inference and thus of universal propositions militated against the acceptance of the principle of causation.

Does this mean that the plurality of phenomena perceptible to the senses are destitute of causes? The Materialists of the Sarvadarśanasamgraha raise this question thus: "Nanv adṛṣṭāni-stau jagad vaicitryam ākasmikaṃ syād iti" ("If what is not perceived is not granted [as existing], is it not that variety in the world is due to chance occurrence?") As this school of Materialists was opposed to indeterminism, the answer to that question was in the negative. The use of the word ākasmika to denote the idea of chance occurrence is very significant, because Śaṅkara used the very same word to explain yadṛcchāvāda. Commenting on the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, he says: yadṛcchā ākasmikaḥ prāptih. If ākasmika is a synonym for yadṛcchā, then certainly the Materialist theory set forth in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha cannot be considered a "curious admixture of Svabhāvavāda and Yadṛcchāvāda", as Hiriyanna would have us believe, because ākasmika is rejected as a solution and in its place the belief in inherent nature (svabhāva) is upheld. Even the Nihilist school of Materialists, which accepted a doctrine of motionless permanence (avicalita-nityatvam), appears to have believed in a theory of inherent nature (svabhāva).

Defining the word svabhāva occurring in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (1.2), Śaṅkara says: "Svabhāva is the unique power or property restricted to [individual or classes of] objects, like the
warmth of fire.” Udayana Ācārya, in his *Nyāyakusumāñjalī*, supports and elaborates this view: “What pertains to all cannot be inherent nature (*svabhāvatva*) and indeed, the same thing cannot be the nature of more than one; otherwise there is contradiction.” Vardhamāna, commenting on this passage, says: “*Śvabhāva* is said to be the property restricted to one [class of] object[s]. If that pertains to everything, then there would not arise the state of inherent nature (*svabhāvatva*) or uniqueness (*asadhāraṇatva*).” Vardhamāna’s explanation is significant in equating inherent nature (*svabhāva*) with uniqueness (*asadhāraṇatva*). This means that *svabhāvavāda* involves the idea of necessary connection or invariability (*niyamatva*).

Udayana Ācārya defines invariability as “the dependence of the effect on the cause” and goes on to argue that if the Svabhāvāvādins are to accept such a theory of invariability, then this *svabhāvavāda* may be acceptable. Commentator Varadarāja also maintains that “This itself, [invariability] is the dependence of the effect on the cause [in such a way] that it happens only when that exists. If an assisting cause devoid of invariability is not meant [by *svabhāvavāda*], then *svabhāvavāda* would be accomplished. . . . If there be a *svabhāvavāda* [according to which] smoke exists when there is fire, it would be acceptable to us.”

This interpretation of *svabhāvavāda* makes it a theory of causation that maintains the invariable concomitance between two things such as fire and smoke. It would therefore be a recognition of the validity of a universal proposition that was categorically denied by the Materialists. As Varadarāja himself points out, the *svabhāvavāda* accepted by the Materialists is different from this. The example quoted by Udayana Ācārya to illustrate the Materialist theory of *svabhāva* seems to refute the idea of interdependence. Varadarāja also considers that the belief in permanence is intended to affirm nondependence (*anapekṣatva*). Belief in the permanence of material elements was a cornerstone of the Materialist creed. Therefore, the *svabhāvavāda* propounded by the Materialists was clearly opposed to interdependence.

For the Svabhāvavādin, a phenomenon does not depend on another phenomenon or group of phenomena for its existence. It depends on its inherent nature (*svabhāva*). Inherent nature was the only cause (*kāraṇa*). Therefore, Nṛsimha Āśrama, commenting on
the *Samkṣepaśārīrikā*, says: "The Čārvākas maintain that inherent nature (ṣvabhāva) is the cause because of the inadmissibility of positing a theory of cause and effect apart from inherent nature."\(^{50}\) This is because the Materialists were reluctant to draw any inferences beyond what is perceived. They refused to depend on past experiences to draw inferences for the present or the future. Denying induction, they were forced to abandon causality, and they maintained that all things—for example, the sharpness of the thorns, the variegated instincts of the birds and the beasts—are born of inherent nature. To maintain this it was not necessary to assume the validity of something unseen. It was an inference that did not go beyond the verifiable, or, more correctly, the perceptible.

The Materialists’ rejection of interdependence and any form of causation except inherent nature (ṣvabhāva) earned them the appellation of noncausationists (ahetuvāda) (see below). But it must be emphasized that they were not indeterminists, for they accepted the determinism of nature (ṣvabhāva). The interpretation of svabhāva as the unique power or property of an object or a class of objects implies the classifiability of the things of the world according to their resemblance to one another. This leaves diversity or plurality as the ultimate characteristic of the universe. The prefix sva in the term svabhāva means “one’s own,” implying contrast with “other,” and is therefore definitely opposed to monism.\(^{51}\) In fact, the *Tattvopaplavasimha* emphasizes the diversity in the world: “Because things are determined, each according to its own nature, by nature, . . . they partake of individuality or diversity.”\(^{52}\)

If svabhāva is to be interpreted as inherent nature or self-nature, why did the Buddhists and Jainas include it under the category of external causation (param katam, i’atso), in opposition to self-causation (sayam katam, isū tso)? The idea of self-causation, as we saw earlier (see chapter 1), was wedded to the conception of ātman and considered to be the reality in man as well as in things. But the Svabhāvavādin, who recognized no such entity as ātman as a reality, formulated this theory of inherent nature (svabhāva) to explain the force at work in material phenomena. It was a purely physical law. The individual was only an automaton functioning according to the dictates of the stuff out of which his physical personality was composed. Nature was a power over which human
beings had no control;\textsuperscript{53} in this sense it was external to them. Hence its inclusion under the category of external causation by those who recognized the validity of human exertion as a causal factor.

This being the case, it is difficult to subscribe to the view put forward by Basham that according to the \textit{svabhāvavāda} the individual was “rigidly self-determined by his own somatic and psychic nature.” Such a wider application of \textit{svabhāvavāda} to include psychic phenomena can not be found, especially in the teachings of the Materialists, who alone, apart from the Ājīvikas, put forward a theory of inherent nature (\textit{svabhāva}) before the rise of Buddhism. Basham himself maintains that the Ājīvikas “viewed the individual as determined by forces exterior to himself.”\textsuperscript{54} If even the Ājīvikas, who accepted such phenomena as rebirth, did not consider the psychic personality as being self-determined, it is difficult to see how the Materialists could do so. In fact, Basham’s interpretation derives from a consideration of \textit{svabhāvavāda} as a philosophy distinct from Materialism.

\textbf{Ājīvika Determinism}

Another conception coming under the category of external causation that has very close connections with \textit{svabhāvavāda} is \textit{niyātīvāda}, complete determinism or fatalism. Much has been said about the conception of \textit{niyati}, which was put forward by the Ājīvika school of thought.\textsuperscript{55} Very definite ideas have been expressed on many problems connected with Ājīvikism. We feel that many of these views should be reconsidered and modified. Basham, explaining the close connection between \textit{svabhāvavāda} and \textit{niyātīvāda}, says that some heretics exalted \textit{svabhāva} to the status of \textit{niyati} in the regular Ājīvika system. To illustrate this connection he quotes from the \textit{Praśnanyākaraṇa} of Jñānavimala and the \textit{Tarkarahasya-adīpikā} of Guṇaratna.\textsuperscript{56}

One of the earliest exponents of \textit{niyātīvāda}, or fatalism, was Makkhali Gosāla. His teachings are recorded in the \textit{Sāmaññaphala-suttanta} thus:

\begin{quote}
There is neither cause nor basis for the impurity of living beings; they become impure without cause or basis. There is neither cause nor basis for the purity of living beings; they become pure without cause or basis. There is no deed per-
formed either by oneself or by others, no human exertion or action, no strength, no courage, no human endurance or human prowess. All beings, all that have breath, all that are born, all that have life are without power, strength, energy; have evolved according to destiny (niyati), species (saṅgati), and nature (bhāva); and experience pleasure and pain in the six types of existence.”

The crucial phrase in this passage is niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-parinātā. Basham translates it as “developed by Destiny (niyati), chance (saṅgati) and nature (bhāva).” Jayatilleke equates saṅgati with yadhrcchā (chance). Both scholars seem to have been guided by a rarer meaning of saṅgati given by lexicographers. MacDonnell gives the following meanings: “meeting with, resorting to a place, frequenting, association, intercourse; alliance (rare); accidental occurrence (rare); fitness, appropriateness; connection, relation; by chance, haply. Monier-Williams gives a similar list of meanings. Since chance (yadhrcchā) is opposed to both forms of determinism, namely, destiny (niyati) and inherent nature (svabhāva), Jayatilleke tries to reconcile the contradiction by maintaining that Makkhali Gosāla is a “syncretic thinker” and that the central concepts of different schools are welded together in his teachings. Basham and Jayatilleke seem to have overlooked the traditional explanation of the word saṅgati. An examination of the comments of Buddhaghosa and Śilāṅka in the light of the Ājīvika cosmology shows that the term saṅgati, in the description of Makkhali Gosāla’s teaching, does not stand for chance occurrence (yadhrcchā).

Śilāṅka explains the term samgaiyam as samgaiyam’ti samyak svaparināmena gatiḥ (“development or progress according to proper self-evolution”). The use of the word samyak is extremely important in that it points to the absence of any incongruity or inconsistency. To understand the full significance of the statement above, it should be examined in the light of the rest of Makkhali Gosāla’s teaching. We have already seen that the Svabhāvavādins advocated plurality and the classification of this plurality according to the resemblance the elements bear to one another. Makkhali Gosāla accepted svabhāvavāda as well as the classifiability of things, and in accordance with them presented the theory of the six types of existence (cha abhijāti, liu sheng). Buddhaghosa defines saṅgati as channam abhijātīnaṁ tattha tattha gamanaṁ (“movement or
progress according to any one of the six types of existence.” The explanations of saṅgati by Buddhaghosa and Śīlaṅka seem to be very similar, the only difference being that the former gives a more specific description of the way things or beings are evolved, i.e., according to the six types of existence, while the latter explains it in very general terms as self-evolution (svaparīñāma). Moreover, Buddhagosa does not consider the words sattā, pāṇā, bhūtā and jīvā, occurring in the statement of Makkhali’s teaching, as synonyms but as references to different types of existence:

- sattā = camels, buffaloes, donkeys, etc.
- pāṇā = beings with one sense, with two senses, etc.
- bhūtā = beings born from eggs, born in the womb, etc.
- jīvā = rice, barley, wheat, and such other plants.

The description of niyativāda in the Chinese version of the Sāmaññaphala-sutta, which is more lucid and less obscure than the Pali version, confirms Buddhaghosa’s analysis of beings into different species. The Chinese equivalent of the phrase sabbe sattā sabbe pāṇā sabbe bhūtā sabbe jīvā reads thus: i ch’ieh chung sheng yu ming chih lui, and may be literally rendered as “all beings, species of living things.”

A comparison of the Pali and Chinese versions of the Devadaha Sutta of the Majjhima would throw much light on the exact meaning of saṅgati. There five pre-Buddhist theories are mentioned:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Pali version</th>
<th>Chinese version</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. pubbekatahetu,</td>
<td>1. yin pën tso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. issaranimmānahetu,</td>
<td>2. yin ho hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. saṅgatibhāvahetu,</td>
<td>3. yin wei ming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. abhijātihetu,</td>
<td>4. yin chien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. diṭṭhadhamma-upakkamahetu,</td>
<td>5. yin tsun yu</td>
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</tbody>
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P(1) and C(1) represent the Jaina theory of karma (see below). P(2) and C(5) represent the theory of creation (see chapter 1). P(5) and C(4) refer to a theory put forward by those who upheld the validity of human exertion. The phrase ho hui in C(2), meaning “coming together” or “harmony,” were used to render the Pali term sannipāta, which occurs in the passages describing the process of rebirth, or more properly, the conception of a being. Therefore,
in the present instance, *ho hui* may be taken as representing the term *saṅgati*. Thus, C(2) is the equivalent of P(3). Then we are left with P(4) and C(3). C(3) may be translated as “by reason of destiny” (= *niyati*?), which along with C(2) would constitute the Ājīvika theory of *niyatasaṅgatibhāvahetu*. But P(3) and P(4) appear to overlap each other because, according to Buddhaghosa’s analysis, *saṅgati* can be explained on the basis of the theory of the six types of existence (*abhijāti*). Thus, it appears that the Chinese version of the *Devadaha-sutta* presents the Ājīvika conception of *niyatasaṅgatibhāva*, having split it into two parts—*wei ming* referring to *niyati* and *ho hui* representing *saṅgati* (*bhāva*)—while in the Pāli version we find a repetition of the conception of species (*saṅgati*).

That even Gautama Saṅghadeva, in his translation of the *Devadaha-sutta*, has understood the term *saṅgati* to mean “coming together” or “harmony,” and not “chance” (*yadrṛchā*) is evident from his rendering of the term as *ho hui*. The problem would then be how to interpret this “coming together” or “harmony.” Another Chinese rendering of the phrase *niyatasaṅgatibhāvaparīnātā* becomes helpful in solving this problem. It is the phrase *ting fèn hsiang hsū chuan pien*, where *ting fèn* represents *niyati*, *hsiang hsū* represents *saṅgati* (*bhāva*), and *chuan pien*, *parīnātā*. Therefore, the coming together or harmony represented by the characters *ho hui* may be understood as the “harmony of the characteristics that constitute one stream.”

According to the Ājīvika theory of existence, a thing has to fall into one of the six categories of existence. The particular characteristics possessed by a thing determine the nature of the species into which it falls. It is the “concurrence” of these characteristics that is denoted by the term *saṅgati*. The concurrence is not haphazard. It is strictly determined by destiny (*niyati*). Once the nature of the species (*saṅgati*) is determined by Destiny (*niyati*), that species begins to evolve (*parīnāma*) according to its nature (*bhāva* = *svabhāva*). This may be the proper self-evolution (*samayak svaparīnāma*) that Śīlāṅka had in mind.

Considering the three factors separately, as Buddhaghosa does, we find that they are presented in a particular order. Destiny (*niyati*) is placed at the beginning because of its universality
and all-comprehensiveness. It is the cause that accounts for the manifold diversity of the universe. Then comes a more specific factor, species (saṅgati), and lastly, nature (bhāva), that is, the nature of that particular species. This interpretation of the concept of saṅgati has the support of Belvalkar and Ranade, whose translation of the passage in the Sāmaññaphala-suttanta, although done about four decades ago, has gone unnoticed. They have paraphrased the last part of the passage thus: “They [the beings] are bent this way and that by their fate, by the necessary conditions of the class to which they belong, by their individual nature, and it is according to their position in one or the other of the six classes that they experience ease and pain.”

This description of the evolution of the different types of existence is reminiscent of the biological speculations of the earlier thinkers, such as Mahādāsa Aitareya. In fact, Basham, in his analysis of the Ājīvika doctrines, also recognized the impact of the earlier biological speculations on the teachings of the Ājīvikas.

Thus, according to Makkhali Gosāla, the evolution of things is determined by three factors, destiny (niyati), species (saṅgati) and inherent nature (svabhāva). This explanation would make it unnecessary to consider Makkhali Gosāla a syncretic thinker or to give a special explanation why the idea of evolution came to be associated with the teachings of Makkhali Gosāla. Evolution was the very basis of his biological speculations, as it was with some of the thinkers of the Vedic tradition (see chapter 1). Even a group of Materialists accepted a theory of evolution.

If saṅgati is to be understood in the above manner, then the Sūtrakṛtāṅga passage may be translated as follows: “Saṅgaiyāni means development or progress according to proper self-evolution. Whatever experience of pleasure and pain, no matter whose, in whatever time or place—that is according to one’s species. Destiny is one’s natural lot. They say that since pleasure and pain, etc., are not produced by human exertion and so on, evolution is caused by destiny and species.” In fact, Śilāṅka identifies saṅgati with niyati. Thus it is possible to eliminate the idea of chance (yadṛcchā) from the teachings of Makkhali Gosāla, and the evidence above would show how, in the words of Basham, “some heretics exalted svabhāva to the status of niyati in the regular Ājīvika system.”

Summing up the doctrine, Buddhaghosa says: “Whatever
should happen will happen in that same way. Whatever should not happen will not happen." Thus, it is complete determinism, but not indeterminism, that is the basis of Ājīvika fatalism. If the phrase *niyatiṣaygatibhāvaparīnātā* is interpreted in this manner, it is clear that chance (*yadṛcchā*) has no place in the teachings of Makkhali Gosāla and, therefore, of the Ājīvikas. B. C. Law has rightly observed that "Gosāla maintains that everything happens according to the unalterable laws of nature, that is to say, he banishes chance from the whole of experience. He seeks to explain things as a biologist in the light of these principles: (1) Fate, (2) Species, and (3) Nature." This analysis leads to a very important conclusion. Makkhali Gosāla's was not an attempt to reconcile the central teachings of different schools of thought. With due recognition for his ingenuity, it may be held that he was presenting a set of beliefs, logically and mutually consistent, leading from a theory of complete Natural Determinism to a doctrine of Fatalism.

Jayatilleke has rightly observed the influence of the earlier speculations regarding the problem of time (*kāla*) on the determinist thesis of the Ājīvikas. In the *Atharvaveda* time (*kāla*) is conceived as an hypostatized entity that has everything in the world under its control. Time had produced what was in the past and would produce what would be in the future. This conception of time (*kāla*) as the cause of the things in the world was mentioned in the list of theories given in the *Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad*. The influence of this conception of time is to be found in the Ājīvika theory of salvation.

In keeping with his Determinism, Makkhali Gosāla propounded a theory of transmigration that, in the words of Basham, "seems to have been thought of on the analogy of the development and ripening of a plant." As may be expected, this kind of rebirth has its appointed end. Thus, Makkhali Gosāla maintained that "*samsāra* is measured as with a bushel, with its joy and sorrow, and its appointed end. It can neither be lessened nor increased, nor is there any excess or deficiency of it. Just as a ball of thread will, when thrown, unwind to its full length, so fool and wise alike will take their course and make an end of pain." This theory came to be known as *samsārasuddhi*, or "purification through wandering in the cycle of existence."
note that this theory is said to have been propounded by the noncausationists (ahetuvādī), because they denied any form of causation other than species and nature.90

Let us examine the moral and ethical implications of the conception of Natural Determinism, for it is this aspect that comes under the persistent criticism of the Jainas and the Buddhists. The Śānti-parvan of the Mahābhārata presents us with a model account of svabhāsavāda. Though a later account, it is the most comprehensive. It combines the main features of Lokāyata Materialism and Ājīvika Determinism.91

There, Bṛhasma quotes an old story of a discussion between Prahlāda and Indra to dispel doubt as to whether man is the doer of actions producing consequences. Prahlāda upholds svabhāsavāda, for he maintains that everything comes into being and then ceases in consequence of its own nature (svabhāva). He draws several conclusions from this main thesis. Firstly, there is no personal exertion as such because nothing is achieved by it. Secondly, in the absence of personal exertion, no personal agent exists. Thirdly, there is no effect of good and bad deeds, no moral responsibility. Lastly, freedom and emancipation come through inherent nature (svabhāva).

The denial of human exertion is a necessary corollary of svabhāsavāda. As we have already pointed out, nature (svabhāva) is a force external to man in the sense that he is unable to control or change the course of nature. He has no power over his own physical personality because his physical frame is subject to the physical laws that govern nature. Jayatilleke has pointed out that the arguments adduced by the Niyativādins against causal determination, are said to hold against the connection between human exertion and its fruits.92 Jayatilleke quotes only Śīlāṅka (9th century), although the argument is stated in the same manner in the Mahābhārata. There the argument is attributed to the Svabhāsavādin, thus showing the close connection between svabhāsavāda and niyativāda. It is stated thus: “Even among persons doing their utmost, the suspension of what is not desired and the attainment of what is desired are not seen. What comes then of personal exertion? In the case of some, we see that without any exertion on their part, what is not desired is suspended and what is desired is achieved. This then must be the result of nature (svabhāva)”.


Whatever the philosophical implications of this argument, it has been used by the Svabhāvavādins to reject the validity of human exertion.

The denial of the validity of human exertion is, according to the Sāmaññaphala-sutta, one of the main theses of the fatalist Makkhali Gosāla. Thus, the Materialists, who upheld a theory of nature (svabhāva), and the Ājīvikas, who accepted Determinism (niyati), agree in repudiating human exertion as having any influence on the course of nature.

If we accept the Mahābhārata description of svabhāvavāda as accurate then we are compelled to admit that the absence of personal exertion implies the absence of a personal agent. This brings together the teachings of Makkhali Gosāla and Pakudha Kaccāyana because, while the former believed in the absence of human exertion, the latter reiterated the absence of a personal agent. Pakudha Kaccāyana maintained that “No man slays or causes to slay, hears or causes to hear, knows or causes to know,” because “even if a man cleaves another’s head with a sharp sword, he does not take life, for the sword cut passes through or between the elements.” In the same tone the Svabhāvavādin of the Mahābhārata says: “When one slays another, one slays only the other’s body.” The Chinese version of the Sāmaññaphala-sutta attributes this doctrine to Pūraṇa Kassapa, who according to the Pali version was a Materialist. Thus, Pakudha Kaccāyana, who was an Ājīvika, seems to have shared some of the dogmas accepted by the Materialists. He is represented as putting forward a theory of motionless permanence (avicalita-nityatvam). We have shown that the Nihilist Materialists also propounded a theory of motionless permanence while accepting svabhāvavāda as a central tenet. Therefore, it is not improbable that Pakudha Kaccāyana accepted a theory of Natural Determinism (svabhāvavāda).

Further, according to the Svabhāvavādin of the Mahābhārata, the denial of human exertion and the repudiation of a personal agent leads to the denial of moral responsibility. He maintains that “What we have now become is neither due to any act of ours nor of others. Everything is due to inherent nature (svabhāva),” The denial of moral responsibility is explicitly stated as part of the teachings of Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Kesakambali and Pūraṇa Kassapa, and is implied in the teachings of Pakudha.
means that the Materialists, as well as the Ājīvika Determinists who accepted svabhāvavāda, held the view that there is no moral responsibility, no effect of good and bad deeds.

The teachings attributed to Makkhali Gosāla in the Sāmañña-phala-suttanta are in another place called ahetuvāda; the teachings of Pūraṇa Kassapa, akiriyavāda, and the teachings of Ajita Kesakambali, natthikavāda. The three terms ahetuvāda, akiriyavāda, and natthikavāda are used in another context as synonyms. This is evident from the Chinese renderings of at least two of the terms. The term akiriyavāda is rendered into Chinese as shuo wu tso, and the phrase natthikavāda as shuo wu yeh, the only difference being that the tso expresses a more active meaning than does yeh. The rendering of natthikavāda as shuo wu yeh, “he who maintains that there is no [effect of] action,” shows that the definition of the term in the PTS Dictionary is inaccurate.

Basham has observed that “In certain passages of the Pāli Canon the description of doctrines among the six teachers is significantly altered, in a way which strongly suggests that the credos ascribed in the Samañña-phala-suttanta to Makkhali, Pūraṇa, and Pakudha were aspects of a single body of teaching”. The examination of svabhāvavāda described in the Mahābhārata confirms this and points to the close connection between Materialism and Ājīvika Determinism. Therefore, it is difficult to question the authenticity of the Chinese version of the Samañña-phala-suttanta, as Basham himself does, although it does not agree with the Pāli version in the description of the teachings of these six heretical teachers.

Thus we are led to the conclusion that svabhāvavāda, as described in the Mahābhārata, is a synthesis of Materialism and Ājīvika Determinism. It incorporates the teachings of four of the six heretical teachers, Ajita Kesakambali, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Pūraṇa Kassapa and Makkhali Gosāla. In spite of their differing emphases all of them were Naturalists, accepting Natural Determinism (svabhāvavāda) as the basis of their teachings.

Buddhist criticism. The Devadaha-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, though mainly devoted to a refutation of the Jaina theory of karma, is also an attempt to demonstrate that belief in external determination undermines belief in moral responsibility. The
Buddha argues that if happiness and suffering are caused by destiny (niyati, wei ming) or one's lot or species (saṅgati, ho hui), then the Niganṭhas, because they undergo extreme forms of suffering, have an evil destiny or are of evil species. The Buddha, who is freed from all defiling tendencies and who therefore enjoys extreme forms of happiness, has a good destiny or is of good species. This criticism represents an attempt to show the fallacy of positing an external agency, even in cases where individual responsibility is clearly manifest, because the Niganṭhas' severe pain is inflicted upon themselves by themselves, while the Buddha's happiness is a direct result of his untiring effort.

Another criticism of this theory of external causation is found in the Mahābodhi Jātaka: "If man's behavior depends on one's species (saṅgatyā) and nature (bhāvāya), then his actions, which should or should not have been committed, are committed without any intention [on his part]. If so, who is it that would be smeared by the evil consequences when these actions are unintentional." This argument was adduced to refute the belief in a creator God (issara), too.

Therefore, whenever the Buddhists criticize the doctrines of the heretical teachers, they seem to refer only to those aspects with which they disagreed. The conception of inherent nature (svabhāva) that was common to the teachings of four of the six heretical teachers is not referred to, except that of Makkhali Gosāla. And reference to his conception of svabhāva may have been made because it was exalted to the status of destiny (niyati). The word svabhāva is never even mentioned in the early Buddhist texts, and when it occurs in the later commentaries it connotes "truth." Criticism of the philosophical theory of nature (svabhāvavāda) is conspicuous by its absence, although the theory definitely existed during the time of the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad. This does not mean that the Buddhists accepted in toto the theory of nature (svabhāvavāda) of the earlier teachers. The Buddhists would have certainly objected to the attempt to limit svabhāva to physical nature alone, ignoring the mental or psychological and moral aspects of nature that Buddhists consider the fundamental constituents. But the silence of the Buddhist texts on svabhāvavāda may be accounted for if we admit the influence of this theory on the Buddhist theory of natural causal Determinism (see chapter 4).
CONCEPTION OF NATURALISM

The third type of Naturalism referred to at the beginning of this chapter does not fall into the category of either Materialism or complete Determinism. Naturalism in this sense is expressed in the Buddhist texts by the term *dhammatā* ("nature of things"). While the word is used to explain the behavior of physical phenomena,\textsuperscript{112} it is not confined to that. Even psychological attitudes are given naturalistic explanations and are illustrated by examples from physical nature. The *Kosambiya-sutta* says: "It is the nature (*dhammatā*) of a person endowed with right understanding that whatever kind of offense he falls into, . . . he confesses it, discloses it, declares it quickly to the teacher or to intelligent coreligionists; having confessed, disclosed and declared it, he comes to restraint in the future, just as an innocent little baby lying on its back draws back its hand or foot if it has touched a live ember. . . ."\textsuperscript{113} It is also "the nature (*dhammatā*) of a person endowed with right understanding that if he is zealous concerning those many duties to be done for coreligionists, then he becomes of strong aspiration for training in higher conduct (*adhisīla*), higher thought (*adhicitta*), and higher intuitive wisdom (*adhipaññā*). Just as a cow with a young calf, while she is pulling the grass, keeps an eye on the calf . . . ."\textsuperscript{114}

Even extrasensory perceptions and emancipation are not considered supernatural occurrences in Buddhism. They are natural causal occurrences.

It is in the nature of things (*dhammatā, fa tsū jian*), that a person in a state of concentration knows and sees what really is. A person who knows and sees what really is does not need to make an effort of will to feel disinterested and renounce [the things of this world]. It is in the nature of things that a person who knows and sees [the world] as it really is, feels disinterested and renounces. One who has felt disinterested and has renounced does not need to make an effort of will to realize the knowledge and insight of emancipation (*vimutti, chiai t’o*). It is in the nature of things that one who has felt disinterested and has renounced realizes the knowledge and insight of emancipation.\textsuperscript{115}

According to this statement, mental concentration, which is a product of training and effort, is a causal factor (*upanisā, yin*)
in the production of knowledge leading to emancipation. It is categorically stated that in the absence of right mental concentration, the cause for the production of knowledge and insight is absent. This does not mean that these processes are absolutely determined by destiny (niyati, wei ming) or any such thing, as the Ājīvikas believed, but that they are natural causal occurrences. The Buddhists, unlike the Materialists, did not confine their Naturalism to physical nature. Thus, in the later commentaries, which attempt to systematize the teachings found in the early sutras, five kinds of causal patterns are enumerated. They are in the realm of (a) the physical (inorganic) world (utuniyāma), (b) the physical (organic) world (bijaniyāma), (c) the sphere of mental life (cittaniyāma), (d) the moral sphere (kammaniyāma), and (e) the higher spiritual life (dhammaniyāma) (see chapter 6). Thus the teachings of the Buddha may, in certain respects, fall into the third category of Naturalism.

Criticism of External Causation

The above-mentioned theories of external causation (param katam, t'a tso) were criticized by the Buddhists for two main reasons. First, because they implied a denial of the validity of human exertion and posited a principle external to man as the cause of his pleasure and pain. Second, because they led to a belief in annihilation. The second criticism is stated in the early Buddhist texts thus: “The theory of external causation of suffering, . . . according to which one acts and another experiences, amounts to a theory of annihilation (uccheda, tuan).”

If we understand annihilation (uccheda, tuan) in the usual sense of destruction of life and the absence of rebirth, the statement that external causation leads to a theory of annihilation presents a problem. How are we to include the Ājīvika theory of determinism (niyati, wei ming) under this category of annihilation? The Ājīvikas, unlike the Materialists, did not hold that a being is cut off and completely destroyed at death; they believed in some kind of survival. This problem may be easily resolved if we distinguish several different uses of the term uccheda (tuan). In the context above, “annihilation” may be interpreted as the annihilation of action (kamma), that is, elimination of the connection between an action and its consequences. Annihilation in this
sense can be taken as denial of moral responsibility and may be synonymous with natthikavāda. Thus, uccchedavāda and natthikavāda mainly represent the theories denying moral responsibility, though they are used more specifically to denote nihilistic systems.

Criticism of the theory of external causation brings us once again to the problem of personal identity. It was mentioned that the theory of self-causation led to a belief in permanence, a belief in a permanent entity underlying the empirical reality (see chapter 1). According to it, the person who acts (the cause) and the person who experiences (the effect) are one and the same, the identity of the two individuals (or the cause and the effect) being maintained on the basis of a permanent substance. The theory of external causation leads to an opposite result, namely, a belief in annihilation (ucceda, tuan). This means that the person who acts and the person who experiences the result are two different persons; the cause and the effect are different. All the statements in the early Buddhist texts to the effect that a person acts and reaps the consequences are made to refute the theory that denies the identity of the person who acts and the person who experiences the results. But these statements should not be taken as referring to an ultimate reality; they are only empirical statements and the identity is maintained not by positing an extraempirical entity such as a soul (ātman), but by a theory of causality (see chapter 6).

Thus, the Buddha criticized two main theories: (1) the doctrine that posited a permanent soul (ātman) on the basis of which personal identity, moral responsibility, and survival were explained, which came to be known as attikhavāda (shuo yu lun che), and (2) the doctrine that did not posit such a soul, denied personal identity, moral responsibility, and survival, which came to be known as natthikavāda (shuo wu lun che). Both these theories were rejected by the Buddha on empirical grounds. We have already stated the argument for the rejection of the first (see chapter 1). In the same manner, the Buddha appealed to experience in his refutation of the second. He maintained that “to one who sees, with proper understanding, the arising of the things in the world, the belief in nonexistence would not occur.”

The Jaina Theory of Causation

The third of the four main types of pre-Buddhist causal theories is that which upholds internal as well as external causation
(sayam katan ca param katan ca, tsu tso t'a tso). This is a relativist theory that attempts to combine the first two types of theories discussed above, self-causation and external causation. There appear to be two such theories in Indian thought. One is pro­pounded by the Jainas, who were recognized as relativists. The other, as pointed out by Jayatilleke, is mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.

We have seen how the Upaniṣadic thinkers conceived of Being (sat) or reality as permanent, immutable, and eternal, and how they rejected impermanence, mutability, and change as illusions (chapter 1). The Jaina thinkers, in the desire to account for the various forms of experience such as change, continuity, impermanence, and duration, and supported by their epistemo­logical standpoint that absolute judgments are not possible at the mundane level, maintained that Being (sat) is multiform in that it exhibits the characteristics of productiveness (utpāda), de­structiveness (vyaya), and permanence or durability (dhruvya). This came to be known as parināmanityavāda, a theory that comes very close to that of Mahādāsa Aitareya (see chapter 1).

It was pointed out that the rejection of change and mutability as illusory impeded fruitful speculation on the problem of causality during the period of the Upaniṣads. When the Jaina thinkers accorded greater reality to experiences such as change and muta­bility, they initiated serious discussion of the problem of causality. It has been held that the first attempt at systematic analysis of the causal problem was made by the Ājīvikas. But because of their theory of strict Determinism and Fatalism they were reluctant to accept any cause other than destiny. On the other hand, the Jainas, with their relativist epistemological outlook, made a genuine effort to determine the nature of causality.

The locus classicus of their theory of causality is the Śūtrakṛtāṅga and its commentary by Śilāṅka. In the former, Mahāvīra criticizes several theories concerning the causality of suffering. It is interesting to note that some of the same theories came under the persistent criticism of the Buddha. These theories thus had a historical basis and were not mere imaginations of the Buddha or Mahāvīra. Mahāvīra says: "Suffering is not caused by oneself (sayam kaṭām); how could it be caused by another (anna­kaṭām)? Happiness and suffering, final beatitude and temporal [pleasure and pain] are not caused by themselves or by others; they
are due to one's own lot or species (*saṃgāyaitam*). This is what they [the Fatalists] say.”

The phrase “caused by oneself” (*sayam kādam*) is explained by Śīlāṅka as “caused by one's own exertion” (*ātmanā puruṣakā-rena kṛtam*). The Jainas rejected it because they found that even when there is equal human effort, sometimes the results differ or there are no results. Explaining the phrase “caused by another” (*annakaḍam*), Śīlāṅka lists several existing theories of causality: destiny (*niyati*), time (*kāla*), God (*īśvara*), nature (*svabhāva*), and action (*karma*). Destiny is identified with species (*saṅgati*) and is taken up for criticism later. The other conceptions are considered and argued against in turn.

Mahāvīra then says: “Those who proclaim these views are fools who fancy themselves learned; they have no knowledge and do not understand that things are partly determined and partly undetermined (*niyatāniyayaitaśītī*).” Śīlāṅka’s commentary on this statement is very important. Below it is reproduced in full.

Because they unconditionally (ekāntena) resort to the theory of creation by destiny (*niyatikṛtam*, “predestination”), “when things are partly determined and partly undetermined,” that is to say, happiness, etc. are partly determined, brought about necessarily (*avyaśyaṁbhāvyuṣadāraṇāpyaśindhūm*) and partly undetermined, brought about by one’s own exertion (*ātmapuruṣa-kāra*), God (*īśvara*), etc., therefore, they are ignorant; they have no knowledge of the cause of happiness, suffering, etc., and are devoid of knowledge. But in the teachings of the Jainas (*arhatānām*), some part of happiness, suffering, etc., is due to destiny [or predetermination, *niyatāniyayaitam*]—it is said to be caused by destiny [or predetermination] because of the necessary manifestation of [past] *karma* as a cause at some moment or other. Similarly, some part is undetermined (*ani-yayatiśrava*), that is, caused by human exertion (*puruṣakāra*), time (*kāla*), God (*īśvara*), nature (*svabhāva*), *karma*, etc. Herein, the effectiveness, in some way or other, of human exertion in the case of (the production of) happiness and suffering, etc., is maintained. Since an action yields results, and the action depends on human exertion, it has been said: “One should not give up one’s effort thinking (that everything) is due to destiny (daivam). Without effort who would be able to obtain oil from sesame seeds?” But the inequality
of results obtained when there is equal human exertion, although said to be a fallacy, is not a fallacy. Because, in such a case, the difference in human exertion is the cause of the inequality of the results. If for some person equal exertion produces no result, then it is the work of something unseen (adrṣṭakṛtaḥ). That too we consider a causal factor. Thus, time (kāla) also is a cause because the bakula [Mimusops elengi], the campaka [Miceliya campaka], the asoka [Jonesia asoka roxb], the punnāga [Rottleria tinctoria], the nāga [Mesua roxburghii], the sahakāra [a kind of mango] and such other trees are seen to bloom and bear fruit during the proper season, but not always. The statement that variety in the world is not possible because of the oneness of time (kālasyaikapatvat) does not hold good in the case of our theory. For we do not accept the agency of time (kāla) alone, but accept karma too; therefore, cosmic variety is not a fallacy. 134

In a similar way, Śīlāṅka assesses the other causal theories.

A careful examination of Mahāvīra’s statement in the light of Śīlāṅka’s commentary reveals two main features of the Jaina theory of causation. First, because of their epistemological standpoint, the Jainas refused to posit unconditionally (ekāntena) one single cause. They examined each one of the causes posited by various thinkers in their explanation of the causality of suffering, etc.—causes such as human exertion (puruṣakāra), destiny (niyati), time (kāla), God (īśvara), nature (svabhāva), action (karma)—and showed that these do not, by themselves, constitute causes. But in the end they agreed that these are causal factors depending on the point of view from which they were considered. Taking up the problem of human exertion, Śīlāṅka maintains that if it fails as a cause, that is because there are other causes that are not directly seen (adrṣṭa).

Thus, Jaina theory partakes of relativity as well as plurality. But this plurality of causes can be divided into two broad categories: (1) internal causes such as human exertion (puruṣakāra), and (2) external causes such as time, God, nature, and karma. The first group can be included under the category of self-causation (sayāṃ katāṃ, tsu tso), and the second under the category of external causation (param katāṃ t’a tso). Although these are considered to be untenable as causes when taken individually, when considered in a group or from different standpoints their
causal status can be defended. Thus, the theory referred to in the early Buddhist texts as “internal as well as external causation” (sayam kai añ ca param katañ ca, tsu tso t’a tso) can be attributed to the Jainas. This may be why Mahāvīra is represented as criticizing each of the two theories of self-causation (sayam kadañ) and external causation (annakadām), but not a combination of both.

A different grouping of causal factors appears in Śīlāṅka’s classification of those that are destined to occur (niyata) and those that are not (aniyata). The only example Śīlāṅka gives of the former is karma “because it can necessarily manifest itself [as a cause] when the opportunity is available” (kasmimścid avasare ’vasyambhavyudayasadbhāvāt). Karma is also included with undetermined (aniyata) causes, along with human exertion (purusakāra), time (kāla), etc. Therefore, a distinction has to be made between these two forms of karma.

We are inclined to believe that the karma that is determined (niyata) to occur refers to past karma, while that which is undetermined (aniyata) refers to present and future karma. If so, the connection between past karma and its characteristic of being determined (niyata) seems to be very significant. It shows that just as the Ājīvīkas raised species (saṅgati) or nature (svabhāva) to the status of niyati, the Jainas raised karma to the status of niyati. It may be mentioned that the Jainas did not have to face the problem of personal identity because they believed in the existence of individual souls, which were considered to be substances and therefore eternal. By maintaining that karma is a necessary cause, the Jainas viewed the present as being strictly determined by past karma. If one’s personality is so strictly determined, it appears that there is no freedom of will. But this conclusion is avoided by the way in which the undetermined (aniyata) cause is explained. It was pointed out that what is undetermined is what is caused by one’s human exertion, God, etc. The Jainas recognized human exertion as a causal factor under certain circumstances. This means that although one’s present state is determined by one’s past karma, one can change the future because one’s human exertion is an effective cause. Therefore, man is endowed with freedom of will. This belief is referred to in the early Buddhist texts as pubbekatahetu or yin pên tso or yin su ming
tsao. 136 A representative passage in the early Buddhist texts runs thus:

Whatever the individual experiences, whether painful or pleasant or neutral, all is due to what was done previously. Thus by burning up, by making an end of, past deeds, by the nondoing of new deeds, there is no overflowing into the future. From there being no overflowing into the future comes the destruction of deeds; from the destruction of deeds comes the destruction of anguish; from the destruction of anguish comes the destruction of feelings; from the destruction of feelings all anguish will be worn away. Thus say . . . the Niganthas. 137

From this passage it is evident that a knowledge of causes and conditions is behind the Jaina theory of existence. The first part of the theory is tempered by a belief in strict determinism (niyata): everything a human being experiences is completely determined by his past karma and there is no escape from it. The second part partakes of the idea of conditionality such that when A happens B happens. Herein, causal factors such as human exertion, God, and nature are recognized. This seems to have been taken by the Jainas as indeterminism (aniyata). Thus, Mahavira's belief that things are "partly determined and partly undetermined" (niyayāniyayānti) is reflected in the Buddhist statement of the Jaina theory of karma.

The account of the Jaina theory of karma given by Barua is very confusing. He starts by attributing a certain theory to the Jainas and ends by accepting an altogether different proposition. He says:

The Buddha understood that Mahāvīra, in opposition to current beliefs that our happiness and misery are caused by others—determined wholly and solely by external factors and conditions—formulated a new theory, namely, that they are caused by the individual agent of our free will. That our weal and ill are conditioned solely by or dependent upon external causes is one extreme, and by opposing to this a new individualistic theory, Mahāvīra ran to the other extreme, neither of which can a man with true insight reasonably accept. 138

Barua makes such a statement because he considers the doctrine
of self-causation (sayam katam) mentioned in the Pali Nikayas a reference to the Jaina theory of karma.\textsuperscript{139} He fails to see that this same theory was rejected by Mahavira. Moreover, after comparing descriptions of the theory of karma in the early Buddhist and the Jaina sources, he maintains that it is “hardly possible for us to detect any differences between their opinions.”\textsuperscript{140} But being unable to ignore the many passages in the Pali canon where the Buddha is represented as criticizing the Jaina theory of karma, Barua is forced to examine whether there is any difference between the two schools of thought. Eventually he comes to a conclusion that contradicts his earlier statement regarding the Jaina doctrine. He says: “In accordance with Mahavira’s view I am not, as a thinking subject, wholly and solely the maker of my moral being, but I am partly a creature of circumstances.” And in support of this view he quotes Mahavira’s statement that “things depend partly on fate and partly on human exertion.”\textsuperscript{141} We have pointed out that this relativistic theory is mentioned in the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas, where it is presented as a combination of self-causation and external causation (see chapter 1). The theory of self-causation is therefore not a Jaina theory, as Barua seems to think, but a theory formulated by the thinkers of the Vedic and Upanishadic traditions.

**Buddhist Criticism of the Jaina Theory**

In the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas, the theory of complete Determinism in the sphere of moral responsibility—that everything we experience is due to past karma (pubbekatalhetu, yin pên tso)—is clearly attributed to the Jainas, but not the relativistic theory of internal and external causation (sayam katañ ca param katañ ca, tsu tso t’a tso). The latter is not attributed to any specific school. What is the connection between these two theories?

On the authority of the Jaina commentator, Śīlāṇka, it was pointed out that for the Jainas self-causation (sayam kaḍam) stood for causation by one’s own exertion, while external causation (annakaḍam) included the work of time, God, nature, etc. We agreed with Barua that “Mahavira appears to be in sharp antago­nism with Gosala.”\textsuperscript{142} This is because Mahavira disagreed with Gosala’s denial of moral responsibility and free will. But Mahavira did not reject the theory of Determinism (niyati) advocated by
Gosāla. This is evident from Mahāvīra’s dictum that “things are partly determined and partly undetermined” (niyayāniyayayam). This, then, was the main problem faced by Mahāvīra. While accepting a theory of Determinism (niyati), Mahāvīra wanted to uphold moral responsibility and free will. Acceptance of the doctrine of karma accomplished the latter. By asserting that man's present life is completely determined by his past karma, he was able to make room for the theory of Determinism (niyati). Thus, the theory of moral responsibility, according to which everything a person experiences is due to past behavior (pubbekatahetu), is only a corollary of the philosophical theory that combines self-causation and external causation.

The theory of moral responsibility put forward by the Jainas cannot be considered a strictly individualistic theory. That would defeat the very purpose for which it was formulated by Mahāvīra. In fact, as mentioned earlier, he rejected the individualistic theory of moral responsibility. Mahāvīra would maintain that the individual is responsible for his acts, but once he has committed an act (karma), it completely determines his future and thus becomes something external to him, for he cannot control it. It is interesting to note that the Buddhists group this theory with two other theories, theistic determinism (issaranimmanā, tsun yu tsao) and indeterminism (ahetu appaccayā, wu yin wu yüan), and call them all sectarian tenets (see chapter 1). The theory of creation positing an external personal agent was a widely prevalent view.

Opposed to this personal agent was the impersonal principle, namely, karma. In addition to these two major theories of moral causation, a third existed that denied any form of causation. It was specifically stated that the theory of pubbekatahetu, along with the other two, lead to a denial of moral responsibility (akiriya). Why did the Buddhists consider the Jaina theory of karma, which purports to explain moral responsibility, as leading to a denial of moral responsibility? Perhaps because the Jaina theory partakes of determinism. Moreover, if the identification of pubbekatahetu with the theory of karma referred to by Śīlāṅka is correct, Śīlāṅka was justified in including it under external causation, although it was intended to occupy an intermediate position between self-causation and external causation. Or, perhaps in the belief that man is almost powerless to control
already committed actions, as the Buddhist texts would have us believe, the Jainas attempted to expiate past actions by the practice of severe austerities and to prevent further accumulation of *karma* in the future by nonaction.

The Buddha’s criticism is levelled against the first part of the theory, which maintains that every experience that a human being has in this existence or moment is completely determined by his past behavior (*pubbekatahetu, yìn pèn tso*). Looking upon *karma* as an external force, as the Jainas themselves did, the Buddha says: “If one’s experiences of pleasure and pain are due to what was done in the past, that person is paying his debt, to wit, his former sins. Who, when freed from debt, would be smeared by his sins?”144 The argument that was used to refute the idea of creation and of “species” is thus also employed to refute the Jaina theory of *karma*. It is maintained that “if the experiences of a human being are determined by past *karma*, the Nigañthas, who in this life undergo extreme forms of suffering, would have been of evil behavior in their past lives”, and “the Tathāgata who experiences extreme forms of happiness was of good behavior in his past life”.145

Apart from these few instances, the Buddha’s criticism is directed, not so much at the theory itself, but at the epistemological basis of the theory. The Buddha asks the Jainas whether they knew that they existed in the past and whether they knew that they committed such and such an act. The Jainas replied in the negative and claimed that they depended on the testimony of their teacher, Nigañtha Nāthaputta.146

In the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* we come across another relativistic theory of causation comparable to that of the Jainas. While the Jainas posited *karma* as an external cause and upheld the validity of human exertion as an internal cause, the Theists mentioned in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* believed that God is the external cause and that the person assumes various forms according to his own deeds.147 As Jayatilleke has pointed out, Dhammapāla, commenting on the *Udāna*,148 referred to this theory thus: “It is the belief of some that God, etc. [nature, destiny, etc.], in creating the soul and the world do not create them entirely of their own accord but take into consideration the good and evil of each being
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[considered as] a cooperative cause, and thus the soul and the world are [both] self-caused and caused by another".149

Theory of Noncausation

The last of the four main types of causal theories is the theory of “chance occurrence” (yadrcchā), or the theory of “fortuitous origination” (adhiccasamuppāda, wu yin wu yūan), which is a denial of any form of causation. In the early Buddhist texts the term adhiccasamuppāda replaced the earlier term yadrcchā. Jayatilleke has identified this theory with the niyatīvāda of the Ājīvikas, firstly because he believes that the word saṅgati occurring in the description of niyatīvāda connotes the idea of “chance,” and secondly, because niyatīvāda was considered to be a form of ahetuvāda.150

We cannot accept the first argument since we understand saṅgati as “species,” not “chance.” With regard to the second argument, although niyatīvāda came to be described as ahetuvāda, it was only in the sense that there was no cause other than niyati, not in the sense of chance occurrence. It should be noted that the ahetuvāda of Makkhali Gosāla falls into the category of external causation (paraṁ katalā, t’a tso), whereas fortuitous origination implies a denial of both internal and external causation (sayam katalā ca paraṁ katalā ca, fei tsū fei t’a tso).151

The theory of “fortuitous origination” (adhiccasamuppāda), although it does not imply any form of determinism such as niyatīvāda, may be designated a theory of noncausation (ahetuvāda). This is what the Buddhist commentator Dhammapāla meant when he said: “Adhiccasamuppāna means ‘arisen by chance’; it is called the theory of ‘fortuitous origination’ because events arise without any cause. Therefore, even ahetukavāda is to be included in it.”152
III. Clarification of Terminology

ONE OF THE TERMS used most frequently in the early Buddhist texts to denote both causation and causality is *paṭiccasamuppāda* (Sk. *pratītyasamutpāda*), which is a combination of the two terms *paṭicca*, ‘having come on account of’ (*prati* + √ī + *ya*), and *samuppāda*, ‘arising’. Buddhaghosa defines it thus: “causation or dependent arising (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) is the mode of causes (*paccayākāra*). The mode of causes is that according to which coordinate phenomena are produced mutually. Therefore, it is called causation.”¹ Again, he explains the term ‘arisen’ (*samuppanna*), as: “When arising, it arises together, that is, coordinately, not singly or without a cause,”² and “that which has arisen depending on causes.”³ These definitions emphasize the existence of a group of causes and their occurrence together.

Another term used in the early texts to denote causation or causality is *idappaccayatā* (Bsk. *idampratyayatā*⁴), which means ‘conditionality’ or ‘relativity.’ It is an abstract noun derived from the combination of the terms *ida* or *idam* (neuter of *ayam*), meaning ‘this,’ and *paccaya* (*prati* + √ī) ‘foundation’, ‘cause,’ or ‘basis.’ The PTS Pali-English Dictionary explains it as “having its foundation on this, that is to say, causally connected, by way of a cause.” Buddhaghosa suggests the following meaning: “From the standpoint of the condition (*hetu*) or group of conditions (*hetusamūha*)
that give rise to such states as decay and death, as stated, there is said to be conditionality."

Edgerton states that the two words idampratayatā and pratītyasamutpāda constitute one compound and that the editors of the Vinaya Piṭaka have wrongly separated them. The different uses of the term idappaccayatā in the Pali texts do not justify that opinion. In the Pali texts we come across two main uses of the term idappaccayatā. Sometimes it is used to denote a characteristic of patīcchasamuppāda, as, for example, in the statement, “Causation is said to have [the characteristics of] objectivity, necessity, invariability and conditionality.” Here the two words are clearly used separately, the term idappacayatā defining one of the characteristics of causation (patīcchasamuppāda). Candrakīrti seems to take idampratayatā in the sense of relativity, as is implied in the statement, “when this exists, that exists” (asmin sati idam bhavati). This is distinct from active causation (pratītyasamutpāda), which is referred to by the statement, “when this arises, that arises” (asyotpādād idam upadaya). But sometimes the term idappaccayatā is used as a synonym of patīcchasamuppāda and appears along with it. In such cases, the term patīcchasamuppāda is almost always preceded by the term idappaccayatā. Of the four characteristics of causation mentioned above, the importance of idappaccayatā (see below) may be taken as the raison d’être for using it as a synonym of patīcchasamuppāda. It is probably this usage of the term that misled Edgerton to declare that the two terms constitute one compound.

Moreover, a comparison of some of the Pali passages in which idappaccayatā occurs with the corresponding passages in the Chinese Āgamas shows that the Āgamas, except in one instance, do not have a special translation for this term. In the example quoted in the paragraph above, (from S 2.26, the Chinese version in TD 2.84b; Tsa 12.14), the term tathatā is rendered as ju fa ērh; avittahatā as fa pu li ju; anāññathatā as fa pu i ju; and sui shun yün ch’i may be taken as a rendering of the term idappaccayatā. The absence of a special translation for idappaccayatā or idampratayatā is more evident in the Chinese translations of the later Buddhist texts such as the Bodhisattva-bhūmi. That may be because when the Buddhist texts were translated into Chinese, the usage of idappaccayatā as a synonym for patīcchasamuppāda had gained currency, with the result
that the characters used to translate *patīccasamuppāda* were also used to render *idampratyayatā*.

The definition of *patīccasamuppāda* given by Buddhaghosa, as well as some of the discussions of the theory of causation in the early texts imply the recognition of a group or number of causes. A ‘cause’ implies a ‘harmony of causes’ that constitute one cause having the capacity to produce an effect. Thus, Buddhaghosa maintained that if there were a deficiency in any of the several causes that constitute a single cause, there would be no effect. The group of causes (*hetu*-*sāṁśātuḥ*) producing an effect would not be able to do so if they were mutually independent or if some of them were lacking. Therefore, through mutual dependence, equally (*samaṇī*) and together (*sahā*), they produce the effect or the resultant states.

In the Chinese Āgamas we come across several different translations of *patīccasamuppāda*. Two of the most popular renderings are *yin yuân fa* and *yuân ch‘i fa*. In the first, the character *yuân*, which is generally used to express the term *pratyaya*, is used as a verbal form, like *ch‘i* in the second rendering, to express the idea of ‘arising.’ In some instances it is possible to find *yin* and *yuân* used in compound form but denoting *hetu* and *pratyaya*, respectively. For example, the phrase *hetuṃ patīcca sambhūtam* has been rendered into Chinese as *yin yuán hui ērh sheng* and *yin yuân ho ho sheng*. Although the Pali version refers to the cause in the singular as *hetu* (a collective noun), the Chinese versions definitely imply a harmony of several causes. Even though in classical Chinese *yin* means direct cause as opposed to *yuân*, which refers to an indirect cause, this distinction cannot be made in the early Buddhist texts, because the technical meaning *yin* and *yuân* acquired in Buddhist Chinese is based on the meaning of the words they represent, namely, *hetu* and *pratyaya*. Even if we translated the two Chinese passages as “arising on account of the harmony of *hetu* and *pratyaya*,” the usage of the two terms *hetu* and *pratyaya* in the early Buddhist texts would not allow distinction between them as ‘cause’ and ‘supporting condition,’ respectively.

The idea of a group of causes has misled some scholars to think that Buddhism recognizes a difference between *hetu* and *pratyaya*, two of the words most frequently used to denote the idea of ‘cause.’ Monier-Williams, defines *pratyaya*, as: “[with the Buddhists] a co-operating cause, the concurrent occasion of an event
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as distinguished from its approximate cause.” Soothill and Hodous as well as Jeschke and Saratchandra Das, have followed Monier-Williams’ interpretation. Soothill and Hodous went further when they said (in the same place): “It is circumstantial, conditioning or secondary cause, in contrast with yin (hetu), the direct or fundamental cause. Hetu is the seed, pratyaya the soil, rain, sunshine, etc.” De la Vallée Poussin also believes that “A distinction is to be made between the cause (hetu) and the conditions (pratyaya).” In an article on the Buddhist concept of identity, he seems to elaborate on this point: “Yet like all the Buddhists, the Vātsāputriyas admit—basing their faith on scripture and experience—that a flame is always being renewed, and that it never remains for one moment identical with itself. The flame of the lamp on the third watch of the night is the continuation of the flame in the first watch, these two flames form a series (santati): the first is the cause (hetu) of the second, for they have both the same nature, the wick and oil are not causes but only co-efficients (pratyaya).”

Do the early Buddhist texts recognize a distinction between cause (hetu, yin) and condition (pratyaya, yūan)? Words expressing the idea of cause in the Pali Nikayas are numerous. Buddhaghosa has given a list, including paccaya, hetu, kāraṇa, nidāna, sambhava, and pabhava, and maintains that although the words are different, they express the same meaning. To the above list may be added upanisā. A similar list of synonyms is given in the Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośa-vyākhyā of Yaśomitra. Of these, paccaya and hetu occur very frequently in the Pali Nikāyas, and the former appears to have been most favored. In the Chinese Āgamas the characters yin and yūan, representing hetu and paccaya, are widely used.

It is almost certain that the hetu (yin) and paccaya (yūan) were used synonymously in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, although some of the early interpreters have mistakenly rendered them as ‘cause’ and ‘effect,’ respectively. The locution “What is the cause, what is the condition [reason]?” occurs very frequently in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas and also in later texts such as the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, Suvarnaprabhāsottama-sūtra, and Lalitavistara. Another example illustrating the synonymous use of the two terms is found in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas: “There are two causes, two conditions for the arising of right view (sammā diṭṭhi, chēng chien). Which two? Testimony of another (parato
ghosa, ts'ung t'a wēn) and proper reflection (yoniso manasikāra, chèng szu wei)."24 This passage was quoted by Yasomitra when he wanted to illustrate the synonymous use of the two terms in the early Buddhist texts.25 Therefore, the view expressed by some of the modern critics of Buddhism that "hetu is the seed, pratyaya the soil, rain, sunshine, etc." (see above) does not seem to be applicable in the literature cited above. Such definitions would wrongly imply that in the early Buddhist texts hetu (yin) denotes 'cause' and paccaya (yuàn) stands for 'condition,' thus making only a common-sense distinction.26

Let us consider the example quoted by Soothill and Hodous to illustrate the distinction between 'cause' and 'condition.' This very example is found in the Samyukta, both in the Pali and the Chinese versions.27 There, Bhikkhunī Selā rejects two of the existing theories of causation, namely, self-causation (attakatāṃ, tsǐ tso) and external causation (parakatāṃ, t'a suo tso), saying "This personality is not caused by oneself, nor is it caused by another. It comes into being on account of a cause (hetum paticca)28 and disappears when that cause is destroyed."29 Then she cites a simile: "Just as a seed that, when sown in a field, will grow if it is supplied with the essence of the earth and moisture, so that [five] aggregates, the [eighteen] elements and the six senses come into being on account of a cause and disappear when that cause is destroyed."30 In the Pali version, hetum, the word denoting 'cause,' is in the singular, but in the simile three causes or conditions are enumerated: (1) the seed, (2) the fertility of the soil, and (3) moisture. Does it mean that the seed is the cause and the others are secondary conditions? If so, then the seed should be able to produce the sprout without the other factors, because according to the Buddhist theory of causation a cause must be able to produce or give rise to an effect invariably (see chapter 4). But in the above simile the seed is not capable of producing the sprout without the support of the other two factors. Therefore, in this case the seed itself cannot be considered the cause. Moreover, the seed has to satisfy several other conditions: it should be unbroken, not rotten, not destroyed by the wind or sun, and must be fresh and well planted. Otherwise, it will not sprout forth or grow up and attain maturity (S 3.54; TD 2.8c–9a; Tsa 2.7). A cause in this context can be described as the sum total of the various conditions.31
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This point can be illustrated further by another example from the Majjhima Nikāya. There we find an exact linguistic equivalent of the phrase hetum paṭicca in paccayam paṭicca, which clearly shows that hetu and paccaya were interchangeable and were used synonymously. It occurs in a passage describing the causation of perception. Although the text does not refer to all the conditions that have to be satisfied to make possible an act of perception, it refers to two of the conditions, the sense organ and the corresponding sense object. But as in the example quoted earlier, although there is more than one condition, they are referred to in the singular as paccayam.

These few examples illustrate two main features of the early Buddhist theory of causation that have been misunderstood by some scholars. First, early Buddhist theory transcends the common-sense notion of causation. While recognizing several factors that are necessary to produce an effect, it does not select one from a set of jointly sufficient conditions and present it as the cause of the effect. In speaking of causation, it recognizes a system whose parts are mutually dependent. This dependence has been designated the ‘dependent origination’ (paṭiccasamuppāda), which conforms with the definition given by Buddhaghosa. Thus, although there are several factors, all of them constitute one system or event and therefore are referred to in the singular. Only if a cause includes all the necessary factors will it give rise to the effect. In taking this position, early Buddhism did not make any distinction between cause (hetu, yin) and condition (pratyaya, yūan), even though current convention did recognize such a distinction.

The definition of a cause as the sum total of several factors that gives rise to a consequent led to further developments in the Buddhist theory of causality later. During the period of the Abhidhamma, the Buddhists started investigating the nature of the several factors that constitute a cause. They found that each of the several factors stands in a different relationship to the effect. These different types of relation were analyzed in the Paṭṭhāna of the Theravādins and philosophical treatises of the other schools of Buddhism.

When the analysis of ‘jointly sufficient conditions’ was undertaken during the period of the Abhidhamma, the meaning of hetu (yin) was restricted to ‘root’ or ‘primary,’ but pratyaya (yūan),
which stood for ‘cause’ in general, came to be prefixed by various terms such as *hetu* and *ālambana*. In this manner arose the compound *hetu-pratyaya* (*yin yüan*), which means ‘primary or root cause.’ In this case *hetu* is only an adjective qualifying the word *pratyaya*, and *hetu* alone does not seem to have been used to mean ‘primary cause.’ With this specialization of the meaning of *hetu*, its former function of denoting ‘cause’ was taken over by *pratyaya*. But the Yogācārins also retained the earlier meaning of *hetu* as ‘cause’ in general (see below). According to the Ābhidhammika definition, *paccaya* is “that depending on which the [fruit or effect] derived comes,” with *hetu* meaning ‘root’. A similar definition of *pratyaya* is given by Nāgārjuna in the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*: “Those which, through dependence, give rise [to effects] are called the pratyayas.”

Viewing the simile quoted by Soothill and Hodous in light of this new analysis, we maintain that the seed would be *hetu-pratyaya* (*yin yüan*), meaning ‘root cause,’ not *hetu* (*yin*). The essence of the earth, moisture, and temperature may be put into the category of nutritive cause (*āhāra-paccaya*). The earth (*ti*), as given in the Chinese texts, may be considered a supporting cause (*nissaya-paccaya*). *Paccaya* or *pratyaya* or *yüan*, therefore, stands for ‘cause,’ whether as a root or in some other capacity. As pointed out earlier, the use of *hetu* (*yin*) to denote cause in general was not completely abandoned, for we find references to ten *hetus* (sometimes called *kāraṇa* or *nēng tso*), which again are qualified by various prefixes, for example, “supporting cause” (*sahakāri-hetu*, *t’ung shih yin* and *sahakāri-kāraṇa*, *t’ung shih nēng tso*). It is important to note that these different types of causes do not, by themselves, invariably give rise to effects. Although for purposes of examination various causes are distinguished, they do not make any difference in the production of the effects.

It was the Sarvāstivāda school that appears to have distinguished between *hetu* (*yin*) and *pratyaya* (*yüan*), which misled the scholars mentioned above into believing that all Buddhists did so. The Sarvāstivādins formulated a theory of six *hetus*:  

1. *kāraṇa-hetu*, *nēng tso yin*.
2. *sahabhū-hetu*, *chū yu yin*.
3. *sahāga-hetu*, *hsiang ying yin*.
4. *samprayuktaka-hetu*, *t’ung lui yin*.  
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5. sarvatraga-hetu, pien hsing yin.
6. vipāka-hetu, i shu yin.43

They also formulated a theory of four pratyayas:

1. hetu-pratyaya, yin yüan.
2. samanantara-pratyaya, têng wu chien yüan.
3. ālambana-pratyaya, suo yüan yüan.
4. adhipati-pratyaya, tsêng shang yüan.44

That the Sarvāstivādins were the first to formulate a theory of causality with two aspects, hetu (yin) and pratyaya (yüan), is sufficient evidence that they were the first to make a distinction between hetu and pratyaya.45 Moreover, this distinction does not carry the imprint of authority from the sutras, as is evident in the inability of the Sarvāstivādins to quote a statement therefrom to support it. They merely say that the sutras (that deal with the six hetus) are lost, while at the same time they quote statements from the sutras to justify the synonymous use of the two terms.46

Apart from the formulation of a theory of causality with two facets, there is a statement in the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya that indicates recognition of a distinction between hetu and pratyaya. It is a quotation from an unnamed sutra and is preserved in the Sanskrit version as well as in two Chinese translations, one by Hsian Tsang and the other by Paramārtha. The Sanskrit version reads,

Tathā cakṣur bhikṣo hetū rūpāṇi pratyayaḥ cakṣurvidgna-syotpādāya,

and may be translated,

In this manner, monks, the visual organ is the cause (hetu) and form the condition (pratyaya) for the arising of visual consciousness.47

The specific use of hetu to describe the visual organ and pratyaya to refer to the external object is very significant.48 Analyzing this causal process of perception in light of the common-sense notion of causation, it can be maintained that the visual organ is the ‘cause’ and the external object the ‘condition’ or ‘contributory cause.’ In an act of perception, common sense would suggest that the visual organ is more important as a cause than an object of
perception. Therefore, it would be possible to say that the Sarvāstivādin distinction between *hetu* (*yin*) and *pratyaya* (*yuan*) corresponds to the distinction between cause and condition in the common-sense notion of causation.

It is of interest to investigate the source of the quotation above from the *Abhidharmakosa*. In his edition of the Chinese version of the *Abhidharmakosa*, Saeki Kyokuga identifies this passage with a statement in the *Samyukta Ágama* (Kando ed., 9.6). This seems to be a reference to the wood-block edition of the Chinese Tripitaka and is thus not easily accessible. The question is resolved by Nishi Giyū. In his Japanese translation of the *Abhidharmakosa* appearing in the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō*, he refers to the Taishō edition of the Ágamas, where the *Samyukta* statement occurs as yen yin yüan sê yen shih sheng. The Pali version of this statement is found elsewhere as *cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppañjata cakkhuvinnānaṃ*. It occurs in several places in the Pali Nikāyas, the Chinese Ágamas, and even in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts of a later date. It may be translated,

Visual perception [or consciousness] depends upon the visual organ and the visible object in order to arise.

This is a stereotyped description of the causation of perception found in the Buddhist texts.

It is quite evident that there is a difference between the statement in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* and its Chinese versions on the one hand and the statement in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Ágamas on the other. The *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* version presents the visual organ (*cakṣu, yen*) as the *hetu* (*yin*) and the external object (*rupa, sē*) as the *pratyaya* (*yuan*). But no such distinction is implied in the Pali Nikāya and the Chinese Ágama versions. In fact, even the later Pali scholiasts seemed to consider the sense organ and the sense object on a par as far as their causal capacity is concerned. In the Nikāyas and the Ágamas no statement corresponds to that in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*. This leads us to conclude that if the Sarvāstivādins were actually quoting from the sutras (included in the Nikāyas and the Ágamas), they changed the statement found in the sutras to suit their own theory of causation.
Clarification of Terminology

If the Sarvastivādins recognized a distinction between cause and condition, their theory of causation would fall in line with the common-sense notion of causation. The distinction between cause and condition is said to be the result of the common-sense notion of a ‘thing.’ It is believed that “commonsense distinguishes between a thing and its states.” The thing or phenomenon is regarded as something substantial—a substance persisting through a period of time—but it has states that change. This common-sense notion of substance was, no doubt, a basic part of the Sarvastivāda teachings. For the first time in the history of Buddhist thought, the Sarvastivādins accepted a bifurcation of elements as having substance and characteristics (see chapter 4). This came to be called dravyavāda and is believed to be the result of Vaiśeṣika influence. The acceptance of such a bifurcation leads to the recognition of a distinction between cause and condition. For example, if clay is considered the substance, and the form it assumes (jar, etc.) its characteristics or states, then clay itself would be taken as the cause, while the potter, and the potter’s wheel, etc., which give clay its shape, would be only subsidiary conditions. Thus, all evidence, textual as well as doctrinal, proves that the Sarvastivādins were the first to make a distinction between a cause (hetu, yin) and condition (pratyaya, yūan).

Therefore, when Yaśomitra wrote the Sphutārthābhidharmakośavyākhya, the Buddhist scholars differed as to the nature of hetu (yin) and pratyaya (yūan). In one place Yaśomitra refers to the earlier view in which the terms were used synonymously. A quotation from the suttas is given to prove this point. Later, commenting on the statement cakṣur bhikṣo hetur iti (see above), he refers to several dissenting views thus: “Hetu is the proximate cause, the remote one is the pratyaya; others say hetu is what generates [or produces], whereas pratyaya is only the supporting condition; still others maintain that the two are synonymous.”

As far as we know, the only Theravādin text that upholds this distinction between hetu and paccaya is the Nettippakarana, included in the Khuddaka Nikāya. Discussing requisites or conditions (parikkhāra-hāra), it says, “two things give rise to or produce [a phenomenon], cause and condition.” Explaining the characteristics of a cause and a condition, the same treatise points out
that the cause has the characteristic of being unique, and the condition the characteristic of being common. The example of the sprout is given to illustrate this distinction: the seed is the unique ‘cause’ for the arising of the sprout, while the earth and water, being common, are only ‘conditions.’ The discussion concludes with, “intrinsic nature is the cause, extrinsic nature the condition; cause is internal, condition external; the cause generates [or produces], the condition supports; that which is unique is the cause, that which is common is the condition.”

We agree with Nānanamoli’s comment, on the analysis of the category of requisites (parikkhārahāra) in the Nettippakarana, that the distinction between hetu and paccaya seems peculiar to this work and that in the suttas no such difference is discernible. Since a definition implying a distinction between hetu and paccaya cannot be found in the other canonical texts of the Theravadins, the compilers of the Nettippakarana may have been influenced by the ideas expressed on the subject at the time the Sphutārthābhidharmakosāvākhya was compiled.

While the Sarvāstivādin theory of causation consisted of the two facets, hetu (yin) and pratyaya (yuan), the Vijñānavādins and the Theravadins emphasized the theory of pratayas. The Vijñānavādins even extended the theory of pratayas by enumerating twenty subdivisions of the hetu-pratyaya (yin-yuan). Ten of them are referred to in the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya of Vasubandhu and in the Vijñaptimatratāsiddhi (Dharmapāla’s version). In the former, they are called karalā (nēng tso), and in the latter they are termed hetu (yin). This shows that even when the jointly sufficient conditions were being analyzed, the words hetu (yin), kāraṇa (nēng tso) and pratyaya (yuan) were used synonymously. The subdivisions of hetu-pratyaya (yin-yuan) are called kāraṇa (nēng tso) in one text and hetu (yin) in another. The division of hetu-pratyaya into twenty kāraṇas in the Abhidharmasamuccaya appears to be very significant. With the three other pratayas, they make a total of twenty-three, which corresponds closely to the list of twenty-four enumerated in the Paṭṭhāna of the Theravadins (see chapter 8).

After the Sarvāstivādins put forward a theory of causation with two facets, the Vijñānavādins seem to have attempted to resolve the problems created by this dichotomy by fusing the two theories together. The Abhidharmasamuccaya describes several
Fig. 1: Forms of hetu and pratyaya in the Sarvastivāda (Abhidharmakośa) and Vijnānavāda (Abhidharmasamuccaya) Schools
ways in which a primary cause (hetu-pratyaya, yin-yüan) can be recognized. They are by way of—

1. Self-nature (svabhāva, tzu hsing).
2. Diversity (prabheda, ch’a pieh).
3. Assistance (sahāya, chu pan).
4. Coexistence (sampratipatti, têng hsing).
5. Increase (ṛddhi, tsêng i).
6. Opposition (paripantha, chang ai).
7. Grasping (parigraha, shê shou).

In his commentary on the Abhidharmasamuccaya, Haribhadra maintains that the first two characteristics, self-nature and diversity, together establish the kāraṇa-hetu (nêng tso yin), and the remaining five characteristics, in order, elucidate the sahābhā (chü yu), saabhāga-(hsiang ying), samprayuktaka- (t’ung lui), sarvatraga- (pien hsing) and vipāka- (i shu) hetus. This clearly indicates an attempt by the Vijnānavādins to reconcile the two theories put forward by the Sarvāstivādins. While the Abhidharmakośa includes all five hetus, except kāraṇa-hetu, under hetu-pratyaya, the Abhidharmasamuccaya goes one step further to include even the kāraṇa-hetu under this category. Moreover, Haribhadra concludes by saying that all hetus can be included under the category of kāraṇa-hetu, thus making kāraṇa-hetu and hetu-pratyaya identical. The difference of standpoints of the two schools is apparent in Figure 1.

The purpose of the classification by the Vijnānavādins was to define hetu-pratyaya so that whatever causes (hetu, yin) appeared in the Sarvāstivāda classification could be brought under hetu-pratyaya. Even though the terms hetu and kārana were retained by the Vijnānavādins, they do not differ in meaning; they are interchangeable and are used synonymously. Therefore, we may conclude that early Buddhism as embodied in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, as well as the later Theravāda and Vijnānavāda schools, did not recognize a difference between ‘cause’ and ‘condition’ and that the words hetu and pratyaya did not denote any such distinction.
IV. The Conception of Dharma

IN OUR DAILY EXPERIENCE "we are accustomed to distinguish between occurrences that we regard as being regularly connected and occurrences that we consider to be accidentally or casually conjoined."¹ There is no doubt that primitive man discovered some minor uniformities, and that he made use of this knowledge as a guide to his daily activities. But where such uniformities could not be discovered he resorted to rituals and magical practices.² His ritual practices may therefore be explained as unconscious attempts at overcoming or avoiding what he considered to be accidental occurrences. The two types of events enumerated above, namely, those that regularly occur and those that occur accidentally, have been called uniformities and multiformities, respectively.³ Scientific knowledge is said to consist in resolving these multiformities into a uniformity of a higher generality and greater abstraction, or to explain the causation of what have been described as accidental occurrences, so that belief in events that sometimes happen may be replaced by belief in events that always happen.

The Buddha made a similar discovery when, with the insight he gained as he sat under the Bodhi tree on the banks of the river Nerañjarā, he was able to penetrate into the nature of dhammā.⁴ The truth he discovered is summarized in a discourse he delivered to his disciples later. There he speaks of two aspects of his discovery,
(1) 'causation' (paññicasamuppāda, yin yüan fa), and (2) 'causally produced dhammā' (paññicasamuppanne ca dhamme, yüan sheng fa).\(^5\)

The So-ch’u-ching makes this distinction very clear in using the two phrases yin yüan ch’i and yin yüan ch’i so sheng fa to denote paññicasamuppāda and paññicasamuppannadhamma, respectively.\(^6\) The former is further explained in terms of the causal formula: "When this is present, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises. When this is absent, that does not come to be; on the cessation of this, that ceases." This causal pattern, according to which things are conditioned, is explained in terms of the twelve factors of the special application of the causal formula (see chapter 5). Thus, it is a distinction between the causal relation and the causally related. The problem of causation, therefore, involves two aspects, the rule or pattern according to which things change, and the things themselves that are subject to change.\(^7\)

Analysis of the nature of causally produced dhammā throws much light on the problem of causation. The conception of dhamma (fa) is fundamental to Buddhist philosophy. Conze has observed that "In its essentials the Dharma-theory is common to all schools, and provides the framework within which Buddhist wisdom operates."\(^8\) The term dhammā is used in a wide variety of meanings.\(^9\) The implications of the term have been examined by the commentators, and the various uses are given in two slightly different lists.\(^10\) Wilhelm and Magdalene Geiger have amalgamated these two lists, giving five different uses as follows:

1. **guna**, Eigenschaft, Fahigkeit, Tugend.
2. **desanā**, Lehre, Predigt.
4. **pariyatti**, heiliger, kanonischen Text.
5. **nissatta** (= nījjīva), Unbelebt, Ding, Sache.\(^11\)

We are primarily concerned with the third and the fifth uses, which, for the sake of convenience, may be considered similar. Dhamma in this sense has undergone multifarious changes in the different schools of Buddhist thought. Our main attempt in this chapter will be to examine the conception of dhamma in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, referring to other developments when necessary.\(^12\)
A wide variety of translations of dhamma have been suggested by scholars. Stcherbatsky renders it as 'elements.' C. A. F. Rhys Davids seems to prefer 'phenomena.' Wilhelm and Magdalene Geiger have translated as 'Ding(e),' or more properly, 'die empirischen Dinge.' We propose to leave the term untranslated until the conception in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas is fully examined and assessed in light of later developments. Then we can determine which of the translations would best express the meaning of the term in these early texts.

The most important characteristics of dhamma are said to be impermanence (anicca, wu ch'ang), unsatisfactoriness (dukkha, k'u) and nonsubstantiality (anatta, wu o). Various other characteristics have been given, but they all are representations or even further elaborations of the three major characteristics. There is, for example, the triad consisting of impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, and change or transformation (vīparītāmādhamma, pien i fa). The last characteristic replaces nonsubstantiality (anatta), because change represents the opposite of substantiality or substance (atta, o), reckoned as the immutable substratum of empirical reality. Of the three characteristics mentioned above, the most important is impermanence (anicca, wu ch'ang); the other two may be regarded as corollaries.

Discussing the Buddhist theory of the impermanence of dhammā, Stcherbatsky makes the following observation:

The elements of existence are momentary appearances, momentary flashings into the phenomenal world out of an unknown source. Just as they are disconnected, so to say, in breadth, not being linked together by any pervading substance, just so they are disconnected in depth or in duration, since they last only one single moment (kṣaṇa). They disappear as soon as they appear, in order to be followed in the next moment by another momentary existence. Thus a moment becomes a synonym of an element (dharma), two moments are two different elements. An element becomes something like a point in time-space. The Sarvāstivādin school makes an attempt mathematically to determine the duration of a moment. It, nevertheless, admittedly represents the smallest particle of time imaginable. Such computations of the size of the atom and the duration of the moment are
evidently mere attempts to seize the infinitesimal. The idea that two moments make two different elements remains. Consequently, the elements do not change, but disappear, the world becomes a cinema. Disappearance is the very essence of existence; what does not disappear does not exist. A cause for the Buddhist was not a real cause but a preceding moment, which likewise arose out of nothing in order to disappear into nothing. 17

Stcherbatsky attributes this conception of dharma to the "first period" of Buddhist philosophy. 18 This attribution is not well-founded because the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, which represent the "first period," contain no such conception of dharma. Evidence suggests, rather, that the conception of dharma described by Stcherbatsky belongs to the period represented by the Abhidharma.

The Abhidharma Piṭaka, though regarded by the scholastics as having originated with the Buddha himself, 19 is no doubt a product of a later age. It has been observed that the teachings embodied in the Abhidharma Piṭaka represent merely an explicit form of the Dharma implicit in the Sūtra Piṭaka.20 This tendency to minimize the difference between the teachings of the Sūtra and Abhidharma Piṭakas is the cause of much misunderstanding regarding the relative positions of the different schools of thought in Buddhism. Evidence strongly suggests that early Buddhism, as embodied in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, represents a form of phenomenalism. 21 It is true that in speaking of the external world, or more properly of 'form' (rūpa), the Buddha makes reference to primary existents (mahābhūta) and 'secondary form' (upādāya rūpa).22 But this division is not equivalent to the division of matter into primary and secondary qualities found in many of the realist schools. The so-called primary existents represented by earth (paṭhavi), etc. are nothing but sense data. Hence, earth, for example, is defined as grossness (kakkhalatā).23 On the other hand, there are specific statements that knowledge of the external world is based on experience (vedanā), and that this experience is dependent on contact with sense data (phassa).24 Hence, any theory about the nature of the external world has to be based on sense data (phassa), and speculation that goes beyond sense data would be metaphysical and futile. Such theories are
based on hypothetical ideas about what reality ought to be rather than on verifiable data. In other words, they are beyond the sphere of experience (avisaya, fei ching chieh). 25

But with the Abhidharma we notice a gradual change in this philosophical outlook. The origin of the Abhidharma has been traced to an attempt to preserve the fundamental teachings of the Buddha after his demise. 26 The method adopted to achieve this end was to pick out the central teachings and analyze and classify them. Once the central tenets were determined, the next step was to classify and group them into various categories, sometimes in numerical order. 27 This process of analysis and classification continued until the formulation or compilation of texts such as Dhammasaṅgani and Vibhaṅga of the Theravadins and Jñāna-prasthāna and other texts of the Sarvastivādins. There we find the analysis and classification of dharma into material (rupa) and mental (citta, caitasika) groups. Such analyses and classifications had to be complemented by a system of definition, and in defining these categories the Ābhidharmikas seem to have followed their own ideas rather than those found in the early texts. For example, rūpa or form came to be regarded as nonmental (acetasika, cittavippayutta). 28 Such definitions led to a clear demarcation between mental and physical events comparable to the division of reality into mind and matter. Thus the philosophy of the Abhidharma assumed the form of a naïve realism or pluralism, which was very different from the philosophical outlook of early Buddhism.

The Abhidharma tradition in India then became exposed to various external, non-Buddhist influences. Philosophical speculation continued in the wake of the emergence of such pluralistic and realistic schools as the Vaiśeṣika, and the Ābhidharmikas also succumbed to speculation, engaging in an endless analysis of dharmas into their minutest forms. This process of analysis reached its logical conclusion when the Ābhidharmikas accepted the view that a dharma is a point in space-time. Thus, the Buddhist schools in India came to accept the theory of atoms (paramāṇuvāda) and a theory of moments (kṣaṇavāda). As Stcherbatsky himself points out, “such computations of the size of the atom and the duration of the moment are evidently mere attempts to seize the infinitesimal.” 29 These are the theories that dominated the philosophical atmosphere during the period of the Abhidharma, although
Stcherbatsky has attempted to throw them back to the time of early Buddhism. They are conspicuously absent, even in the Theravāda tradition before Buddhaghosa (see chapter 7). Setting aside the theory of atoms for the time being, let us consider the theory of moments, which is closely connected with the theory of impermanence (*anicca*) and which has created innumerable problems in understanding Buddhist conception of causality.

The difficulties faced by the Buddhists who accepted a theory of moments (*kṣaṇavāda*) is illustrated not only by the criticism of non-Buddhist thinkers such as Ānākara but also by the objections raised by Buddhists themselves. Śāṅkara pointed out that “Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit that when the thing existing in the second moment enters into being, the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission, it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of cause and effect, since the former momentary existence ceases or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.”

In the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Śāntarakṣita cites the view of Bhadanta Yogasena that causal efficiency cannot be maintained in the case of momentary existences.

Yamakami Sōgen wrongly accuses Śāṅkara of “complete ignorance of the Buddhist doctrine of Universal impermanence.” On the contrary, Śāṅkara has convincingly shown the logical implications of the theory of momentariness. His criticism does not affect the theory of impermanence (*anicca, wu ch’ang*) as expounded in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, or even the pre-Buddhaghosa Theravāda. The theory of moments, which is a product of psychological or even logical analysis of the theory of impermanence, presents a problem, as Śāṅkara and Yogasena have pointed out, with regard to the conception of causality. If a thing exists for one moment only, a moment being reckoned as the smallest particle of time imaginable, how can the causal efficiency of that moment be made intelligible?

The later Buddhists adopted two methods for solving the problem of causal continuity created by the acceptance of a theory of moments. The first was to recognize an unchanging substratum underlying the momentary flashes of the apparent phases of *dhammā*. The second was to formulate a theory of immediate
contiguity (samanantara) and grant causal efficiency (arthakriyā-kāritva or paccayatā) to the immediately preceding dhammā. As will be seen (chapter 7), the Sarvāstivādins adopted both these methods, while the Sautrāntikas and the later Theravādins criticized the first and adopted the second.

In his anxiety to defend the Buddhist theory against Śaṅkara's criticism, Yamakami Sōgen, says: "The substratum of everything is eternal and permanent. What changes every moment is merely the phase of the thing, so that it is erroneous to affirm that, according to Buddhism, the thing of the first moment ceases to exist when the second moment arrives."³³ This distinction between the substratum of a thing and its changing phases, a distinction similar to the common-sense notion of a thing as having primary characteristics and causal characteristics,³⁴ has been the keynote of Sarvāstivāda teachings.

In his discussion of the Sarvāstivāda teachings, Stcherbatsky uses the term "element" to translate the word dharma. "Element" has been defined as "that which cannot be reduced to simpler terms under the conditions of investigation."³⁵ Thus, in science, the term refers to the different kinds of atoms, the sort of material of which the world is composed. The use of the term "element" to render the word dharma may be in keeping with the teachings of the Sarvāstivādins. Dharmas are, according to them, the simplest elements to which an empirical object can be reduced. Stcherbatsky points out that these elements were considered to have four salient features: (1) nonsubstantiality (all dharmas are anātman)—this refers to all seventy-five elements, whether eternal or impermanent, (2) nonduration (all saṃskṛta-dharmas are anitya)—this refers only to the seventy-two impermanent elements of phenomenal existence, (3) unrest (all sāśrava-dharmas are duḥkha), and their unrest has its end in (4) final deliverance (their nirvāna alone is sānta).

After enumerating the four salient features of a dharma, Stcherbatsky explains the first of these in detail. He maintains that "the term anātman is usually translated as 'non-soul,' but in reality ātman is here synonymous with a personality, an ego, a self, an individual, a living being, a conscious agent, etc. The underlying idea is that, whatsoever be designated by all these names is not a real and ultimate fact, it is a mere name for a multitude of interconnected facts, which Buddhist philosophy is attempting to analyze
by reducing them to real elements (dharma).” Thus, according to the Sarvāstivāda teachings, as interpreted by Stcherbatsky, a being (pudgala) is nothing but a congeries of elements; it is in itself no ‘ultimate reality’ (not a dharma). This implies that although the individual is not a real individual, the elements (dharmas) that constitute him are ultimate realities. But these ultimate realities are separate, disconnected elements that, according to the second of the four salient features, are momentary (kṣanika). To use Stcherbatsky’s own expression, “they are momentary appearances, momentary flashings into the phenomenal world out of an unknown source.” Thus came about the dichotomy of an element as having a substance (svabhāva) that is unknowable and having a phenomenal appearance (lakṣaṇa) that is causally conditioned. While the underlying substratum came to be denoted by the words svabhāva and dravya, which are synonymous, the causal characteristics came to be differently conceived by the various Sarvāstivāda teachers.

The Abhidharmakośa, as well as the other texts dealing with the doctrines of Sarvāstivāda, refers to four main theories put forward by the school on the nature of the causal characteristics (lakṣaṇa). The first is the view advocated by Dharmatrāta, who taught a theory of change of state (bhāvanāyathatva, liù i). He maintained that a thing existing during the three periods of time changes its state (bhāva) but not the underlying substance (dravya). This process is compared to the different shapes assumed by gold, which itself does not change. Thus, the three epochs of time—past, present, and future—are differentiated by the nonidentity of the states (bhāva). Ghoṣaka, another teacher of this school, contributed the second theory, the view that only the characteristics of a thing are subject to change (lakṣaṇānyathatva, hsiang i). According to him, an entity always takes three courses. When a thing is present, it has the seeds of the past and the future. Likewise with things of the past and the future. This is illustrated by the example of a man who is attached to one woman but who is not at the same time detached from other women. Third is the view adopted by Vasumitra, who believed that a thing, when passing through the three periods of time, does not change its nature but changes its condition (avasthānyathatva, wei i). The condition is determined
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by causal efficiency \((kārita)\). "When efficiency is present, the thing is said to be present; when efficiency has been given up, it is said to be past; and when it is going to have efficiency, it is future."39 And fourth, Buddhadeva upheld a theory of change of relations \((anyonyathātva, tai \ i)\). A thing is said to change because of the change of its relation with the past and the present. Thus, a woman can both be a daughter and a mother. A refutation of these views is to be found in the \(Tattvasaṅgraha-pañjikā\) of Kamalaśīla.40 Thus, the Sarvāstivādins recognized "two hemispheres" in the world of empirical reality.41 One is the world of experience and knowledge; it has no ultimate reality since everything there consists of fleeting momentary appearances. The second is the world of reality, the reality behind the momentary appearances.

It is true that the Sarvāstivādins denied the substantiality of the individual \((pudgala)\). But compelled by the need to explain the problem of continuity resulting from the acceptance of discrete momentary dharmas, they came to believe in an underlying substratum \((svabhāva, dravya)\) considered to be eternal \((sarvādā asti, hēng yu)\).42 We agree with Ninian Smart that the "difficulties of this kind were one motive for the Realist school to insist strongly upon the existence of everything past, present and future: so that events could enter into relations with one another."43

By his interpretation of the term \(dharmatā\), Stcherbatsky seems to authenticate the Sarvāstivāda theory of eternal elements. A passage in the \(Mādhyamikavṛtti\) that had already appeared in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas declares, "Whether the Tathāgatas were to arise or whether the Tathāgatas were not to arise, this nature of dharmas remains." \(\text{(utpādād vā tathāgataṁ anutpādād vā tathāgataṁ sthitaiśvaiśa dharmānāṁ dharmatā)}\).44 Stcherbatsky seems to have taken \(dharmatā\) in this context to mean the "essence of dharmas," i.e., their \(svabhāva\) as opposed to their causal characteristics \((lakṣana)\).45 Therefore, he translates the word \(dharmatā\) as "ultimate realities".46 And as the statement in the \(Mādhyamikavṛtti\) goes, these realities are eternal irrespective of whether the Tathāgatas were to arise or not. As is pointed out below (chapter 5), \(dharmatā\) \((P. \ dhammatā)\) refers to the causal connection between two dharmas rather than an underlying substratum of dharmas. If \(dharmatā\) stands for the causal connection,
it cannot mean an ultimate reality (dharma svabhāva) as the Sarvāstivādins understood it, because Nāgārjuna and his followers rejected the conception of svabhāva, using the argument that svabhāva is opposed to causality (see below).

This theory that all dharmas in their ultimate nature (svabhāva) exist during the three periods of time, past (atīta, ch’ū), present (vartamāna, chin), and future (anāgata, lai), gave the Sarvāstivādins their appellation. Asserting that the theory of the Sarvāstivādins represents the earliest phase of Buddhist thought, Stcherbatsky quotes a passage from the Samyukta Agama. The Buddha is asked what is meant by “everything exists” (sabbatthi or sarvam asti or i ch’ieh yu), and he replies, “‘everything exists’ means the twelve ‘gateways of perception’ (āyatana) exist.” Stcherbatsky comments: “Now the twelve āyatanas are merely one of the many classifications of the elements of existence of matter and mind. The Sarvāstivādin school admitted seventy five such elements. These elements were called dharmas.”

We believe that Stcherbatsky misunderstood the implications of the above text. The statement “everything exists means the twelve āyatanas exist,” did not mean that the twelve āyatanas, past, present, and future, exist, as the Sarvāstivādins would have interpreted. There is no reference to the past and the future, or, for that matter, to any conception of time. Early Buddhism does not deny present sense experiences, or therefore, their causes, namely, the sense organs and sense objects. This idea is clearly expressed in the sutra that immediately follows the one Stcherbatsky quoted: “The visual organ and the visible object produce visual consciousness and contact. As a result of visual contact (yen ch’ū) there arise feelings that are either pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. This is what is meant by ‘everything exists.’” This passage clearly shows that the reference is to present sense experiences and their causes.

Moreover, the Sarvāstivāda theory of ‘everything exists’ (sarvam asti) not only implies the real existence of the twelve āyatanas, but also the existence of an eternal substratum (dravya) or ultimate nature (svabhāva). This idea is denied by the very sutra quoted by Stcherbatsky because it emphasizes that positing anything beyond the twelve āyatanas would be beyond the sphere of experience (fei ch’ing chieh = avisaya). Thus, even the so-called ‘elements’ (dharma) that, according to Stcherbatsky, were con-
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sidered ultimate realities by the Sarvâstivâdins are looked upon as being nonsubstantial (wu o = anatta). They have no substance (svabhâva) that survives during the three periods.\footnote{51}

The theory that everything past, present, and future exists is contradicted by yet another sutra in the Nikâyas and the Āgamas.\footnote{52} According to the analysis in this sutra, the Sarvâstivâda theory that dharmas past, present, and future exist oversteps the limits of linguistic convention. The version in the Pali Nikâyas reads thus:

"There are these three linguistic conventions or usages of words or terms that are distinct—have been distinct in the past, are distinct at present, and will be distinct in the future—which [conventions] are not ignored by the recluses and brahmins who are wise. Which three? Whatever form (rûpa) there has been, which has ceased to be, which is past and has changed is called, reckoned, and termed 'has been' (ahosi); it is not reckoned as 'it exists' (atthi) nor as 'it will be' (bha-

This statement should have served as a warning for the Sarvâstivâdins to avoid the mistake of maintaining that dharmas in their ultimate reality exist during the past, present, and future. The Sarvâstivâda theory may therefore be taken as a new development in the history of Buddhist thought resulting from the acceptance of the theory of momentariness. If so, it would be unfair to attribute the misconception (viparyâsa) of "perceiving a self in things without self, thinking of nonexistent things as existent" to all the so-called Hînayâna schools, although it may be attributed to the Sarvâstivâda school.\footnote{53}

Discussing the nonsubstantiality of the individual (pudgala), Stcherbatsky writes: "The underlying idea is that, whatever be designated by all these names, it is not a real and ultimate fact, it is a mere name [sammuti] for a multitude of interconnected facts."\footnote{54} This view is, of course, based on the statement in the Pali Nikâyas
and the Chinese Āgamas that illustrates the doctrine of non-substantiality: "Just as the word 'chariot' exists on the basis of the aggregation of parts, even so the concept of 'being' exists when the five aggregates are available." Examining the simile in that statement, it would seem that the chariot is unreal (nonsubstantial) because it is merely a name for a multitude of different parts (wheels, axle) assembled in a certain way. But are the individual and separate parts real or substantial? On closer scrutiny one finds that they too are unreal or nonsubstantial in that they are causally produced, just like the whole, the chariot.

Therefore, the view was accepted that just as the individual is unreal, so the component parts, the aggregates, are unreal in that they have no substance (ātman = svabhāva), being subjected to becoming (bhūta), composition, (saṅkhetāra), and causal production (paticcasamuppanna). Thus, anātman becomes a synonym of niḥsvabhāva. That the aggregates (skandha), taken not only in combination but also separately, are nonsubstantial is emphatically stated in the sutras. The Chinese Āgamas seem to go further in maintaining that even the aggregates taken separately are nonsubstantial (wūo = anatta) and unreal (k'ung = suūṇa).

It was this line of argument that was adopted by Nāgārjuna to refute the Sarvāstivāda conception of reality. He devoted one whole chapter of the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā to refuting the doctrine of the substantiality of the dharmas. Starting from the fundamental proposition in Buddhist philosophy that there is nothing in this empirical world that is not causally produced, Nāgārjuna raises the question, “How could a contingent svabhāva be possible?” Candrakīrti replies, “The concept of contingency (kṛtakatva) and substance (svabhāva) cannot be combined in one meaningful unity (asamgati-rtham), for they are contradictory (parasparaviruddhatvād). According to realistic logic, the term svabhāva has more or less the meaning of ‘thing-in-itself’ (svabhāvo). Even with regard to this definition, nobody in the world would designate contingent reality as svabhāva. So, for example, heat [as a property] of water [is a contingent reality and for that reason is not its svabhāva].”

Then Candrakīrti anticipates the reply of the opponent, which he states thus: “Svabhāva is noncontingent (akṛtaka), as for example, with heat as a property of fire, for in this example the inheritance
(samparka) of the thing (padârtha) and its attribute (antarâ) is not causally produced (ajanita). Therefore one can speak of svabhâva.” 61 To this the Mâdhyamika replies:

It must be stressed, of course, that this acceptance of a non-contingent svabhâva is only true from the point of view of common-sense experience (lokavyahâra). On the contrary, we maintain that heat as a property of fire is not a svabhâva, for fire is itself contingent (kritaka). It originates in correlation (sâpekṣatâ) with certain causes and conditions through the cooperation of various factors: the lens, fuel, the sun, or owing to the friction of pieces of wood. There is no heat independent of fire. So heat is also produced in correlation with causes and conditions and is therefore a contingent (kritaka). And being contingent, it cannot be a svabhâva, just as heat of water cannot be a svabhâva. 62

Here, too, the Mâdhyamikas were attempting to show that the dharmas are devoid of substance (svabhâva) because they are causally produced or are contingent. This is the very argument adduced in the Pali Nikâyas and the Chinese Âgamas to show the nonsubstantiality of the dharmas.

Moreover, the Mâdhyamikas quoted a statement of the Buddha to justify their rejection of the Sarvâstivâda conception of the eternality of the dharmas. Nâgârjuna says: “Recognizing the problems of ‘Being’ and ‘non-Being,’ the Buddha has, in the Kâtyâyana-sûtra, rejected the two concepts ‘it is’ and ‘it is not.’” 63 Candrakîrti points out that this sûtra is studied in all schools of Buddhist thought. 64 Also in the Nikâyas and the Âgamas the two concepts ‘everything exists’ and ‘everything does not exist’ are rejected because they are said to lead to a belief in permanence (sassata-diṭṭhi, ch’ang chien) and to a belief in annihilation (uccheda-diṭṭhi, tuan chien). 65 For the Buddha, these were metaphysical problems. The Sarvâstivâda theory that dharmas in their own nature or substance (svabhâva) exist during the three periods of time may be considered a result of metaphysical speculations on the problems of time and continuity. 66 There is no doubt that the Sarvâstivâda theory leads to belief in permanence, although Stcherbatsky attempts to show that it does not. 67 This becomes clear from the fact that Nâgârjuna viewed the theory of svabhâva in the same way as the Buddha viewed the Upanisadic conception of ‘Being’ (sat). 68
Therefore, in his attempt to counteract the Sarvāstivāda conception of *svabhāva*, Nāgārjuna found it appropriate to quote the statement of the Buddha refuting the Upaniṣadic conception of ‘Being’ (*sat*).

Even a later Theravāda text such as the *Kathāvatthu* is unequivocal in its criticism of the Sarvāstivāda conception of the ‘substantiality of dharmas’ (*dharma-svabhāva*). Ignoring this explicit criticism in the *Kathāvatthu*, Murti says: “It is a mistake to think that the Mahāyāna schools reversed the denial of the soul and reaffirmed its reality. If anything, they were more thorough in carrying out the Nairātmya doctrine. They denied not only the substance [of the individual, *pudgala-nairātmya*] but also extended the denial to the elements (*dharma-nairātmya*), which the Hīnayāna schools had uncritically accepted as real.” The theory of the nonsubstantiality of the *dharmas*, as pointed out above, was not new to the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. In the Pali Nikāyas we find specific references to the doctrine of the nonsubstantiality of all *dharmas* (*dharma-nairātmya*) in the locution *sabbe dhammā anattā*. Not being able to accept that early Buddhism made such a denial, L. de la Vallée Poussin, quoting a passage from the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* where this locution occurs, changed it to *sabbe saṅkhārā anattā*, indirectly implying that it is either a misreading or a later interpolation. This, no doubt, is another example of the way in which a modern scholar may be tempted to interpolate early texts to suit his own interpretation of the ideas embodied in these texts. Fortunately, the Chinese Āgamas seem to support the statement in the Pali Nikāyas, for we find the exact equivalent of this statement (*i chieh fa wu o*) in several places.

The conception of *dhārma* in early Buddhism, as depicted in the Pali Nikāyas, the Chinese Āgamas, and the Theravāda *Abhidhamma* as represented by the *Kathāvatthu*, would therefore be much different from the Sarvāstivāda conception. Hence we maintain that it was the Sarvāstivādins who propounded a theory of the substantiality of dhammas and that there is no justification for extending that criticism to the other Hīnayāna schools.

The second method of reconciling the doctrine of causal continuity with the theory of momentariness was adopted by the Sarvāstivādins and by the Sautrāntikas and the Theravādins with slight variations. The Sarvāstivādins accepted four moments of
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a conditioned thing (*samśkṛta*), one of which is the static (*sthiti*). This static moment was further defined according to its causal efficiency. "The production of a result (*phalākṣepa*) by a dharma endowed with potency gained as a result of coming into [present] existence and the harmony of [external and internal] conditions, is said to be the causal efficiency (*kārita*)." To maintain causal continuity among such momentary dharmas, they formulated the theory of immediately contiguous cause (*samanantarapratyaya, tēng wu chien yuān*).

The Sautrāntikas, who did not recognize the static moment, believed that a dharma disappears immediately as it appears. For them, what is perceived as a static moment or moment of duration is a series of successive moments with a continuous flow. They too employed the theory of immediately contiguous cause to explain the connection between two successive moments. Yet the conception of momentariness presented other problems. If existence is a series of successive moments, how can birth, decay, and destruction be explained? The Sautrāntikas attempted to solve this by maintaining that birth is the beginning of a series; decay represents the fact that in a given series each successive moment is slightly different from the preceding one; and lastly, destruction is the end of the series. The causality of each individual moment in a series is then reduced to invariable antecedence. But still they had to explain the origin or beginning of a series. It was to explain this problem that they presented the theory of causation that came to be known as *abhūtvā bhāva utpāda*, or *pēn wu chin yu sheng*, according to which the first member of the series being nonexistent (*abhūtvā*, *pēn wu*) comes into existence (*utpāda, sheng*). This theory of causation will be discussed in detail in chapter 7.

The Sautrāntika theory, which denies the static moment (*sthiti-kṣaṇa*) of a dharma, was given authority and sanctity when it was attributed to the Buddha himself. Kamalāśīla, in his commentary on the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, records the Buddha as saying: "All forces are instantaneous. But how can a thing that has no duration nevertheless have the time to produce something?" The following answer is given: "That is because what we call 'existence' is nothing but efficiency (*kriyā*), and this very efficiency is called a creative cause." This means that a dharma represents an eternally changing process.
Yet the problems raised against the theory of moments remained unsolved. The Sarvāstivāda solution to the problem, which was based on acceptance of a substance (svabhāva), although contrary to the Buddha’s doctrine of nonsubstantiality (anātma), was nevertheless more straightforward. On the other hand, the Sautrāntikas, while denying substance, merely assumed the causal efficiency of the momentary existence. But this very assumption was being questioned.

For some time the Theravāda tradition, as represented by the Pali Abhidhamma Piṭaka, did not have to face these problems. The reason was that the metaphysical theory of moments did not appear in the Theravāda tradition until the time of the great commentator Buddhaghosa (see chapter 7). Therefore, when the doctrine of momentariness appeared in the Theravāda tradition, the solutions presented by the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas came along with it. The Sarvāstivāda doctrines appeared in disguise in the works of Buddhaghosa, Dhammapāla, and the writers of the Polonnaruva period. The Sautrāntika ideas came to be advocated by Ānanda of Mūlaṭikā fame.

The foregoing account shows how the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas, in their attempt to present a logical analysis of the doctrine of impermanence (anicca), came to accept a theory of moments, which in turn led to several theories not consistent with early Buddhism. While the Sarvāstivādins accepted a belief in an underlying substratum in dharmas, thus going against the non-substantialist (anātma) standpoint of early Buddhism, the Sautrāntikas were led to adopt a theory of causation that was very similar to the one rejected by the Buddha (see chapter 7). These differences suggest that the teachings of the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu are not representative of the earliest phase of Buddhism.

What, then, is the theory of impermanence found in the early Buddhist texts? Hardly any evidence can be gathered from the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas to support the view that things were considered to be momentary (kṣaṇika, ch’ā na). We do not come across any statement such as, “All forces are momentary.” The theory of momentariness is not only foreign to early Buddhism but is contradicted by some statements in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. For example, two suttas in the Samyukta called Assutavā describe how a man should give up attachment to the physical body
made up of the four primary existents because the body grows and
decays, comes into being and perishes. Comparing the vacillation
of the mind with the change taking place in the physical body, it
continues: “This physical body made up of the four primary exis­tents exists for one, two, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty,
fifty, a hundred or more years. That which is called the mind,
thought, or consciousness arises as one thing and ceases as another
whether by night or by day.”

That description of mind and body
is not inspired by a theory of momentariness. In fact, it seems to
refute the idea of momentariness when it says that the physical body
is comparatively more stable than the mind. Physical bodies are
experienced as enduring for some time, although they are subject to
change and decay, which change is not perceived as occurring every
moment. Nor is there any suggestion that the mind is subject to
momentary changes. The suttas merely emphasize the relative
speeds at which the body and mind change.

This is an empiricist account of change. The statement, “All
conditioned things are impermanent,” it has been observed, “is not
given as a result of metaphysical inquiry or of any mystical intuition,
but a straightforward judgment to be arrived at by investigation
and analysis. It is founded on unbiased thought and has a purely
empirical basis.”

Buddhaghosa’s commentary on these suttas betrays an over­
whelming influence of the conception of momentariness. His
attempt, to again use Stcherbatsky’s words, “is to seize the infini­
tesimal.” Buddhagosa maintains: “Just as the flame of a burning
lamp, without leaving the area of the wick, breaks up then and
there and when it burns or flickers in succession throughout the
night it is called a lamp, even so, taking the succession [of states]
this body is presented as enduring for a long time.”

Here he is trying to explain the perceived duration of the body by resorting
to a theory of moments. It is reminiscent of the Sautrāntika solution
to the problem of duration. In fact, the Sphutārthābhidharmakośa-
vyākhyā uses the simile of the flame to explain the momentariness of
existents (bhūtāni). The explanation runs thus: “The movement of
the stream of elemental properties, whose nature is such that it
appears in successive places, is like the flame because of its momen­tariness. The comparison with a flame is given because the moment­
tary character of a flame is an established fact.” With regard to
mental phenomena, Buddhaghosa says: "There is no single thought that can endure for one night, or even for one day, for during a moment of the snapping of the fingers, there arises several hundred thousand myriads of thoughts." 

Does this explanation of Buddhaghosa represent the original position with regard to the theory of impermanence? In view of the empiricist attitude of early Buddhism, the answer would be no. According to early Buddhism, things are impermanent, not because they are momentary, but because they are characterized by birth (upāda, ts'ung ch'i'), decay or transformation (thitassa aññathatta, ch'ien p'ien), and destruction (vaya, mieh chin). Whatever is born is impermanent, since that which is born is sure to perish. What is conditioned or compound (sañkhata) is also impermanent, and so is that which is subject to decay. In short, impermanence is a synonym for arising and passing away, or birth and destruction. This pattern of things—that all conditioned things are impermanent (anicca, wu chang), unsatisfactory (dukkha, k'u), and that all dharmas are nonsubstantial (anatta, wu o)—is eternal.

The term dhamma, when applied to empirical things, is always used in the sense of 'causally conditioned dhammas' (pañuccasamuppanna-dhamma). The realization of this fact may have prompted Nāgārjuna to declare: "There is nothing in this world that is not causally produced." In the famous dictum that is held to summarize the Buddha's teachings, it is said: "The Great Recluse says that the Tathāgata has spoken of causally produced (hetuppabhava) dhammas, their cause [or causes] and their cessation." The Nikāyas and the Āgamas abound in statements such as: "sabbe sañkhāra aniccā, sabbe sañkhāra dukkhā, sabbe dhammā anattā." The last statement seems significant. Here the occurrence of the two terms, sañkhāra and dhamma, is intriguing. Do they refer to two different things? Or, are they synonymous?

The term sañkhāra, when it refers to a psychological fact, certainly means 'disposition.' But there are occasions when it is used in a very broad sense to refer to everything in this world. One prominent example is from the Mahā-Sudassana-suttanta where, referring to the glories of the famous king of the past, Mahā-Sudassana, his cities, treasures, palaces, elephants, horses, carriages, women, etc., the Buddha says: "Behold, Ānanda, how all these things (sañkhārā) are now dead and gone, have passed and
vanished away. Thus impermanent, Ānanda, are the saṅkhāras; thus untrustworthy, Ānanda, are the saṅkhāras. And this, Ānanda, is enough to be weary of, to be disgusted of, to be completely free of, such saṅkhāras."\(^98\)

The past participial form saṅkhata (wei) is generally used to refer to anything that is ‘compound,’ ‘organized,’ or deliberately ‘put together,’ hence synonymous with kata (iso) ‘made,’ ‘done.’ Thus, saṅkhata describes anything in which man’s dispositional tendencies (saṅkhārā) has played a major role. In such cases, the things that are carefully selected for compounding or putting together, that is, the components, may also be called saṅkhāras. In the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, the human personality consisting of the five aggregates is called ‘a bundle of components’ (saṅkhārapuṇja).\(^99\) Therefore; it is possible that saṅkhāra in the context above is intended to denote all the aggregates, including ‘dispositions.’

In contrast to these saṅkhāras, there are things that are not so deliberately compounded, but that are ‘natural’ or ‘causally conditioned’ (paṭiccasamuppanna). This means that paṭiccasamuppanna dhammas are to be distinguished from saṅkhāras (or saṅkhata dhammas). Thus all saṅkhāras are dhammas, but not all dhammas are saṅkhāras, because some dhammas are natural occurrences. If saṅkhāra is understood in this broad sense, then the above statement may be translated as: “All components are impermanent; all components are unsatisfactory; all dhammas are nonsubstantial.”

If dhamma is all comprehensive (and includes even saṅkhāras), the statement sabbe dhammā anattā will imply that all things, including the saṅkhāras, are nonsubstantial. Therefore, it is not possible to maintain that, according to early Buddhism, the ‘aggregates’ (khandha) are ‘substantial.’ In spite of the statement “sabbe dhammā anattā” occurring in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, where dhammā include all saṅkhāras or ‘components’ such as the aggregates (khandha), the editors of the PTS Pali-English Dictionary, commenting on the nature of the khandhas, say: “Being the ‘substantial’ factors of existence, birth and death depend on the khandhas.”\(^100\) In a similar tone, Murti says: “As a matter of dialectical necessity then did Buddha formulate, (or) at least suggest, a theory of elements. The Mahāyāna systems clearly
recognize this dialectical necessity when they speak of the pudgala-nairātmya—the denial of substance (of the individual)—as intended to pave the way for Absolutism. Śūnyatā is the unreality of the elements as well (dharma-nairātmya)."\(^{101}\)

These comments imply that according to early Buddhism the individual (pudgala) is unreal but the components (khandha or skandha) are real or have substance. But that view is contradicted by a large number of statements in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas that emphasize the unreality or nonsubstantiality of the khandhas as well. The most explicit denial of the reality or substantiality of 'components' is quoted by the Mādhyamikas themselves: "All form is comparable to foam; all feelings to bubbles; all sensations are mirage-like; dispositions are like the plantain trunk; consciousness is but an illusion; so did the Buddha illustrate [the nature of the aggregates]."\(^{102}\)

Moreover, the aggregates (khandhā) are considered to be causally produced (hetu-patīcca sambhūtā).\(^{103}\) The characteristics of the dhammas are said to be found also in the causes. They are said to be impermanent (anicca), conditioned or compounded (saṅkhata), and causally produced (patīccasamuppanna) and are therefore not substantial.\(^{104}\) Speaking of these three characteristics, C. A. F. Rhys Davids has rightly remarked: "Hereby we see how interwoven are these three concepts. . . . And they are held in such a way as to elude the metaphysical problems of (a) realism and idealism, and (b) of mechanism and atomism."\(^{105}\)

Thus we see that the causes and the caused have been described in similar terms. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that early Buddhism, as depicted in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, does not posit the substantiality of dhammas as the Sarvastivādins did. It was the awareness of this fact that led Candrakīrti to make the following categorical statement: "Indeed, the Tathāgatas never posit the real existence (astiṭva) of a soul or the aggregates."\(^{106}\) That statement directly contradicts the view expressed by Murti that the Buddha formulated a theory of elements as a dialectical necessity.

Another rendering of the term dhammā that may mislead a student of early Buddhism is 'phenomena.' There are two different theories of phenomenalism: (1) that all knowledge is limited to phenomena (i.e., things and events in time and space) and that we cannot penetrate into reality itself, and (2) that all we know is
phenomena, that is, reality present to consciousness, either directly or reflectively, and that phenomena are all that is to know, there being no 'thing-in-itself' or object out of relation to consciousness.107 ‘Phenomenon’ in the first sense may be a better rendering of the Sarvāstivāda conception of dharma-laksana. That is because it is opposed to dharma-svabhāva, which may be considered the equivalent of ‘thing-in-itself,’ thus coming under the category of the unknowable. ‘Phenomenon’ in the second sense may come very close to the conception found in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, where the emphasis is on sense data as the content of our empirical knowledge, with denial of any real substratum behind phenomena.108 Because early Buddhism did not recognize an underlying substratum in dhammas and because all dhammas were considered to be empirical, the rendering of the term as ‘die empirischen Dinge’ by Wilhelm and Magdalene Geiger (see above) seems satisfactory.

Stanislaus Schayer has put forward a theory of dharma different from those discussed above: “The extension of the term dharma to all elements of the mundane and supramundane existence is an innovation of the later scholiasts and . . . the antithesis of rūpa and dharma is a survival of pre-canonical Buddhism which actually divided the world into two opposite categories of rūpa and dharma.”109 He bases his conclusion on (1) the theory of ‘two bodies’ (dvikaṭa), namely, the rūpa-kāya, representing the physical personality of the Buddha, and dharma-kāya, the spiritual personality and (2) the use of the term dharma in the phrases dharma-ayatana and dharmadhātu, where it represents mental objects or concepts. If his theory is correct, then the use of the term dhamma in the famous passage that begins “ye dhamma hetuppabhava . . .” (see note 101, above) and the statement summarizing the Buddha’s teaching, (“paṭiccasamuppādañ ca vo bhikkhave desissāmi paṭiccasamuppanne ca dhamme [“I shall preach to you, O monks, on causality and causally conditioned phenomena”]) may have to be taken as referring to ‘mental facts’ only. But this is not so, for we find even ‘form’ (rūpa), especially nāmarūpa (ming se) denoting not only the psychic but also the physical personality, included under the category of paṭiccasamuppanna-dhamma.110 There dhamma is used in a very broad sense to include physical as well as mental facts. Therefore, the relationship between dhamma as signifying ‘concepts’ and
patīcchasamuppanna-dhamma as implying everything empirical can be diagrammatically represented thus:

In light of the above analysis of the conception of dhamma, it is difficult to agree with Stcherbatsky, Murti, Schayer, and others who interpret early Buddhism as a form of radical pluralism. Moreover, according to early Buddhism, pluralism (nānatta) and monism (ekatta) are metaphysical views,¹¹¹ which, as the commentator has rightly remarked, are similar to or associated with annihilationism and eternalism.¹¹²
V. The Causal Principle and Its Validity

IN CHAPTER 4 we investigated the nature of causally produced dhammā, which is one aspect of the Buddha’s discovery. This chapter examines the second aspect of the Buddha’s discovery, the pattern according to which change takes place in things (dhammā). The change in things is not haphazard or accidental. It takes place according to a certain pattern, and this pattern of things, this orderliness in things, is said to be constant. It is a cosmic truth eternally valid and independent of the advent of the Tathāgatas.1 This pattern has been variously described as ‘conditionality’ (idappaccayatā, sui shun yüan ch’i) and as ‘causality’ (paṭiccasamuppāda, yin yüan fa) (see chapter 3). Thus, according to the Buddha’s philosophy, there are no accidental occurrences; everything in the world is causally conditioned or produced (paṭiccasamuppamam). The realization that every occurrence is a causal occurrence is said to clear the mind of all doubts, a characteristic of the state of perfect knowledge and enlightenment.2 This truth the Tathāgata discovers and comprehends; having discovered and comprehended it, he points it out, he teaches it, lays it down, establishes, reveals, analyzes, clarifies it and says “look.”3 The significance of the discovery is such that, according to the Buddhist texts, he who perceives the causal law sees the truth, and he who sees the truth perceives the Buddha.4

This theory of causation has been called the ‘middle path’
because it steers clear of the two extremes (anta, pien) with regard to causation; self-causation, which leads to a belief in eternalism, and external causation, which leads to a belief in annihilationism (see chapters 1 and 2).

The general Buddhist formula of causality is often stated in the following manner:

**Pali version.**

"Imasmitp. sati idam hoti, imassa uppādā idam uppajjati."

"Imasmitp. asati idam na hoti, imassa nirodhā idam nirujjhati."6

**Buddhist Sanskrit version.**

"Imasya sato, idam bhavati, imasya asato idam na bhavati."7

"Imasyotpādād idam utpadyate, imasya nirodhād idam nirudhayati."8

**Chinese version I**

"Tz’ū yu ku pi yu, tz’ū ch’i ku pi ch’i."

"Tz’ū wu yu ku pi wu yu, tz’ū mieh ku pi mieh."9

**Chinese version II**

"Jo yu tz’ū tsē yu pi, jo wu tz’ū tsē wu pi."10

These may generally be rendered into English as follows:

> **When this is present, that comes to be;**
> from the arising of this, that arises.
> **When this is absent, that does not come to be;**
> on the cessation of this, that ceases.

There are two main points in the versions quoted above that should be clarified at the outset. First, in the Pali version of the formula, the same demonstrative adjective "this" (idam) is used, not the pair "this" and "that" (idam, asau), as in some of the Buddhist Sanskrit versions, although we have used the two adjectives in our English translation. Commenting on this question C. A. F. Rhys Davids said: "This should not lead the reader to see in the formula a set of merely identical propositions. Pali diction does not distinguish between the two terms in our way; but the context invariably shows that there are two terms and not one."11 Moreover, in any statement of causation it is held that the referents, in this case, those denoted by the demonstrative pronouns, "must differ from one another in at least one respect."12 The Buddhist Sanskrit version of the Praītyasamutpāda-sūtra, discovered in
fragmentary form, uses the two words "this" (idam) and "that" (asau). In the English translation above we have followed the Chinese translators, who almost always distinguish the two terms by the use of the two characters tz'ū ("this", "these") and pi ("that", "those").

Second, it has been argued that the form of the causal principle—"C, therefore E," or "E because C"—is inadequate to pour causation into because it has the form of an explanatory statement. It suggests only a reason, and does not express the idea of conditionality. This is true with regard to the Chinese version I, where the character ku denotes only a reason. But the locative absolute construction in Pali and Sanskrit (as in the statements imasmīn sati idam hoti or asmin satidam bhavati), and the use of the characters jo and tsē in the Chinese version II, seem to express the idea of conditionality in a more definite form. Those versions may therefore serve as a corrective to the Chinese version I.

Causality or causation (paṭiccasamuppāda, yin yüan fa), as described in the Samyukta, is synonymous with the causal nexus, for example, as between ‘ignorance’ (avijjā, wu ming) and ‘dispositions’ (sahkhāra, hsing). This causal nexus is said to have four main characteristics, (1) ‘objectivity’ (tathatā, ju fa ērh), (2) ‘necessity’ (avītathatā, fa pu li ju), (3) ‘invariability’ (anānīthatā, fa pu i ju), and (4) ‘conditionality’ (idappaccayatā, sui shun yüan ch'i).

A. B. Keith, who made a persistent attempt to restrict the Buddhist theory of causation to the so-called chain of causation, seems to have overlooked the importance of this passage when he said: "The lover of causation would have insisted on each link; for the practical Buddhist all that was necessary was to show that evil was caused and the minor details could be left vague." Let us examine these four characteristics of the causal nexus in detail.

The first characteristic, ‘objectivity’ (tathatā, ju fa ērh), describes the status of causation in Buddhism. We have already shown that some of the Upaniṣadic thinkers considered change, and consequently causation, a mental construct, a purely subjective phenomenon (see chapter 1). For them causation had no ontological status; it was a purely epistemological category belonging solely to the description of human experience. If causation were only a mental construct, then it would be a concoction or fabrication of man, a hypothesis without any real basis. Hence a very pertinent question is raised in the Samyukta Agama as to who
constructed or fabricated this theory of causality, the Buddha or some other person. Buddha's reply to this question was: "It is neither made by me nor by another. Whether the Tathāgatas were to arise in this world or not, this pattern of things (fa chieh\textsuperscript{18} = dhammadhatu) is eternally existent. Concerning this [pattern of things] the Tathāgata has insight, is fully enlightened." The Buddha's reply certainly emphasizes the objective validity of the causal law.

The 'objectivity' of causation is further illustrated in the Buddha's comparison of its discovery to the discovery of a buried city.\textsuperscript{19} The metaphor is stated thus:

Suppose a man faring through the forest, through the great woods, sees an ancient path, an ancient road traversed by men of former days. And he goes along it and sees an ancient city, a former prince's domain, where men of former days lived, a city adorned by gardens, groves, pools, foundations of walls, a beautiful spot. . . . Just so did I behold an ancient path, an ancient way traversed by former Buddhas. . . . Following that path, I came to understand fully decay and death, their arising, their cessation and the path leading to their cessation.\textsuperscript{20}

Of the four Noble Truths discovered by the Buddha, the second and the third refer to the theory of causation. These references would be sufficient to show that according to early Buddhism, as embodied in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, causation is not a category of relations among ideas but a category of connection and determination corresponding to a feature of the actual world, both subjective and objective, so it has an ontological status. It is a component of experience because it is an objective form of interdependence in the realm of nature.

Unfortunately, Buddhaghosa's explanation seems to have missed the point completely. According to Buddhaghosa: "As those conditions alone, neither more nor less, bring about this or that event, there is said to be 'objectivity.'"\textsuperscript{21} Following this, Nathmal Tatia has translated the word tathātā as "regularity of sequence" and considers it to be the positive characteristic of the causal law, while avītathātā, rendered as "absence of irregularity," is considered to be the negative characteristic.\textsuperscript{22} According to our understanding, this does not bring out the real implications of the
term tathātā. Tathātā (from tatha > tathā) in the early Buddhist texts means 'correspondence,' and as a characteristic of causation, therefore, it is used to mean that causation is not merely an idea or thought-construction without any objective validity, but an idea that corresponds to what is found in nature. This is very clearly expressed in the Chinese rendering of the term as ju fa ērh. This interpretation of the conception of tathātā finds support in Mahāyāna Buddhism, wherein the term is used to mean 'true essence,' 'actuality,' 'truth,' or 'ultimate reality,' and is employed as a synonym of satya. The use of tathātā as a characteristic of causation seems to be very significant, especially at a time when causation was either considered a thought-construction or was completely denied. In this context, therefore, the word can be interpreted as "what corresponds to reality."

The second characteristic of the causal nexus, avitathatā (fa pu li ju), has been rendered as 'necessity' which conforms to the explanation given by Buddhaghosa: "Since there is no failure, even for a moment, to produce the events that arise when the conditions come together, there is said to be 'necessity.'" Whether the concept of necessity should be included in an adequate formulation of the causal principle has been the subject of much discussion in recent years. The traditional anthropomorphic meanings attached to the word 'necessity' have been rejected, and the empiricist view that it denotes a lack of exception or the existence of regularity has been accepted. The word avitathatā, even according to Buddhaghosa's definition, means necessity in the sense of lack of exception. It has been observed that "If the notion of necessity is stripped of its anthropomorphic and fatalistic associations, it is reduced to ... constancy and uniqueness," a view that is also implied in the early Buddhist conception of avitathatā.

The third characteristic of causation or the causal nexus is 'invariability' (anatathatā, fa pu i ju), which Buddhaghosa defines in the following manner: "Since no effect different from [the effect] arises with [the help of] other events or conditions, there is said to be 'invariability.'" This definition should not be understood as implying "same cause, same effect" or "every event has a cause, and this cause is always the same." A theory of causation maintaining that if the same cause is repeated, the same effect will result, is said to have the shortcoming of emphasizing the sameness of
causes and effects.²⁸ It has no scope at all, "since the same cause never occurs exactly."²⁹ But 'invariability' in the early Buddhist texts does not refer to the nature of causes and effects. On the contrary, it refers to the nature of the relation existing between causes and effects. It only states that there is a constant relation between causes of certain kinds and effects of certain kinds. It emphasizes the constancy of the relation rather than the sameness of causes and effects.

The fourth characteristic of causation is 'conditionality' (idappaccayatā, sui shun yüan ch'i). That it was used as a synonym of 'causation' (paṭiccasamuppāda) in the early Buddhist texts (see chapter 3) points to its great importance. Buddhaghosa's definition runs thus: "From the condition or group of conditions that gives rise to such states as decay and death there is said to be 'conditionality.'"³⁰ Buddhaghosa's explanation seems to imply that a thing comes into existence only if the necessary condition or group of conditions is available. Conditionality as a characteristic of causation is still more important in that it prevents causality from being considered a form of strict determinism. It places causality midway between fatalism (niyatīvāda) and accidentalism (yadre-chāvāda) (see chapter 2). Fatalism, or strict determinism, and accidentalism are said to be the two extreme forms of lawlessness.³¹ If so, conditionality may be called the 'middle path' because it avoids the two extremes, namely, the unconditional necessity asserted by fatalism and the unconditional arbitrariness assumed by accidentalism.

It has been observed that "the statements of causal laws, and in general, scientific laws, do not assert that something will inevitably happen under all circumstances, regardless of the past or the present conditions. Quite on the contrary, statements of causal laws assert that if and only if certain conditions are met with certain results would follow."³² While this is implied in Buddhaghosa's definition of conditionality, it is also clearly expressed in the use of the locative absolute phrase in the general formula of causation—"When this exists, that exists"—where the word when represents the conditional particle "if."

Keith confused the conception of conditionality in early Buddhism with determinism when he made the following accusation against Buddhism:
Moreover, man has the power to act; strange as it may seem when one ground of the denial of the self is remembered, and the apparent determinism of the Chain of Causation, the Buddha has no doubt whatever that the determinism of Makkhali Gosāla is the most detestable of all heresies. The position is the more remarkable because one of the arguments in the Canon and later against the existence of the self is that such a thing must be autonomous, while all in the world is conditional and causally determined. But the issue is solved by the simple process of ignoring it and Buddhism rejoices in being freed from any error of determinism to menace moral responsibility. 33

Oltramare seems to agree with Keith, for he puts forward a similar theory that “Le Bouddhisme a poussé jusqu’aux dernières limites son explication phénoméniste et déterministe des choses.”34 These views are based entirely on a wrong understanding of the conception of causation in early Buddhism and its explanation of the problem of moral responsibility. This question will be examined in detail in chapter 6.

‘Necessity,’ (avitathatā, fa pu li ju) in the sense of lack of exception and invariability (anaññathatā, fa pu i ju), is also expressed in the positive aspect of the general formula of causation: “When this exists, that exists; on the arising of this, that arises.” On the other hand, conditionality is emphasized by the negative aspect, which is expressed by the second part of the causal formula: “When this does not exist, that does not exist; on the cessation of this, that ceases.”

In addition to these four characteristics of causation, which are specifically mentioned in the early Buddhist texts, there are a few other important characteristics that are not directly stated but are clearly implied by the causal principle. We have seen how early Buddhism criticized the idea of self-causation, which implied the prior existence of the effect (satkāryavāda), and the idea of external causation, which accounted for a previously nonexistent effect (asatkāryavāda) (see chapters 1, 2). The rejection of these two views may suggest that the Buddhist theory of causation expresses merely the constant conjunction of two things. 35 The first part of the general formula of causation, “When this exists, that exists,” certainly expresses the idea of constant conjunction or association.
While criticizing self-production and production of a nonexistent effect, however, early Buddhism was not prepared to reduce causation to constant conjunction, especially to constant association of successives, i.e., regular succession, because such a form of causation "does not represent a category of determination through change, but only as an antecedent."

Empiricists such as David Hume have reduced causation to mere succession or constant conjunction of impressions—supposedly based on experience. But such a reduction of causation to mere succession is meaningful if experience is analyzed only in terms of momentary impressions, moments being reckoned as the smallest and indivisible units of time. A similar definition of experience is encountered in a later school of Buddhism, the Sautrāntika (see chapter 4), which as a result of accepting the theory of moments (kṣaṇa), reduced causation to a mere succession of momentary appearances. In fact, this school's theory led to a denial of causation, as did Hume's. It is true that early Buddhism depended on experience (i.e., 'contact,' phassa, ch'u or 'sensation,' vedanā, shou) to verify the nature of reality. But such experience was not considered momentary (see chapter 4). Therefore, the causal connection itself becomes an object of experience. Thus, the statement, "When this exists, that exists," is immediately followed by, "On the arising of this, that arises" (imassa uppādā idam uppajjati), thereby combining the principle of lawfulness or constant conjunction with that of productivity. The use of the word "arising" (uppāda, ch'i) with the term "exists" (bhavati, yu) is therefore not mere repetition or only the statement of a concrete formula as opposed to the abstract formula given first. It represents, rather, a deliberate effort to include the idea of productivity in the statement of causation. This is further exemplified by the use of "dependent arising" or "dependent origination" (paticcasamuppāda) to express the idea of causation. Even the Buddhists of a later date who had accepted the theory of momentariness and emphasized the constant conjunction of things attempted to accommodate the idea of production when they defined a momentary thing as having the capacity to produce the effect (kārita or arthakriyākārita) (see chapter 4).

Another interpretation of the statement, "When this exists, that exists," is given by Nāgārjuna in Ratnāvalī. He finds in the
The Causal Principle and Its Validity

statement only the idea of *relativity*, not active causation. The example he gives is that the idea of shortness exists only in relation to the idea of length. The determination of a thing or object is possible only in relation to other things or objects, especially by way of contrast. Nāgārjuna maintains that the relationship between the ideas of ‘short’ and ‘long’ does not owe to intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). This rare interpretation of the causal principle is not completely foreign to the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas, for in one place in the *Samyukta* the idea of relativity is clearly expressed: “That which is the element of light . . . is seen to exist on account of [in relation to] darkness; that which is the element of good is seen to exist on account of bad; that which is the element of space is seen to exist on account of form (*rūpa*).”

Comparing the theories of causation advanced by the practical agent and the scientific investigator, Stebbing says: “The practical agent, however, is content with a relation that is determinate only in the direction from cause to effect: whenever X occurs, E occurs. Such a relation may be many-one; given the cause, the effect is determined, but not conversely. But a scientific investigator wants to find a relation that is equally determinate in either direction, that is, he seeks a one-one relation: whenever X occurs, E occurs, and E does not occur unless X has occurred.” The general statement of causation, “Whenever this exists, that exists or comes to be,” when coupled with the negative aspect, “Whenever this does not exist, that does not exist or come to be,” seems to establish a one-one relation which, according to Stebbing, is a scientific theory of causation.

Apart from the one-one relation discussed above, we come across the “practical commonsense view,” which implies the existence of a plurality of causes. It has been noted that: “When a plurality of causes is asserted for an effect, the *effect* is not analysed carefully. Instances which have significant differences are taken to illustrate the *same effect*. These differences escape the untrained eye, although they are noticed by the expert.” In the *Dvayata-anupassanā-sutta* of the *Sutta-nipāta* the problem is raised of how suffering (*dukkha*) originates and how it can be ended. The Buddha replies that it is due to the substratum of rebirth (*upadhi*). But the Buddha seems to sense the interlocutor’s wish to know of other causes, for he says that according to another standpoint.
(añana pariyañeyena) ignorance (avijjā) is the cause of suffering. Then he proceeds to enumerate ten different causes, which are shown in Figure 2. This is an instance of a many-one relation that is determinate in one direction only, from cause to effect.

Thus, the causal principle as stated in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas seems to include all the features of a scientific theory of causation—objectivity, uniqueness, necessity, conditionality, constant conjunction, productivity, relativity—as well as one-one correlation. But the existence of such “practical commonsense views” side by side with a philosophically advanced theory may confuse the student of Buddhist thought. Such confusion can be avoided if we distinguish the different types of people to whom the Buddha’s teachings were addressed. They were meant

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**Fig. 2: A many-one relation**
not only for those who were philosophically mature and spiritually advanced, but also for untrained (sekha), ordinary people (puthujjana). The Buddha was reluctant to confuse the minds of the latter speaking of highly philosophical theories. His was a gradual path of instruction; hence, during the initial stages of instruction, the Buddha spoke to an ordinary man in terms intelligible to him.

The question of the truth about causation and the validity of the causal law was discussed briefly when the characteristic of 'objectivity' (tathātā, ju fa êrh) was examined. A detailed examination of this problem seems to be in order because of the doubts raised on this issue at every stage in the history of philosophy, both Eastern and Western. In the history of Indian philosophy before the Buddha, the first to deemphasize the principle of causation was the idealist school of the Upaniṣads, which, as was pointed out in chapter 1, denied change and therefore causation. This was because of the Upaniṣadic view that reality (ātman) is permanent and eternal. Thus, the denial of an entity such as ātman and emphasis on change as a matter of fact opened the way to fruitful speculation regarding causality. Such speculation actually gave rise to the very significant theory of the Materialists, that of inherent nature (svabhāva). Unfortunately, because of their extreme aversion to the idealistic metaphysics of the Upaniṣads, the Materialist thinkers not only rejected belief in a soul (ātman), but even denied the truth and validity of mental phenomena. Their suspicions about the different sources of knowledge such as perception and inference led them to the metaphysical theory of inherent nature (svabhāva) as an explanation of the pattern of change in physical phenomena.

Following a 'middle path,' the Buddha emphasized the objective validity of the causal propositions and the possibility of their verification through perception, both normal and paranormal, and through inductive reasoning. An attempt to find out the nature of the causal law in Buddhism, therefore, involves an examination of the epistemological standpoint adopted by the Buddha. The most thorough analysis of the early Buddhist theory of knowledge based on the Pali Nikāyas has been done by K. N. Jayatilleke. Without going over trodden ground we shall confine ourselves only to a few problems connected with the verification of the theory of causation.

Jayatilleke maintains that inductive inferences in Buddhism are based on a theory of causality. But according to some modern
epistemological theories, the theory of causation itself is based on inductive inference, thus leading to a circularity in the argument. In light of the Buddhist theory that will be explained in the following pages, we propose to distinguish between 'causation' and 'causal uniformity' or 'causality' and maintain that only causal uniformity or causality is based on inductive inference and that causation itself is given in experience. In the Western world, the view that 'causation' is based on inductive inference seems to be a consequence of the Humean analysis of experience. A detailed investigation into this problem is essential to understanding the status of causation and causal uniformity or causality in Buddhism.

Empiricism in modern Western philosophy is said to have started with John Locke and through George Berkeley reached its culmination in David Hume. Locke, appealing to experience, attempted to eliminate the Cartesian dualism as well as a belief in 'substance.' But Berkeley came dangerously close to positing a 'mental substance.' Hume, in his endeavor to reject the belief in a 'mental substance,' fell back on the introspective method. Thus, Hume came to adopt the Cartesian method of investigation in his desire to eliminate the belief in a 'self' (or substance), which he considered pernicious. To illustrate this method of Hume, let us quote from his *Treatise*.

For my own part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble upon some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are remov’d for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions remov’d by death, and cou’d neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I shou’d be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity.

The method adopted by the early Buddhists to reject belief in a 'self' (ātman) was very similar to that adopted by Hume. But the Buddha, and the early Buddhists, did not arrive at the conclusion to which Hume arrived, indicated in the second part of the paragraph quoted above. We pointed out above that in Buddhism
the rejection of the ‘self’ did not lead to annihilation. In fact, the causal process (which was referred to as the ‘middle’ between the two extremes of eternalism and annihilationism) was considered sufficient to explain the continuity of a thing without positing a ‘self’ or a ‘substance.’ But Hume was unable to accept that sort of idea because he considered causation nothing but a succession of discrete momentary impressions. Let us look at his argument:

I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.⁵₀

Though he declared that “Our thought is still more variable than our sight,” Hume does not seem to have distinguished between the different patterns of change available to experience. For example, change taking place in a flame appears to experience as being more rapid than change taking place in a piece of stone. Similarly, the pattern of change available or observable in thought is different from that of the external world. His analysis of space is found in the following passage from the Treatise:

The table before me alone is sufficient by its view to give me the idea of extension. This idea is then borrow’d from, and represents some impression, which this moment appears to the senses. But my senses convey to me only the impressions of colour’d points disposed in a certain manner. If the eye is sensible of any thing farther, I desire it may be pointed out to me. But if it be impossible to shew any thing farther, we may conclude with certainty, that the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these colour’d points and the manner of their appearance.⁵₁

Hume reached this conclusion regarding the nature of extension, according to which an object is analyzed in terms of points
(similar to the atoms, paramâtu, posited by Indian thinkers) after his speculation regarding the nature of time, which was a necessary condition of his entire philosophy. His conception of time is summarized in the following passage:

All this reasoning takes place with regard to time; along with an additional argument which it may be proper to take notice of. 'Tis a property inseparable from time, and which in a manner constitutes its essence, that each of its parts succeeds another, and that none of them, however contiguous, can ever be co-existent. For the same reason, that the year 1737 cannot concur with the present year 1738, every moment must be distinct from, and posterior or antecedent to another. 'Tis certain then, that time, as it exists, must be compos'd of indivisible moments. For if in time we cou'd never arrive at an end of division, and if each moment, as it succeeds another, were not perfectly single and indivisible, there would be an infinite number of co-existent moments, or parts of time; which I believe will be allow'd to be an arrant contradiction. 52

Now it is possible to see how Hume's arguments are ordered. Speculation on the problem of time, which he considered a necessary condition for the analysis of experience, led him to the view that time consists of indivisible moments, never coexisting but succeeding one another. If experience is analyzed in terms of time, time itself being considered momentary and discrete, the experience of external objects also has to be explained in this manner. Hence, experience of the objects of the outer world came to be analyzed in terms of points, discrete and momentary. 53 Once the experience of the outer world is analyzed in this manner, it becomes difficult to account for the causal efficiency of such discrete and momentary entities or even any kind of relation among them. The connection between them would merely be one of succession.

The conception of time and space arrived at by Hume therefore seems to be almost identical with the conception of moments (kṣaṇa) and atoms (paramâtu) held by some of the later Indian philosophers, especially the Vaiśeṣikas (Hindu) and the Sautrāntikas (Buddhist). We have already pointed out that the Sautrāntikas, as a result of their acceptance of the theory of momentary experiences (kṣaṇikavāda), failed to account for causal continuity.
For them causation was merely a succession of immediately contiguous (samanantara) point-instants. This, no doubt, was also the theory of causation accepted by Hume.

The theory of moments (kṣaṇa) may be a consistent logical development of the theory of impermanence, a theory intended to eliminate belief in 'substance.' It could also be considered a product of the introspective analysis of experience that was part of the Buddhist Abhidharma tradition. Judging from the sections quoted from the Treatise, it appears that Hume, too, emphasized momentary, discrete, and indivisible impressions as a result of his speculation on the problems of time and space as well as his introspective analysis of experience. After Hume, the idea that experience consists of momentary and discrete impressions gained such popularity among philosophers that causation came to be looked upon as a mere inference, not part of what is given in experience. In fact, B. A. W. Russell went so far as to maintain that "The law of causality . . . like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a by-gone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm." Russell's view owes, no doubt, to the circularity of the argument when causation itself is considered to be an inductive inference (not part of experience) and inductive inferences themselves are supposed to be based on the theory of causality.

But the position is not the same in early Buddhism. We have already pointed out that in early Buddhism experience was not analyzed in terms of moments (see chapter 4). According to the Assutavā-sutta, early Buddhism recognized several patterns of change. One was the experience of change taking place in one's own psychic process, and another was the experience of change in the outer world. In the case of the former, the experience is of rapid change. In the case of the latter, the experience is of a rather stable objective reality. With regard to the perceived physical body, it was said: "This physical body, made up of the four great existents, is seen to exist for one, two, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, hundred or more years." With regard to the thought process, it was said: "That which is called mind, thought, or consciousness arises as one thing and ceases as another whether by day or by night." Hume seems to have made the same distinction when he said, "Our thought is more variable than our sight," although
he does not remain faithful to that idea when he goes on to analyze experience. According to early Buddhism, physical bodies are experienced as enduring for some time, and although they are subject to change and decay, this change is not experienced or perceived as occurring every moment. This, as we have pointed out (chapter 4), is an empiricist account of change. But our perception of our own thought process is much different. It is experienced as being in perpetual flux, palpitating like a fish out of water. It is therefore extremely difficult to control (durakkhaṃ) and guard (dunnīvā-rayamī). The purpose of meditational practices is to gain mastery over our thought process.

If the objective world is explained in this manner, then it is possible to maintain that we have experience not only of individual objects but also of the causal connections between them. The following argument could be raised against that view: Although one is able to perceive the causal connection between two events that succeed one another without a pause or temporal gap (e.g., the connection between touching a live electric wire and getting a shock), one cannot directly perceive the relationship between two events that are separated in time and space, although action at a distance is recognized as a fact. In the latter case, one has to depend on one’s memory, which may not be reliable. This, of course, would not be considered a problem by the Buddhist, who accepts the validity of extrasensory perception.

According to the early Buddhist texts, the Buddha claimed to have attained the sixfold higher knowledge. Its forms are as follows:

1. Psychokinesis (iddhividha, ju i tsu).
2. Clairaudience (dībasota, t’ien êrh).
3. Telepathy (cetopariyāṇa, t’a hsin chih).
4. Retrocognition (pubbenivāsānussatiṇṇa, su ming chih).
5. Knowledge of the decease and survival of beings (cut’ūpa-pātaṇaṇa, sheng szū chih), also known as clairvoyance (dibbacakkhu, t’ien yen).
6. Knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses (āsavakhayaṇa, lou chin chih).

The first is not relevant to our discussion here because it represents a form of psychic power rather than an actual form of knowledge. The second is very important in that it suggests the
ability to perceive sounds well outside the range of normal hearing. It is said: "With clairaudience, clear and transcending human hearing, one hears two kinds of sounds, human and divine, far and near." This extension of auditory perception, both in extent and depth, would enable a person to perceive directly certain correlated phenomena that are only inferred by others. The Majjhima records an instance where a conversation between two people, the brahman Bhāradvāja and the ascetic Māgadhiya, was heard at a distance by the Buddha. Perceptions like these would undoubtedly give the Buddhists greater certainty about certain causal correlations.

The faculty of telepathy (cetopariyāna, t'ā hsìn chih) enables one to know the general state as well as the functioning of another's mind. One who has developed this faculty is said to be able to comprehend the minds of others in the following manner: "He knows it as a passionate mind, a dispassionate mind, a mind full of hatred or free from hatred, ignorant or devoid of ignorance, attentive or distracted, exalted or unexalted, inferior or superior, composed or not composed, emancipated or not emancipated." It is as if "one were to observe one's face in a mirror or a pan of water and notice whether there is a mole or not." In the same way one is able to perceive the workings of another's mind.

The Anguttara Nikāya refers to four ways of knowing another's mind. They are (1) by observing external signs (nimitta), (2) by obtaining information from others, (3) by listening to the vibrations of thought of another as he thinks and reflects, and (4) by comprehending the mind of another and observing how the mental dispositions are ordered so that he is able to predict that such and such thoughts are likely to arise. The first two ways fall within normal perception, and the last two are forms of paranormal perception. The first two ways can be called 'mediumistic;' the last two are direct perceptions. This direct perception of thought processes enabled the Buddha and his disciples who had developed such faculties to feel more certain about the functioning of mental phenomena. In fact, their certainty was so great that they were able to say, after observing a good number of cases, that "such and such thoughts would follow such and such thoughts invariably." The difficulty of knowing another's mind was, therefore, the raison d'etre of scepticism about the uniformity of mental phenomena. This kind of scepticism
is referred to by the Jaina commentator, Śilāṅka, when he said: “Scepticism is best since it is difficult to gauge the thought processes of another”.65

The fourth form of knowledge is retrocognition (pubbenivāsānussatiñāna, su ming chih), by which one is able to verify one’s own history.66 It is said: “When the mind is supple and pliant on attaining the fourth jhāna, one recalls one’s manifold past existences, one birth, two births, and so on for many periods of the evolution and dissolution of the world in the following manner: ‘I was in such a place with such a personal and family name, such a status, having such and such food. Dying there, I was born here.’ In this manner one recounts his various past existences in all their aspects and details.” This perception is compared to that of a person who, after going on a journey from village to village, is able to recall all the details of his journey.67

This knowledge of one’s own past existences is followed by the knowledge of the decease and survival of other beings. “With his clear and paranormal clairvoyant vision, he sees beings dying and being reborn, the low and the high, the fair and the ugly, the good and the evil, each according to his karma.”68 This knowledge is sometimes called the ‘divine eye’ (dibbacakkhu, t’ien yen), by which the Buddha could perceive objects that were beyond the horizon of normal vision.69 Disciples of the Buddha also claimed to have had visions of celestial figures beyond the reach of normal vision.70 Perceptions of this nature may have served as a basis for inferences drawn by the Buddha and his disciples.

By means of the knowledge of the past existences and the knowledge of the decease and survival of beings, the Buddha was able to verify the problem of rebirth. In Buddhism, the propositions about the phenomenon of rebirth are inductive inferences based on the data of direct experience.71 The Buddha is represented as criticizing the Jaina ascetics for not personally verifying the truth or falsity of the theory of survival and moral retribution.72 The Buddha and his disciples, in contrast, were said to have personally verified the doctrine of survival and moral retribution; thus their inductive inferences with regard to the possibility of survival were more certain.

With knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses, and also through the foregoing four forms of knowledge, one is able
to verify the four Noble Truths and the origin and cessation of defiling impulses. This form of knowledge is peculiar to Buddhism, whereas the four other forms, together with psychokinesis, were developed by the contemplatives of pre-Buddhist India.

Thus, having experienced particular instances of causation through sensory as well as extrasensory perception, the Buddha arrived at a general theory of 'causality' or 'causal uniformity,' which he considered to be a universally valid principle: "Whether the Tathāgatas were to arise in this world or not, this nature of things, this state of things, this orderliness of things, this causal pattern remains." The essence of the Buddha's enlightenment, as pointed out earlier, was said to consist of the realization of this causal uniformity (dhammattā). This causal uniformity carries more certainty for Buddhists since it is not based on pure reasoning and since it is not a mere mental fabrication. It is based on actual experiences of individual causal situations. Thus, while 'causation' is considered part of experience, 'causality' or 'causal uniformity' is looked upon as an inductive inference based on particular instances of causation.

Acceptance of the validity of extrasensory perception and the employment of such means of knowledge in the verification of the truth about phenomena led the Buddhists to attach a greater degree of credibility and certainty to causal laws. Extrasensory perception was recognized as a valid form of perceiving and verifying not only mental phenomena but also physical phenomena that are not given to immediate sensory perception.

One of the most important attributes of the five forms of extrasensory perception is that they are all concerned with the past and the present. There is no reference to the future. It is believed that the "essential function which causality has been supposed to perform is the possibility of inferring the future from the past, or more generally, events at any time from events at certain assigned times." Thus, after verifying a number of causal relations, such as between birth and decay and death, the Buddha made inductive inferences concerning the future. The knowledge of these causal situations was called the "knowledge of the [causal] processes" (dhamme nāṇam). Describing the inductive inferences made on the basis of such knowledge, it was said: "By seeing, experiencing, acquiring knowledge, and delving into these
phenomena, he draws an inference (*nayeṇ neti*) about the past and the future (*aṭṭhānāgata*) as follows: 'All those recluses and brahmans who thoroughly understood the nature of decay and death, its cause, its cessation, and the path leading to the cessation of decay and death did so in the same way I do now; all those recluses and brahmans who in the future will thoroughly understand decay and death . . . will do so in the same way I do now'—this constitutes his inductive knowledge (*idam assa anvaye nānām*)." This represents an inference from one specific instance to a general law or uniformity.

The foregoing discussion should help to determine the nature and validity of the causal principle in early Buddhism. To summarize, knowledge of causation is obtained through experience, and knowledge of causal uniformity is obtained through inference (*anvaya*) based on experience. The latter is especially necessary to understand the future; in other words, it accounts for predictability. This causal uniformity is considered by some modern philosophers to be a probability only, since sometimes we find instances that seem to violate this principle of uniformity. As a result, doubt has been cast on the validity of causal uniformity. This, as pointed out recently by H. Van Rensselar Wilson, owes to a confusion of standpoints, the epistemological and the ontological:

There are two kinds of problems connected with causation: epistemological problems and ontological or metaphysical problems. Although they are interrelated in many ways, it is possible for purposes of analysis to keep them relatively distinct, and in my opinion it is important that confusion between them be avoided as far as possible. It therefore strikes me as unfortunate to speak as though predictability (an epistemological concept) were synonymous with causal necessity (an ontological concept). Lack of causal necessity entails lack of predictability; but I see no reason to assume that lack of predictability entails lack of causal necessity.

The fact that the epistemological difficulties in sociological, psychological, and many biological situations preclude our *knowing* what all the specific relevant causal factors are in a particular case does not warrant the conclusion that there are none. Present inability to specify the values of a variable can hardly be construed as evidence that no such values exist.° This seems that the Buddha, while accepting the universal validity
of the causal uniformity, avoided making it a strictly deterministic principle according to which the cause should produce the effect under any circumstances whatsoever. Such theories of strict determinism (*niyati*) were held by some of the thinkers prior to and during the Buddha’s day (see chapter 2). It is against this background that we ought to evaluate the causal principle propounded by the Buddha. As a result of certain prejudices, some philosophers had refused to recognize the validity of certain causal factors operative in the causal process and thereby either tended to accept complete determinism, or, on the discovery of any instance of failure of this strictly determined process, indeterminism. This is very clearly brought out by a famous discourse in the *Majjhima Nikāya* called the *Maha-kammavibhaṅga-sutta*. In it the Buddha refers to some recluses and brahmans who, by a thorough application and concentration of mind, were able to see beings who had led an immoral life and had been reborn in an evil state. As a result of this telepathic insight, they concluded: “He who takes life, steals, . . . who is of wrong views, would be reborn in an evil state after death. They who know this have right knowledge; others are mistaken.” To consider this conclusion to be “the only truth and that all else is false” is, according to the Buddha, a very grave mistake. The difficulty of drawing such absolute conclusions is demonstrated by the Buddha. He points out that a person who sees a man reborn in a happy state after having led an immoral life comes to a conclusion diametrically opposed to the one given above. He maintains that there is no effect of good and bad deeds. The Buddha does not doubt the attainments of the person who perceives the phenomenon of rebirth and moral retribution; rather, he doubts the validity of the inference because certain aspects of the causal process were not taken into consideration. The Buddha points out that in the case of the person who had led an immoral life but was reborn in a happy state, there may have been counteracting tendencies. Perhaps he led a good life at some time during a past or present life, or perhaps he held right views at the moment of death. An interesting illustration of this problem is found in the *Lonaphala-vagga* of the *Anguttara Nikāya* (see chapter 6 for a discussion of this text). Thus, according to the Buddha, strict determinism and indeterminism are both extremes that are products of prejudice and ignorance.
VI. The Causal Explanation of Existence

THE CAUSAL PRINCIPLE discussed in the previous chapter was found to be operative in every sphere of existence. Later scholiasts refer to five broad spheres in which the causal process works. They are as follows:

1. The physical (inorganic) world (utuniyāma).
2. The physical (organic) world (bījanīyāma).
3. The sphere of thought or mental life (cittaniyāma).
4. The social and moral sphere (kammanīyāma).
5. The higher spiritual life (dhammanīyāma).¹

This classification is, no doubt, based on the various statements made by the Buddha to explain man and his environment.

Physical Causation

One of the problems that attracted the attention of the pre-Buddhist thinkers was the origin and development of the world. The keenness of the Indian mind for cosmological speculation is well manifested in the large number of theories put forward during this period. We have seen how speculation starting as far back as the time of the Rgveda came to be systematized and assumed final form in the theories of the Upaniṣadic thinkers such as Uddālaka (see chapter 1). Most of these thinkers accepted a First Cause such as Being (sat) and explained the world as the final product of evolu-
tion, mostly by way of self-causation. Others, who conceived of this First Cause as a personal creator God, considered the world the creation of this omnipotent Being. As we have seen, most of these views were known to the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Agamas.

For empirical and logical reasons the Buddha abstained from any discussion of the problem of the origin of the world (see chapter 9). He emphatically declared that “it is not possible to know or determine the first beginning of the cycle of existence of beings who wander therein deluded by ignorance and obsessed by craving.” Nevertheless, the Buddha found it necessary to give a rational explanation of the problem of evolution, especially to refute the claims of the Brahman caste to superiority which were based on the theory that Brahmā had created the world. Thus, the Aggaññā-suttaṇta, which discusses the evolution of the world process, was preached to explain the evolution of the existing social order, namely, the four castes.

Without positing a First Cause such as the Being (sat) of Uddyālaka, the Buddha, after stating that the beginning of the cycle of existence (samsāra) is difficult to know or determine, described the world as being subject to a process of dissolution (sāṃvātta, huai) and evolution (vivātta, pien):

There comes a time, . . . when, sooner or later, after the lapse of a very long period of time, this world passes away (or is destroyed). And when this happens, beings (who have reached the end of their life span) are reborn in the world of Radiance, and there they dwell; made of mind, they feed on rapture, are self-luminous, traverse the air, remain in glory, and thus they stay for a long time. There also come a time, . . . when, sooner or later, this world begins to reevolve. (When this happens, beings who have passed away from the world of Radiance, usually come to life as humans. And they too are made of mind, they feed on rapture, are self-luminous, traverse the air, abide in glory, and remain thus for a long time.)

Whatever the credibility of the above description, it illustrates two important features of Buddhist cosmological speculation. First, it implies that the world in which we live is only a small part of an extensive universe. Although speculation about the origin
and extent of the universe is generally discouraged in early Bud­
dhism, the vastness of space and the immensity of time are never
forgotten. In the vastness of cosmic space are found an endless
number of worlds, of which this earth is only a very small part.
The passage quoted above implies that there can be mutual in­
fluence among these different worlds. When the earth undergoes
dissolution, beings living there are reborn in another sphere, whence
they come back to earth as it starts reevolving. In this manner, a
continuity is maintained amidst dissolution and evolution, without
a complete extinction of life. Such speculations enabled the Bud­
dhists to avoid the question of the beginning of the world process
and therefore of life.

Second, the passage emphasizes the immeasurable length of
time between dissolution and evolution and between evolution and
dissolution. The processes of evolution and dissolution take periods
of time measured in eons (kappa, chieh). The duration of a single
eon is such that it can be explained only by parables. One of them
is, “[Suppose] there were a great mountain, one league in width,
one league in length, and one league in height, a solid mass without
chasms or clefts. And [suppose] a man at the end of every hundred
years were to strike it once with a silk cloth. That mountain would
be destroyed sooner than would an eon [pass].”

Describing the relative beginning of the process of evolution
(vivatta, pien), the Aggaññā-suttanta says:

Now at that time, all had become one world of water, en­
circled by dense darkness. Neither moon nor sun appeared.
No stars or constellations were seen. Neither was night
manifest nor day (neither months nor half-months), neither
seasons nor years (neither male nor female).

This passage is strongly reminiscent of the description in the
Nāsadīya-sūkta of the Ṛgveda. There, to explain the relative
beginning of evolution, the Buddha, made use of current specula­
tion in a way not inconsistent with his philosophy. Perhaps to
accord with the description of the state of the world at the time of
evolution, the Buddha maintained that beings of the world of
Radiance who were self-luminous and capable of traversing the air
were reborn on earth because no other beings could be expected to
survive under earth’s conditions.
Another stage in the process of evolution is described in the passage that follows the one quoted above:

And to those beings, ... sooner or later, after a long period of time, the earth with its savor was spread out in the waters. (Even as scum forms on the surface of boiled milky rice that is cooling, so did the earth appear.) It became endowed with color, odor, and taste. Even as well-made ghee or pure butter, so was its color; even as the flawless honey of the bee, so sweet it was. Then . . . one of the beings with greedy disposition said: "Lo now! What will this be?" and tasted the savory earth with his fingers. He, thus tasting, became suffused with the savor and was overcome by craving. Other beings who followed his example and tasted the savory earth with their fingers were also suffused with the savor and overcome by craving. Then those beings began to feast on the savory earth, breaking off lumps of it with their hands. And as a result, their self-luminosity faded away. Thereupon, the moon and the sun became manifest. When the moon and the sun became manifest, night and day became manifest. After this, the seasons and years became manifest. Thus far did the world evolve.

Comparing the foregoing description of the evolution of the world with the theories put forward by the earlier thinkers such as Mahīdāsa and Uddālaka (see chapter 1), we discern one of the salient features of the Buddhist theory of evolution. Whereas the theories of Mahīdāsa and Uddālaka explained evolution as a pattern of self-causation, the Buddha explained evolution in terms of the causal formula, "when this exists, that exists or comes to be; . . ." This is especially illustrated by the last part of the preceding quotation in its Pali version, where, as in the general formula, the locative absolute construction is used: "sayaṃ pabhāya antararhatiṣṭya candimasuriyā pūrurāḥsu; candimasuriyesu pūturūtesu nakkhatānī tārakarūpānī pūturāḥsu" ("When self-luminosity faded away, the moon and the sun became manifest; when the moon and the sun became manifest, the stars and the constellations appeared.").

Although this account of the evolution of the world from a chaotic state is no more than a hypothetical description (as every description of the evolution of or origin of the world must be), it
reveals, as T. W. Rhys Davids has observed, “a sound and healthy insight and is much nearer to actual facts than the Brahman legend it was intended to replace.” Its importance lies mainly in the fact that it gives a causal account of physical change.

The foregoing causal account of the evolution of the world should be supplemented by the causal account of the dissolution of the world, which is found in the Aṅguttara. The Buddha is explaining the impermanent nature of all component things (saṅkhārā, hsing) as introduction to the doctrine of renunciation. He describes how the great earth would be destroyed by a cosmic catastrophe:

There comes a time, after many hundreds of thousands of years, when there is no rain. All vegetation, including the giant trees of the forests, is dried up by the heat of the sun and destroyed. After another long period, a second sun appears, as a result of which all the streams and water spouts dry up and disappear. With the appearance of a third sun, the great rivers are parched and dry up without leaving a trace behind. The huge lakes that are the sources of the great rivers are completely dried up when a fourth sun appears. The appearance of a fifth sun is the cause of the gradual drying up and disappearance of the four great oceans. The waters of the four great oceans recede a hundred leagues and [continue] until they reach seven hundred leagues. Then the waters remaining at a depth of seven palm trees gradually dry up so that their depth is up to a man's ankle. What is left is comparable to the puddles of water left in the footprints of cows during an autumnal rain. With the appearance of a sixth sun, both this earth and Sumeru, the king of mountains, begin to belch forth clouds of smoke. Lastly, when a seventh sun appears, the earth bursts into flames, becoming a single sheet of fire.

Here too we find the general formula of causation applied to explain the gradual process of dissolution. The gradual increase in the number of suns appearing in the sky may be taken as a poetic way of describing an increase in the heat of the sun, which, it was believed, would cause the destruction or dissolution of the earth.

In addition to this description of the processes of evolution and dissolution of the world, we occasionally come across causal accounts of such physical events as earthquakes and drought.
Occasional reference is also made in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas to the causation of plant life. Most of these references occur in connection with explanations of the causation of the human personality, psychic events, or even moral behavior. Analogies are drawn between the growth of plants and the arising of the human personality. An explanation of the process by which a person comes to be reborn in an inferior existence, it is said: "Behavior is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture that cause beings who are deluded by ignorance and obsessed by craving to be reborn in an inferior existence."

Causation of the Human Personality

One of the most important problems that the Buddha had to face as a result of denying a permanent self (ātman) was how to explain the causation of the human personality and its continuance in saṃsāra. It was pointed out that the process of rebirth of human beings had been directly verified by the Buddha and his disciples, who had developed extrasensory perception. The process of rebirth was thus not merely an explanation of certain problems connected with moral causation. The problem for him was to explain this fact of rebirth without positing a permanent and enduring entity, which he considered an unverifiable metaphysical principle.

In the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, the human personality is generally represented by the term nāmarūpa or ming sē and sometimes ming hsiang, where nāma or ming represents the psychic personality and rūpa or sē (hsiang) stands for the physical personality. In further elaboration, man is explained in terms of six elements (dhātu, chieh): of earth (paṭhavī, ti), water (āpo, shui), heat (tejo, huo), air (vāyu, fēng), space (ākāsa, k'ung), and consciousness (viśñāna, shih). The psychic personality is represented by one element, consciousness, while the physical personality is further analyzed to show that a permanent element such as a material soul (ātman) posited by some of the Materialist thinkers does not exist.

But this analysis of the human personality into six elements was not as popular as another classification, which reduced the personality to five aggregates (khandha, yin). The physical personality is represented by one aggregate, form (rūpa, sē), while the psychic personality is further analyzed into four aggregates: feeling or sensation (vedanā, shou), perception (saññā, hsiang), dispositions
(saṅkhārā, hsing), and consciousness (viññāna, shih). This fivefold classification predominated in the early discourses because the Buddha used it to refute the conception of the more psychic self or soul that was accepted by the Upaniṣadic thinkers. With regard to these five aggregates, we agree with the explanation presented by C. A. F. Rhys Davids: "There is here no order in function and evolution." The four immaterial aggregates merely represent the different aspects of the psychic personality, which in the earlier classification was denoted by the element of consciousness (viññāna, shih). The five aggregates have been called the aggregates of grasping (upādānakkhandha, shou yin) because they represent the five things to which a person clings as his personality. It is specifically stated that these five aggregates of grasping, constituting what may be called the personality, are causally conditioned (paṭiccasamuppamma, yin yün sheng).

According to the early Buddhist texts, a being is conceived when three conditions are satisfied. First, there should be coitus of the parents; second, the mother should have her period; third, a gandhabba (hsiang yin) should be present. The first of these accounts for the seed that forms the physical personality (rupa, se). This is clearly implied in the Mahā-hatthipadopama-sutta, where it is said that the body, which is physical and which is derived from the four great existents, is born from the parents and is sustained by liquid and gross food. The second and third conditions describe the circumstances under which the seed provided by the parents will grow in the mother's womb. Even though the seed is provided by the union of the parents, if the mother does not have her period and if a gandhabba is not present, that seed will not germinate. Of these two circumstances, the first is purely a temporal one. The latter is very significant in that it determines the nature of the psychic personality of the new individual. Gandhabba (hsiang yin) in this context is identified with 'consciousness' (viññāna, shih), which is the psychic factor that survives physical death and which, in association with the fetus or the biophysical factors in the womb, helps in the development of the new personality. This consciousness is said to serve as food (āhāra, shih) for beings who are conceived as well as for those seeking birth (sambhavesī). The word viññāna (shih) is here used in an eschatological rather than a psychological sense.
In his analysis of the early Buddhist conception of viññāṇa, E. R. Saratchandra has rejected the view that rebirth constituted a central tenet of early Buddhism. He questions the interpretation given in the Mahā-nidāna-suttanta to the statement “depending on consciousness arises the psychophysical personality” (viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṁ). He thinks that it is due to the influence of the non-Buddhist belief in rebirth and insists that it not be taken as representative of the original Buddhist position.

Saratchandra sees a contradiction in the reply in the Mahā-nidāna-suttanta to the question whether the psychophysical personality would grow to maturity if consciousness did not enter the mother’s womb. He maintains that “The very contradiction inherent in the explanation shows it up as a later intrusion. It is said that, if viññāṇa did not descend into the mother’s womb, the growth of nāmarūpa would be prevented. If nāmarūpa here stands for the whole individual composed of mental and physical factors, we should have to regard viññāṇa as something over and above nāmarūpa, a position which is not consistent with the rest of the Buddhist teaching. Nāmarūpa, whenever it stood for the individual, always included viññāṇa as well.”

This view seems to us to be based on a superficial understanding of the early Buddhist texts. In the Aṅguttara it is stated that “conception (gabbhassāvak-kanti, sheng mu t’ai) is dependent on the six elements, and when there is conception, there is the psychophysical personality (nāmarūpa).” The six elements consist of the five physical elements and consciousness. Hence, conception is the conjunction of the two aspects of the personality, the physical and the psychic. This idea is stated more clearly in the Saṃyutta: “That which is thought of, that which is reflected upon, and that which is dwelt upon—that becomes the basis [literally, “object,” ārammana] for the establishment of consciousness. Where there is a basis, consciousness is provided with a foothold. When consciousness is established and develops, then there is conception of a psychophysical personality (nāmarūpastāvak-kanti, ju yu ming sê).”

All the statements just quoted emphasize that consciousness is dependent on a physical personality and that without the conjunction of consciousness and the physical personality there cannot be a psychophysical personality. While not denying the influence of the physical on the psychophysical personality, the Buddha
emphasized the importance of consciousness or the psychic personality because only it has a past history. It is the personality that survives physical death and, in conjunction with the new biophysical contributions of the parents, gives rise to a relatively new psychophysical personality. Therefore, when it is said that “depending on consciousness there is the psychophysical personality (viññānapaccayā nāmarūpam),” it means only that the ‘surviving consciousness’ is a factor in determining the nature of the psychophysical personality (nāmarūpa). Hence, the question in the Mahānīdāna-suttanta—“Were viññāṇa, ... not to enter the mother’s womb, would body and mind be constituted therein?”—may rightly be considered “a case of folklore speech adopted by the Suttanta teaching,” as C. A. F. Rhys Davids thought it to be. This conception of viññāṇa as a transmigrating entity is not, as Saratchandra tries to interpret the explanation of Mrs. Rhys Davids, an intrusion into Buddhist thought from folk religion.

While the term viññāṇa (shih) was used in passages describing the process of rebirth, it was also employed in the description of the attainment of enlightenment, because enlightenment culminates in the cessation of rebirth. In the Samyutta we come across two passages describing the passing way, immediately after the attainment of enlightenment, of two of the Buddha’s disciples, Godhika and Vakkhali. They “attained perfect release, with consciousness finding no support or basis (appatiṭṭhitena viññāṇena parinibbuto).” This statement has been brushed aside by Saratchandra as another popular interpretation. That the word viññāṇa in this context is used in an eschatological sense is further proved by the Chinese translation of this passage. The statement appatiṭṭhitena viññāṇena has been rendered into Chinese as wu yu shen shih (“there is no rebirth consciousness”) or as pu chu shih shen (“without continuity in rebirth consciousness”).

It is significant that the phrase shen shih has been used to render the idea expressed by the phrase hsiang yin (= gandhabba), which, as pointed out above, denoted an eschatological concept.

The combination of shih, the term for ‘consciousness,’ with shen is very interesting, especially because shen is also used to translate the word atta (ātman) meaning ‘soul.’ This conception of viññāṇa (shih) no doubt created problems, even during the time of the Buddha. We find one of the Buddha’s immediate disciples,
Sātī, affirming that “it is this consciousness that transmigrates without change.” Asked by the Buddha what he means by this ‘consciousness,’ Sātī replies: “It is that which speaks, feels, and experiences the effects of good and bad deeds.”47 He was thus admitting the existence of a subject or agent within the psychophysical personality, the agent of all the actions as well as the enjoyer of all the experiences. The reasons for the Buddha’s refusal to contribute to such views have been discussed earlier (see chapter 1). This, therefore, is a very clear attempt to interpret the Buddha’s teaching as being not much different from those of the Upaniṣads, an interpretation that has its modern advocates.48 Rejecting the idea of a permanent consciousness that functions as the subject or agent, the Buddha insisted that he had “in many ways spoken of consciousness as being causally produced and that apart from causes there would be no arising of consciousness.”49

The use above of the term ‘consciousness’ (vijñāna, shih) as a connecting link between two existences invalidates Saratchandra’s view that the concept of vijñāna in an eschatological sense is not integral to the early teachings. Moreover, while explaining the connection between consciousness and the psychophysical personality, the Chi’eng wei shih lun maintains that vijñāna in this context refers to the eighth vijñāna (according to the Yogācārins), i.e., ālaya-vijñāna or ‘store-consciousness,’ because the other seven forms of consciousness are not continuous.50

The fact is, the term vijñāna (shih), like the term saṅkhāra (hsing), is used in the early Buddhist texts in a wide variety of meanings that Saratchandra has failed to distinguish. At least three important uses of vijñāna can be clearly distinguished. First, it is used to denote psychic phenomena in general, synonymous with the terms citta (hsin), ‘mind,’ and mano (i), ‘thought.’51 Second, it is used to describe a complete act of perception or cognition (see below); and third, it stands for the connecting link between two lives, a form of consciousness that later came to be designated ‘rebirth consciousness’ (patisandhi-vijñāna). The first of these refers to psychic life in general, and the last two represent two important aspects of consciousness.

It is of interest to find out whether there is any connection between the last two uses of vijñāna, namely, the psychological and the eschatological. ‘Consciousness’ in an eschatological sense is
almost always associated with ‘dispositions’ (sañkhāra, hsing). The nature of the sañkhāras is exemplified by a statement in the Aṅguttara Nikāya that one who has attained “the state of concentration free from cogitative and reflective thought can comprehend with his mind the mind of another, and by observing how the mental sañkhāras are disposed in the mind of that particular individual, [he can] also predict that he would think such and such a thought at a later time.”

As is evident from that passage, the subject is not aware of this thought process, which is cognized by the telepathic insight of another. This, no doubt, is a reference to unconscious mental processes. This unconscious mental process constituted the ‘stream of becoming’ (bhavasota or viññānasota) and maintained continuity between two lives without interruption, but itself existed in a state of flux. A person who has developed extrasensory faculties is said to be able to “perceive a man’s unbroken flux of consciousness established both in this world and in the next.” This is the same consciousness that was referred to as gandhabba (hsiang yin), the consciousness that is said to enter the mother’s womb; it is even, according to the twelvefold formula of causation (see below), the consciousness that conditions the psychophysical personality.

In the last case, when it is said that dispositions condition consciousness, it means that the dispositions (sañkhāra, hsing), by conditioning consciousness, or more correctly the unconscious process, determine the nature of the psychic personality of the newly born individual. But these dispositions are ultimately the results of perceptive activity. This is clearly implied in a passage in the Sutta that discusses the difference between a dead man (mato kālakato, wei szŭ) and a man who has entered the state of mental concentration characterized by the cessation of perception and sensation (saññaivedayitanirodham samāpanno, ju mieh chêng shou). “In the case of a dead man, his dispositions, bodily, verbal and mental, cease to exist and are pacified; life has come to an end, breath is calmed, and the senses are destroyed. But in the case of a man who has attained the state of cessation of perception and sensation, even though his dispositions have ceased to exist and are pacified, his life has not come to an end, breath is not calmed, and the senses are not destroyed.”

According to this account, although the senses of the man who has attained the state of cessation of perception and sensation are
intact, because there is a temporary cessation of perceptive activity he does not accumulate any dispositions. The obvious conclusion is that dispositions are the results of perceptive activity. Not only the tendencies in the conscious mind but even those in the unconscious process are the results of perception. Therefore, as early as the time of the Nikāyas, the conclusion was reached that "mind is luminous by nature and it is defiled by adventitious defilements." This, no doubt, was the germ of the theory of the Yogācārins stated in the *Lāṅkāvatāra-sūtra.* But the question of when this mind, pure and luminous, first came to be defiled by adventitious elements was more or less a question about the origin of saṃsāric existence. Therefore, from the standpoint of early Buddhism, it was a problem that came under metaphysics proper.

'Consciousness' (*viññāna, shīh*) can be described as something that is conditioned as well as something that conditions. On the one hand, consciousness arises because of conditions (*paccayam paticcā, sui so yūan sheng*), for example, the contact of sense organs and sense objects (see below). On the other hand, as discussed above, it serves as a cause in that it conditions the psychic personality of the newly born individual. Thus, the problem of perception, as well as the problem of rebirth, which the Upaniṣadic thinkers solved by positing an immutable and perduring soul, were given causal explanations in the early Buddhist texts.

Causation of the Perceptual Process

The process of perception, which the Upaniṣadic thinkers also explained on the basis of a metaphysical self (*ātman*), received a causal explanation in the hands of the Buddha. For him, this was a problem of prime importance because he realized that all the misery and unhappiness in the world were due to the evils associated with sense perception. The Buddha thus found it necessary to explain clearly how sense perception takes place. He realized that a proper understanding of the sensory process would give insight into the origin of suffering as well as into the way one can attain freedom from suffering. Hence, in the *Samyutta Nikāya,* the higher life (*brahmacariya*) lived under the Buddha is said to be aimed at understanding the sense organ, the sense object, and sense contact, i.e., sense perception, because it is sense perception that leads to suffering.

The theory of sense perception is represented in the twelvefold
formula of causation by *sālāyatana* (*liu ju chiū*). The term *āyatana* (*ju chiū*), which, to use a word from modern psychology, means 'gateway,' denotes both the sense organ and the sense object. The origin of perception from the subject-object relationship is described in diverse ways in many places in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. One of the most important statements follows:

> Depending on eye . . . and visible form arises visual consciousness; meeting together of the three is contact (*phassa*); because of contact arises feeling or sensation (*vedanā*); what one feels, one perceives (*saṃjñāti*); what one perceives, one reflects on (*vitakketi*); what one reflects on, one is obsessed with (*papañceti*); what one is obsessed with, due to that, concepts characterized by such obsessed perceptions (*papañcasaññasākhā*) assail him with regard to visible form cognizable by the eye, belonging to the past, the future, and the present."62

The implications of this passage have been interpreted in various ways by scholars who have written on the problem of perception in Buddhism. The latest on the subject is by Nānananda, who, in his small but excellent work, *Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought*, has given a very clear exposition of this passage. He rightly points out its significance in distinguishing three important stages in the process of perception. The formula begins on a very impersonal note and follows the pattern set out in the general formula of causation ("When this exists, that exists or comes to be"). This impersonal manner of description is found only up to the point of feeling or sensation (*vedanā*). Then the mode of description, the grammatical structure of the sentences changes to a very personal tone suggestive of deliberate activity. Note the use of the third-person verb: "What one feels or senses, one perceives; what one perceives, one reflects on; what one reflects on, one is obsessed with." Thus, immediately after feeling (*vedanā*), the process of perception becomes one between subject and object. The feeling comes to be looked upon as belonging to a subject. This marks the intrusion of the ego-consciousness, which thereafter shapes the entire process of perception, culminating in the generation of obsessions. These obsessions, according to the commentator, are threefold: craving (*tanha*), conceit (*māna*), and dogmatic views (*diṭṭhi*). The final
stage in this process of perception seems to be different from the preceding two stages. It is no longer a mere contingent process, nor is it an activity deliberately directed, but an inexorable subjection to an objective order of things. At this final stage of perception, he who has hitherto been the subject now becomes as it were a hapless object.

This analysis of the process of perception is of tremendous importance for several reasons. First, it replaces the theory of an eternal and unchanging entity (like the ātman) considered to be the subject, with a causal account of the process. Second, while tracing the origin of ego-consciousness to the deliberate activity of the mind, it also accounts for the phenomenon of free will, without which a theory of moral responsibility is untenable. It shows that up to the point of feeling or sensation one is governed by a natural flow of events, a flow in turn governed by the causal pattern. But immediately after that begins deliberate activity, which can lead one either to subjection to the objective order of things, that is, to enslavement to things of the world, or to freedom from bondage to such things through the elimination of ego-consciousness (ahāmkāra or mamamkāra).

Let us examine the problem of free will in Buddhism. The reconciliation of free will with causality has been a perennial problem in philosophy. With regard to the problem of free will in Western philosophy, it is pointed out that the advocates of free will depend on the apparent indeterminacy of the future as compared with the determinacy of the past, because what is foreseen is considered to be fated. Jayatilleke presents another view in explanation of the Buddhist position. He distinguishes between physical and psychological causation and maintains that since causality “is a probability and not a necessity when psychological factors are involved,” one can admit freedom of will.

With regard to the first view, it has been well argued that dependence on future indeterminacy as the basis of a theory of free will is the result of ignorance. That is because “it is plain that no desirable kind of free-will can be dependent simply upon our ignorance; for if that were the case, animals would be more free than men, and savages than civilized people.” If we are able to recollect some of our past volitions, volitions that have changed the course of our lives, then we would certainly feel we were free
in the past. Similarly, we might be free in the future even if we are able to perceive our future volitions. Therefore, the definition of freedom that “our volitions shall be as they are result of our own desires, not of an outside force compelling us to will what we should rather not will”\textsuperscript{70} seems to be consistent with the teachings of Buddhism. This is possible only if we recognize the causal status of our dispositions and desires, a recognition that points to a Buddhist contribution to Indian thought when viewed in light of the theories propounded by the naturalistic schools current in India during the Buddha’s day (see chapter 2).

Jayatilleke quotes two statements from the Pali Nikāyas in support of his view that causality “is only a probability, not a necessity, when psychological factors are involved.” The first is, “A person who knows and sees things as they are, need not make an effort of will (saying) ‘I shall become disinterested’; it is in the nature of things (dhammatā) that a person who knows and sees becomes disinterested.”\textsuperscript{71} This statement implies that causality reigns supreme in the sphere of psychological life. As opposed to this, Jayatilleke quotes another statement that if a person “being ardent, gains knowledge and insight, and because of it, praises himself and disparages others,” he will not progress in spiritual development.\textsuperscript{72} Comparing these two statements, one in which causality seems to work and the other in which the same causal process seems to have failed, Jayatilleke concludes that causality is a probability when psychological factors are involved.

Acceptance of such indeterminism in the sphere of psychological causation would seem to go against the Buddha’s theory of the uniformity of mental phenomena (cittaniyāma; see above). But a careful examination will show that these two statements explain two different causal situations. According to the first statement, causality is a law valid in the sphere of psychological life. In the second example, the individual’s disposition, that is to say, his inclination to be satisfied with the knowledge he has gained, appears to have interfered with the natural process and therefore produced a result that is different from what it would otherwise have been. Thus, the difference between the two examples is that in the case of one a certain causal factor, namely, the disposition to be satisfied, is absent and in the case of the other, it is present. Only if we dismiss the importance of this disposition
as a causal factor can we maintain that causality in the present case is merely a probability, not a necessity.

On the contrary, the examples above illustrate very clearly that causality is not incompatible with free will so long as psychological factors such as dispositions are given causal status. In fact, the incompatibility of causation with free will becomes a problem when causation is confined to physical phenomena alone, denying its validity and the causal efficiency of psychic phenomena. It was the knowledge that causality was effective in the past, is effective in the present, and will be effective in the future that enabled the Buddha and his disciples to put an end to suffering and thereby attain perfect happiness and peace. This may have been a very good reason for the inclusion of ignorance of the past as well as of the future under the category of ignorance (avijja, wu ming). 73

Causation of Moral Behavior

We have seen that before the rise of Buddhism several different theories of moral causation had been put forward by Indian thinkers. The eternalists of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic traditions held the view that man is both the doer (kartr) of the actions and the enjoyer (bhoktr) of the consequences (see chapter 1). This theory was based on a metaphysical self (ātman) believed to reside in the individual. Hence they concluded that whatever happiness and suffering a man experiences owes to self-causation.

On the other hand, there were the nihilists, who denied any form of moral causation or responsibility. First, the Materialists advocated a strictly determined law such as the principle of inherent nature (svabhāva) (see chapter 2). Second, the Ājīvikas, led by Makkhali Gosāla, believed in fate (niyati) and therefore could not grant man's responsibility for his actions (see chapter 2). The Theists, who transferred man's responsibility for his actions to an omnipotent God (issara), were criticized by the Buddha as denying moral responsibility (see chapter 1).

Opposed to these different schools of thought were the Jainas, who considered moral behavior as being completely determined. The present, they believed, is completely determined by one's past behavior (pubbekahetu). Karma for them was an inexorable law that could not be escaped (see chapter 2).

Rejecting all these views as unsatisfactory, the Buddha gave
a causal account of human behavior. Behavior, according to him, consists of three forms, bodily (kāya, shen), verbal (vaci, k’ou), and mental (mano, i), and he emphasized the psychological aspect. Once, when explaining what immoral behavior is, the Buddha maintained that both bodily and verbal behavior has mind as the basis. On another occasion, he was interrogated by the Jaina ascetic Dīghatapassī, who believed that bodily punishment (kāya-danḍa, shen fa) is more blameworthy than mental punishment (manodanḍa, i fa). The Buddha turned the discussion from punishment (danḍa, fa) to action (kamma, yeh) and maintained that mental behavior should be considered more blameworthy in the commission or perpetuation of evil. This is a clear example of the Buddha’s emphasis on the psychological aspect of behavior rather than on external behavior manifested by way of body and speech. Hence, he defined behavior (kamma, yeh) as volition (cetanā, szū).

The Buddha’s emphasis on the psychological aspect of behavior led some of his contemporaries to think that he believed that “Bodily behavior is unreal. So is verbal behavior. Only mental behavior is true or real.” One such person was the ascetic Poṭaliputta, but venerable Samiddhi corrected this misrepresentation. Samiddhi pointed out that a man “experiences pain after having committed volitional acts (saṅcetanikam kammam, tso yeh), bodily, verbal as well as mental.” When the discussion between Poṭaliputta and Samiddhi was reported to the Buddha, he rebuked Samiddhi: “This foolish person Samiddhi has given a categorical answer to a question that demands a conditional or analytical reply.” After thus accusing Samiddhi, the Buddha explained the problem: “Having committed a volitional act leading to pleasurable feeling with the body, speech, and mind, one experiences pleasurable feeling. [The exposition continues with volitional acts, leading to painful and neutral feeling.]” Even from this analytical answer given by the Buddha it is evident that volition is the basis for the three forms of behavior, bodily, verbal, and mental. Thus, the two statements—(1) that mind is the basis of bodily and verbal behavior, and (2) that volition is the basis of all three forms of behavior, bodily, verbal, and mental—were made at different levels and should not be confused. The former ranks the three forms of behavior according to degree of importance, while the latter
describes the psychological motives or springs of behavior, bodily, verbal, and mental.

Let us consider the cause of moral behavior. The Buddha did not present an overall postulate to account for the causation of moral behavior, mainly because his was a theory of conditionality rather than a doctrine of strict determinism. Instead of providing an all-inclusive theory of moral causation, as the Jainas did (see chapter 2), he gave answers to various questions in specific contexts. Therefore, it is possible to find several causal explanations of behavior in the early Buddhist texts.

In the Aṅguttara, the problem of the causation of behavior is raised. The Buddha answers that “contact (ṣīṣa, kēng lo) is the cause of behavior (kamma, yeh).” This statement can be interpreted in two ways. First, taking phassa (kēng lo) as sense contact, it may be interpreted as a broader or more general cause of behavior. This is because mental tendencies, such as craving (ta'ā, yu), that may be considered specific causes of behavior are only results of contact (phassa). This is exemplified by the statement that the cause of craving “is an agreeable object. [Because] in the case of a person who reflects wrongly on an agreeable object, craving that has not yet arisen arises and craving that has already arisen increases.” Second, we may take phassa (kēng lo) in a more physical sense to represent a stimulus-response sort of causal explanation, where reflex movement is followed by sensory excitation. This may be illustrated by the example of a person who, while crossing a road, jumps up either because of a twinge in his stomach or because a car happens to back fire. Another example is “an innocent little baby lying on its back [who] quickly draws back its hand or foot if it has touched a live ember.”

Apart from this more general cause (or the physical cause of sensory stimulation, whichever we may take it to be), there are certain other motives, such as craving (rāga, t'an), hate or aversion (doṣa, wei), and confusion (moha, ch'īh), that are more or less conscious tendencies that serve as causes of behavior. Generally these causes are thought to produce evil or immoral behavior. Hence, morally good behavior is produced by mental tendencies that are the opposites of those mentioned above. These fall into the category of volitions (cetanā, szū), which determine the gravity
of an action. Buddhism emphasizes the elimination of these springs of action. Hence the importance of mental culture.

In addition to these conscious motives, there are unconscious motives that determine the behavior of man. They are represented in the early Buddhist texts by the term ‘disposition’ (*sañkhāra*). Dispositions are accumulated either consciously (*sampajāno*) or unconsciously (*asampajāno*). It was pointed out earlier that in the special formulation of the causal principle the term *sañkhāra* (*hsing*) stands for ‘unconscious dispositions.’ They also account for the problem of moral responsibility. The cause of behavior given in the *Samyutta Nikāya* is a specific instance of such unconscious motives. There it is pointed out that a man, when told that such and such things, for example, deadly poison, lead to disaster, will naturally avoid such things because he “desires to live (*jīvitukāma; ch ’iu sheng*), recoils from death (*amaritukāma, yen szū*), desires happiness (*sukhkāma, ch ’iu lo*), and recoils from pain (*dukkhapatikkūla, yen k ’u*)." Once a person is informed that such and such a thing is harmful to him, his behavior in the presence of that thing will be determined by these unconscious drives.

The Buddha gave different causal explanations for different problems, which shows, in the words of a modern writer, “the sensitivity to the different sorts of questions that can be asked about human actions and the different sorts of answers that are appropriate.” It also indicates the Buddha’s reluctance to posit an overall theory of motivation that might create confusion by elevating an answer to a limited question to the status of a general postulate.

While human behavior is itself produced by causes, it is followed by the correlated consequences. This correlation between action (*kamma, yeh*) and consequence (*phala, pao* or *vipāka, i shu*) constitutes the doctrine of *kamma* in Buddhism. An examination of some of the texts that deal with the problem of moral behavior and responsibility reveals that it is generally founded on the doctrine of rebirth. This is evident from the *Cūla-kamnavibhaṅgasutta*, which maintains that a person who kills living creatures or has no compassion for them will, because of that behavior, be reborn in an evil state. If he were not reborn in an evil state, and if he returned to life as a human, . . . he would be short-lived.
This implies that the doctrine of moral responsibility, like the doctrine of rebirth, is properly “verified” by the development of extrasensory powers (see chapter 5). On the basis of data available through such forms of telepathic insight as clairvoyance (cut'úpapātanāṇa, sheng szū chih), inductive inferences were drawn. The texts reveal two kinds of correlations drawn between action (kamma, yeh) and consequence (vipāka, i shu). These may be grouped as specific and general correlations.89

A list of specific correlations is found in the Cūla-kamma-vibhaṅga-sutta. They include the following:

A person who kills living creatures... tends to be short-lived, while a person who refrains from taking life... tends to be long-lived. A person who harms creatures... tends to be sickly, while one who refrains from harming creatures... tends to be healthy. One who is irritable... tends to be ugly, and one who is not irritable... tends to be handsome. A person who is jealous... tends to be weak, while one who is otherwise... tends to be powerful. A person who is miserly... tends to be poor, while a person who is liberal... tends to be rich. A person who is humble... tends to be reborn in a good family, while one who is haughty... tends to be reborn in an evil family. He who does not consult the religious teachers for advice on what is good and bad... tends to be ignorant, while one who does so... tends to have great wisdom.90

From these specific correlations further generalizations were made that also had to be verified by telepathic insight. Thus, we find the theory that a person who leads an immoral life will be reborn in an evil state. These inductive inferences cannot be taken as the basis of absolute laws implying complete determinism. This is explicitly stated in the Mahā-kammavibhaṅga-sutta, where the Buddha refers to some recluses and Brahmans who, by thorough application and concentration of mind, were able to see beings who had led an immoral life and were reborn in an evil state. As a result of this telepathic insight, they concluded, “He who takes life, steals,... who is of wrong views, will be reborn in an evil state after death. They who know this have right knowledge. Others are mistaken.”91 The Buddha rejected this conclusion as a very grave mistake. He pointed out that a person who sees a
man reborn in a happy state after leading an immoral life comes to a conclusion that is diametrically opposed to the one given above. The Buddha did not doubt the attainments of the person who perceives the phenomenon of rebirth and moral responsibility; rather, he doubted the validity of the conclusion because certain aspects of the causal process were not taken into consideration. In the case of a person who led an immoral life but was reborn in a happy state, there may have been counteracting tendencies: perhaps he led a good life during previous lives or in the present, or perhaps he held right views at the moment of death.

An interesting illustration of this problem is found in the *Loṇaphala-vagga* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*. The Buddha says that if a person maintains that “Just as this man does a deed, so does he experience it,” then the living of the holy life would be meaningless; there would be no opportunity for the complete destruction of suffering. But if one accepts the theory, “Just as this man does a deed that would be experienced in a certain way, so does he experience its consequences,” this makes the religious life meaningful, and there is opportunity for the complete destruction of suffering. The former statement implies a form of complete determinism in the sphere of moral responsibility, comparable to the theory accepted by the Jainas. This may be why the Buddha considered it harmful to the religious life and the achievement of the goal. We agree with Woodward and Hare in *GS* that “this does not controvert the doctrine of the deed, but means that the particular kind of action does not find its exact replica in fulfilment.” However, we cannot agree with their reason for that conclusion: “times and men and things are always changing.” The reasons for our disagreement may become clear in the following analysis.

The sutta describes similar deeds committed by two different people. For instance, one person may do a trifling evil deed, for which he ends up in hell. Someone else may do a similar trifling evil deed and experience the consequences in this life, not afterward. Thus, two people commit identical evil deeds but reap different consequences in different ways. In the case of the first person the consequence is magnified and is reaped in another evil existence. In the case of the other the consequences of the same evil deed are not powerful enough to lead him to an evil state after
death, but are experienced in this life or are not even felt. The reason for this is not that “times and men and things are always changing” but that there are differences between the people committing these deeds. This is confirmed by the sutta itself: “Here a certain person has not properly cultivated his body, behavior, thought and intelligence (is inferior, insignificant), and his life is short (and miserable).” With such a person . . . even a trifling evil deed done leads him to hell. . . . In the case of a person who has proper culture of body, behavior, thought, and intelligence [who is superior and not insignificant], and is endowed with long life, the consequences of a similar evil deed are experienced in this very life (and much of it or even a modicum of it would not be seen).”

This passage illustrates a salient feature of the Buddhist theory of moral responsibility. The effect (phala, pao) of a deed (kamma, yeh) is not determined solely by the deed itself but also by the nature of the person who commits the deed and, we may add, by the circumstances in which it is committed. Several interesting metaphors are given in the sutta quoted above to illustrate this point, one of which may be summarized as follows: “If a man throws a grain of salt into a little cup of water, the water in that cup would become salty and undrinkable owing to that grain of salt. But if a man were to throw a similar grain of salt into the river Ganges, because of the great mass of water therein, it would not become salty and undrinkable.” This illustrates further the danger of drawing absolute conclusions on the basis of generalizations.

From the description in the Mahā-kammavibhaṅga-sutta it appears that some of the Buddha’s contemporaries, although they had developed extrasensory powers by which they could verify the decease and survival of beings, had neglected certain important aspects of the causal process in drawing inferences. The views of those who denied moral responsibility have already been analyzed in detail (see chapter 2). They differ so sharply from the Buddhist theory that no confusion is possible. But the theory of complete determinism in moral responsibility adopted by the Jainas (see chapter 2) was very often confused with the Buddhist theory of moral causation. The main difference between the two is that the Jaina interpretation of karma is based on a theory of complete determinism (niyatti), whereas the Buddhist conception is founded on the theory of causation (paṭiccasamuppāda, yin yuăn fa). The
Buddha did not hold that everything is completely determined by one's past behavior (*pubbekatahetu, yin pên tsô*). Acquisition of merit in the past (*pubbe ca katapuññaiã*) is only one of the factors that, along with "life in an appropriate surrounding" (*paṭirūpadesavāsa*) and "proper self-application" (in this life) (*attasammāpāṇidhi*), contribute to an auspicious or good life. Moreover, according to the statement in the *Mahā-kammavibhaṅga-sutta*, even an evil-doer could be reborn in a happy state of existence if he held right views at the moment of death or had done good deeds in an earlier existence. Taking a specific instance of the causation of the human personality, the Buddha pointed out that "action or behavior (*kamma*) is the field, consciousness (*viññāṇa*) the seed, and craving (*tāṇhā*) the moisture that lead to the rebirth of a being." Therefore, behavior is only one of the causes that determine the nature of one's future life. The *Milinda-pañha* (p. 268) distinguishes things of the world according to their mode of genesis, for example, arisen on account of *kamma* (*kammanibbatta*), arisen on account of causes (*hetunibbatta*), and arisen on account of season (*utunibbatta*). Even in this case, the possible existence of counteracting causes is not ruled out. Thus, it is not complete determinism but conditionality that is the basis of the Buddha's theory of moral responsibility. Only in so far as behavior contributes, in this manner, to the determination of man's future life, does a man have "*kamma* as his own, *kamma* as his matrix, *kamma* as his kin, *kamma* as his refuge." In this way *kamma* is said to divide beings as inferior and superior. Therefore, according to Buddhism, there is no need to expiate for past actions or to avoid performing actions in the future. What Buddhism emphasizes is the avoidance of evil actions, cultivation of morally good actions, and the purification of the mind as the way to attain perfect happiness.

**Causation of Social Phenomena**

One of the major social philosophies dominating the life of the Indians before the rise of Buddhism was the caste system. Enounced in the *Puruṣa-sūkta* of the *Rgveda*, the system of four social hierarchies was said to be divinely ordained. The Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas abound with refutations of this social theory. Of special significance is the *Aggañña-sutta*, which, in its refutation, presents an evolutionary account of the
world. At this time the Brahman caste claimed the highest position in this social hierarchy: “Only a Brahman is of the highest social class; other classes are low. Only a Brahman is of white complexion; others are dark. Only Brahmans are of pure breed, not the non-Brahmans. Only Brahmans are genuine children of Brahmā, born of his mouth, offspring of Brahmā, created by Brahmā, heirs of Brahmā.”

In the Aggaññā-sutta, after giving an evolutionary account of the world, the Buddha explains how the different social grades came into existence. Following is a summary of this description.

Then differences of sex appeared; households were formed; and the lazy stored up the rice instead of gathering it each evening and morning; and the rights of property arose and were infringed. And when lusts were felt and thefts committed, the beings, now men, met together and chose men differing from them in no way except in virtue (dhamma) to restrain the evildoers by blame or fines or banishment. These were the first khattiyas. And others they chose to restrain the evil dispositions that led to the evildoing. And these were the first Brahmans, differing only in virtue (dhamma). Then certain others, to keep their households going, and maintain their wives, started various occupations. And these were the first vessaś. And some abandoned their homes and became the first recluses (samaṇa). But all these were alike in origin, and the only distinction between them was in virtue.

The Buddha thus insisted that caste and other divisions in society were occupational in origin and maintained that one did not have to follow a particular caste merely because he was born to parents who followed that caste. Moreover, to refute both the Brahmans’ claim to superiority and the universal validity of the caste system, the Buddha cited existing societies with only two castes, masters (ayya, ta chia) and slaves (dāsa, nu), and pointed out that even theirs were not rigid social divisions because a slave could become a master and a master a slave. From the spiritual standpoint, the Buddha considered moral life the factor that determines the status of beings; from the social and economic standpoints, he held that wealth creates the differences: “A śūdra acquiring wealth and fame can command the services of even the kṣatriyas, brāhmaṇas and vaiṣyas.”
Apart from this Vedic theory of determinism in social life, there is another philosophical theory of natural determinism in the sphere of social life that does not seem to have exerted much influence on contemporary society. It is an application of the fatalistic theory of natural determinism propounded by the Ājīvikas (see chapter 2). This social philosophy is attributed to Pūraṇa Kassapa, who was one of the leading Ājīvika teachers. He believed that human beings belong to one of six types of existence or species (abhiṣṭi): the black species (kaññābhijātī), the blue species (nīlābhijātī), the red species (lohitābhijātī), the yellow species (halidābhijātī), the white species (sukkābhijātī), and the pure white species (paramasukkābhijātī). Malalasekera and Jayatilleke have raised doubts that these colors denoted differences in physical complexion and suggest that the classification implies genetically different physical and psychological types. But considering the various types of people included under the different categories, we cannot say whether the classification implies genetically different physical and psychological types. The groups are described thus:

1. **Black species**: Butchers, raisers of fowl, hunters, fishermen, dacoits, executioners, and all who adopt a cruel mode of living.
2. **Blue species**: Monks leading ascetic lives and other people who accept the doctrine of moral responsibility.
3. **Red species**: The Niganṭhas (Jainas) who wear only one robe.
4. **Yellow species**: Laymen who wear white robes and the disciples of the naked ascetics.
5. **White species**: Male and female Ājīvika disciples.
6. **Pure white species**: Nanda, Vaccha, Kisa, Saṅkicca and Makkhali Gosāla.

Cursory examination of the list above reveals that these groups do not represent categories differing in physical appearance but denote people graded according to the degree of moral advancement judged by Ājīvika standards. Thus, even the lay disciples of the Ājīvikas were considered superior to the disciples of other religious teachers. The Ājīvikas in general are considered to be of the white species, while the Ājīvika teachers belong to the pure white species. We have seen that the Brahmans considered themselves white, while all the rest, even the kṣatriyas and the vaśyas,
who belonged to the same stock and were thought to be fair-skinned as opposed to the dark aborigines, were considered black. The Ājīvikas adopted this principle, increasing the number to six groups denoted by colors.

All these “typologists” believed that man is born into the various groups as a result of fate and that a person is incapable of altering it by his own will or effort. Thus, both these schools of thought, the Brahmins insisting on the divine ordination of social rank, and the Fatalists emphasizing strict determinism, presented social philosophies that were static.

Dismissing these views, the Buddha gave an evolutionary account of human society. He pointed out that “living in an appropriate surrounding” (patirūpadesavāsa) was a factor that contributed to the moral and spiritual advancement of the individual. Being concerned for the welfare of living beings, the Buddha could not neglect their life in society. As a social reformer, therefore, he was led to analyze the causes of social evils and suggest remedies. Just as Buddahood is the goal of those who have renounced the world in search of the perfect happiness of nibbāna, so is universal kingship (cakkavatti-rajja, chuan lun sheng wang) the ideal for the layman who chooses to live the secular life to perfection. Therefore, in Buddhism, the social or secular philosophy is on several occasions set forth by a universal monarch.

A universal monarch is said to be a person who has conquered the whole world, not by force but by virtue. But that state cannot be attained hereditarily. The Cakkavatti-sīhanāda-suttanta relates an incident about the accession of a son to the throne of his father, who was a universal monarch. Immediately after his accession, the glories of a universal monarch that the son was supposed to have inherited disappeared. Very much dejected, the son reported this to the father, who said: “The glories of a universal monarch cannot be considered a paternal heritage (pettikalā dayajjalā, fu ch‘an).” The implication is that one cannot even claim material possessions, not to speak of moral and spiritual distinction, on the grounds of one’s birth. This is certainly a reaction against the claims of the Brahmins to superiority on the basis of their birth into that particular caste. Moreover, it emphasizes that even the highest secular position has to be earned, not inherited. According to the Lakkhana-suttanta the state of a universal monarch can be attained by a person who leads a virtuous life.
The duties of a universal monarch are to impart moral instruction and to look after the moral as well as the material advancement of the people. For this it is necessary to analyze the causes of social evils and attempt to remedy them. In the Cakkavatti-sīhanāda-suttanta we come across an instance where a universal monarch made such an analysis. He found that “As a result of the nonaccruing of wealth to the destitute, poverty increased; when poverty increased, there was a rise in thefts; when thefts increased, there was escalation of violence; when violence was rampant, there was an increase in murder; when murder increased, lying became common; when lying became common, the life span as well as the comeliness of human beings diminished.”\(^{119}\) The suttanta goes on to describe how all the social evils, including stealing, improper sexual behavior, hate, jealousy, disrespect of parents, elders, and teachers, were caused as a result. This is a strictly causal account of social evils, and it is interesting to note that poverty and maldistribution of wealth were considered major causes. According to the Aggaṇiṇa-suttanta, the king was first appointed when these evils first appeared in society, and his duty was to uproot their causes and prevent such evils from arising again.\(^{120}\) Since maldistribution of wealth was one of the main causes of social evils, it was the duty of the king to find ways by which people could obtain wealth,\(^{121}\) for material or spiritual prosperity could not be achieved through praying (patthanahetu) or begging (āyacanahetu).\(^{122}\) But the acquisition of wealth alone was not the solution, for some people, while protecting their own share, would undoubtedly try to appropriate what belonged to others.\(^{123}\) This implies that maldistribution of wealth is not the only cause of social evils. Equally important causes, such as greed, are mental tendencies found in the destitute and rich alike. For this reason, the universal monarch must instruct the people in spiritual (dhamma) advancement as well as material (attha) advancement.\(^{124}\)

In fact, Buddhism emphasizes the mental tendencies that are the causes of social evils. This is because material progress alone cannot bring about the changes necessary for the moral advancement of man, although it is a prerequisite. Psychological tendencies such as greed and aversion must be gradually eliminated. Although these psychological tendencies depend on external things or sense data (nimitta), pleasurable (sukha) or unpleasurable (patigha), they
arise primarily from lack of understanding or improper reflection (ayoniso manasikāra) on the objects that produce these evil tendencies in man.\textsuperscript{125} Hence the importance of knowledge and mental concentration as means to the elimination of causes that give rise one’s own suffering and that of others.

**Causation of Spiritual Phenomena**

The Buddha criticized three of the existing theories of causation on the grounds that they were harmful to religious life (see chapters 1, 3). Acceptance of the belief that one’s happiness and suffering is determined by an external agent such as God meant the surrender of one’s freedom and ability to work out one’s own salvation. In opposition to this theory of theistic determination, the Buddha held that “purity and impurity depend on oneself, and nobody can purify another.”\textsuperscript{126} Neither the theory of determinism in moral responsibility advocated by Mahāvīra (chapter 2) nor that adopted by the Ājīvikas (chapter 2) left room for individual freedom. The theory of indeterminism, on the other hand, led to the denial of the efficacy of religious life because one could not be sure of what would happen during the next moment.

Acceptance of a theory of causal dependence, not only in individual and social life but also in the physical world, enables one to put an end to suffering by removing the causes that produce it. Therefore, the Buddha maintained that there are causes for the defilement, and hence the purity, of man.\textsuperscript{127} The Bodhisattvabhūmi explains how the processes of defiling (sāṅklesā) and of purifying (vyavadāna) take place according to the ten causes (dasabhīr hetubhiḥ).\textsuperscript{128}

It was pointed out that wrong understanding of, or reflection on, the perceptual world produces attachments or aversions that lead to most of the suffering in the world. Proper reflection (yoniso manasikāra) implies reflection according to the genesis (yoni) of things, that is to say, reflection on the causality of things. The purpose is to avoid the two extreme views of eternalism (sassatavāda) and annihilationism (ucchedavāda), which are said to promote evil tendencies such as egoism. Knowledge of causality should go hand in hand with restraint of the senses (indriyasamvara, hu ch’u ken), which enables one to cut at the roots of craving. Thus, the religious life is directed at cutting the tangle of wrong views and
developing insight (paññāvimutti, hui chiai t'o). The outcome of this release is attainment of the knowledge of emancipation, the knowledge that one has “put an end to rebirth, that the higher life has been lived to its perfection, and that there is no hereafter.” This final knowledge is not attained by a beginner all of a sudden. The Buddha declared: “I do not say that one can win final knowledge at the very outset; it is attained by a gradual discipline, a gradual mode of action and conduct.”

The stages of the attainment of this final knowledge are described in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. Briefly, they consist in practice of the virtuous life (ariyena sīlakkhandhena, sheng chieh chii), followed by restraint of the senses (indriyasamvara, hu ch’u ken). When one is confronted by a sense object, he does not allow evil tendencies such as covetousness and displeasure to flow in; thus he restrains the senses. He then develops mindfulness (sati-sampajañña, cheng chih ch’u ju) and strives to eliminate the “five impediments.” This leads him to the first stage of the jhāna. By developing the mind further he is able to reach the fourth jhāna, where the mind is so serene and supple that he is able to develop the sixfold higher knowledge (abhinnā, chih t’ung). Three of these six are essential, but not necessary, for knowledge of emancipation. (1) Retrocognition (pubbenivāsānussatiñña, su ming chih) allows him to verify the fact of preexistence. According to the Bodhisattva-bhūmi, this knowledge is essential for the realization that the theory of eternalism (sāsvatavāda) posited by some of the sramanās and brāhmaṇas is invalid. (2) Clairvoyance (cut’ūpapātañña, sheng szu chih) enables him to verify the decease and survival of beings and the doctrine of karma. (3) Knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses (āsavakkhayāñña, lou chin chih) is necessary for verifying the four Noble Truths. “As he thus knows and sees, his mind is emancipated from the inflowing impulses of sensuous gratification (kām’āsava, yu lou), of personal immortality (bhav’āsava, yu lou), and of ignorance (avijj’āsava, wu ming lou). Along with this emancipation arises the knowledge that emancipation has been attained.”

The Sāmyutta Nikāya gives a strictly causal account of the various stages of the path to enlightenment. This was in opposition to the view of Pūrana Kassapa that there is no cause or condition for the lack of knowledge and insight or for the presence of knowledge and insight.

So far, the discussion has dwelt on the various causal patterns
pertaining to the world of normal experience and the realm of spiritual life, or the attainment of freedom. But how does a Buddha or any other saint who has already attained freedom fit into this scheme? How is his behavior determined?

It was pointed out earlier that most of the suffering man experiences in this world is due to the way his perceptual process is conditioned. Among other things, the understanding of this perceptual process, followed by the stopping of evil impulses or defilements (āsavakkhaya, lou chin), constitutes knowledge and freedom. Looking at the various aggregates constituting the psychophysical personality as being nonsubstantial (anatta) and preventing ego-consciousness from assailing one when perception takes place, a learned Āryan disciple has revulsion for (nibbindati) the physical form (rūpa), feeling or sensation (vedanā), perception (saññā), dispositions (sañkhāra) and consciousness (viññāna). Having revulsion, he is not attached (nibbindati virajjati); being non-attached, he is freed (virāgā vimuccati); in the person who is thus freed there arises the knowledge of freedom (vimuttaṁ vimuttaṁ iti nānam hoti): “Destroyed is birth (khīṇa jāti); lived is the higher life (vusitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ); done is what ought to be done (katāṁ karaṇīyaṁ); and there is no future existence (nāparam itihattāyāti).”

This means that the elimination of ego-consciousness by the development of insight can change the normal process of perception. With the attainment of mental concentration or restraint (saññvara), one is able to prevent the influx of impurities such as attachment (rāga) and aversion (paṭigha). Thus, in an enlightened one, perception simply does not generate obsessions and the consequent suffering; instead, as a result of his not grasping onto things, including his own personality, as being substantial, he becomes detached (virāga). Detachment produces freedom (vimutti), through which one may attain stability (thitattā) of mind so as not to be agitated by gain (lābha) or loss (alābha), reputation (yasa) or disrepute (ayasa), blame (nindā) or praise (pasamsā), happiness (sukha) or suffering (dukkha)—the eight worldly phenomena (aṭṭhaloka-dhamma) by which one is constantly assailed in this life. The highest point of ‘blessedness’ (maṅgala) is achieved, according to the Mahā-maṅgala-sutta, by “one whose mind is not overwhelmed when in contact with worldly phenomena (loka-dhamma), is freed from sorrow, taintless and secure.” Such a person feels
secure and at peace in the midst of all the destruction and confusion prevailing in this world. This form of behavior is described as “going against the current” (patisotagāmī), but it is still a causal process where each state is conditioned by a previous state. It is called “going against the current” because, unlike an ordinary man, the person who has attained emancipation (sammadāññāvimmutto) does not allow any attachment (rāga) to arise in him when he perceives a pleasurable object, even though he experiences a pleasurable feeling. Hence for him there is no grasping; in the absence of grasping he is not smeared by the world (anupalitto lokena). When he is not smeared by the world he remains in a state of perfect happiness (paramasukha).

It appears from the foregoing analysis that the causal process is operative in all spheres, including the highest state of spiritual development, namely, nirvana. But the later scholars attempted to distinguish two spheres, one in which causation prevailed and the other which is uncaused. This latter view was, no doubt, the result of a confusion in the meanings of the two terms, saṅkhata (‘compounded’) and paticcasamuppanna (‘causally conditioned’).

We have already pointed out (see chapter 5) that saṅkhata and paticcasamuppanna, although used to refer to the phenomenal world, connote two different meanings. The former, it was found, refers to anything that is ‘compounded’, that is ‘organized,’ ‘planned,’ or ‘put together,’ therefore, conditioned by the dispositional tendencies (saṅkhāra) of man. On the contrary, paticcasamuppanna refers to that which is ‘naturally conditioned,’ i.e., ‘causally conditioned.’ For this reason, although both terms were used to describe the phenomenal world, only the former in its negative form (asaṅkhata, wu wei) is used to define nirvana. Since in the Buddha and the arahants “all dispositions have been completely calmed” (sabbasaṅkhārasamatha), that state of freedom is called the ‘element of the unconditioned or uncompounded’ (asaṅkhathadātu), and is always defined in terms of the absence of attachment (rāgakkhayā), of aversion (dosakkhayā), and of confusion (mohakkhayā). It was never described as ‘the uncaused’ or ‘the in-dependent’ (appaticcasamuppanna). This means that nirvana is a state where there is ‘natural or causal happening’ (paticcasa-muppāda), but not ‘organized,’ or ‘planned’ conditioning (saṅkha-raṇa). This fact was completely overlooked by the scholars who
were indiscriminate in defining saṅkhata as a synonym (paryāya) of paticcasamuppanna.\textsuperscript{143}

The Twelvefold Formula of Causation

So far we have been discussing the Buddha’s explanations of different causal situations. In addition to these different analyses, we come across a recurring, twelvefold formula in the early Buddhist texts, a formula that was intended to explain important questions about man and his destiny. This special formulation of the causal principle, which dominates the early Buddhist texts, is stated thus:

When this exists, that exists or comes to be; on the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not exist or come to be; on the cessation of this, that ceases. That is to say:

- on ignorance depend dispositions;
- on dispositions depends consciousness;
- on consciousness depends the psychophysical personality;
- on the psychophysical personality depend the six ‘gateways’;
- on the six ‘gateways’ depends contact;
- on contact depends feeling [or sensation];
- on feeling depends craving;
- on craving depends grasping;
- on grasping depends becoming;
- on becoming depends birth;
- on birth depend aging and death.

In this manner there arises this mass of suffering.\textsuperscript{144}

Because this formula dominates the early Buddhist texts, many scholars have considered it to be the only aspect of causation discussed in Buddhism.\textsuperscript{145} The preceding account of the various spheres in which the principle of causation operates, as well as the discussion in chapter 5, shows that this is not the case. Moreover, some of these scholars have maintained that the purpose of the special formulation is to explain the origin and cessation of suffering (dukkha). Keith says: “We can now see the limited character of the Chain of Causation, it is intended to explain the coming into being of misery . . . .”\textsuperscript{146} This evaluation seems to take into account only
one aspect of the special formulation, to the neglect of the other important aspects. It is possible to maintain that the ultimate purpose of the special formulation is to explain the origin and cessation of suffering. But other important issues are also involved.

We have already seen how some of the Upaniṣadic thinkers, who were able to verify the continuity of the human personality either rationally or intuitionnally, came to believe in eternalism (sassatavāda, chang chien), which they defended by a metaphysical theory of self-causation (see chapter 1). On the other hand, Materialists and Ājīvikas denied self-causation and adopted a theory of external causation, which led them to believe in annihilation (uccheda, tuan) of the human personality at death and also of karma (see chapter 2).

The Buddha, for whom karma and rebirth were realities, was reluctant to contribute to any one of these metaphysical theories. The empiricist approach of the Buddha prevented him from positing an unverifiable soul to explain the continuity of the individual after death. On the other hand, he was far removed from the materialist approach denying the continuity of the individual and his moral responsibility. Thus, the problem he confronted was to explain the working of karma and the process of rebirth without falling into the two extreme metaphysical theories of self-causation and external causation. As Jayatilleke points out, the raison d'ètre of the special formulation of the causal principle "lies in the necessity to give a causal account of the factors operating in maintaining the process of human personality and thereby of suffering." This is clearly expressed in a passage from the Samyutta: "In the belief that the person who acts is the same as the person who experiences [the result] . . . he posits eternalism; in the belief that the person who acts is not the same as the person who experiences [the result] . . . he posits annihilationism. Avoiding both these extremes, the Tathāgata preaches the doctrine in the middle. On ignorance (avijjā, wu ming) depends dispositions (saṅkhāra, hsing). . . . In this manner there arises this mass of suffering." The theory of causation is placed not only against these two theories but also against two other metaphysical theories, a combination of self-causation and external causation and fortuitous origination (see chapter 2). Keith has written that by opposing the Buddhist theory to all pre-Buddhist theories, the foregoing passage in the Samyutta Nikāya
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places Buddhist doctrine in a difficult position. That is because “all these issues belong to the realm of the indeterminates.” Therefore, he concludes, “We obtain nothing more than the vague general assertion that things as compounded come into being under the effect of causes, but we have to put beside this the doctrine that we do not know anything definite as to their operation; ...”¹⁴⁹

The four theories against which the Buddhist theory of causation was preached represent a fourfold scheme. These four alternatives were dismissed by the Buddha with the words, “Do not [ask] thus” (mā h’evam), because he considered them to be indeterminate (avyākata, wu chi),¹⁵⁰ and therefore to be set aside. They are indeterminate because categorical answers to the first two alternatives (and therefore also to the third and fourth alternatives, which represent the assertion and denial, respectively, of the combination of the first two) lead to metaphysical theories to which the Buddha was reluctant to contribute. Without being a partisan of any one of these metaphysical views, the Buddha adduced empirical causal explanations. Thus, it is unfair to equate the Buddha’s theory of causation with those of the pre-Buddhist teachers, as Keith does.

Further, the formulation of the special theory giving empirical causal explanations of the birth and development of the individual eliminated other metaphysical problems such as creation by God, First Cause, and even Final Cause. This was observed by Buddhaghosa, who raised the question, “Is ignorance [which comes first in the explication of the special formulation] like the primordial matter (pakati) of the Sānkhya school of thought (pakativāḍīnam), an uncaused first cause of the world?”¹⁵¹ And he gives the following reply: “It is not uncaused. The cause of ignorance has been declared when it was said ‘On account of the defilements (āsavā) ignorance arises.’”¹⁵¹ In support of the view that ignorance is not without a cause (akārāṇam) he quotes a passage from the Nikāyas:¹⁵² “The first beginning of ignorance is not known [for us to maintain that] ‘before this there was no ignorance; at this point there arose ignorance.’ But the fact that ignorance is causally produced can be known.”¹⁵³ This means that the special formulation cannot be designated a ‘chain’ of causation because no absolute beginning is envisaged. On the contrary, it is better represented by a circle, without beginning. Thus, the special formulation has come to be known as vatta-kathā.¹⁵⁴
In the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas the special application of the causal formula is introduced in many ways. Sometimes it is introduced directly by the statement, “I will preach to you, O monks, the doctrine of causation.” Other times, the formula is presented in explanations of such things as aging and death (jarāmarāṇa, lao šu), the four forms of nutrition (āhāra, shih), the five aggregates (khandha, yin) constituting the individual, the causality of moral behavior, or amidst criticism of some current philosophical theories.

Doubts have been raised about how the general formula (“When this exists, that exists . . .”) came to be prefixed to the statement of the twelfefold formula. Thomas believes that the coupling of the two was a later addition. The philosophical importance of the general formula of causation, as well as the place accorded it in early Buddhism (chapter 5), does not warrant such an assumption. In the passage quoted above the Buddha is represented as demonstrating his intellectual powers by referring to his knowledge of the arising and passing away of the psychophysical personality. The general formula of causation was something that he discovered with his attainment of enlightenment. Therefore, when he had to explain the arising and passing away of the psychophysical personality, he seems to have adopted the more instructive method of stating the formula first and then applying it to explain the causation of this personality. This is quite a logical procedure. Moreover, in most of the sūtras of the Samyukta Āgama, where the theory of the twelve factors is discussed the general formula precedes it, even though this does not occur in the Pāli counterparts. Considering the large number of passages in the twelfth fascicle of the Samyukta Āgama (which roughly corresponds to the Nidāna Samyutta of the Samyutta Nikāya), where the general formula has been prefixed to the theory of twelve factors, it would be difficult to reject them as late compositions, as Thomas does. On the contrary, the prefixed version may even be an earlier version, and the practice of prefixing the general formula may have been abandoned when it was taken for granted that the special formulation represented an application of the general formula.

Several modern scholars have made important analyses of the twelfefold formula. A brief account of this formula concludes our analysis of the causal principle in early Buddhism.
Ignorance (*avijjā, wu ming*) heads the list of twelve factors. But, as pointed out earlier, it is not presented as the beginning of a process but as the most important factor to eliminate in seeking enlightenment and hence in disrupting the worldly process. It is explained in various ways. Ignorance is said to determine the dispositions (*saṅkhāra, hsing*), in the sense that in the absence of correct knowledge about the nature and destiny of the individual, one's dispositions are determined in a way detrimental to one's future. These dispositions give shape to one's consciousness (*viññāṇa, shih*), which in turn tends to determine one's current psychophysical personality (*nāmarūpa, ming sē*) as well as the psychophysical personality one inherits in the next life. Depending on the psychophysical personality, there arise the six senses (*saṭṭha-yatana, liu ju chüi*). The activity of the senses leads to contact (*phassa, chüi*), which brings about feeling or sensation (*vedanā, shou*). This psychological process generates deliberate activity, and the result is the arising of craving (*tanhā*) (or its opposite, revulsion, *paṭigha*, which ultimately can be traced back to craving). Craving is said to be of three types: craving for sense pleasures (*kāma-tanhā, yu ai*), for existence (*bhava-tanhā, yu ai*), and for nonexistence (*vibhava-tanhā, wu yu ai*). Craving leads to grasping or clinging (*upādāna, ch’üi*), which culminates in becoming (*bhava, yu*) in the sense of rebirth (*punabbhavābhīnibbatti, t’eng lai yu*). Becoming is followed by birth (*jāti, sheng*), with its associated suffering.

Thus, as C. A. F. Rhys Davids concludes: “In the central links we have the working out of the process of sentience, culminating in the central links—sense, feeling, desire—and representing a fresh ebullition, a new source of causal force reaching on into the next birth. There its resultant is renewed sentience, eventually again to be darkened by the inevitable disease-decay-death—a centre of effects in sentience due to causes in the past.” These past causes have been simplified and given in abstract form, while the present is analyzed in detail from conception to grasping for another life. Thus it is difficult to agree with Beckh, who maintains that the idea of the ‘chain’ cannot be spread over three lives.

Several attempts have been made to compare the special formulation of the causal principle with the Śaṅkhya series, based mainly on such slender evidence as the similarity of terms used. Jacobi and Pischel believe that the theory is derived from Śaṅkhya.
Keith sees close parallels. Senart finds borrowings only in the first two terms, arguing, "if ignorance is, as in Buddhism, empiric, it has no claim to head the list of terms." The nature of ignorance and the reason for its placement at the head of the formula have been discussed earlier. These views may have originated in a misinterpretation of terms used in the special formulation as well as a wrong assessment of the purpose for which the theory was formulated. First, the Śāṅkhya theory purports to explain the evolution of the world from the primordial source (prakṛti). No such thing is envisaged by the Buddhist theory, which is mainly intended to explain the problem of rebirth and moral responsibility, especially in relation to the individual. Second, since the Śāṅkhya accepted a theory of self-causation (satkāryavāda), to them each factor in the causal series is produced out from the other. But such a relation is not proposed in the Buddhist theory (chapter 1). Keith's misinterpretation of the causal formula prevented him from agreeing with Oltramare, who gave a reasonable analysis of how the theory came to be propounded. Keith wrote that the suggestions made by Oltramare are ingenious but too coherent and logical to be primitive.
VII. Later Developments

ON THE BASIS of the foregoing analysis, we maintain that the teachings preserved in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas show no significant difference, at least with regard to the conception of causality. Sometime after the parinibbāna of the Buddha, the Buddhists attempted to systematize the teachings scattered throughout the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. This resulted in the emergence of the different schools of Abhidharma, each possessing an Abhidharma Piṭaka of its own. At least the two major Ābhidharmika schools, Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda, have preserved their Abhidharma Piṭakas, which vary considerably.

The Theravāda form together with its literature, both canonical and commentarial, was introduced into Ceylon during the reign of the great Indian Emperor Asoka (3rd century B.C.). There it developed in relative isolation, and thus many of the original ideas could be preserved from amalgamation with the new conceptions and theories propounded by the later schools of Buddhism, at least until the time of Buddhaghosa. The Sarvāstivāda school became popular mainly in northwestern India. Which of these schools represents the earliest phase of Buddhism has been a subject of much controversy. Stcherbatsky maintains that "the Vaibhāśikas are the only continuators of one of the oldest schools, the Sarvāstivādins. They derive their name from the title of a huge commentary upon the Kanonical works of this school and follow in philosophy
generally the same lines as did the original school.”¹ Murti also sees no major difference between the two schools: “The Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda, in spite of some important differences, may be considered as representing one metaphysical standpoint.”²

It has been pointed out that as regards the conception of dharma, the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda differ considerably. Two of the most important ideas associated with the conception of dharma that developed later are (1) the theory of moments (kṣanā), and (2) the theory of atoms (paramāṇu). These two theories are conspicuous by their absence in the earlier phase of Theravāda (before Buddhaghosa). In the Theravāda tradition we first encounter a theory of moments in the works of Buddhaghosa. This is clearly evident from a statement found in Buddhaghosa’s Atthasālintī. Commenting on the ‘present’ (paccuppanna), he says, “Herein, the continuous present (santāti-paccuppanna) finds mention in the commentaries; the enduring present (addhā-paccuppanna) in the suttas. Here some say that ‘the thought existing in the momentary present (khāṇa-paccuppanna) becomes the object of telepathic insight.’”³

This implies that the theory of moments was not among the doctrines embodied in the Sutta Piṭaka or the commentaries preserved at Mahāvihāra, the center of Theravāda Buddhism in Ceylon. If so, the incorporation of this theory in the Pali Commentaries may be taken as the work of Buddhaghosa. Even the theory of atoms (paramāṇu) was not found in the Sutta Piṭaka or the commentaries of the Theravadins. Buddhaghosa seems to have made a halfhearted attempt to introduce it also into the Theravāda tradition.⁴ Thus, two of the most important theories, which created innumerable philosophical problems for the Sarvāstivādins as well as the Sautrāntikas, were not found in the pre-Buddhaghosa Theravāda tradition. This is the main reason why we consider the original Theravāda distinct from the Theravāda embodied in the commentaries of Buddhaghosa.⁵

It was pointed out in chapter 4 that with the acceptance of the theory of moments, the Sarvāstivādins had to explain the problem of continuity. This they did by accepting a theory of ‘own nature’ (svabhāva). In fact, Yaśomitra (who had leanings towards the Sautrāntika school), commenting on the Abhidharmakośa, maintained that “by ‘own nature’ means by the ‘self.’”⁶ That is why all
the other Buddhist schools criticized the Sarvāstivāda teachings as heretical.

The Sarvāstivāda theory of 'own nature' left its impressions on the Sarvāstivāda theory of causation, too. As pointed out above (chapter 3), the Sarvāstivādins distinguished between cause (hetu) and condition (pratyaya) because they accepted the substantialist standpoint that cause and the effect are connected by their 'own nature' (svabhāva). The Sarvāstivādins themselves admit that they are 'substantialists' (sadvādī).7 This is almost identical with the theory of 'everything exists' (sabbam atthi) rejected by the Buddha because he thought it would lead to a belief in eternalism (sassata-dīṭṭhi) (chapter 1). Thus, not only was the theory of 'own nature' identical with the theory of 'substance' or 'self' (ātman), as pointed out by Yaśomitra, but it also tended toward eternalism (śāsvatadrṣṭi); hence the view of the Sarvāstivādins that things (i.e., 'own nature') exist during past, present, and future.

If so, it is difficult to agree with Murti that the Sarvāstivāda (or more exactly, Vaibhāṣika) theory of causation is a nonidentity theory (asatkāryavāda).8 The evidence adduced above goes against the view that the Sarvāstivādins perceived a complete difference between a cause and its effect. For them to have considered cause and effect as completely different entities would have made their theory of 'own nature' meaningless. In fact, as will be pointed out later, the Sautrāntikas affirmed a difference between cause and effect "because there was no 'own nature' (svabhāva) connecting them."

In the very first stanza of the first chapter of the Mūlamanḍhayamaka-kārikā, Nāgārjuna refers to four types of causal theories: (1) self-causation (svata-utpatti), (2) external causation (parata-utpatti), (3) both (i.e., self-causation and external causation, dvābhyaṃ), and (4) noncausation (ahetu). In the second stanza he refers to the Buddhist theory of four causes or causal correlations (pratyaya). Murti seems to consider that this theory of four pratyayas comes under the category of external causation, probably because some Buddhist schools, while accepting the theory of pratyayas, considered the cause as being different from the effect. If Murti were right, we would except Nāgārjuna, after stating the four types of causal theories (stanza 1) to criticize the first type, self-causation. Immediately after enumerating the four pratyayas,
Nāgārjuna analyzes the nature of the causal relations and says: "The 'own nature' of the existents (bhāva) is not found in the causes (pratyaya)." Thus, the reference here is to the theory presented by the Sarvāstivādins, who, while accepting the theory of four pratyayas, also believed that cause and effect are related to each other by way of 'own nature.' Therefore, to Nāgārjuna, the Sarvāstivāda theory of causation is a theory of self-causation, not a theory of external causation.

The theory of causality propounded by the Sāṅkhya school is generally known as the 'identity theory' (satkārya-vāda). This is because, according to the Sāṅkhya school, prakṛti is the 'primordial matter' out of which the world evolved, and this prakṛti persists in the products of evolution, too. Thus, the cause and the effect are identical in essence because they are 'made of' prakṛti. Now this prakṛti is sometimes called svabhāva ('own nature'). This shows the very close resemblance of the Sarvāstivāda theory to that of the Sāṅkhya.

The Sāṅkhya conception of evolution seems to be a systematic exposition of the ideas presented by thinkers such as Uddālaka during the Upaniṣadic period, with the difference, as pointed out by Šaṅkara (chapter 1), that the Being (sat) of Uddālaka is sentient while the prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya is insentient. This difference is also, to some extent, reflected in their theories of causation. In the theory of Uddālaka the 'cause' was looked upon more as a 'sentient being'; hence causation is one of 'self-causation' (svayamkṛta-vāda). In the Sāṅkhya school the 'cause' is considered 'insentient,' and therefore causation consists of 'self-generation' or 'generation out of itself' (svatotpatti- or satkārya-vāda). Yet in both cases the basis is the same. The former recognizes a substantial agent (ātman), and the latter affirms a substance (svabhāva = prakṛti) by which the identity of the cause and the effect is maintained.

We have seen how the Upaniṣadic theory of self-causation was criticized and rejected by the Buddha. One of the main arguments adduced by the Buddha was that this view leads to belief in a permanent and eternal self or soul. The same can be said of the Sāṅkhya theory, which leads to a permanent and eternal substance. The implication of the Sarvāstivāda theory is not very different. The Sarvāstivādin admission that cause and effect are related by way of 'own nature' (svabhāva) implies that this 'own
nature' is the 'substance' \((dravya)\) that survives through the past, present, and future and is therefore permanent and eternal. This is why they maintained that substance \((dravya)\) exists \((asti)\) during the past, present, and future. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the Sarvāstivāda theory of causation, along with that of the Śāṅkhya, falls into the category of 'self-causation' that came to be known as the 'identity theory' \((satkāryavāda)\), but not under the category of the 'nonidentity theory' \((asatkāryavāda)\), as Murti seems to believe. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the Sarvāstivādins claimed to be 'substantialists' \((sad-vādī)\).

If the Sarvāstivāda theory of causation is a parallel form of the identity theory \((satkāryavāda)\) of the Śāṅkhya school, which of the Buddhist schools accepted a theory similar to the nonidentity theory \((asatkāryavāda)\) of the Vaiśeṣika school? Explaining the conception of dharma presented by the Sautrāntikas, we pointed out that it is based on the theory of moments. The Sautrāntikas recognized only two moments, nascent \((utpāda)\) and cessant \((vyaya)\), and rejected the static moment \((sthitī-kṣaṇa)\). Since each moment was considered to be different from the other, and since no underlying substratum (like the svabhāva of the Sarvāstivādins) was recognized, they maintained that there was only a series of moments that succeeded one another, the causation of each individual moment being reduced to invariable antecedence. What is perceived as duration is only the series of successive moments with a continuous flow. It was pointed out that the Sautrāntikas had to solve yet another problem, the origin or the beginning of the series (chapter 4). It was to explain this problem that the Sautrāntikas said that a thing being nonexistent comes into existence \((abhūtvā bhāva utpāda, pēn wu chīn wu shēng)\).

The view that a thing being nonexistent comes into existence seems to have been the basis of the theory of causation that came to be known as the 'nonidentity theory' \((asatkāryavāda)\). As pointed out above, Murti's attribution of this theory to the Sarvāstivādins seems to have no basis. All the available evidence indicates that it was the Sautrāntikas who advanced such a theory. A statement in the Śikṣāsamuccaya runs thus: “A thing, being nonexistent, comes into existence, and having come into existence, passes away, because it has no ‘own nature’ \((svabhāva)\).”\(^{12}\) The theory of \(abhūtvā bhāva utpāda\), therefore, contradicts the Sarvāstivāda conception of
This is further exemplified by Candrakīrti’s statement: “Thus heat is said to be without ‘own nature’ [= substance], because fire itself is associated with causes and conditions. Fire, by being previously nonexistent and coming into existence later, is contingent or causally produced.” Finally, the *Sphuta-rthābhidharmakośa-vyākhya* definitely attributes this theory to the Sautrāntikas. The Sautrāntikas, whose theory of *abhūtvā bhāva utpāda* is almost identical with the *asatkāryavāda* of the Vaiśeṣikas, were questioned as to why the sesame seed should produce oil, not any other substance, though they are equally nonexistent in the causal entity. Their reply was that there cannot be any questioning with regard to the ultimate laws of nature, which are unthinkable and beyond the scope of speculation.

After examining in detail the arguments for and against the Buddhist theory of momentariness, Mookerjee says: “From the elaborate exposition of the theory of causation with its confused tangle of criticism and counter criticism, . . . one cannot resist the impression that the Sautrāntika has failed, in spite of his logical acumen and wealth of dialectic, to carry any conviction. The fact of the matter is that causation is as unintelligible in the theory of flux as in the theory of permanent cause.” Thus, it was left to Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara to expose this, and they very successfully made use of their dialectics to prove the inherent contradictions both in the theory of *satkārya* (production of a potentially existing effect) and in the conception of *asatkārya* (production of a previously nonexistent effect). Murti gives a lucid account of the Mādhyamika criticism of *asatkāryavāda*, which we need not repeat here. When Das Gupta said that “the effect according to the Buddhists was nonexistent, it came into being for a moment and was lost,” he was not confusing the non-Buddhist theory with the causal theory of the Buddhists, as Jayatilleke seems to think. He was referring to a theory of causation actually held by one of the schools of Buddhism, the Sautrāntikas. The wrong impression conveyed by Das Gupta is that this theory was accepted by all the early Buddhist schools.

An attempt has been made by de la Vallée Poussin to equate the Sautrāntika theory of *abhūtvā bhāva utpāda* with the conception of causation in the Pali Nikāyas. He quotes a statement pertaining to causation from the *Majjhima Nikāya* and places it side by side
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with the Sautrāntika statement of causation. The Majjhima Nikāya statement runs thus: “In this manner, these dhammas, being nonexistent come to be” (evam khila me dhammā ahutvā sambhonti). By placing these two statements together de la Vallée Poussin seems to be trying to show that the Sautrāntika theory is similar, if not identical, with the theory of causation in early Buddhism.

It is true that the two statements abhūtva bhāva utpāda and ahutvā sambhonti convey the same idea. But this similarity is only superficial and should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the two concepts have rather different substructures. Mookerjee, as mentioned earlier, has pointed out all the difficulties presented by the theory of momentariness, especially with regard to the conception of causation. The Sautrāntikas came to adopt the theory of abhūtva bhāva utpāda because of their acceptance of the theory of momentariness. But a theory of momentariness appears nowhere in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas (chapter 4). Nor do we find in them any metaphysical speculations on the problem of time. Therefore, the phrase ahutvā sambhonti, in the Nikāyas, can be considered a straightforward empirical statement involving no speculation about momentariness. It simply states that a dhamma that did not exist before comes into existence (when the necessary conditions are present). Thus, the objections raised against the Sautrāntika conception of abhūtva bhāva utpāda do not apply to the Nikāya conception of ahutvā sambhonti. For instance, Śāntarakṣita refers to criticism of the theory of momentariness by Bhadanta Yogasena thus: “Since there cannot be causal efficiency, either successively or simultaneously, the belief in momentariness is vain. When no peculiarity can be brought about [in the cause] by the auxiliaries, the series is rightly held to be undifferentiated [i.e., there is no occasion for diversity; it would produce the same seed-series instead of the dissimilar sprout-series.]” But this kind of criticism cannot be leveled against the teachings in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, where there is a recognition of empirical things, impermanent but still existing for some time (chapters 4, 5), not necessarily momentary. Causes, therefore, are observable facts existing for some time, and they can act successively or simultaneously because they are not momentary.

H. V. Guenther writes that the statement in the Majjhima
Nikāya (i.e., ahutvā sambhonti), in spite of its high authority, is rejected by the author of the Milindapanha. This is because of the Milinda statement; “natthi keci saṅkhārā ye abhavānta jāyanti.” But Guenther has failed to notice that the very statement from the Majjhima Nikāya is asserted by the author of the Milinda: “yam ahutvā sambhonti hutvā paṭīvīgacchati esa purimā koṭi paṇñāyati.” Moreover, the two statements natthi keci saṅkhārā ye abhavānta jāyanti and ahutvā sambhonti are semantically different. The words ahutvā and abhavānta refer to a difference in time. While ahutvā refers to the past, abhavānta refers to the present or even the future. Thus, the first statement means that “there are no dispositions [produced] that are not [susceptible to] arising,” the reason being that when the necessary conditions are present the effect would be produced; and the second statement means that “whatever, being nonexistent, comes to be and having been, passes away—such is the apparent beginning.”

Nor does the phrase ahutvā sambhonti imply the metaphysical question whether the effect is not inherent in the cause. This is attested to by a statement in the Śīksāsamuccaya: “Here, O King, the subjective heat element arises; it does not come from somewhere, nor does it, when ceasing, go into accumulation somewhere.” On the other hand, the statement “natthi keci saṅkhārā ye abhavantā tā yānti” does not imply that the effect is inherent or immanent in the cause. The examples quoted in the Milinda clearly state that the causes exist and that depending on these causes the effect is produced. For example, in the case of a house that did not exist before, it is said that there was wood in the forest, clay in the earth, and as a result of exertion on the part of men and women in handling these materials, there arose the house.

Just as the identity theory (satkāryavāda) leads to a belief in permanence, so does the non-identity theory (asatkāryavāda) lead to a belief in annihilation or the absence of continuity. The Buddha faced this identical situation, which is evident from the Kaccāyanagotta-sutta. There he rejects both atthitā and natthitā because they would lead to belief in permanence (sassata) and annihilation (uccheda), respectively.

From the analysis above it will be evident that Buddhist schools such as Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika, as a result of the problems created by the theory of momentariness, adopted causal
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Theories that were metaphysical in character. The analysis of experience into indivisible moments was a dominant feature of the philosophical atmosphere in which Nāgārjuna lived. Hence the situation was extremely complicated for Nāgārjuna, so whatever new interpretation he gave to the causal theory propounded by the Buddha was prompted by circumstances. Though presented with a choice of metaphysical theories of causation presented by both Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools, Nāgārjuna was drawn to the doctrines embodied in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. He therefore sought a way to justify the teachings embodied there, and his dialectic seems to be an attempt to provide a philosophical foundation for these doctrines. Hence a word about these doctrines may be in order.

The concept of Buddha is the most important topic in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. Buddha Gotama was a historical person. The Sutta Piṭaka affords us ample evidence of that. He influenced the lives and thought of the people of India during his time to such an extent that superhuman qualities came to be attributed to him, not only after his death but even while he was alive. These qualities—intellectual, moral, and even physical—soon raised him to the position of a deva in the eyes of his followers. The result was that the followers themselves became puzzled as to the real nature of the Buddha’s personality. When the question regarding the Buddha’s personality was raised, the Buddha himself answered that he was neither a manussa, nor a gandhabba, nor a yakka, nor even a deva or a brahma, but that he was only a Buddha. Similar questions were being raised even two hundred and fifty years after his death, during the reign of Asoka, the Maurya, in the third century B.C. Thus it became one of the most important topics of discussion in the history of Buddhist thought.

The passing away of the Buddha created a big vacuum in the lives of his followers and admirers. The Mahāparinibbāna-suttanta, which relates the incidents in the last days of the Buddha’s life seems to imply this. To perpetuate the memory of the Buddha, the Buddha himself recommended to his followers four places of pilgrimage. The desire of the faithful followers to have the Buddha as an object of worship contributed to the development of the conception of an eternal spiritual body (dharmakāya) of the Buddha.

Although in the early Sūtra tradition the question whether
the Buddha exists after death was regarded as a metaphysical question and was left unanswered, speculation regarding the immortality of the Buddha continued, and in the Mahāyāna tradition the Buddha came to be looked upon as one who “remains forever” (sādā sthitah).33 According to the Saddharma-pundarīka, Gautama Buddha did not really die after eighty years’ sojourn on earth. He can never die. He is immortal, and his parinirvāna is only an illusion.34 If the Buddha is supramundane and immortal, his physical body (rūpakāya) could not represent his real nature. Therefore, the Vajracchedikā maintains, “The Tathāgata is not to be recognized by means of the marks on his body.”35 Buddha is the embodiment of dharma.36 Thus the real body of the Buddha is the spiritual body (dharma-kaśa).37 The Buddha’s real body is not only spiritual but cosmic as well. While the spiritual body (dharma каśa) is identified with all the constituents of the universe (sarvadharm), it is considered to be the same as absolute reality (tathatā).38

This monistic philosophy, which is a culmination of the speculation on the nature of the Buddha, is the basic theme of the Prajñāpāramitā literature. Running through that literature is a conflict between absolute reality, the dharma-kaśa, considered to be nondual (advaya), and phenomenal reality, which is a plurality. To resolve this conflict we find the Vajracchedikā adopting the standpoint that reality is beyond description.39

This was the religio-philosophical tradition that caught the fascination of Nāgārjuna. In his attempt to resolve the conflict between the ultimate and phenomenal realities, Nāgārjuna seems to have adopted a novel technique. Instead of merely pointing out the conflict between the ultimate and the phenomenal, he used the dialectical method to eliminate the phenomenal from the discourse. As pointed out earlier, the Buddhist as well as the non-Buddhist schools of his day provided Nāgārjuna with the opportunity of developing his dialectic by presenting two contradictory theories of causation. By resorting to the dialectical method he attempted to expose the inherent contradictions in these theories of causation. Since experience was reckoned in terms of moments and since the theory of moments stood in the way of a satisfactory explanation of the process of causal production (utpāda), Nāgārjuna, unlike the Buddha, gave up the appeal to experience. He was quite aware that pratītyasamutpāda was
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the central tenet of Buddhism and that the Buddha’s enlightenment consisted in the discovery of the causal principle. Therefore, in setting forth his dialectic, he retained one aspect of the theory of causation recognized by early Buddhism, the idea of relativity (chapter 5). Then he raised the principle of causation from the empirical level to that of absolute reality. This shift of emphasis emerges very clearly from the interpretation that the Mādhyamikas gave to the Kaccāyanagotta-sutta of the Samyukta.⁴⁰

The early Buddhist theory of causation was called the middle path because it steered clear of the two extremes represented by the theories of existence (atthitā) and nonexistence (nātthitā). The Buddha rejected these two views because he thought they would lead to the belief in eternalism (sassata) and annihilationism (uccheda), respectively. The Kaccāyanagotta-sutta, which gives the analysis above, is specifically mentioned by Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā.⁴¹ Analyzing the two extremes of existence (astiṭva) and nonexistence (nāstiṭva), Nāgārjuna comes to the same conclusion: “[The theory that everything] exists means adherence to eternalism. [The theory that] nothing exists is annihilationism. Therefore, the wise do not adhere to either of the views of existence and nonexistence.”⁴²

But in the Mādhyamika literature we come across two versions of the analysis found in the Kaccāyanagotta-sutta. The first is the Kāśyapaparivarta of the Ratnakūta-sūtra, which is profusely quoted in the Mādhyamakāvṛtti of Candrakirti, and the other is the Mādhyamakāvṛtti itself. A comparison of the two throws much light on the difference between early Buddhist and Mādhyamika theories of causation. In the Kāśyapaparivarta, where the interlocutor is not Kaccāyana but Kāśyapa, it is said: “[Everything] exists,’ Kāśyapa, is one extreme. ‘[Everything] does not exist’ is the second extreme. In between these two extremes, Kāśyapa, is the middle path, and it is the correct perception of things.”⁴³ The Kāśyapaparivarta then describes this middle path (madhyamā pratipad) in terms of the twelfold causal formula in its progressive and regressive orders. This description is very close to the one found in the Pali Nikāyas as well as in the Chinese Āgamas.

The same passage occurs in the Mādhyamakāvṛtti and was identified by de la Vallée Poussin. But there it appears with an addition. Unlike the earlier references, there the middle path
(madhyama pratipad) is qualified by several other epithets such as ‘formless’ (arūpya), ‘nonindicative’ (anidarsana), ‘supportless’ (apratiṣṭhā), noumenal (anabhāṣa), signless (aniketa), and non-conceptual (āvijñāptika),44 most of which are generally applied to the transcendental reality, nirvāṇa. But the definition of the middle path as consisting of the twelvefold causal formula is omitted. The Kāśyapaparīvarta, like the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, rejects the two metaphysical theories and gives a causal account of the phenomenal reality. But in the Mādhyamakāvatī these two views are criticized from the standpoint of ultimate reality. While the middle path in the former is empirical and phenomenal, the middle path in the latter is transcendental. In fact, the general tendency in the Mādhyamakāvatī is to identify causality (pratītyasamutpāda) with the transcendental reality.45

The perfect Buddha,
The foremost of all teachers I salute.
He has proclaimed
‘Tis [like] blissful [Nirvāṇa],
Quiescence of Plurality.
There nothing disappears,
Nor does anything appear.
Nothing has an end,
Nor is anything eternal.
Nothing is identical (with itself),
Nor is anything differentiated.
Nothing moves,
Neither here nor there.46

Thus, it seems that the doctrine of origination was denied by the Mādhyamikas only from the standpoint of the transcendental reality. Candrakirti makes a statement to this effect: “From the Transcendentalist’s standpoint it is a condition where nothing disappears, [nor something new appears], etc., and in which there is no motion. It is a condition characterized by the eight [above-mentioned] characteristics [such as] ‘nothing disappears,’ etc.”47 The use of such epithets to describe the state of nirvāṇa is not rare in the early Buddhist texts.

The enumeration of the eight attributes—‘nondisappearing’ (anirodham), ‘nonarising’ (anutpādam), etc.—as characteristics of
causality may have been prompted by a statement in the early Buddhist texts. This statement is also found in the Mādhyamakavṛtti: "Whether the Tathāgatas were to arise or not, this nature of phenomena exists." In the early Buddhist texts this statement implied merely the objective validity of the causal principle (see chapter 5). The elevation of the causal principle from the phenomenal to the transcendental level seems to have created many problems for the Mādhyamikas, as is evident from the great attention paid to it by Candrakīrti.

Since the theory of causation was formulated to account for the arising (utpāda) and passing away (nirodha) of things, the question was raised how we can deny events such as disappearance. Candrakīrti is represented as saying that Nāgārjuna composed the Mādhyamaka-sāstra to explain that problem. Therein he shows that there is a difference between the real meaning (neyārtha) and the conventional meaning (nītārtha) of the scriptures. But that does not appear to solve the problem because it too is an appeal to the transcendent. The transcendental standpoint, which is so emphatically stated in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, was adopted by the Mādhyamikas to reject all forms of views (drṣṭi). The Aṭṭhaka-vagga of the Sutta-nipāta contain many discussions of the problems connected with metaphysical views (diṭṭhi). In one of them, it is true, the Buddha maintains that “There is only one truth; there cannot be a second.” But the problem is whether the Buddha was referring to an Ultimate Reality, a transcendental Absolute, on the basis of which all other theories are considered to be false. In other words, did the Buddha adopt a transcendentalist point of view in his analysis of phenomenal reality? Did he maintain that “Reason involves itself in deep and interminable conflict when it tries to go beyond phenomena to seek their ultimate ground?” This is a crucial problem that needs detailed analysis; we take it up later (chapter 9) so as not to interrupt the argument here.

The adoption of the transcendentalist standpoint is noticed in the Kāśyapaparivarta as well as in the Mādhyamakavṛtti, where the extremes of permanence (nitya) and impermanence (anitya), of ‘substantiality’ (ātman) and ‘nonsubstantiality’ (anātman), of ‘defilement’ (samkleśa) and ‘purity’ (vyavadāna), are rejected as being unreal from the standpoint of the transcendental
reality (paramārtha). Commenting on these statements in the Kāśyapaparivarīta, Murti says: “Dialectic is engendered by the total opposition between two points of view diametrically opposed to each other. And the required opposition could have been provided by the ātma-view of the Brahmanical systems and the anātma-vāda of earlier Buddhism.”54 Later Murti declares that “As a matter of dialectical necessity then did the Buddha formulate, or at least suggest, a theory of elements. The Mahāyāna systems clearly recognise this dialectical necessity when they speak of pudgala-nairātmya—the denial of substance—as intended to pave the way for Absolutism. Śūnyatā is the unreality of the elements as well (dharma-nairātmya).”55 We have pointed out (chapter 4) that Murti’s assumption that the Buddha suggested a theory of elements as a matter of dialectical necessity is contradicted by a statement made by Candrakīrti himself in the Mādhyamakavṛti.

What is more important to us at present is Murti’s view that the ātma-vāda of the Brahmanical systems and the anātma-vāda of earlier Buddhism provided the required opposition for the development of the Mādhyamika dialectic. Murti seems to think that the pudgala-nairātmya (nonsubstantiality of the individual) presented by the Buddha and the early Buddhists constituted one extreme, opposed to the ātma-vāda, the other extreme. But what of the dharma-nairātmya (nonsubstantiality of the elements) of the Mahāyānists? It is not a form of anātma-vāda? The statement of Murti above seems to be based on the assumption that the Buddha, and therefore the early Buddhists, formulated only a theory of elements, not a theory of the nonsubstantiality of elements (dharma-nairātmya), which enabled the Mādhyamikas to bring about a ‘Copernican revolution’ in Indian philosophy. Our investigation has shown that this view is untenable (chapter 4).

In the earlier part of this chapter we indicated what constituted the thesis and antithesis that enabled Nāgārjuna to formulate his dialectic. The metaphysical theories of causation presented by the Sāṅkhya and Sarvāstivāda constituted the thesis, i.e., the assertion of substance; and the causal theories of the Vaiśeṣika and Sautrāntika provided the antithesis, i.e., the negation of substance. Although the latter view denying substance may appear to be similar to the early Buddhist theory, as we have pointed out there is a major difference in that it leads to a denial of causation, thus
coming very close to the anātmavāda of the Materialists, which was rejected by the Buddha himself. Thus, when Nāgarjuna wrote, the philosophical atmosphere was so polluted by speculative metaphysics that either he had to accept causality, and along with it the belief in ‘substance,’ or he had to reject ‘substance’ (the early Buddhist position) and along with it causality. This was the dilemma faced by Nāgarjuna, and, as pointed out earlier, he resorted to the transcendental standpoint to reject all metaphysics.

How did he achieve this? We saw earlier that from the standpoint of the transcendental everything in the phenomenal or the conditioned (saṃskṛta) world was considered unreal in that everything is relative. Substance (ātma) and ‘no-substance’ (anātma) are relative; so are permanence (nitya) and impermanence (anitya), defilement (saṃkleśa) and purity (vyavadāna). Nāgarjuna emphasized this aspect of causation to deny the reality of the phenomenal. Relativity implies a denial of self-existence (svabhava), hence the absence of reality (śūnyatā). This aspect was emphasized by Nāgarjuna. He found that speculation was based on concepts. He took each concept and showed how it is relative. Thus, by showing the antinomial conflict, he demonstrated the futility of speculative metaphysics. This was the purpose of his dialectic. In the philosophical atmosphere in which he lived, he could not maintain that something arose as a result of causes, because immediately the question would have been raised whether that which arose inhered in the causes or not. Therefore, he was compelled to give up the idea that causation explains ‘arising’ (utpāda) and ‘passing away’ (niruddha); instead, he maintained that causation explains only relativity.

But even if pratītyasamutpāda were to be interpreted as a ‘theory of relativity,’ would there not be an antithesis, the ‘theory of nonrelativity’ (apratītyasamutpāda)? If so, even pratītyasamutpāda had to be given up as an extreme. This Nāgarjuna was not prepared to do. Therefore, he denies that anything is ‘unrelated’ (apratītyasamutpanna), and raises pratītyasamutpāda to the level of transcendental reality, thereby avoiding any interpretation of it as an extreme (anta). By doing so, he seems to divorce the theory (i.e., pratītyasamutpāda) from the things the theory was intended to explain (i.e., the relative or the conditioned, pratītyasamutpanna).

This seems to be the main difference between early Buddhist
and Mādhyamika conceptions of causation. Whereas in early Buddhism the theory of causation was employed to explain all types of causation available in the world of experience, including nirvāṇa (chapter 6), in Mādhyamika thought it was employed to explain only the relativity of the phenomenal, the theory itself being considered transcendental.
VIII. Causal Correlations: 
Another Facet of Development

THE DEFINITION of a cause (hetu, pratyaya) as the sum total of several factors led to further developments in the Buddhist theory of causation (see chapter 3). During the period of the Abhidharma, the Buddhists began to analyze each of these several factors to determine the exact relationship between them. In the Theravāda such speculations are embodied in the *Paṭṭhāna*, while in the other schools of thought these analyses are found in almost every text.

The theory of causal correlations (pratyaya, yūan) mentioned in the *Abhidharmakosā* seems to be the nucleus from which the more elaborate theories developed. That most of the schools started with the theory of four correlations is attested by the important place accorded it in the different schools. In the Theravāda Abhidhamma these four are listed among the first five, the *samanantara-pratyaya* being counted as two, the *anantara-* and *samanantara-paccayas*. In the Sarvāstivāda and Mādhyamika schools the number was fixed at four. Hence, when the Yogācārins wanted to account for certain relations that are not covered by these four, they subdivided one of them, the *hetu-pratyaya* (primary cause; see chapter 3). The Theravādins, who were not restricted by such limitations, went on multiplying the number freely until they formulated a theory of twenty-four relations.

We have pointed out that the Yogācāra school enumerated seven characteristics of the primary cause (hetu-pratyaya, yin yūan),
one of which was subdivided into twenty forms (chapter 3). Of the seven characteristics of the hetu-pratyaya, six were related to the six hetus (causes) enumerated by the Sarvâstivâdins. The other, prabheda, has twenty subdivisions, of which the first ten are mentioned in the Madhyântavibhāga-bhāṣya of Vasubandhu and the last ten are treated in the Bodhisattvabhumi and the Ch‘êng wei shih lun. Thus, the four pratyayas represented a very broad classification of causes, and their subdivisions provide a detailed analysis of all the different causes.

In his translations of the A-pi-ta-mo chü-shê lun and the Ch‘êng wei shih lun, de la Vallée Poussin has discussed in detail the various pratyayas formulated in these texts. A critical analysis of the theory of twenty-four paccayas of the Theravâdins has been made by Nyanatiloka. We do not propose to re-cover their ground. Our attempt here will be to compare the theory of paccayas presented by the Theravâdins on the one hand and the theories presented by the Sarvâstivâdins and the Yogâcârins on the other, to determine whether there is any correspondence between them.

Hetu-paccaya or ‘primary cause’ is the first of the twenty-four forms of causal correlation enumerated in the Patthāna. It occupies a place of similar importance in the Sarvâstivâda and Yogâcâra teachings. In the philosophy of early Buddhism, psychological motives such as greed (lobha, t’an), hate or aversion (dosa, wei), and confusion (moha, ch’ih) are referred to as the roots (mūla, kēn), in the sense of primary causes, of evil behavior. The Patthāna cites these psychological motives as examples of primary causes (hetu-paccaya), and Buddhaghosa maintains that a thing can be a primary cause in the sense of being the root (mūlatthena). These three motives are compared to the roots of a tree, which feed and nourish the other parts of the tree. Just as greed, hate or aversion, and confusion are the primary causes of evil (akusala, pu shan), so their opposites are the primary causes of good (kusala, shan).

According to the Yogâcâra school, the ‘store-consciousness’ (ālaya-vijñāna), which serves as a receptacle of the “seeds” (būja) such as dispositions (vāsanā), is the primary cause of the seven forms of active consciousness (pravṛtti-vijñāna), which are the effects. But to the Yogâcârins, ālaya-vijñāna includes both good and bad tendencies, although according to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, which represents a formative stage in the evolution of
Yogacāra thought, only the good tendencies (kusala-vāsanā) are considered to be the primary causes.¹²

The ārammaṇa-paccaya or the ālambana-pratyaya (suo yuān yūan) is the objective cause or condition. Discussing the ālambana-pratyaya, Yasomitra says: "There are two kinds of causal relations, namely, that which produces (janaka) and that which does not produce (ajanaka). The ālambana-pratyaya does not produce because it is only an objective support."¹³ Here the reference is to the perceptual 'image' produced by the object (viṣaya), rather than the object itself. Since the 'image' has already been produced by the object, it need not be produced again in the mind by the object, and therefore it serves only as objective support. Hence the distinction between the ālambana-ṣaṭka (i.e., the six forms of viññāna) and the viṣaya-ṣaṭka (the six objects).¹⁴

For the manifestation of mental phenomena, some kind of objective support is a sine qua non. Buddhaghosa maintains that there is nothing in this world that will not become an object of consciousness.¹⁵ While the five forms of sense consciousness that are produced by external stimuli serve as objective support for the five forms of sensory perception, all forms of mental coefficients, all terms expressive of concepts, and nibbāna are related to mind by way of objective support. The Yogacāra school, which did not accept the reality of the external object, nevertheless recognized this relation. They believed that consciousness (viññāna) contains within itself the ingredients of the subject-object relation and represents one stage in the evolution of consciousness.¹⁶

Adhipati-paccaya is the dominant cause. It represents the efficient cause because it exerts influence over the effect.¹⁷ For example, the six internal bases of cognition (the eye, etc.) are related to the six forms of cognition in this manner.¹⁸ Pali Abhidhamma distinguishes two forms of the dominant cause: (1) objective dominance (ārammaṇādhipati) and (2) coexistent dominance (sahajātādhipati).¹⁹ The first accounts for the impressions created by external objects on the mind. The external world presents us with various agreeable and disagreeable objects. These impressions determine to a great extent the nature of our cognitions. Not only the impressions but also the nature of the sense organs themselves affect the character of the cognitions. But apart from these objective presentations and the nature of the sense organs, there are certain motives that
dominate our consciousness, which are said to arise along with consciousness. Intention, will, energy or effort, reason, and investigation fall in this category and are considered coexistent dominant conditions. In the ultimate analysis even such mental concomitants appear to be engendered by external objects. But because of the dominating or “overpowering” influence of these motives a distinction seems to have made between objective and coexistent dominance.

The Sarvastivādins and the Yogācārins give a much wider meaning to adhipati-pratyaya (tsēng shang yüan). According to the Sarvastivāda it is a comprehensive and universal cause. The Yogācārins go so far as to include the other three causes, hetu, samanantara, and ālambana, under this category. While the other three causes explain specific relations, adhipati-pratyaya accounts for any possible relations. Hence we find the Sarvastivādins identifying it with kāraṇa-hetu. The difference between the Theravāda and Sarvastivāda conceptions may be explained thus: The Theravādins, whose speculations were not restricted by the limitations imposed by other schools, continued to expand the original theory of four pratyayas, enunciating new causes as occasion demanded. Therefore, it was not necessary to accept a cause that could accommodate anything not falling under the other three causes. As a result, their definition of adhipati-paccaya was limited. On the contrary, the Sarvastivādins who accepted the theory of four pratyayas and formulated a theory of six hetus, defined the adhipati-pratyaya so that anything not accounted for in these two theories could be included in it. The Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun states that adhipati-pratyaya exerts influence in four ways, namely, by being a generating cause (sheng), a sustaining cause (wei or chu), an accomplishing cause (chēng), and a cause of acquisition (tē). Thus, all primary and subsidiary causes fall into this category.

Samanantara-paccaya or samanantara-pratyaya (tēng wu chien yüan) is defined as the proximate or contiguous cause. The Theravāda tradition perceived two forms of this pratyaya, although they are not strictly distinguished (see above). The formulation of this correlation may have been necessitated at first by the rejection of the idea of annihilation (uccheda, tuan). But with the development of the theory of momentariness during the period of the Abhidharma, its importance in accounting for the rapid succession of
momentary phenomena came to predominate (chapter 4). With the formulation of this relation, the Sarvāstivādins, the Sautrāntikas, who formulated a theory of momentariness, and the later Theravādins, who accepted this theory—all were able to explain the continuity of momentary phenomena, primarily the mental. According to the definitions given by all the schools of thought, a phenomenon that serves as a cause for an immediately succeeding phenomenon, without pause, can be called an immediately contiguous cause.  

\[ Abhinirvṛtti-kāraṇa \] (or [hetu] [sheng ch'i neng tso]) mentioned in the Yogacāra treatises also emphasizes the immediate production of the effect and is therefore called the proximate cause (āsannaḥ pratyayah).  

Next in the list of twenty-four paccayas of the Theravādins is sahajata-paccaya, the conascent cause. In the Patthana it is defined as “that which arises to help or assist the arising of another phenomenon.”  

The example of the lamp is quoted to illustrate this relation. When a lamp is lighted, the light accompanies the lighting of the lamp. When the lamp is burning, it burns together with its heat and light. In this case, the lamp relates itself to light and heat by way of conascence. This corresponds to [sahabhū-hetu] (chū yu yin) in the Sarvāstivāda classification. The Sphutartha quotes an example from the early texts as an illustration: “These three limbs of the path accompany right view. Along with them have arisen feeling, sensation, volition, etc.”  

De la Vallée Poussin translates it as “cause mutuelle”. This relation seems to refute the idea that a cause should always be temporally prior to its effect. An effect will appear when the necessary factors summarized by the cause have been fulfilled—not necessarily after the cause. This relation implies that factors mutually support each other to give rise to the effect and continue to do so even after the effect has come into existence.  

In this respect it is similar to the co-relative cause (aṇṇamaṇṇa-paccaya, see below). This, according to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, is an aspect of the primary cause (hetu-pratyaya) and is described as ‘assistance’ (sahāya, chu pan). It is further explained as the relation between phenomena that “arise together and exist without deficiency, like the primary and derived elements.”  

Not all relations are genetic or ‘intrinsic.’ In many cases it is possible to discern interdependence rather than genetic connection.
The reciprocal or co-relative cause (aññamañña-paccaya) was formulated to account for such connections. The idea was first expressed in the Upaniṣads: “The body is founded on breath, and breath is founded on the body.”34 In the early Nikāyas and the Āgamas it is maintained that such a relation occurs between consciousness (viññāna, shih) and the psychophysical personality (namārūpa, ming sè). The relation is compared to that between two reeds that stand leaning against one another; if one were to be taken away the other would certainly fall.35 The example of the three sticks (tīdanā) is usually quoted in the Pali Abhidhamma to illustrate this relation.36

The Yogācārins consider this relation a characteristic of the primary cause, and they call it ‘coexistence’ (sampratipatti, têng hsing). Coexistence is explained as the function of a phenomenon that exists with another phenomenon and serves it by way of objective support, such as the mind and mental concomitants.37 According to Haribhadra’s classification (chapter 3), it coincides with sabbhāga-hetu (hsiang ying yin), formulated by the Sarvāstivādins.38 In the Shē ta ch’êng lun, Asaṅga is represented as maintaining that the two forms of consciousness, ālaya-viññāna and pravṛtti-viññāna, are reciprocal causes (anyonyapratyaya = aññamañña-paccaya).39 The interdependence here does not mean genetic interrelation but, rather, mutual interdependence among existents, “a static set of reciprocal dependencies like that among the parts of a steel frame.”40

The dependence cause (nissaya-paccaya) is described as the ground or basis for the existence of some other phenomenon.41 This relation is slightly different from the two preceding (sahajāta and aññamañña) paccayas. For example, the earth is the dependence cause or the basis on which a tree can grow. But the earth does not arise with the tree, as in the case of the conascent cause (sahajāta-paccaya), nor does the earth depend on the tree for its existence, as in the case of the coexistent or reciprocal cause (aññamañña-paccaya). In psychology, the six ‘gateways’ (āyatana) of sense perception serve as dependence causes for the six forms of cognition (viññāna).

The counterpart of this cause is the dhṛti-kāraṇa (ch’ih nêng tso) of the Yogācārins, a subdivision of the primary cause (hetupratiyaya). According to their definition, the earth is related in this manner to the beings who live therein42 because the earth holds
them and prevents them from falling. A separate cause corresponding to this does not appear in the Sarvāstivāda classification. But it may be possible to include it under adhipati-pratyaya, which in the Yogācāra tradition functions as a supporting cause (pratiṣṭhā, chu).

Next is the ‘sufficing cause’ (upanissaya-paccaya), which Buddhaghosa defines as “excessive dependence”. It represents a powerful means or inducement. According to the Paṭṭhāna, there are three forms of the sufficing cause. They are (1) the objective sufficing cause (ārammanuṇaṇipanissaya), (2) the immediate sufficing cause (anantarūpanissaya), and (3) the natural sufficing cause (pakaṭūpanissaya). The first is similar to the dominant influence of the object (ārammanuṇadhipati); the second is similar to the immediate contiguous cause (samanantarā-paccaya). The importance of the third lies in the fact that it explains moral and spiritual advancement. Because of sufficing causes such as faith (saddhā), one gives alms, observes the moral rules, performs uposatha functions, develops meditative powers and insights, etc.

In a certain way this relation is similar to sarvatraga-hetu (pien hsing yin) of the Sarvāstivādins. It may be argued that any phenomenon serving as a powerful inducement for certain forms of behavior, moral or immoral, persists until the goal to which that behavior is directed is achieved. In this sense upanissaya paccaya resembles sarvatragahetu, for according to the latter a false view held by a man dominates all his behavior, bodily, verbal, and mental. His behavior becomes infused with the false view and is made disagreeable to others. False view, while serving as a strong inducement, runs through his entire behavior. Haribhadra has pointed out similarities between sarvatraga-hetu and the characteristic of the primary cause described as “opposition” (paripantha, chang ai).

The preexistent or prenascent condition (purejāta-paccaya) recognizes the prior existence of some phenomenon as a condition for the production of another phenomenon. Helping or supporting the arising of a thing by its prior existence is the function of this cause. Among the list of hetus or kāraṇas put forward by the Yogācārins, none corresponds exactly with this cause. But ākṣepahetu (chao yin nèng tso) or ‘projecting cause,’ which is a subdivision of the primary cause, in certain respects resembles the preexistent
condition. Ākṣepa-hetu accounts for the problem of action at a distance, hence is defined as 'remote cause' (vidūrah pratayayah). Ignorance (avidyā) produces old age and death (jarāmaranā) and is therefore a remote cause. According to the Bodhisattvabhūmi, a seed producing another of its kind is a remote cause, because the intermediary stage represented by the tree is not given. But the Theravāda description seems to imply the continued existence of the cause even after the effect has come into existence. Thus, the only similarity between the two relations is that they both recognize a time lag between the cause and the effect.

That which supports the continued sustenance of a phenomenon that has already come into existence is said to be the post-existent or postnascent condition (pacchajāta-paccaya). For example, the continued supply of the necessary quantity of moisture, etc. is necessary for an existing plant to grow to maturity. Otherwise there would be change in its growth (S 3.91–92). In the same way, a personality, which has come into existence because of past causes, requires continued sustenance in the future. If the four kinds of food—material food, contact, volitions, and consciousness—do not feed this personality, it will not develop or continue to exist. This definition is quite similar to that of the nutriment cause (āhāra-paccaya, see below) and may therefore be compared to the cause of stability (sthiti-kārana, chu nēng tso), which again is a subdivision of the primary cause.

According to the Paṭṭhāna, any phenomenon that causes its resultant to accept its inspiration so that the latter can gain greater and greater advancement is called the habitual-recurrence condition or cause (āsevana-paccaya). The term āsevana is used in the sense of habituation by constant repetition. If a man develops thoughts of loving kindness (mettā) once, he will be enabled to develop the same thoughts with a greater degree of perfection later. An important characteristic of this relation is that it exists among things of the same order, among likes.

The same relation is expressed by a characteristic of the primary cause termed 'increase' (puṣṭi, i). It is explained as "the good, bad and, neutral dharmas previously cultivated that cause greater and greater efficiency of the dharmas, good, bad, and neutral, respectively, to be produced in the future." Haribhadra maintains that this is similar to the samprayuktaka-hetu. Accord-
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ing to the Sphutarthā, there are five characteristics of hetu, one of which is upabṛmhaṇa. It is defined in the same way puṣṭi is defined in the Abhidharmasamuccaya.\(^{61}\)

The need to account for the problem of moral responsibility gave rise to the relation of kamma (kamma-paccaya). The problem of the causation of moral behavior and responsibility has been discussed earlier (chapter 6). The importance of this problem may have induced the Ābhidhammikas to formulate a special relation to account for it. According to the Theravāda Abhidhamma, kamma here refers to the particular function of the volitions.\(^{62}\) It is a reflection of the statement in the early Buddhist texts that kamma is merely volition (see chapter 6). Two forms of kamma relations were distinguished by the Abhidhammikas: (1) the asynchronous (nānakkhāni,ka), and (2) the conascent (sahajāta).\(^{63}\)

The psychophysical personality that arises in this existence is due to the dispositions (sankhāra) or volitions (cetana) of the past life. This is the asynchronous kamma relation because the dispositions or the volitions belong to the past. On the other hand, there are certain thoughts, good (kusala) or bad (akusala), that arise along with the volitions. Such volitions are related to the thoughts by way of the conascent kamma relation.\(^{64}\)

In several respects, the kamma relation resembles vipāka-hetu (i shu yin) of the Sarvāstivādins. Like the kamma relation, vipāka-hetu emphasizes the volitional aspect of karma. Like the asynchronous kamma relation, it partakes of the idea of projection (ākṣepakatva) of the effect and recognizes a time lag between the cause and the effect.\(^{65}\) Haribhadra has equated vipāka-hetu with a characteristic of the hetu-pratyaya given in the Abhidhammasamuccaya as ‘grasping’ (parigraha, shè shou).\(^{66}\) The characteristic of ‘grasping’ is explained by the example of “bad and defiling tendencies causing the belief in a [permanent] soul.”\(^{67}\) But a closer relationship exists between the asynchronous kamma relation and ākṣepa-kāraṇa (chao yin nèng tso), the projecting cause enunciated by the Yogācārins.\(^{68}\) In the asynchronous kamma relation, kamma signifies a particular energy. It does not cease, though the volition may cease to be evident, but exists in a latent form. As soon as it obtains a favorable opportunity, and when the other necessary conditions are available, it produces the effect.\(^{69}\)

The nutriment-cause (āhāra-paccaya) is one that is prefigured
in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. The Nikāyas and the Āgamas refer to four things—material food, contact, volition, and consciousness—that serve as nutrition for beings who are born and those seeking birth (chapter 6). But the Ābhidhammikas specify the function of food (āhāra). They maintain that “even though food has the power to generate [some effect], the primary function of food is to support or sustain [what has already come into existence].” This view is clearly implied in the sthiti-kāraṇa (chu nêng tso).

The faculties (indriya)—such as faith (saddhā), energy (viriya), mindfulness (sati), concentration (samādhi), and knowledge (panna)—that control the behavior of man come under the category of controlling conditions (indriya-paccaya). During the time of the Abhidhamma twenty such faculties were enumerated. Because of the importance of these faculties in determining the behavior of an individual, the Paṭṭhāna has formulated this special kind of cause. But the idea of dominance (adhipati) implied in this relation makes it quite similar to adhipati-paccaya (see above). Therefore, the Sarvāstivādins and the Yogācārins may have been satisfied with the formulation of adhipati-pratyaya.

The stages on the path to a goal are considered by the Ābhidhammikas as causes (paccaya) because each stage has the power of clearing the ground and assisting the attainment of the succeeding stage. Such causes or conditions are called the path conditions (maṅga-paccaya). This relation resembles prāpana-kāraṇa (těng chih nêng tso), which is illustrated by the example of the path leading to nirvāṇa. The Ch'êng wei shih lun refers to it as an aspect of adhipati-pratyaya (an accomplishing cause, chêng, see above).

Sampayutta-paccaya, or the ‘association condition,’ accounts for the synthesis of phenomena that are analyzed into different parts for the sake of examination. Statements referring to the association of ideas are not rare in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. This relation corresponds in many respects to samprayukta-hetu (t'ung lui yin), formulated by the Sarvāstivādins. The Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda definitions are similar. The former maintains that association takes place in four ways: (1) having one base (ekavatthuka), (2) having one object (ekārammaṇa), (3) arising simultaneously (ekuppaṭtāda), and (4) ceasing together (ekanirodha). Speaking of the samprayukta-hetu, the Sphutartha says, “it is deter-
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mined by its function of having one object.” Haribhadra says the same thing with regard to a characteristic of the primary cause that he describes as sampratipatti (têng hsing), although he prefers to identify samprayukta-hetu with the characteristic puṣṭi (tsêng i).

Atthi-paccaya, or the ‘presence condition’, is defined in the Theravāda Abhidhamma as “that which renders service by being a support to another through presence.” This may appear to be a redundance, but the importance of this relation becomes clear when we consider the early Buddhist notion of ‘cause.’ It has been pointed out that a cause is the sum total of several factors (chapter 3). Taking the example of a plant, it was pointed out that there are three factors essential for its arising. The presence of earth and moisture is essential, not only for the arising of the sprout, but also for its later development. It is this aspect of the ‘presence’ of certain conditions that is emphasized in this relation.

Atthi-paccaya seems to correspond to sahaṅgiri-kāraṇa (t’ung shih nêng tso) or sahaṅgiri-hetu (t’ung shih yin). Sahāṅgiri-hetu, or the supporting cause, is a subdivision of the primary cause and is defined as the concurrence (sāmagrī, ho ho) of various factors, thus emphasizing the need for the presence of several conditions.

Thus, nearly eighteen of the twenty-four causal correlations enumerated in the Patṭhāna have counterparts in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra theories. We have not been able to find parallels for six of the relations enumerated by the Theravadins. However, in addition to those mentioned above, the Yogācāra list contains thirteen more relations for which parallels are not traceable in the Theravāda Abhidhamma.

One of the relations enumerated in the Patṭhāna that has no parallel in the other schools is vipāka-hetu. It does not, by definition, correspond to the vipāka-hetu of the Sarvāstivādins. The former, unlike the latter, does not emphasize the importance of volitional activity. In fact, the Patṭhāna maintains that a phenomenon that aids, without exerting any effort, the arising of another phenomenon is called vipāka-paccaya, or the ‘resultant condition.’

Jhāna-paccaya, or the ‘contemplation condition,’ was formulated by the Theravādins to explain the process of concentration. The factors that allow the mind to sustain concentration are such causes (paccaya). Some of these factors are initial application (vitakka), sustained application (vicāra), pleasurable interest (pīti),
joy (somanassa), indifference (upekkhā), and one-pointedness of mind (cittassa ekaggata). While the relation by way of association (sampayutta) illustrated the homogeneous nature of consciousness, the relation by way of dissociation (vippayutta) explains the distinction between mental and physical phenomena. It purports to refute the view of the idealists that material elements are mere projections of the mind. While explaining the interdependence of mental and physical phenomena, it helps to keep them apart, thus affirming the realist standpoint of the Abhidhammikas.

An important aspect of the causal situation left unexplained by the presence condition (atthi-paccaya) is expressed by the ‘absence condition’ (natthi-paccaya). The presence condition emphasizes only the presence of certain conditions or factors for the arising of a thing. But there are certain factors that should disappear to make room for the appearance of the effect. In the example of the seed, we found that the presence of three conditions was necessary. If the sprout is to come into existence, the seed has to give way, but the other two conditions may still have to be present and continue to support the sprout. It is this disappearance and making room for the effect to manifest itself that is emphasized in the absence condition.

The ‘abeyance condition’ (vigata-paccaya) and the ‘continuance condition’ (avigata-paccaya) are defined in the same way as the absence and presence conditions, respectively. The formulation of these conditions may have been prompted by the desire to eliminate the belief in a static reality, which may be implied by the absence and presence conditions. The abeyance condition emphasizes gradual disappearance, and the continuance condition avoids the static existence implied by the presence condition.

The following several paragraphs give a brief description of the thirteen forms of correlation discussed in the Abhidharmasamuccaya that have no parallels in the Theravāda list. (1) Utpatti-kāraṇa (sheng nêng tso) is the producing or generating cause. It is defined, like the supporting cause (sahakāri-kāraṇa), as the complex (sāmagrī) of causes that gives rise to the effect. It is illustrated by the relationship between the complex of causes such as the visual organ, etc. and visual consciousness (caksurviñāna). Haribhadra says that it is the cause of production because it gives rise to an
Causal Correlations

effect that did not exist earlier. The Ch'eng wei shih lun, which does not refer to the first ten causes enumerated in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, includes the producing cause under the category of adhipati-pratyaya by pointing out that production (janana, sheng) is one of the modes by which the adhipati-pratyaya manifests its activity.

(2) Prakāśa-kāraṇa (chao nēng tso) is the revealing cause. It is like the lamp, which reveals objects (or colors) by destroying the darkness. (3) Vikāra-kāraṇa (pien huai nēng tso), or the cause of alteration, brings about a change in another phenomenon. It is illustrated by the example of fire, which alters the nature of anything inflammable. Haribhadra points out that this is a cause that changes one series to another, as, for example, fire changes the series called “wood” to the series called “charcoal.”

(4) Viyoga-kāraṇa (fēn li nēng tso) is a cause of separation as a sickle is in relation to what is to be cut. It cuts into two what is connected or conjoined. (5) Parinātī-kāraṇa (chuang pien nēng tso) is a cause of transformation as is a skill in the metalworking art in relation to gold and silver. This refers only to the transformation of a basic material; hence it differs from the cause of alteration, which implies a complete change. (6) Sampratyaṣya-kāraṇa (hsin chiai nēng tso), is the cause of agreement, as smoke is to fire, because what is not manifest can still be known by comparison or inference. (7) Sampratyaṣya-kāraṇa (hsien liao nēng tso) is a cause of making known or proving, for example, a proposition, a reason, and an example. (8) Vyavahāra-kāraṇa (sui shuo nēng tso) is the cause of reference or denomination, which is the basis of speech. Speech depends on names (nāma), perception (samjñā), and views (drṣṭi), which therefore are the causes of reference. Here nāma names the object, samjñā perceives it, and drṣṭi adheres to it. Thus, all forms of speech are determined by names, perceptions, and views (nāma, samjñā, drṣṭi).

(9) Apeksā-kāraṇa (kuan tai nēng tso) is the cause of expectation. It is illustrated by the relation between hunger and thirst to the search for food and drink, respectively. (10) Āvāha-kāraṇa (yin fa nēng tso) is defined as the coinciding or agreeing cause because it is supposed to bring about results that are in conformity (anukūla) with the causes. It is illustrated by the example of proper service to royalty leading to the gaining of the confidence of the royalty.
Pratiniyama-kāraṇa (ting pieh nēng tso) is the cause of specialized activity. The dispositions (saṃskāra), in so far as they possess a special force to produce their fruits, are called pratiniyama-kāraṇa. For example, a birth in any one of the five realms is determined by the appropriate causes producing birth in that realm, and this is thought to emphasize the diversity of causes. (12) Virodhi-kāraṇa (hsiang wei nēng tso) is the cause of opposition or an obstructing factor, such as the relation of hail to corn. (13) Avirodhi-kāraṇa (pu hsiang wei nēng tso) is merely the absence of obstruction, hence a negative cause.

A passage in the Sumangalavilāsinī of Buddhaghosa is strongly reminiscent of the analysis of the pratyayas in the Abhidharma-samuccaya and other treatises of the Yogācāra school. There Buddhaghosa describes the various powers and types of knowledge possessed by the Buddha.98 One of them consists of the knowledge that ignorance (avijjā) is related to the dispositions (saṅkhārā) in nine possible ways, as a causes of:

1. Production or genesis (uppādo huttā, cf. uputtattakāraṇa).
2. Natural happening (pavattari huttā, cf. pravrṛtti, abhinirvrṛtti).
3. Objectivity (nimittat huttā, cf. ārammana, ālambana).
4. Endeavoring or striving (āyuhanatt huttā).
5. Association (samyo ga huttā, cf. samprayuktaka'sampayutta).
7. Arising (samudayo huttā).
8. Primary support (hetu huttā).

The marked similarity between this and the analysis in the Abhidhammasamuccaya seems to show that Buddhaghosa was aware of the developments taking place in northern India during his time. It also indicates that Buddhaghosa’s interpretation of the Theravāda texts was very much colored by these ideas. In fact, the cause of obstruction (palibodha), number 6 in this list, was not recognized in the Theravāda tradition, because in that tradition a ‘cause’ was understood to be something that helps or supports (upakāraka) the arising of another thing, not something that obstructs.99
IX. Conclusion

THAT THE BUDDHA left certain metaphysical questions unexplained (avāyākata, Sk. avyākṛta) has engaged the attention of many scholars. T. R. V. Murti after having examined all the previous theories, advanced a theory that has exerted so much influence on modern scholars that it seems to be considered the last word on the subject. As an exposition of the Mādhyamika philosophy, Murti’s *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* is unquestionably the best we have. But we contend that although Murti has presented an authoritative account of Mādhyamika philosophy, his interpretation of early Buddhism is not in the least satisfactory. We have pointed out (chapters 4, 7) how Murti wrongly attributed certain theories, such as the theory of real elements, to the early Buddhists and even to the Buddha himself. In this chapter we propose to show that Murti’s theory regarding the silence of the Buddha does not have any basis.

In *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, Murti starts by saying, “It is our contention that the Mādhyamika dialectic is anticipated in essentials by the Buddha. The Mādhyamikas have but systematically formulated his suggestions and drawn out their implications” (p. 36). The conclusion being thus preconceived, Murti goes on to present the different views expressed by modern scholars and then interprets the ten (in later Mahāyāna, fourteen) unexplained questions in a manner that supports his conclusion. He selected only a few sections from the early Nikāyas for his explanation of
the unexplained questions and overlooked many of the earliest and most important portions of the Nikāyas, which throw much light on this problem—for example, the Atīṭhaka-vagga of the Sutta-nipāta. As a matter of fact, the selections that directly refer to the ten unanswered questions afford very little help in revealing the reasons for the Buddha's silence, except the Culla Mālunkya-sutta, which emphasizes pragmatic reasons.

Let us state the ten questions as they occur in the early sources. They are grouped by topic.

*Duration of the universe*
1. The world is eternal.
2. The world is not eternal.

*Extent of the universe*
3. The world is finite.
4. The world is infinite.

*Nature of the soul*
5. The soul is identical with the body.
6. The soul is different from the body.

*Destiny of the saint (arhat)*
7. The saint exists after death.
8. The saint does not exist after death.
9. The saint does and does not exist after death.
10. The saint neither exists nor does not exist after death.

Jayatilleke has made the most recent analysis of these ten questions. He differs from Murti in the way he distinguishes the different types of questions, and gives different reasons for the Buddha's silence on them. He points out that the first four questions have no answer because of the limitations of empiricism (see chapter 6). He finds the other six questions logically meaningless and maintains that they resemble the solution of the Logical Positivists. They differ from the solution of the Logical Positivists, he points out, as follows: "The Buddhist while saying that it is meaningless to ask whether one exists in (hoti), does not exist in (na hoti), is born in (upapajjati), is not born in (na upapajjati) in Nirvāṇa, still speaks of such a transcendent state as realizable." Jayatilleke's source for this interpretation is a statement in the Sutta-nipāta: "The person who has attained the goal is without measure; he does not have that with which one can speak of him."
Conclusion

This brings us face to face with one of the most crucial problems in early Buddhism—the interpretation of *nirvāṇa*. In the first place, the person referred to in the quotation above (*atthaṅgata*) could either be one who has attained the goal (*artha*) in this very life (*diṭṭhadhamma*), in which case it does not pose much of a problem, or one who has passed away (*astha-gata*), in which case Jayatilleke’s interpretation creates difficulties. Jayatilleke’s interpretation seems to assume the existence of a transcendent state realizable after death, a state that is not describable. This appears to be the same theory that the Buddha considered to be metaphysical, namely, “The Tathāgata exists after death” (*hoti tathāgato parammaranā*). The second clause in the quotation above, *yena naṁ vajju taṁ tassa natthi* [he does not have that with which one can speak of him], if interpreted literally, would mean that a being exists in *nirvāṇa* after death, but that no concepts can be used to describe him. In this, Jayatilleke’s view comes close to that of Murti.

We have seen that the Buddha rejected the Upaniṣadic belief in *ātman*. It was pointed out in chapter 1 that one of the ways the Buddha analyzed this concept resembles the analysis of such concepts by the Logical Positivists, who believed that the grammatical structure of a sentence is not a trustworthy guide to its meaning. If the Buddhists had interpreted the foregoing statement in the *Sutta-nipāta* literally, to mean the existence of a being in *nirvāṇa* (after death), there is no reason why they should have rejected the Upaniṣadic theory of *ātman*, for according to the Upaniṣads *ātman* was also a transempirical reality. Thus we maintain that the reason for which the Buddha rejected the Upaniṣadic conception of *ātman*, whether empirical or transcendental, was the same for which he rejected the belief in the survival of a saint after death. For to accept a transempirical or transcendent state, to be realized by the enlightened one *after death*, is to reject the very basis of early Buddhist epistemology, namely, empiricism. The reason is that an enlightened one realizes that he has put an end to craving and grasping and has eliminated any kind of future existence (*khīṇā jāti, sheng i chin; nāparaṁ itthattāya, kēng pu shou yu*).

The statement, “The person who has attained the goal is without measure” (*atthaṅgatassa na pamāṇam atthi*) seems to convey the idea that there is no way of knowing (*pamāṇa = pramāṇa*, a source of knowledge) the state of the enlightened one after his death.
Hence there is no sense in applying concepts to describe him. Thus, here, as with the question of the extent and duration of the universe, there appears to be an epistemological problem, the limitation of empiricism. That, we believe, is why the Buddha was silent on the status of the enlightened one after death. It accounts also for the Buddha’s rejection of the two metaphysical theories: the concept of ātman and the theory of the existence of a transcendental state attained after the death of the enlightened one, a state that seems to be identical with the Brahman of the Upaniṣads. The silence of the Buddha was thus due to his awareness of the limitation of empiricism, rather than of concepts.

What, then, is the nirvāṇa that he always spoke of? It is a state of perfect mental health (aṛoga), of perfect happiness (parama sukha), calmness or coolness (śīthilā), and stability (āneṅja), etc. attained in this life, or while one is alive. It is the nibbuti attained by every arahant, male and female, as described in the Thera-gāthā and the Therī-gāthā. After attaining this state, a person enjoys perfect happiness until the end of his life.

As mentioned earlier, speculation regarding the fate of the enlightened one after parinibbāna came to occupy a very important place in Buddhism, especially after the passing away of Gotama Buddha (chapter 7). The faithful follower was not satisfied until he was convinced that the Buddha, after his parinibbāna, continued to exist in some transcendental form. This was the kind of speculation that came to the forefront in Mahāyāna and that culminated in the conception of the Absolute (variously termed tathatā, dhar­makāya, etc.) in the Prajñāpāramitā literature.

The belief in a transempirical reality may have received support from the speculations of the Yogācārins, who considered the highest knowledge to be the nondiscriminative consciousness attained in the highest state of samādhi by a Yogi. This nondiscriminative consciousness may have been considered a foretaste of the transempirical state to be attained by the saint after death. Significantly, the Buddha was said to have attained this latter state, called nirodhasamāpatti, just before he passed away. When he was in this state some even thought that he had attained parinibbāna. As the texts indicate, he emerged from this trance before he finally passed away. (This attainment of nirodhasamāpatti by the Buddha when he needed rest is often referred to in the texts; the attainment of that state just before passing away could also have been an attempt by
the Buddha to overcome the physical pain that came upon him just before death.)

Nirodhasamāpatti is the same as saññāvedayitanirodha, "the cessation of perception and feeling," which is the highest state of meditation attained by the Buddha and the other arahants. That the Buddha attained nirodhasamāpatti just before his parinibbāna may have led the later Buddhists to believe that the Tathāgata continues in a transempirical state after death. Since in nirodhasamāpatti both perception and feeling ceased to exist, it could not be described in positive terms such as perception (saññā) or feeling (vedanā). On the other hand, complete annihilation (uccheda) did not occur, for a person who had attained this state could, at will, return to a normal state of consciousness. What is important is that nirodhasamāpatti does not constitute enlightenment and freedom. It is an important stage of mental concentration attained by the Yogi whence he is able to develop not only the insight necessary to achieve enlightenment but also the renunciation that leads to freedom. A prerequisite of the state of complete freedom (nirvāṇa) is insight, which is also attained as a result of concentration, which in turn consists of the sixfold higher knowledge (see chapter 5). These two processes, insight and concentration, culminate in nirvāṇa, understanding of and freedom from the world. These two processes are represented in Figure 3.

The first process enables one to gain calmness and therefore freedom of mind (cetovimutti, hsin chiai t’o); the second leads to understanding and freedom through insight (paññāvimutti, hui chiai t’o). Both these processes therefore seem to converge when one attains enlightenment. Hence, in early Buddhism, enlightenment is said to consist of freedom of mind and freedom through insight, which result in the realization that one has put an end to birth (khiñjā jāti, sheng i chin), that one has lived the higher life (vusitaṁ brahmacariyan, fan hsing i wei), that one has done what is to be done (katam karanīyaṁ, so tso i p’an), and that there is no future existence (nāparaṁ itthattāya, keng pu shou yu). An enlightened person can go about in the world without being smeared by the world (chapter 6). It is this state of nirvana that the Buddha says is realizable. Such behavior is considered transcendental (lokuttara), because it contrasts with the ordinary behavior of men, who are engrossed in the darkness of ignorance (avijjā).

As for the state of the enlightened one after death, there is no
Fig. 3: The Process of Spiritual Development Leading to Nirvāṇa
way of knowing. Therefore the silence of the Buddha with regard to these questions seems to have been prompted by the limitations of empiricism—the very same reason the Buddha refused to answer questions about the extent and duration of the universe. The Buddha is recorded as maintaining that there is no further existence for one who has attained enlightenment (see above). If he had pressed this view, he would no doubt have been criticized as a 'nihilist,' which in fact he was at one stage. On the other hand, if he had maintained that the enlightened one attains a transcendental state after death, he would have earned the title of 'eternalist' and would not have been very different from the pre-Buddhist teachers whose doctrine he had categorically rejected. Similarly, one cannot have the experience of a personality \( jīva \) divorced from the physical body \( sarīra \) and a personality identical with the physical body. Thus, according to our understanding of the early Buddhist texts, the silence of the Buddha regarding these ten questions is due entirely to the limitations of empiricism, and not to the inability of concepts to describe a transcendental reality.

One could, of course, raise the question, What is the meaning or implication of the phrase “transcends logic” \( \text{atakkāvācara} \), Sk. \( \text{atarkāvācara} \) occurring in the early Buddhist texts? Referring to his discovery, causality \( \text{patīcchasamuccaya} \), the Buddha said that it is deep, immeasurable and “transcending logic.” Did he mean that concepts, which are the tools of logical thinking, are inadequate to express reality? It does not seem to be so, because analysis of the conceptual thinking in one of the oldest parts of the canon, the \( \text{Aṭṭhaka-vagga} \) of the Sutta-nipāta, does not lead to such a view.

A careful study of the oldest suttas indicates not that the concepts themselves are inadequate to express reality, but that the way our minds are conditioned when using such concepts creates difficulties in understanding reality through such means. Let us take, for example, the concept that is most controversial among Buddhists, the concept of ‘self’ \( \text{atta} \), Sk. \( \text{atman} \). The mind of the pre-Buddhist thinker was conditioned in one of two ways when using the concept of ‘self’: either (1) he believed that there is a permanent, transempirical entity (as in the Vedic tradition), or (2) he believed that there is no personality, no personal identity, and therefore no continuity except in the material particles that constitute one’s physical body (Materialist tradition). The concept of ‘self’ thus appears to have
been used as each person wanted it to be used—in other words, according to each individual's inclination. Says the *Sutta-nipāta* (781):

“When, inclination prompts
and self-will reigns, shall men
desert their cherished views?
—Their outlook shapes their speech.”

The interference of one's likes and dislikes in the use of concepts, according to the Buddha, leads to dogmatic beliefs (*diṭṭhi*) and hence endless logomachies. The Buddha realized that by calling for definitions he was able to prevent people from using concepts in this manner. He often followed this method in his teaching, as in the case of the monk Sāti, who held the view, according to the Buddha, that “it is this very consciousness that transmigrates, not another.” The Buddha immediately asked, “What now Sāti is this consciousness?” (*katamaṇ tam Sāti viññāṇam*), to which Sāti answered, “He who is the speaker, experiencer, and who experiences the consequences of the good and bad actions in such and such places.” Here Sāti was referring to an agent, a subject like the 'self' posited in the Upaniṣads. The Buddha considered that a heresy (*diṭṭhigata*) and went on to explain consciousness as a causally conditioned phenomenon (*paticcasamuppanna*) (see chapter 1). But the denial of a permanent entity as posited by the Upaniṣadic thinkers did not lead the Buddha to the other extreme of denying personal continuity, as did the Materialists. The ātma-vāda of the Vedic tradition gave rise to the *anātma-vāda* of the Materialists. The Buddha considered this *anātma-vāda* itself another extreme, because while denying the transempirical or nonempirical ‘self,’ the Materialists also denied empirical consciousness, which for the Buddha was a reality. Therefore, the Buddha continued to use concepts such as ‘I’ (*aham*), ‘you’ (*tvam*), and ‘self’ (*atta*), but without either implying the existence of a transempirical reality or denying personal continuity.

Another group of concepts seems to have expressed only some aspects of empirical reality because they were used to clothe one’s own metaphysical assumptions. These were the pre-Buddhist concepts of causation such as ‘self-causation’ (*sayaṃ katam, tsū tso*) and ‘external causation’ (*param katam, t’a tso*) (chapters 1, 2). The
Buddha found these concepts to be limited and inadequate to express reality. This was not because reality as he saw it was indescribable or transcendental but because people used these concepts to express only a part of reality, the part that fit their metaphysical predilections. Thus, the man who was prone to believe in a transempirical soul (ātman) as a reality would explain causation in terms of 'self-causation.' On the other hand, the Materialists, who denied the reality of psychic phenomena, looked upon causation as a mere external causation. The syncretist Jainas accepted both 'self-causation' and 'external causation,' along with their metaphysical assumptions. The Buddha was unable to use the existing concepts and employed entirely new concepts to explain such situations. The use of the term \textit{paticcasamuppāda} (Sk. \textit{pratītyasamutpāda}), a purely Buddhist term, to denote the causal situation illustrates this problem very clearly.

All this may lead to the following conclusions. Rejecting an Absolute (such as the Brahman or Ātman of the Upaniṣads) or a transempirical reality, the Buddha confined himself to what is empirically given. Following a method comparable to that adopted by the modern Logical Positivists, he sometimes resorted to linguistic analysis and appeal to experience to demonstrate the futility of metaphysics. As a result of his empiricism he recognized causality as the reality and made it the essence of his teachings. Hence his statement: "He who sees causality sees the \textit{dhamma}.”\(^{14}\)
**Abbreviations**

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>A</td>
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<td>AA</td>
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<td>Abhidharmasamuccaya</td>
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<td>Abvn</td>
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<td>AD</td>
<td>Abhidharmadīpā</td>
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<td>JPTS</td>
<td>Journal of the Pali Text Society</td>
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<td>JRAS</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kāṭha</td>
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<td>Kośa</td>
<td>L. de la Vallée Poussin's French translation of CSL</td>
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<td>KP</td>
<td>Kāśyapaparivarta, of the Ratnakūṭa-sūtra.</td>
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<td>KS</td>
<td>The Book of the Kindred Sayings (see Samyutta Nikāya)</td>
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<td>Kvū</td>
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<td>KvūA</td>
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<td>LPSSC</td>
<td>Liao pēn sheng szū ching</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>Majjhima Nikāya</td>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>Pāpāficasūdāṇī, Majjhima-aṭṭhakathā</td>
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<td>Mbh</td>
<td>Mahābhārata</td>
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<td>MCB</td>
<td>Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques</td>
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<td>Mīhm</td>
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<td>MK</td>
<td>Mūla-madhyanaka-kārikā (see Mādhyamikavṛtti)</td>
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<td>Mādhyamikavṛtti, Prasannapada</td>
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<td>Nyāyakusumāñjanī</td>
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<td>PCPL</td>
<td>Pien chung pien lun</td>
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<td>PEW</td>
<td>Philosophy East and West</td>
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<td>Pieh i tsa</td>
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<td>PIPC</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress</td>
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Ps  Paṭisambhidāmagga
PSTCC  P’u-sa ti ch’ih ch’ing
PTS  Pali Text Society, London
PTSD  Pali-English Dictionary, PTS
PU  Principal Upaniṣads, ed. S. Radhakrishnan
RS  Ramakūṭa-sūtra
RV  Ṛgveda
S  Sanyutta Nikāya
SA  Sāratthapakāsini, Sānyutta-aṭṭhakathā
Sadnp  Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra
Sakv  Sphuṭārthābhādhamoṣa-vaśākyā
ŚB  Satapatha Brāhmaṇa
SBE  Sacred Books of the East
SDS  Sarvadarśanasamgraha
SDMS  Śaddarśanasamuccaya
Siddhi  L. de la Vallée Poussin’s French translation of Ch’êng Wei shih lun
Śiks  Śiksāsamuccaya
Skt  Śrāvakṛtâṅga, commentary on Sūyagaṅga by Śīlāṅka
Sn  Sutta-nipāta
SnA  Sutta-nipāta-aṭṭhakathā
STCL  Shē ta ch‘èng lun
Sū  Sūyagaṅga
Śv  Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad (see Principal Upaniṣads)
Svpr  Suvarṇaprabhāsottama-sūtra
Tait  Taîtiriya Upaniṣad (see Principal Upaniṣads)
TB  Taîtiriya Brāhmaṇa
TCL  Ta ch‘èng a-pi-ta-mo tsa chi lun
TD  Taishō Shinshu Daizōkyō
Thag  Theragāthā
Thig  Therigāthā
Tikap  Tikapaṭṭhāna, with Buddhaghosa’s commentary
TS  Tattvasamgraha, with paṭijūkā of Kamalaśīla
Tsa  Tsa a-han ching
Tseng  Tseng i a-han ching
Tups  Tattvopaplavasūtra
UCR  University of Ceylon Review
Ud  Udāna
UdA  Paramatthadīpani, Udāna-aṭṭhakathā
VA  Samantapāśādikā, Vinaya-aṭṭhakathā
Vajr  Vajracchedikā Praṇāpāramitā
Vbh  Vibhaṅga
VbhA  Sammohavinodani, Vibhaṅga-aṭṭhakathā
Vin  Vinaya Piṭaka
Vism  Visuddhimagga
WZKS&O  Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie
Notes

NOTE ON CHINESE REFERENCES
All references to the Chinese Buddhist texts are based upon the Taishô Shinshû Daizôkyô unless otherwise stated. The volume number of the Taishô Shinshû Daizôkyô (abbreviated TD) is given first, followed by the page number and the column, indicated by a, b, or c. Within parentheses is given the title of the work in abbreviated form together with the fascicle number and the number of the sūtra within that fascicle. Thus, TD 1.443c (Chung 4.2) is to be read: Taishô Shinshû Daizôkyô, volume 1, page 443, column 3, which is Chung a-han ching (Madhyama Āgama), fourth fascicle, second sutra.

PREFACE

CHAPTER I
2. RV 1.115.3–4.
4. RV 1.115.4.

6. See, for example, *RV* 5.83.


11. Ibid., p. 261. Stebbing quotes Professor T. P. Nunn, who said that even the average student of physics today is still an anthropomorphist at heart.

12. *RV* 1.65.3.

13. Ibid. 10.121.1.

14. Ibid. 4.23.9.

15. Ibid. 1.163.5.

16. Ibid. 5.62.1.

17. Ibid. 2.27.10.

18. Ibid. 4.42.1–2; 5.69.4; 6.67.5; 7.41.7.

19. A. B. Keith, *The Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and Upaniṣads* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1925), p. 83. He says: “From the physical it is an easy step, to the conception of the Rta not merely in the moral world, . . . but also in the sphere of sacrifice.”


21. See *RV* 7.86.


24. Ibid. p. 84: “The stress laid on the conception of the Rta in the sphere of the sacrifice . . . seems certainly to be no more than a reflex of its importance at once in the physical and the moral sphere.”


27. *ŚB* 2.1.4.10.


29. *TD* 1.76a (*Ch’ang* 12.1).

30. *TD* 2.81a (*Tsa* 12.6); 2.86a-c (*Tsa* 12.20–21); 2.93c (*Tsa* 14.1).


32. *TD* 1.76a (*Ch’ang* 12.1); *TD* 2.81a (*Tsa* 12.6).


34. *S* 2.18.

35. *TD* 2.81a (*Tsa* 12.6).


37. *TD* 2.81a (*Tsa* 12.6).

38. *S* 2.18.

39. *TD* 2.81a (*Tsa* 12.6).

40. *Śv* 1.2.
Notes

41. RV 10.129.2.
43. RV 10.190.
44. Barua, p. 12.
45. RV 10.129.
46. ŚB 10.4.2.2.
47. See Keith, pp. 442ff.
48. TB 2.2.7.1.
49. ŚB 11.5.8.1.
50. Ibid. 4.1.1.22; see SBE 26:253.
51. Ibid. 13.7.1.1.
52. Ait Ār 2.1.3.
54. Ait Ār 2.3.8.3; SBE 1:233.
55. Ibid. 2.1.3: "'athāto retasaḥ srṣṭih, prajāpate reto devā devānām reto varṣaḥ varṣasya reto oṣadhaya oṣadhānīm reto'nnam annasya reto praṇāḥ prajānāṁ reto hṛdayam hṛdayasya reto mano manaso reto vāg vaco retaḥ karma tad idam karma kṛtamayaṁ puruṣo brāhmaṇo lokāḥ."
56. Ibid. 2.1.8: "āpa ity āpa iti tad idam āpa evedām vai mūlaṁ adas tūlām ayam pitaite putrā yatra ha kva ca putrasya tat pitur yatra vā pitus tad vā putrasyety etat tad uktam bhavati."
58. Śv 1.12: "Ekādāhīyam nityam evātmāsaṁstham,

nātaḥ parama veditavyam hi kīcita;

bhokta bhogyam preritāraṁ ca matvā,

sarvaṁ proktāṁ trividhāṁ brahmam etat."

59. Kaṭha 2.8; see Hume, *Upaniṣads*, p. 349.
62. Ch 4.1.3.
63. Śv 1.1.6; Munā 1.1.6.
67. ChB, p. 322: "sad ity asitāmātīm."
68. S 2.17; TD 2.85c (Tsa 12.19).
69. S 2.17: "Lokanirodhaṁ kho ... yathābhūtam samappaṇṇāya passato yā loke atthitāṁ sa na hoti." TD 2.85c (Tsa 12.19).
70. Sa 2.32: "atthitāṁ sa sassaṁ."
71. S 2.20; TD 2.85c (Tsa 12.18).
74. *D*. 3.117ff.; *TD* 1.72c (*Ch'ang* 12.1).
75. *D* 3.137–138: “sayāṇaṃ kato attā ca loko ca.” See also *Ud* 69. The Chinese version of the *Pāśādika-suttanta* does not refer to the soul but merely says: “The world is self-caused” (*TD* 1.76a [*Ch'ang* 12.1]).
76. *D* 3.80; *TD* 1.36b (*Ch'ang* 6.1).
78. See chapter 6.
79. *Śv* 2.7; Hume, *Upaniṣads*, p. 278.
80. *Brh* 4.4.5.
81. *Śv* 5.12: “sthōlāṃ śūkṣmāṇī bahūṇi caiva rūpāṇi dehi svagūṇair vṛṇoti”;
82. *S* 1.134; *TD* 2.327c (*Tsa* 45.6).
83. *Śv* 5.7: “guṇāṇvayo yah phalakarmakartā, kṛtasya tasyaiva sa copabhoktā. sa viśvarūpas triguṇas trivartmā, prāṇādhipas samcaratī svakarmabhīh.”
Hume, *Upaniṣads*, p. 407. In translating *samcaratī*, instead of the phrase “roams about” we have used “wanders along,” since the latter better expresses the meaning of *samcaratī*.
84. *Śi* 1.1.2.2.
86. See chapter 2.
87. *D* 3.138; *S* 2.19ff.; *Ud* 69; *TD* 2.86b (*Tsa* 12.21); 2.93c (*Tsa* 14.1).
88. *S* 2.18ff.; *TD* 2.86a (*Tsa* 12.21).
90. *KS* 2.x.
91. *S* 2.13ff.: “Na kallo pañho ti bhagavā avoca. Āhāretīti na ahaṁ vadāmi. Āhāretīti cāhāṃ vadeyyaṁ tatr assa kallo pañho āko nu kho bhante āhāretīti. Evaḥ cāhan na vadāmi. Evaḥ maṃ vaḍamantāṁ yo evaṁ puccheyya’ kissa nu kho bhante viṁśāṇāḥāro’ti esa kallo pañho”; *TD* 2.102a (*Tsa* 15.8).
93. *S* 2.33: “tatrāvuso ye te sāmaṇābrāhmaṇā kammavādaḥ sayāṇaṁ katarpan (sukha-) dukkhaṁ paññāpenti tad api phassa paccayā . . . te vata aññatra phassā pāṭisāṃvvedissantīti n’etaṁ thānaṁ vijjati”; *TD* 2.94a (*Tsa* 14.1); also *TD* 1.76a (*Ch’ang* 12.1), where the same argument is adduced against the theory of the self-causation of the world.

95. Taylor, *Metaphysics*, p. 159, says that this was the attitude adopted by Parmenides and his Eleatic successors.

96. *Brh* 4.4.19; *Katha* 4.10–11.


98. *Brh* 3.8.7; 4.4.15; *Śv* 6.5; *Katha* 2.14; *Brh* 4.4.20.


100. *D* 3.28; *M* 2.222; *A* 1.173; *TD* 1.435b (*Chung* 3.3).


102. Ibid. 10.72.

103. Ibid. 10.129.1.


106. Barua, *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p. 34.


110. Ibid. 10.82.4; Griffith, *Hymns of the Rigveda*, 4:260.


113. *RV* 10.82.5: “dhātā vidhiātī paramota saṃdrk.”

114. *TB* 3.7.9.7; see also *ŚB* 7.4.2.5.

115. *ŚB* 1.6.3.35ff.; 7.1.2.1ff.; St. Augustine believed that the preservation of the world was due to continuous procreation (*ERE* 4:229).

116. *ŚB* 2.5.1.1ff.

117. Ibid. 11.2.3.1.

118. *JB* 3.17.2.


122. See Mahādāsa’s conception of causation discussed earlier.

123. *Āṭ* Ār 2.1.8.

124. Ibid. 2.3.6.2.


126. *Bṛh* 1.4.1–5.
127. Ibid. 2.5.19; 4.4.25; *Ch* 3.14.4.
130. *Śv* 1.14; also 2.15; Hume, *Upaniṣads*, p. 396.
131. *Śv* 1.1: “adhiṣṭhitah kena sukhetaresu vartamahe . . . vyavasthām.”
132. Ibid. 1.3.
133. Ibid. *Tā* 3.7, 20; *Ṣvara*: 4.10; 6.7.
134. Ibid. 4.14; 5.13: viśvasya sraṣṭāram; 4.17: esa devo viśvakarmā.
135. Ibid. 6.7, Tam *tīvarāṇānām* paramaṁ maheśvaram, tamaḥ devatānāṁ paramaṁ ca daivatam.
136. See *Nyāyakusumānjali* of Udayana.
137. *Śv* 5.6.
139. *M* 1.222; *A* 1.173f.; *J* 5.228; *TD* 1.435b (*Chung* 3.3).
141. Text in *D* 1.18; *M* 2.227; translation in *Dial* 1.32.
142. *TD* 1.90c (*Ch'ang* 14.1); see also *TD* 1.69a (*Ch'ang* 11.1); 1.547b (*Chung* 19.1).
143. *D* 3.28: “issarakuttaṁ brahmakuttaṁ aggaṇṭaṁ paññāpenti.” In the Chinese version (*TD* 1.69a: *Ch'ang* 11.1), the terms brahma and issara appear to have been amalgamated.
144. *DA* 3.830.
145. *D* 1.18; *TD* 1.90b–c (*Ch'ang* 14.1).
146. The arguments adduced by various philosophers to refute the intuitional method of verification are discussed by Edwards and Pap, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 458.
147. *D* 1.18; *TD* 1.90c (*Ch'ang* 14.1); see also *TD* 1.547b (*Chung* 19.1).
148. *Bṛh* 1.4.3.
149. *D* 1.18f.; *TD* 1.90c (*Ch'ang* 14.1).
150. *J* 5.238: “Issaro sabbalokassa sace kappeti jīvitaṁ, iddhivyasanaḥbhāvati ca kammaṁ kalyāṇapāpakāṁ, nidesakārī puraśo issaro tena lippati.”
151. *M* 2.222, 227; *TD* 1.444a, 444c–445a (*Chung* 4.2).
152. *A* 1.174; *TD* 1.435b (*Chung* 3.3).

CHAPTER II

Notes


10. Analyzing the ontological speculations of Parmenides, whose conception of “Being” may be considered similar to the conception of _sat_ in the _Upaniṣads_, J. Burnet says that while some consider Parmenides the “father of Idealism,” he himself considers Parmenides the “father of Materialism.” See his _Early Greek Philosophy_ (London: A. & C. Black, 1958), p. 182.

11. _Śv_ 1.2.


16. _D_ 1.55; _TD_ 1.108b (Ch’ang 17.1); _SDSM_ p. 306; _SDS_, p. 2; _Mbh_ 12.215.

17. _Tvps_, p. 1: “prthivyāpastejovayur iti tattvāni.”


19. In Buddhist texts: _D_ 1.55: “attā rūpī cātumahābhūtiko”; _TD_ 1.108b (Ch’ang 17.1); _M_ 1.426: “tāṁ jīvaṁ tāṁ sarṣiraṁ”; _TD_ 1.804a (Chung 60.6). In Jaina texts: _Śī_ 2.1.9: “tajñāvatacchariṁraeti.”

20. _Tvps_, p. 1: “prthivyāpastejovayur iti tattvāni, tat samudaye śaśreṇdireya-viṣayasaṁjñā.” Guṇaratna, in his _Tarkarahasyadīpikā_ (p. 307) quotes a similar passage where _viṣaya_ is placed before _indriya_, with an addition, _tebhyaś caitanyam_, that Jayatilleke considers to be a reference to an emergent _ātman_ (see _Theory of Knowledge_, p. 81, n. 2).


22. _Tvps_, pp. 87ff.

23. Ibid., pp. 70ff.

24. Ibid., p. 106.

25. _Śī_ 2.1.10: “sato pātthi viṁśo asato pātthi sambhavo.”

26. _Skṛ_ 2: fol. 17; see Jayatilleke, _Theory of Knowledge_, p. 70.

28. Ibid., p. 87: “avicalitarūpeṇa pūrvāparākāryaṁ na janyate; also ito pi
dahanadhumayol;1 hetuphalabhāvānupapattiḥ yathā avicalitadahanarūpasya pūr-
vaṁpatanakāryāvīr bhāvakatvam na pratipadyate.”
29. Ibid., p. 106: “na hi vandhyāsutasyābhāve sahetukatvam nirhetukatvam
vā vicārayanti santāḥ.”
30. Anvayārthaprakāṣīkā, p. 390: “svabhāva iti svabhāvavādino nāstikaviśeṣaś cārvākādayaḥ.”
31. Tattvabodhinz, p. 461: “svabhāvavyatirekena kāryakāraṇabhāvanirupa-
nāyogaḥ svabhāvaḥ kāraṇam iti cārvākāḥ.”
32. Saṅkṣepaśārīrikā, 1.1528.
33. See SDS, p. 3; Jayatileke, Theory of Knowledge, p. 72.
34. Jayatileke, Theory of Knowledge, p. 77.
35. Nyāyaśāstra, p. 109: “bhūyodāraṇanagamyāḥ pi na vaśīptāv a vākalpate
sahārasāro pi tad dṛṣṭe vyabhicārāvadhaṇānt bhūyo dṛṣṭvā ca dhūmo’gnisahacāriti
gamyatām aγnau tu sa nāstīti na bhūyodāraṇādgaṭīḥ”; see Jayatileke, Theory of
Knowledge, p. 78.
36. SDS, p. 13.
37. Śv. Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya, p. 276.
38. Hiriyanāna, Indian Philosophical Studies, p. 73.
40. Tups, p. 88.
41. Bibliotheca Indica, 7:276: “svabhāvo nāma padārthānāṁ pratiniyataṁ
saktiḥ, agner aśyayam iva.”
42. NK, p. 59: “sarvasya bhavataḥ svabhāvatvānupapatteḥ. na hy ekam
anekasvabhāvaṁ nāma vyāgyaṭāt.”
43. NK (Prakāṣa), p. 59: “ekaniyato dharmāḥ svabhāva ity ucyate, tad yad
sarvasya sambhavet tādā svabhāvatvam asādhāraṇatvam nopapadye.”
44. NK, p. 57: “niyamasyaiyāpēkṣārthataḥ.”
45. NK (Bodhanī), p. 57: “idam eva hi kāryasya kāraṇāpekṣitvam nāma,
yat tasmiṁ saty eva bhavati ti Yadi niyāmātiriktaupakāro nāṅgikriyate tarhi
svabhāvavāda eva siddhaḥ syat... dahanādīṣu satsv eva dhūmādyo bhavanti’’t-
ḍrāḥ svabhāvavādaś cet sa aṃśabhīr iṣyata eva.”
46. Ibid., p. 56.
47. NK, p. 56.
49. It has been pointed out that the Materialists not only accepted direct
perception (pratyakṣa) as the only valid source of knowledge but also denied
causation. See S. K. Belvalkar, and R. D. Ranade, History of Indian Philosophy,
50. Tarkarahasyādipīkā, p. 13: “kaḥ kaṇṭakāṇāṁ prakāro tiṣṇitaṁ,
vācitrabhāvaṁ mrgapakṣṣaṁ ca... svabhāvataḥ sarvam idam pravṛttiṁ.”
51. Hiriyanāna, Indian Philosophical Studies, p. 74.
52. Tups, p. 88: “sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthitēḥ... vyāvr̥tttābhāgināḥ.”
53. According to the Milinda Pañha (p. 4), this seems to be the view expressed
by the Materialist Pūraṇa Kassapa, who, in reply to the question, “Who rules the
world? (ko lokam pālieti),” said, “The earth rules the world (pathavī lokam pālieti).”
57. D 1.53. The Chinese version of this sūtra attributes this teaching to Pakudha Kaccayana; see TD 1.108c (Ch’ang 17.1). See also TD 2.44a (Tsa 7.16).
62. Śū 1.1.2.3.
63. Skṛ 1: fol. 30.
64. D 1.53; TD 1.108c (Ch’ang 17.1).
65. DA 1.161; SA 2.341; J 5.237.
66. Heernek appears to follow Buddhaghosa in translating saṅgati as “environment”; see ERE, s.v. “Ājīvikas.”
67. DA 1.161.
68. TD 1.108c (Ch’ang 17.1); cf. TD 2.44a (Tsa 7.16).
69. M 2.222; TD 1.443c (Chung 4.2).
70. TD 1.769b (Chung 54.2); cf. M 1.265f. (Mahā-tanhāsaṅkhaya-sutta).
71. TD 2.44a (Tsa 7.16).
73. DA 1.161.
74. Belvarkar and Ranade, History of Indian Philosophy 2: 457.
76. Basham, Ājīvikas, p. 225.
Cf. "Jat tu jadā jena jahā jassa ya niyameṇa hodi,
tat tu tadā tena tahā tassa have idi vādo niyadivādo nu'  
Gommaṭasāra, quoted in Belvalkar and Ranade, History of Indian Philosophy,  
p. 455, n.
79. Skr 1: fol. 31: "niyater eve ti, etac ca dvitiyaślokānte 'bhidhāsye [i.e.,  
at Śū 1.1.2.3]."
80. B. C. Law, Buddhistic Studies (Calcutta and Simla, 1931), pp. 77f.
82. DA 1.161: "yena hi yathā bhavitabbaṃ so tatheva bhavati, yena na  
bhavitabbaṃ so na bhavatīti." Cp. A. J. Ayer, The Concept of a Person and Other  
83. Law, Buddhistic Studies, p. 78.
84. Jayatilleke, Theory of Knowledge, p. 142.
85. AV 19.53, 54; 19.54.3: "Kālo ha bhūtāṃ bhavyaṇ ca . . . ajanayat."
86. Śv 1.2.
87. Basham, Ājīvikas, p. 225.
88. D 1.54: "doṇamite sukhadukkhe pariyaṅkate saṁsāre n'atthi hāyana-  
vaḍghane n'atthi ukkaṃsāvakamse. Seyyathāpi nāma suttagułe khitte nībēthi-  
yamānāṃ eva phaleti, evam eva bāle ca pāṇdite ca sandhāvītvā saṁsārītvā  
dukkhasantāṃ karissanti." It has not been possible to trace this important  
description of salvation in the Chinese Āgamas.
89. M 1.81–82.
90. J 5.228: "Tēsu ahetukāvādī ime saṭṭā saṁsārasuddhiḥ ti mahājanam  
ugghanāpesi"; ibid., 5.237.
91. Mbh 12.215, 217. In 217.17, it is maintained that all creatures spring  
up from the elements—earth, water, space, fire, and wind.
93. Mbh 12.215.19–20:
"Aniśtasya hi nirvṛttir anirvṛttih priyasya ca,
laksyate yatamānānāṃ puruṣārthah tataḥ kutaḥ.  
Aniśtasyaḥbhiniirvṛttim iṣṭasamvṛttim eva ca,
aprayatnena paśyāmaḥ keśaṇcit tat svabhāvataḥ."
95. In D 1.53; TD 1.108c (Ch'ang 17.1), it is attributed to Pakudha Kaccāyana.
96. Ibid 1.56: "Tattha n'atthi hānta va ghātetā va sotā va viṁśītā va viṁśā-  
petā va . . . Yo pi tiṇhena satthena sīsāṃ chindati na koci jīvītā voroṇeti, sattannam  
eva kāyānām antarena satthavivaram anupatati." A similar repudiation of a personal  
agent and responsibility is found in the Bhagavad-gītā 2:19ff.
98. TD 1.108a–b (Ch'ang 17.1).
100. Mbh 12.217.36.
101. D 1.53–54; 1.55; 1.52–53; 1.56.
102. M 1.401ff.
103. Ibid 1.78; TD 1.736c (Chung 49.3); see also A 2.31. However, Jayatilleke  
is reluctant to consider them as synonyms; see Theory of Knowledge, p. 94.
104. TD 1.736c (Chung 49.3).
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106. Basham, Ḍīvīkas, p. 18.

107. Ibid., p. 23.

108. M 2.222: “sace ... sattā saṅgatībhāvahetu sukhadukkhā paṭisamvedentī, addhā ... nigaṇṭhā pāpasāṅgatikā yam etaraḥ dukkhā tībbā katuṅkā vedanā vediyanti.” As pointed out earlier, to represent the term abhijñāhetu of the Pali version, the Chinese version has yin wei ming; cf. TD 1.443c (Chung 4.2).


110. JA 1.21; 3.20; 5.198, 459; Vism 238.

111. The conception of svabhāva discussed above and the theory of svabhāva propounded by the Sarvāstivādins appear to be different. The svabhāva of the Materialists and the Ājīvikas refers to a pattern of change and comes closer to the conception of dharmatā in early Buddhism (see below). But the svabhāva of the Sarvāstivādins signifies an underlying eternal substance in phenomena—as opposed to their characteristics (lakṣaṇa), which are subject to change according to the causal pattern. The term svabhāva seems to have been used in the latter sense in the Sāṅkhya school, where it is used as a synonym of prakṛti, as opposed to the three derivatives of prakṛti. See J. A. B. van Buitenen, “Studies in Sāṅkhya,” JAOS 76 (1956): 156.

112. M 1.185; TD 1.464c (Chung 7.2).

113. M 1.324: “dhammatā esā ... diṭṭhisampannassā puggalassā: kiṃcāpi tathārūpinī āpattīṁ āpajjati tathārūpyā āpattiyyā vuṭṭhānaṁ paññāyati, atha kho naṃ khippo eva satthi vā viññūsu vā saṃbrāhmaṇīsu deseti vivarati uṭṭhīkaroti, desetā vivaritvā uṭṭhīkaravīṭtā āpattiṁ saṃvarāṁ āpajjati. Seyyathāpi dethā kho danca manto uttbhānasayyako hatthena vā pādena vā āṅgāraṃ akkamiṭvā khippa eva paṭisaṃharati . . . .”

114. Ibid.

115. A 5.3, 313; TD 1.485b–c (Chung 10.2).

116. A 3.200; TD 1.486c (Chung 10.7); see also TD 2.129a (Tsa 18.6).

117. S 2.20: “aṇīṇo karoti aṇīṇo paṭisaṃvedīyati . . . paraṃ karaṇaṁ dukkhaṁ ti iti vadoṁ uccchedam etāṁ pariṇī”; TD 2.85c (Tsa 12.18).

118. J 5.228: “uccchedavādī ētā paralokagatā nāma n’atthi ayaṁ loko uccchijjatītī gaṅhāpesi.”

119. D 1.55: “bāle ca paṇḍite ca kāyassa bhedā uccchijjanti vinassanti na honti parammaraṇā”; TD 1.108b–c (Ch’ang 17.1).

120. We find yet another use of the term ucccheda when the Buddha himself admitted that he could be called an uccchedavādī because he advocated the destruction of the three roots of evil: greed, hatred, and confusion; see Vin 1.235.

121. M 3.180; A 1.139; TD 1.504a–c (Chung 12.2).

122. For a modern interpretation of this problem, see Ayer, Concept of a Person, p. 127:

“even if someone could remember the experiences of a person who is long since dead, and even if this were backed by an apparent continuity of character, I think that we should prefer
to say that he had somehow picked up the dead man's memories and dispositions rather than that he was the same person in another body. The idea of a person's leading a discontinuous existence in time as well as in space is just that much more fantastic. Nevertheless, I think that it would be open to us to admit the logical possibility of reincarnation merely by laying down the rule that if a person who is physically identified as living at a later time does have the ostensible memories and character of a person who is physically identified as living at an earlier time, they are to be counted as one person and not two."

123. S 2.17: “Lokasamudayaṁ kho kaccāyana yathābhūtam sammappaññāya passato yā loke natthitā sā na hoti”; TD 2.85c (Tsa 12.18). In S 2.17, *atthitam* (atthikavāda) is identified with *sabbam atthi*, and *natthitam* (natthikavāda) with *sabbam natthi*. *Sabbam atthi* and *sabbam natthi* are mentioned in S 2.77, along with two other metaphysical theories, *sabbam ekattaṁ* (monism) and *sabbam puthuttam* (pluralism). The commentator points out that *sabbam atthi* and *sabbam ekattaṁ* belong to the eternalist school and that the other two are theories of annihilationism (see *SA* 2.76). This explains why there was much opposition to the Sarvāstivāda theory of *sarvam asti* from the other schools of Buddhist thought.


130. Śū 1.1.3–3:

Na tam sayam kādaṁ dukkham, kao annakādam ca naṁ, suham vā jai vā dukkham, sehiyam vā ashiyam, sayam kādam na annehim vedayanti pudho jīyā, sāmgiyam tam tahā tesim, ihamegesi āhīmām.


132. Ibid.: “niyater eve ti etac ca dvitiyaślokaṁte'bhidhāṣye [i.e., at Śū 1.1.2.3].”

133. Śū 1.1.2.4: evam eṣīṁ jaṁpaṁta bāḷā paṇḍjamāṇino, niyayāniyayam saṁtaṁ ayaṁnaṁta abuddhiyā.

134. Skṛ 1: fol. 31–32:

“yato niyayāniyayam saṁtaṁ iti sukhādikam kīcita niyatikrtaṁ—avasyambhāvyadayaṁpraśiṁtaṁ tathā aniyataṁ—āṭmapuruṣakārēśvarādī prāpitaṁ sat niyatikram evaikāntenaśrayanty, ato'jānāṁ sukhaduhkhādi kāraṇam abuddhikā buddhirahitā bhavantyti. Tathā hi ārhatānāṁ kīcita sukhaduḥ—
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khādi niyatita eva bhavati—tat kāraṇasya karmastavaḥ kṣa-
mīṃścīd avasare 'vasyamābhavayudasadbhavāṃ niyatikṛtam ity ucycate, tathā kṣaścīd amiyatikṛtaḥ ca—puruṣākāraṁ kālaś-
varṣavāhāvākarmādikṛtam, tatra kathācīt sukhadukkhādhe puruṣākārasābhāyavatam apy āśreyate, yatāḥ kriyātaḥ phalam bhavati, kriyā ca puruṣākāraṁyati pravartate, tathā coktaṁ: na daivam iti sañcīti tyajed udyamam itmanah, anudyaśena kas talaṁ tilebhyāḥ prāptum arhati? Yat tu samāne puruṣa-
vaṁśe pralobhaṁ saṁsāraṁ putrākāraṁ niyati, ity ucyate,
tathāputraṁ anukriyate. Tathā putrākāraṁ prabhaṁ:

135. Cf. Uttarādhyāyana-sūtra 33.16; SBE 45.194, 196, n.2; ERE 7:468b.
136. Pubbekkatahetu: M 2.217; A 1.174; yin pên tso: TD 1.442c (Chung 4.2);
yin su ming tao: TD 1.435a (Chung 3.3).
137. M 2.214: “yaṁ kīcāyaṁ purisapuggalo paṭisamvedeti sukham vā
dukkhāṁ vā adukkhamasukham vā sabbāṁ tāṁ pubbekkatahetu; īti purīṇāṁ
kammānaṁ tapasā vyantibhāva, navānaṁ kammānaṁ akaraṇaṁ āyatīṁ anavassavo āyatīṁ anavassavāvā kammākkhaya dukkhaṁ kammākkhaya dukkhaṁ vedanākkhaya vedaṁākkhaya sabbāṁ dukkhaṁ niţiyaṁ bhavasatī. Evamvā-
dino ... Nigaṁthi”; TD 1.442c (Chung 4.2).
139. Ibid., p. 386, n. 1.
140. Ibid. p. 391.
141. Ibid. p. 393.
142. Ibid. p. 394.
144. J 5.238: “Sace pubbekkatahetu sukhadukkhāṁ niġacchatī, porīṇāṁ kathaṁ pīpaṁ tam eso mucce ṣanam, porīṇāṁ ṣanomokkho kuvidha pāpene lippati.”
145. M 2.222: “Sace, ... sattā pubbekkatahetu sukhadukkhāṁ paṭisamvedenī, addha, ... Nigaṁṭhā pubbe dukkhatikkāmakārino yam etarāṁ evarūpā dukkkhaṁ tippā kāṭukaṁ vedanāṁ vediyanti ... tathāgato pubbe sukatakakkāṅī, yam etarāṁ evarūpā anāsavaṁ sukhaṁ vedanāṁ vedeti”; TD 1.443c (Chung 4.2).
146. M 2.214ff.; TD 1.442c (Chung 4.2); Jayatilleke, Theory of Knowledge, p. 461.
147. Sv 5.11.
149. UdA 345: “yasmā attānaṁ ca lokaṁ ca nimmiṇaṁ issarādayo na
tevalaṁ sayam eva nimmiṇaṁ, atha kho tesaṁ tesaṁ sattānaṁ dhammādhammaṁ sahaṁkārānaṁ labhīva va, tasmā sayam kato ca pamaṁ kato ca attā ca loka cātī ekaccānaṁ laddhi.”

151. D 1.28–29, 40; 3.33, 138; S 2.20, 33–35, 113ff.; Ud 69, 70; TD 2.81a (Tsa 12.6).


CHAPTER III


3. *SA* 2.41: “paccaye nissāya samuppānam.”


8. *MKV*, p. 9: “asmin sati idaṃ bhavati asyotpādād idam utpadyata iti idampratyanātārthata prafittasamutpādārtha iti.”

9. *Vin* 1.5; *D* 2.36–37; *M* 1.167; *S* 1.136: “duddasaṃ idaṃ thānaṃ yadidaṃ idappaccayatā paṭiccasamuppādo.”


11. See *S* 1.134; *TD* 2.327c (Tsa 45.6).


14. *TD* 2.84b, 85b (Tsa 12.14, 17).

15. *S* 1.134; *TD* 2.327c (Tsa 45.6).


17. L. de la Vallée Poussin, “Philosophy” (Buddhist), *ERE* 9: 848.


20. *S* 2.30–31; see also *D* 2.217, 259; *M* 3.71.

21. *Sakv*, p. 188: “hetu pratayayo nidānaṃ kāraṇaṃ nimittaṃ liṅgam upaniṣad iti paryāyāḥ.”
22. Edgerton, in BHSD, p. 375, points out that Burnouf, Kern, and Foucaux have rendered them thus.

23. In the Nikāyas: M 1.442, 444; 2.45, 74; A 1.55, 66, 200 (ko hetu ko paccayo); in the Āgamas: TD 2.57c (Tsa 9.9); 2.343b (Tsa 47.10); Sadmp, p. 8; Svpr, pp. 6, 11; LV, pp. 120, 128.

24. M 1.294; A 1.87; TD 1.50a (Ch’ang 8.2).

25. Sakv, p. 188: “hetūnāṃ pratyayāṇāṃ ca kāḥ pratīvīṣeṣāḥ. na kaścid ity āha. tathā hy uktām Bhagavatā. dvau hetū dvau pratyayau samyagḍaṭer utpādaẏa. katamau dvau. paraṇaḥ ca ghoso’dhyāmaṁ ca yonīso-manasikāra iti.”

26. L. S. Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic (London: Methuen & Co., 1962), pp. 270–271; J. S. Mill says: “Nothing can better show the absence of any scientific ground for the distinction between the cause of a phenomenon and its conditions than the capricious manner in which we select from among the conditions that which we choose to denominate the cause” (A System of Logic, 2 vols. [London: Longmans Green & Co., 1872], 2:380).

27. S 1.134; TD 2.327c (Tsa 45.6).

28. The Chinese text reads: “arising as a result of the harmony of causes.”

29. It may be objected that an effect is not destroyed or does not disappear if the cause is removed or destroyed; for example, when the seed, which has given rise to the sprout, is destroyed, the sprout itself is not destroyed. But this can be maintained only by taking the seed alone to be the cause. If we consider the cause to consist of factors such as fertility of the soil and moisture, with the destruction of all the factors that constitute the cause the sprout would fail to grow.

30. S 1.134: “yathā aṇñatarāṃ bijaṁ khette vuttaṁ virūḍhati, paṭhaṅgaraṇaṁ ca āgamma sinehaṁ ca tad uñhayaṁ, evaṁ khandha ca dhītuyo cha āyatanā ime, hetuṁ paṭicca sambhūta hetubhaṅga nirujjhare.”

31. Mill, System of Logic, 1:383. B. A. W. Russell argues thus: “If the inference from cause to effect is to be indubitable, it seems that the cause can hardly stop short of the whole universe. So long as anything is left out, some thing may be left out which alters the expected result. But for practical and scientific purposes phenomena can be collected into groups which are causally self-contained, or nearly so. In the common notion of causation the cause is a single event . . . But it is difficult to know what we mean by a single event; and it generally appears that, in order to have anything approaching certainty concerning the effect, it is necessary to include many more circumstances in the cause than unscientific commonsense would suppose” Our Knowledge of the External World (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1926), pp. 229–230, 235.

32. M 1.259; cp. TD 1.767a (Chung 54.2).

33. Vism 520.

34. This seems to be the position adopted by the Logical Positivists. Stating the Positivist view, A. J. Ayer says: “Another point in which our formula is somewhat at variance with popular notions of causality is that it does not differentiate between a ‘cause’ and the accompanying ‘conditions’, the presence of which is considered to be necessary for the cause to produce the effect” (Foundations of Empirical Knowledge [London: Macmillan 1962], p. 181).


38. *MK* 1.5: “utpadyante pratītayam iti utpadda hetukā.”


40. *Tikap* 1.5. The *Abhisa* refers to it as the ‘cause of stability’ or sthitikāraṇa (p. 28), and Dharmapāla includes it under adhipati-pratyaya (*TD* 31.40a; *Ch’eng* 7).

41. *Tikap* 1.5. The *Abhisa* seems to take it as dhrti-kāraṇa.

42. *Siddhi*, p. 459; *TD* 31.41c (*Ch’eng* 8); and *Abhisa* p. 28; *TD* 31.671 (*CL* 3).


44. *Takakusu* observes this distinction when he refers to the six hetus as the chief causes and the four pratyayas as the four subcauses in the Sarvāstivāda theory of causality (The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, 3rd ed. [Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1956], p. 71).

45. *Sakv*, p. 188: “atha katasmāṃ sûtre saḍhetu avatā. sarvo hy abhidharmaḥ sūtrārthaḥ sūtramāyaḥ khyānena iti. antarhitam tat sûtram iti Vaibhāṣikāḥ.”

46. *Takakusu* observes this distinction when he refers to the six hetus as the chief causes and the four pratyayas as the four subcauses in the Sarvāstivāda theory of causality (The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, 3rd ed. [Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1956], p. 71).

47. The Sanskrit version is in *Akb* 464; Hsiiang Tsang’s translation appears in *TD* 29.153c, 21–22 (CSL 29); and Paramārtha’s translation is in *TD* 29.305b, 13–14 (CSSL 22). See *Kośa*, chap. 9, p. 241, n. 3, for the reconstruction of the passage by de la Vallée Poussin.


49. Stebbing, *Introduction to Logic*, p. 262, says: “Further, in determining which of the various occurrences that are present is to be taken as the cause, commonsense selects what is striking.” See also p. 271.

50. *Kokuyaku Issaikei* (*Pi[t’an pu]*), 26/2:479; *TD* 2.57c (*Tsa* 9.9).

51. In the Pali Nikāyas: *M* 1.108ff.; *S* 2.72ff.; 4.32, 67, 166ff.; in the Chinese Āgamas: *TD* 1.604b (*Chung* 28.3); 2.78b (*Tsa* 11.10); 2.87c (*Tsa* 13.3); and in later Buddhist Sanskrit texts: *LV*, p. 176: “cakṣuṣā pratiṣṭhyā rūpapathā cakṣuravijñānam ihopajāyate.”


55. For more examples of this point, see Stebbing, *Introduction to Logic*, pp. 270–271.
Notes

56. Sakv p. 188: "hetūnāṁ pratayānāṁ kah prativiśesah. na kaścid ity āha."
57. Ibid., p. 703: "hetur āsannyaḥ pratayyaḥ; vipraṅṛṣas tu pratayya eva; janako hetuḥ, pratayyas tu ālambanamātramar ity apare; paryāyāv etāv ity apare."
58. Netipakkaraṇa, p. 78: "Dve dhammā janayanti: hetu ca paccayo ca."
59. Ibid.: "asadhāraṇalakkaṇho hetu, sādhāraṇalakkaṇho paccayo."
60. Ibid.: "yathā aṅkurassa nibbattiyā bījaṁ asadhāraṇaṁ paṭhāvi āpo ca sādhāraṇa. Aṅkurassa hi paṭhāvī āpo ca paccayo."
61. Ibid.: "iti sabhāvo hetu, parabhāvo paccayo, ajhattiko hetu, bāhīro paccayo, janako hetu, pariggāhako paccayo, asadhāraṇo hetu, sādhāraṇo paccayo."
63. Abhs, pp. 28-29; TD 31.67lb (CL 3).
64. TD 31.467b–c (PCPL 2).
65. TD 31.41b (Ch'eng 8); Sādhi, pp. 453–463.
66. Abhs, p. 28; TD 31.67lb (CL 3).
67. TD 31.713a (TCL 4).
68. AK 2.61: "hetvākhyāḥ pañcāhetavaḥ."
69. TD 31.713a (TCL 4).

CHAPTER IV

4. Vin 1.1f.; Ud 1.
5. S 2.25: “paticcasamuppādañ ca vo bhikkhave desissāmi paticcasamuppanne ca dhamme”; TD 2.84b (Isa 12.14).
6. TD 1.562c–563a (Chung 21.3); Chachakka-sutta; M. 3.280–287.
10. One is in DA 1.99 and Dха 1.22; the other is in DhsA 38.
14. S 3.41, 67, 180; 4.28, 85, 106ff.; TD 2.66a (Tsa 10.6).
15. S 3.43, 139; 4.68; TD 2.8b (Tsa 2.4).
16. S 3.67; TD 2.66a (Tsa 10.6).
19. DhsA, p. 17, also p. 4; Sakv, p. 12.
22. S 2.3f.; TD 2.85a–b (Tsa 12.16).
23. M 1.185; TD 1.464b (Chung 7.2).
24. S 2.33; TD 1.76a (Ch’ang 12.1).
28. Dhs 125, 206–207. In Sarvāstivāda, the term cittaviprayukta referred to a category of dharmas drawn up later on; see AD, Introduction, pp. 93ff.
29. Stcherbatsky, Central Conception, p. 37.
30. Śāṅkara-bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra 2.2.20: “Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādino’yam abhyupagama, uttarasmiṃ kṣaṇa utpadayānā pūrvaḥ kṣaṇa nirudhyata iti. Na caīvam abhyupagacchati pūrvottarayoh kṣaṇayor hetupalabhāvah śākyate sampādayitum, nirudhyamānasya niruddhasya vā pūrvakṣaṇasyabhāvagraftvatvād uttarakṣaṇapahetubhāvānapatteḥ.”
33. Ibid.
34. Stebbing, Introduction to Logic, pp. 265ff. Following C. D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [London: Kegan Paul & Co., 1962] p. 432), she says: “What changes are the states; what does not change is the thing of which the states are the states.”
37. Ibid., p. 37.
38. Kośa 5.52ff.; TD 29.104c (CSL 20); ADV, pp. 259–260; TS 1.504; Sakv, p. 44, 47ff.; see also de la Vallée Poussin, “Sarvāstivāda,” MCB 5.1–157; AD, Introduction, pp. 117ff.
39. TS 1.504: “tathā kāriṭre’vasthite bhāvo vartamānas tataḥ pracyuto’ftas tad aprāpta’nāgata iti.”
40. TS, pp. 504–505.
42. *TD* 29.104b (*CSL* 20).
44. *MK*, p. 40; in the Pali Nikāyas: *S* 2.25; and in the Chinese Āgamas: *TD* 2.84b (*Tsa* 12.14).
46. Stcherbatsky, *Central Conception*, p. 25.
47. *TD* 29.104c (*CSL* 20).
50. *TD* 2.91b (*Tsa* 13.18).
51. This interpretation of the passage in the *Samyukta Āgama* would mean that Stcherbatsky is not justified in maintaining that the “Theravādins have suppressed it because it did not agree with their particular tenets” (*Central Conception*, p. 5, n. 13).
52. In the Nikāyas: *S* 3.70–73; in the Āgamas: *TD* 2.65c–66a (*Tsa* 10.5), which refers to the past skandhas only.
55. *S* 1.135; *Kv* 66; *Mīn*, p. 28; *TD* 2.327b (*Tsa* 45.5); 454c (*Pieh-i Tsa* 12.5).
56. *M* 1.136; *TD* 1.764c (Chung 54.1); see also *Khandhāsamyutta of Samyutta Nikāya.*
57. *TD* 2.1ff. (*Tsa* 1.15).
60. *MK* 15.2: “svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhāvyayati punaḥ kathāṃ.”
62. Ibid.: “tad evam akṛtakaḥ svabhāva iti lokavyavahāre vyavasthite vayaṃ idāṁ brūmo yad etad aṣṭyaḥ tad api agneḥ svabhāvo na bhavātīti ghṛtyaṃ kṛtakatvāt. Iha maṇḍhānādityasamāṃgamād araṇiprāharṣyādēś cāgner hetupratyayasāpekṣaḥataivopalabhāya, na cāṅgnyayatiḥtām aṣṭyaḥ sambhavati, tasmād aṣṭyaḥ api hetupratyayajanitām, tataḥ ca kṛtakaḥ, kṛtakatvāc cāpāṃ aṣṭyaḥ svabhāvo na bhavātīti śphūtām avaśyate.”
63. MK 15.7: “Kātyāyanāvavādāvē cāsti (ti) nāstīti cobbhayāṃ, pratiṣiddhāṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā.”
64. MKV, p. 269: “idañ ca sūtram sarvanikāyesu pathyate.”
65. S 2.17; TD 2.86a (Tsa 12.18).
66. For a general discussion of these problems, see Bradley, Appearance and Reality, pp. 38–39.
67. Stcherbatsky, Central Conception, pp. 4ff.
68. MK 15.10, Astīti sasvatagraho nastīty ucchedadarsanāṃ.
71. M 1.228; S 3.133; 4.401; A 1.286; Thag 678; Dh 279.
72. L. de la Vallée Poussin Théorie des Douze Causes, p. 111. He was quoting it from A 1.286.
73. TD 2.66b–67a (Tsa 10.7); 2.668c (Tseng 23.4); also 1.9b (Ch’ang 1.1).
74. AD p. 104.
75. Ibid., p. 281: “Vartamānādhasampātāt sāmārgyāṅgaparigrahāt, labdhāsakteḥ phalākṣepaḥ kāritram abhidhāyate.”
76. TD 29.27c (CSL 20): Kośa 2.228: “kṣaṇīkasya hi dharmsaya sthitīṃ vinā bhaved vyayaḥ.”
77. Sakv, p. 33: “kṣaṇīkānāṃ nāsti desāntaragamanāṃ, yatraivopattiḥ tatraiva viñāṣaḥ.”
78. TD 29.27c (CSL 20).
79. Ibid.
81. TD 29.27c (CSL 20): Kośa 2.228.
82. TS 1.11. The question: “Kṣaṇīkāḥ sarve sāṃskārāḥ, asthirānāṃ kutaḥ kriyā.” (Cf. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic 1:119.) The answer: “bhūtir yeṣām kriyā saiva kāraṇam saiva cocyte.”
83. TS 1.11: “Kṣaṇīkāḥ sarve sāṃskārāḥ”; BCAP 376: “kṣaṇīkāḥ sarva-sāṃskārāḥ”; see also TD 29.27c (CSL 20). This statement in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas always reads: sabbe sāṅkhārā anicca.
84. S 2.94–97; TD 2.81c–82a (Tsa 12.7–8).
86. SA 2.99.
87. Sakv, p. 33.
88. SA 2.99.
89. S 3.38; TD 2.607c (Tseng 12.15).
90. A 5.187: “yaṃ kiṃci bhūtam ... tad aniccam.”
92. S 1.186; Thag 1215: “yaṃ kiṃci purifīyati sabbam aniccam.”
Notes

95. MK 24.19: “āpaṛṭtyasamutpanno dharmaḥ kaścina na vidyate”; see MKV, p. 505.
96. Vin 1.41: “Ye dhammā hetupabhavā tesam hetum tathāgato āha, 

tesai ca yo nirodho evamvādī Mahāsamanō.”

See also Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, p. 444; Āryapratītyasamutpāda-sūtra, p. 26.
97. M 1.228; S 3.133; 4.401; A 1.286; TD 2.66b–67a (Tsa 10.7); 668c (Tseng 23.4); see also TD 1.9b (Ch’ang 1.1). E. Lamotte has collected many references to this statement in the early as well as later Buddhist texts (see L’Enseignement de Vimalakīrti, Bibliothèque de Muséon, vol. 51 [Louvain : Muséon, 1962], p. 165, n. 51).

98. D 2.198.
99. S 1.134. The Chinese translators of this passage on saṅkhāra (TD 2.327b: Tsa 45.5) were aware of this general use when they rendered the phrase saṅkhārapuṇja as yin chü, which means a ‘collection of aggregates,’ and avoided using the character hsin, which is generally used to translate saṅkhāra (‘disposition’).
100. PTSD p. 233, s.v. Khandhā.
102. MKV, pp. 41–42; S 3.142:

“Phenapiṇḍūpamaṇī rūpaṇaḥ vedanā bubbulūpamā, 

marūcikūpamā saññā saṅkhārā kadalūpamā, 

māyopamaṇaḥ ca viññāṇaṁ dīpītādīccabandhunā.”

TD 2.69a (Tsa 10.10).
103. S 1.134; TD 2.327c (Tsa 45.6).
104. S 3.96; TD 2.14a (Tsa 2.25); S 3.103; TD 2.14b–15a (Tsa 2.26).
105. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, p. 82.
106. MKV, p. 443: “Na hi Tathāgatāḥ kācid apy ātmanāḥ skandhānāṁ 
vāstitaṁ prajñāpayanti.”
110. S 2.26; TD 2.84b (Tsa 12.14).
111. S 2.77. This passage could not be traced in the Chinese Āgamas.
112. SA 2.76.

CHAPTER V

1. S 2.25: “Uppāda vā tathāgatānaṁ anuppāda vā tathāgatānaṁ ēhitā va sa dhātu dhammaṁśhitāt dhammaniyāmatat idappacayata”; TD 2.84b (Tsa 12.14). See also MKV 40; ASS 73; de la Vallée Poussin, Théorie des Douze Causes, pp. 111–112. Cf. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 217: “It is to be observed that what is constant in a causal law is not the object or objects given, nor yet the object inferred, both of which may vary within wide limits, but the relation between what is given and what is inferred.” See also idem, Mysticism and Logic (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963), p. 142.
2. *Ud*, p. 1: “Yadā have pātubhavanti dhammā, 
ātāpino jhāyato brāhmaṇassā; 
ath’assa kaṅkhā vapayanṭi sabbā, 
yato pājānāti sahetudhammaṃ.”

3. S 2.25; *TD* 2.84b (*Tsa* 12.14).
4. M 1.190–191 and S 3.120; *TD* 1.467a (*Chung* 7.2) and 16.815b (*LPSSC*); see also *ASS*, p. 70.
5. S 4.330; S 2.17, 20, 23; *TD* 2.85c (*Tsa* 12.18, 19).
6. M 1.262–64; S 2.28, 70, 96; *Ud*, p. 2.
7. In *MKV*, p. 9 the locative absolute construction is given thus: “asmin sati idam bhavati, asyotpādād idam utpadyate.”

8. *Mahāvastu*, 2.285, which seems to contain the only complete statement in Buddhist Sanskrit texts; in all the other places only the first part is found.

9. *TD* 2.67a (*Tsa* 10.7), 100a (*Tsa* 14.16). Instead of the character *sheng* sometimes we find the character *ch‘i*; see *TD* 2.85b (*Tsa* 12.17).
10. *TD* 1.562c (*Chung* 21.3); 2.713c–714a (*Tseng* 30.2).
17. *TD* 2.85b–c (*Tsa* 12.17). This short but very important sutra does not appear in a Pāli version.
19. S 2.104–107, called *Nagara-sutta*. The Chinese Buddhists seem to have considered this a very important sutra, as is evident from the existence of three separate translations apart from the two entries in the *Samyukta* (*TD* 2.80b–81a) and *Ekottara* (*TD* 2.718a–c) *Āgamas*. The three translations are (1) attributed to Chih Chien (*TD* 16.826b), (2) by Hsüan Tsang (*TD* 16.827b), and (3) by Fa-hsien (*TD* 16.829a).
23. *PTSD*, p. 296, s.v. tathatā.
24. *BIHSD*, p. 248, s.v. tathatā.
Notes

27. SA 2.41: “aññadhammapaccayehi aññadhammadānupātito anaññathatā ti.”
30. SA 2.41: “Yathā vuttānaṁ etesaṁ jarāmarāṇādīnaṁ paccayato vā paccayasamūhato vā idappaccayatā ti vutto.”
31. Bunge, Causality, p. 103.
32. Ibid.
35. Since the time of Hume, the formula of constant conjunction has been regarded as exhausting the meaning of causation. It is considered to be the correct statement of the causal bond. Thus, A. J. Ayer maintains that “every general proposition of the form ‘C causes E’ is equivalent to the proposition of the form ‘whenever C, then E,’” (Language, Truth and Logic, p. 55). The empiricists have held that “the meaning of causation consists in the statement of an exceptionless repetition, a constant union between cause and effect.” This is what William James criticized as “a world of mere withness, of which the parts were strung together by the conjunction ‘and’” (Pragmatism [New York, Toronto, and London: Longmans Green & Co., 1943], p. 156).
37. Jayatilleke, Theory of Knowledge, p. 449. See also Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, p. 96, for a criticism of this formula. Contrary to the view of Keith, the statement bears the stamp of comprehensiveness rather than imperfection.
38. Cf. the definition of patīccasamuppāda by Buddhaghosa, Vism, p. 520ff. and the definition of paccaya in Vism, p. 532–533: “yo hi dhammo yaṁ dhammaṁ apaccakkhiyā tīṭhati vā uppaṭṭati vā so tassa paccayo ti vutto hoti. Lakkhānato pana upakārakalakkhāno paccayo; yo hi dhammo yassa dhammassa thityāṁ vā uppaṭṭayaṁ vā upakārako hoti, so tassa paccayo ti vuccati.”
40. Ibid. 1.49, “Hrasve sati punar dirgham na bhavati svabhāvataṁ.”
42. Stebbing, Introduction to Logic, p. 264.
45. Sn, p. 139.
46. Stcherbatsky's voluminous work, Buddhist Logic, is based primarily on the "system of logic and epistemology" formulated by Dinnåga and Dharmakīrti.

47. Jayatilleke, Theory of Knowledge, pp. 443, 457.


50. Ibid., pp. 252–53. Italics mine.

51. Ibid., p. 34. Italics mine.

52. Ibid., p. 39. Italics mine.

53. This was more or less prompted by a desire to refute the belief in 'substance' and belief in the continued existence of objects when not perceived.


55. Dh 33.

56. D 1.78ff.; TD 1.553b–c (Chung 19.3). See also TD 1.86a (Ch'ang 13.1).

57. D 1.79; M 2.19: "So dibbāya sotadhātu-yā visuddhāya atikkantamānusikāya ubho sadde suññī, dibbe ca mānuse ca, ye dūre santike ca’; TD 1.86a (Ch'ang 13.1).

58. M 1.502; TD 1.670b (Chung 38.2).


60. D 1.80–81; TD 1.86a (Ch'ang 13.1); see also D 1.213; TD 1.101c–102a (Ch'ang 16.1).


64. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 222.

65. Skr 1: fol. 35: "pañcaśrūṭṭhīm duranvayād ajñānam eva śreyah."


67. D 1.82; TD 1.86b (Ch'ang 13.1).

68. Ibid.

69. D 2.20.

70. Ibid. 1.152.

71. C. D. Broad, who believes that the question of the possibility of human survival of bodily death is partly empirical and partly philosophical, says: "It is empirical in the sense that if it can be clearly formulated and shown to be an intelligent question, the only relevant way to attempt to answer it is by appeal to specific observable facts... The relevant observable facts are some of those investigated by psychological research and in particular certain phenomena of trance-
72. M 1.93; TD 1.587b–c (Chung 25.2).
73. D 1.83–84; TD 1.86c (Ch’ang 13.1).
74. Vism, p. 411.
75. S 2.25; TD 2.84b (Tsa 12.14).
76. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, p. 144.
77. So iminā dharmena diṭṭhena viditena akālikena pattena paryogāhena aśītāṅgāte na yaṃ neti: ye kho keci aśītām addhanām samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā jāramaraṇāṃ abhāvaḥ naṃsu, jāramaraṇaṃ samuṇdayaṃ . . . jāramaraṇaṃ nirodhāṃ . . . jāramaraṇaṃ nirodhāgamāminiṃ paṭipadaṃ . . . seyyathāpahāṃ etarahi . . . Ye hi pi keci anāgataṃ addhanāṃ samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā jāramaraṇāṃ abhijānissanti . . . seyyathāpahāṃ etarhī idam assa anvaye nānaṃ.” The Chinese version gives a very brief description of the contents of the Pali passage. The phrase fa chu chih (=anvaye fa) may be interpreted as “the knowledge of the continuity [of the nature] of things.”
79. M 3.207ff.; TD 1.707b (Chung 44.2).
80. Ibid.; see also Jayatilleke, Theory of Knowledge, p. 463.
81. M 3.214–215; TD 1.708b (Chung 44.2).
82. A 1.249; the Chinese version is included in the Madhyama Āgama, TD 1.433a (Chung 3.1), which is called the “sutra of the salt-simile.” It is interesting to note that the locution anamatagga in the Pali version, which means “inconceivable is the beginning” (ana = negative prefix; mata = past participle of man or m, “to think,” and agga = agra, “beginning”), occurs in most of the Buddhist Sanskrit texts as ānataraggra (see BHSD, p. 21). In the Madhyamakakārikā (11.1), Nāgārjuna says: “Pūrva praṇāyaṃ koṭir neti vūccha mahāmuniḥ, saṃsāro’navarāgro hi nāsyādir nāpi paścimaḥ.” Ānataragga has generally been translated “without beginning and end” (BHSD, p. 21). This is quite clear from Nāgārjuna’s use of nāsyādir nāpi paścimaḥ, on the basis of which Jacques May translates ānataragga as “sans début ni terme” (Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1959, p. 170). But the Āgama version seems to imply “without prior limit” when it renders ānataragga as wu yu pèn chi (TD 2.214b; Tsa 34.1). Again comparing ānataragga and ānataragga, it seems that the former is in keeping with the teachings of early Buddhism in that it implies the difficulty of knowing or determining the beginning,
hence an epistemological rather than an ontological problem. This view carries
the support of later Theravada commentators (see SA 2.156: “anamataggo ti anu
amataggo, vassasataṃ vassasahassanā fānena anugantvā pi anamataggo aviditaggo,
nāssa sakka īto va ētto va aggām jānītum apariceñnapubbāparakoṭītī attho”). But the
latter implies a definite denial of a beginning and is in keeping with the
metaphysics of Mahāyāna.

3. This sutra is found in D 3.80ff.; TD 1.36b (Ch’ang 6.1). The Chinese
version, unlike the Pali version, specifically states its purpose.

4. The portion within parentheses is not found in the Chinese version.

5. The etymology of the term ābhassara has presented problems. The PTSD
derives it from ābhā + svar, “to shine,” and defines it as “shining in splendor” (p. 103). The Chinese translators seem to have followed a traditional explanation
when they rendered it as kuang yīn, “bright speech” (kuang = ābhā, yīn = svara, “syllable”).

6. Here the Chinese version adds: “On account of the exhaustion of merit
[= puññakkhaya?] and the termination of the life span [= āyukkhaya?]”

7. In the Chinese version the portion within parentheses is given after another
passage.

8. See G. P. Malalasekera and K. N. Jayatilleke, Buddhism and the Race


10. The portions in parentheses are not found in the Chinese version.

11. 10.129.1–4.

12. According to the Chinese version, the earth gushed forth or bubbled up
like a fountain and was like cheese or honey in appearance.

13. This simile is not found in the Chinese text.


15. A 4.100–103; TD 2.736b (Tseng 34.1).

16. According to the Chinese version, it is at this stage that the small rivers,
water spouts, and even the four great rivers dry up, which phenomena occur,
according to the Pali version, after the appearance of the second sun.

17. According to the Chinese version, the appearance of the second sun is
followed by the drying up of all vegetation.

18. While the Pali version refers to five rivers, the Gaṅgā, Yamunā, Aciravati,
Sarabhū, and Mahī, the Chinese version has only four, the Gaṅgā, Sindhu, Śītā
and Oxus.

19. The account in the Chinese version starts with seven hundred leagues
and goes down to one league.

20. This simile is not found in Chinese.

21. Earthquakes: A 4.312; TD 2.753c (Tseng 37.5); also TD 1.477b (Chung
9.1); drought: A 3.243.

22. In connection with causality of the human personality: S 1.134; TD
2.327b (Tsa 45.6); 45a (Pieh-i Tsa 12.6); S 3.54; TD 2.9a (Tsa 2.7); A 1.223f.;
(Chung 34.6); Sn 77; Thag 363, 388.

Notes

sineho avijjānīvaraṇānaṃ sattānaṃ taṇhāsamyojanānaṃ hīnāya dhātuyā vinīṇānaṃ patiṭhītam." We have not been able to trace this passage in the Āgamas, but it seems to have been known to the compiler of the Ārya-sālistamba-sūtra (p. 84).

24. M 3.239: "chadhāturo'yāṃ ... puriso ti." TD 1.690b (Chung 42.1).

Although man is said to be composed of six elements, the Pāli version enumerates only five, omitting the element of water. For an idealistic interpretation of the theory of six elements, see Stanislaus Schayer, "Pre-Canonical Buddhism," Archiv Orientalni (Prague), 7 (1935): 130.

25. Ch 8.8.1ff., where the atman is progressively defined starting with the theory that it is the physical body. But this view is rejected in favor of the view that the atman is best represented by the mind in the turiya (fourth) state.


27. Sometimes rendered ch'eng yin (see TD 1.1464c [Chung 7.2], 788a–b [Chung 58.1]), but better translated as ch‘u yun; see TD 2.499c (No. 102).

28. M 1.299: "Paṇca kho me ... upādānakhandhā sakkāyo vutto Bhagavatā"; TD 1.788a (Chung 58.1).

29. M 1.191: "Paṭiccasamuppānā kho pan‘ime ... pañc‘upādānakkhandhā"; TD 1.467a (Chung 7.2).

30. M 1.265: "Tīṇaṃ kho bhikkhave sannipātā gābbhassāvakkanti hoti"; TD 1.769b (Chung 54.2).

31. M 1.184; TD 1.464b (Chung 7.2); see also D 1.76.

32. M 1.265–266.

33. See D 2.63; TD 1.61b (Ch‘ang 10.2).

34. M 1.262; TD 1.767c (Chung 54.2).


36. D 2.63; TD 1.61b (Ch‘ang 10.2).


38. A 1.176: “Channaṃ ... dhātinaṃ upādāya gābbhassāvakkanti hoti, okkantiyā sati nāmarūpaṃ . . . .” TD 1.435c (Chung 3.3) reads: “Because of the harmony of the six elements, there is conception. Because of the six elements, the six senses come into being.” It is stated very often that the six senses depend on the psychophysical personality (nāmarūpapaccayā saḷāyatanam). Therefore, it seems that in the Chinese version the six elements represent the psychophysical personality (the nāmarūpa).


40. M 1.184; TD 1.658a (Chung 36.2).

41. Godhika: S 1.122; TD 2.286b (Tsa 39.11); 383a (Pieh-i Tsa 2.8); Vakkhali: S 3.124; TD 2.347b (Tsa 47.25).

42. Saratchandra, Buddhist Psychology of Perception, p. 20, n. 65.

43. TD 2.383a–12 (Pieh-i Tsa 2.8), which is closer to the Pali version.

44. TD 2.347b–11 (Tsa 47.25).

45. TD 2.603a (Tseng 12.3). The parallel passage is found in M 1.265–266.

46. TD 1.596b (Chung 26.4); M 1.1 (Mūlapāṭhyāya-sutta). The term shen
is never used alone, in the Chinese Agamas, to denote consciousness that survives death.

47. M 1.256: “tad ev idaṃ viññāṇam sandhāvatī samāsaratī anaññām.” TD 1.766c (Chung 54.2) specifically states that it is the consciousness that does not change or alter. M 1.258: “yāvayām . . . vado vedeyyo tatra tatra kalyāṇapāpakāṇaṃ kammānaṃ vipākaṃ paṭīsaṅvedititā.” TD 1.767a (Chung 54.2) says that consciousness is “the doer as well as the causer to do”; see also Miln, pp. 54–56ff.

48. KS 3.viii. E. Zürcher points out that “The Chinese (not unreasonably) were unable to see in the doctrine of rebirth anything else than an affirmation of a survival of a ‘soul’ (shen) after death”; see The Buddhist Conquest of China (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), p. 11.


50. TD 31.17a–b (Ch'eng 3); see also Siddhi, pp. 199–200.

51. S 2.94: “cittāti pi mano iti pi viññāṇam, iti pi,” where the words are used synonymously; TD 2.81c (Tsa 12.7). The Pali-English Dictionary (PTS) renders the terms citta and mano as “thought” and “mind,” respectively. But citta is used in the early Buddhist texts as a generic term, and the Chinese translators have used the character hsin meaning “mind” to render this term. On the other hand, mano, which is only a faculty, has been translated into Chinese as i, “thought.”

52. A 1.171.


54. The bodily dispositions are defined as exhaling and inhaling. Verbal dispositions are reflection and investigation. Mental dispositions are explained as perception and feeling (saññā, vedanā), but the Chinese version seems to imply perception and volition (hsiang szū = saññā and cetanā).

55. S 4.294; TD 2.150a–b (Tsa 21.10).

56. This implies that a saint who has come out of a trance in which perception and feeling had ceased (saññāvedayitanirodha) and whose perceptive faculties are once more active accumulates sañkhāras and is therefore not different from an ordinary man, or at least is liable to fall away from sainthood. This may have prompted the Sarvāstivādins to uphold that a saint could fall away from the state he had attained. See Vasumitra’s Nikāyālambana-sastra, tr. J. Masuda, Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools, in AM 2 (1925): 27. But according to early Buddhism, the difference between an ordinary man and a saint (arhat) is that the dispositions of the latter are inoperative because he has attained the state of “pacification of all dispositions” (sabbasañkhārasamatha).

59. *S* 4.138; this passage could not be traced in the Āgamas.
61. *M* 1.190; *TD* 1.467b (*Chung* 7.2); in the special formulation of the causal principle the two factors nāmarūpa and saṭṭhāyatana explain this relationship.
64. Nāṇananda, *Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought* (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1971).
65. Ibid., p. 5.
70. Ibid., p. 239.
71. *A* 5.313; see *TD* 1.485b–c (*Chung* 10.2).
72. *M* 1.195; *TD* 2.759b–c (*Tseng* 38.4).
73. *D* 3.275; *TD* 2.85a–b (*Tsa* 12.16).
74. *M* 2.25–26; *TD* 1.720 (*Chung* 47.2).
75. *M* 1.373: “Imesaṃ kho aham Tapassi tiṇṇāṃ kammānaṃ evan paṭivi-bhattānaṃ evan paṭivisīṭṭhānaṃ manokammānaṃ mahāsaṃgavaṭṭhānaṃ paṭihāpemi pāpassa kammassa kiriyya pāpassa kammassa pavattiyya, no tathā kāya kammānaṃ no tathā vacīkammānaṃ.” *TD* 1.628b (*Chung* 32.1).
76. *A* 3.415; “Cetana’ham bhikkhave kammānaṃ vadāmi; cetayitvā kammānaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasa.” *TD* 1.600a (*Chung* 27.5).
77. *M* 3.207: “Mogham kāya kammānaṃ mogham vacīkammānaṃ manokammānaṃ eva saccan ti.” *TD* 1.706b (*Chung* 44.2).
78. Ibid.
80. *A* 3.415: “Phasso ... kammānaṃ nidānasambhavo”; *TD* 1.600a (*Chung* 27.5). Here the term keng lo is used to translate phassa; see also *TD* 1.435c (*Chung* 3.3).
83. *M* 1.324.
84. *A* 1.134: “Tiṭṭhimagi ... niḍānaṃ kammānaṃ samudayāya. katamāni tiṇi? Lobho ... doso ... moha niḍānaṃ kammānaṃ samudayāya.” *TD* 1.483c (*Chung* 3.6).
85. A 2.158.
86. S 4.172ff.; TD 2.313b (Tsa 43.9). In the first instinct mentioned, the character sheng, which means 'birth', 'arising,' etc., may be taken in this context as 'life' or 'existence.' In the second instinct, while the Pali term amaritukāma is used as a synonym for jīvitukāma, the Chinese version clearly implies 'aversion to death.' The first two instincts enumerated come very close to what Freud called the life instinct, i.e., the drive for self-preservation—see A. J. C. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians (London: Pelican Books, 1963), p. 27f. The last two instincts represent another idea, which Freud called the pleasure principle. He said: "It seems that our entire psychical activity is bent upon procuring pleasure and avoiding pain, that it is automatically regulated by the PLEASURE PRINCIPLE," Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, translated from the German by Joan Riviere (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1949), pp. 298–299.
87. Peters, Concept of Motivation, p. 50.
88. M 3.203; TD 1.705a (Chung 44.1).
89. Jayatilleke, Theory of Knowledge, p. 460.
90. M 3.203ff.; TD 1.705a (Chung 44.1).
91. M 3.210; TD 1.707bf. (Chung 44.2).
92. Ibid, see Jayatilleke, Theory of Knowledge, p. 463.
93. M 3.214–215; TD 1.708b (Chung 44.2).
94. A 1.249. The Chinese version is included in the Madhyama Āgama; see TD 1.433 (Chung 3.1).
95. "yathā yathā’yaḥ puriso kammaṃ karoti tathā tathā taṃ paṭīsāṃvediyati."
96. "yathā vedanīyaṃ ayaṃ puriso kammaṃ karoti tathā tathā’ssa vipākaṃ paṭīsāṃveditayati." The Chinese version does not show this difference in the two statements. In GS 1.227, the Pali passage is translated: "Just as this man does a deed that is to be experienced, so does he experience its fulfilment." We feel that this does not convey emphatically enough the difference between the two statements. The words yathā vedanīyaṃ should be taken as emphasizing the way it would be experienced.
97. GS 1.227, n. 2.
98. A 1.249: "idha ... ekaccassa puggalassa appamattikam pi pāpaṃ kammaṃ katam tam enaṃ nirayaṃ upaneti. Idha pana ... ekacassa puggalassa tādisam eva appamattikam pāpaṃ kammaṃ katam diṭṭhadhamme c’eva vedaniyaṃ hoti nāṇū pi khāyati bahud eva." TD 1.433 (Chung 3.1). The section within parentheses is not found in the Chinese version.
99. Woodward seems to have had difficulty rendering appadukkhavihārī (see GS 1.228, n. 1). Following the Chinese passage, "shou ming shen tuan" (TD 1.433a) and the translation of the phrase appamāṇavihārī as shou ming shen ch‘ang (TD 1.433b), we have interpreted appa as referring to length of life and dukkha as denoting the quality of life.
100. The passage within parentheses is not found in the Chinese version.
101. A 1.250; TD 1.433a–b (Chung 3.1).
102. Sn 260: "Paṭirīpadesavāsā ca pubbe ca katupaññatā, attasammāpanidhi ca etam mangalam uttamam."
103. *A* 1.223–224; *ASS*, p. 84.

104. The passage in the *Dhammapada* (127), quoted in the *Milindapañha* (p. 150) and in the *Divyavadāna* (p. 532), states that there is no place visible in this universe, the midst of the ocean or even in mountain cave, from which one could ward off the consequences of evil actions (“na antalikkhe na samuddamajjhe na pabbatānaṃ vivaram pavissa, na dissati yo jagatippadeso yatthaṭṭhitto mucceyya pāpakammā”). Taken in isolation, this statement may imply complete determinism in moral responsibility. But considered along with the other statements cited above, it should only be taken as emphasizing the invariability of the causal pattern when there are no obstructing conditions (see the discussion in *Milin*, pp. 150ff.).

105. *M* 3.203; *A* 3.72, 186; 5.88, 288: “Kammassakā sattā kammadāyādā kammayoni kammabandhu . . .” *TD* 1.704c (*Chung* 44.1).


108. The data available in the Pali Nikāyas have been subjected to exhaustive analyses; see R. Fick, *Social Organization in North-East India in Buddha’s Time*, translated by S. Mitra (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1920) and Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, *Buddhism and the Race Question*.

109. *D* 3.81; *TD* 1.36c (*Ch'ang* 6.1).

110. *Dial* 1.106.

111. *M* 2.149; *TD* 1.664a (*Chung* 37.3). The two countries mentioned are Yona and Kamboja.

112. *M* 2.84; *TD* 2.142b (*Tsa* 20.12).

113. *A* 3.383. We have not been able to trace this passage in the Chinese Āgamas. The term ‘species’ (*abhijñā*) in this context is used in a very narrow sense to include human beings only, whereas in the philosophy of Makkhali Gosāla it was used in a broader sense to include “all beings,” although Buddhaghosa has explained it in terms of the six human types (*DA* 1.162).


115. *Kāṇḍakavuttikā*, which is explained by the commentator as *kanṭaka-vuttikā* (*AA* 3.395). See *GS* 3.273.


117. *D* 3.60; *TD* 1.39b (*Ch'ang* 6.2). The glories of a universal monarch are said to consist of seven jewels; see *D* 3.142; *TD* 1.493b (*Chung* 11.2).


120. *D* 3.95f.; *TD* 1.38b–c (*Ch'ang* 6.1).

121. *D* 3.65; *TD* 1.40b (*Ch'ang* 6.2).
123. D 3.92; TD 1.38b (Ch'ang 6.1).
126. Dh 165: “suddhā asuddhā paccattaṁ nāṇṇam aṁno visoddhayet.”
127. S 3.69ff.; TD 2.21a (Tsa 3.23).
129. D 2.251–252; TD 1.34a (Ch'ang 5.1).
130. M 1.184: “khiṇṇa jāti vusitaṁ brahmačariyaṁ kataṁ karanīyaṁ nāparam itthattāyeyi’ it; TD 1.658a (Chung 36.2).
131. M 479, 480; 3.1: “Nāham . . . ādīken’eva aṁnārādhanāṁ vadāmi, api ca anupubbasiṅkhā anupubbakiriyaṁ anupubbapaṭipadaṁ aṁnārādhanā hoti.” TD 1.652a (Chung 35.3).
132. In the Nikāyas: D 1.70, 172, 181; M 1.180–181, 269, 346; A 2.210; in the Āgamas: TD 1.657b (Chung 36.2); 733 (Chung 49.1).
133. Bhā, p. 67.
135. S 2.29ff.
136. Ibid. 3.126.
137. M 1.184; TD 1.658a (Chung 36.2).
139. Sn 268.
140. It, pp. 38–39.
141. A 2.37–39; TD 2.28a–b (Tsa 4.14); 467a–b (Pieh-i Tsa 13.18); 717c–718a (Tseng 31.3).
142. S 4.362.
143. See Dhā 193; also Sakv 174: “saṁskṛtatvam pratītyasamutpāntvam iti prayāyāv etav. Sametya sambhūya pratīyayaiḥ kṛtaṁ saṁskṛtaṁ. Taṁ tam pratiyayaṁ pratītya samutpānṇāṁ pratītyasamutpānnaṁ ‘ti.”
144. S 2.28; M 1.262f.; cf. TD 2.98a–b (Tsa 14.6).
146. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, p. 109; Thomas, History of Buddhist Thought, p. 58.
148. S 2.20; TD 2.85c (Tsa 12.18).
149. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, pp. 110, 112.
150. S 2.19–20; TD 2.86a (Tsa 12.20). Jayatilleke points out that in speaking of logical alternatives that may be false, the Nikāyas use the phrase no h'īdan, “it is not so” not mā h'īvan, “do not ask thus”; see Theory of Knowledge, p. 293.
Notes

152. A 5.113.
155. S 2.1, 25: “Paṭiccasamuppādana vo bhikkhave desissāmi”; TD 2.84b (Tsa 12.14), 85a (Tsa 12.16).
156. S 2.5–11; TD 2.101a–b (Tsa 15.2).
157. Introduction of the special application of the causal formula in connection with aging and death: S 2.11; TD 2.101c (Tsa 15.7); the four forms of nutrition: S 2.28; the five aggregates: S 2.19; TD 2.85c (Tsa 12.19); also 86a (Tsa 12.20); the causality of moral behavior: S 2.17f.; 76f.; TD 2.85c (Tsa 12.18); criticism of current philosophical theories: Thomas, History of Buddhist Thought, p. 60, n. 1.
158. C. A. F. Rhys Davids goes to the other extreme, maintaining that the abstract statement is earlier and that the applied formula is later and was “crudely fitted”; Sākya, p. 152.
159. TD 2.83c, 84b, 85a–c, 86a–b (Tsa 12.11–20).
162. Ibid, pp. 99f.
163. Ibid., p. 106.
164. Oltramare, La Formule des Douze Causes, pp. 28–29.

CHAPTER VII

1. Stcherbatsky, Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, pp. 23–24.
2. Murti, Central Philosophy, p. 66.
5. Ibid.
6. ADV, p. 258: “Yaḥ kalav eṣa prathamo vādī sarvāstivādākyāḥ, eṣa khali . . . sadvād.”
7. Sakv, p. 362: “svabhāvata ity ātmataḥ.”
9. MK 1.3: “Na hi svabhāvo bhāvānāṁ pratyay’adisau vidyate.”
11. We have not strictly observed this distinction in rendering svatotpattīdā as ‘self- causation’.
12. Śīkṣāsamuccaya, p. 248: “iti hy abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā paṭivigacchati svabhāvarahitatvat.”
13. MKV, p. 263: “atha ev auśṇyam agner hetupratyaya-pratibaddhatvāt pūrvam abhūtvā paścād utpādena kṛtakatvāc ca na svabhāva iti yujyate.”


15. TS 1.155: “Niyatācintyāsaktiṇī vastūnīha pratiksanaṃ, bhavanti nānu-joyyāni dahane dāhāsaktitvam.”


17. Murti, Central Philosophy, pp. 170ff.


22. TS 1.153: “Krameṇa yugapac cāpi yatas te’rthakriyākṛtaḥ, na bhavanti tatas teśām vyarthah kṣaṇikatāśrayah, sahakārikṛtaś caiva yadā nātiśayaḥ kvacit, sarvadā nirviśeṣaiva tadā santatir iṣyate.”


25. Ibid., pp. 51–52.

26. Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 248: “Tatra mahārāja ādhyātmikas tejodhātur utpadyate, na kutaścid āgacchati nirdhṛyamāno na kvacit saṅcayāṃ gacchati.” For a discussion of the significance of this statement, see AD, pp. 266ff., where it is said to be a quotation from the Paramārthaśāntiśūtra.

27. Miln, p. 53.

28. S 2.17, which Nāgārjuna quotes in support of his theory; see MK 15.7.

29. I am indebted to my friend Upali Karunaratna, Assistant Editor of the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, for providing me with some of the reference material on this subject.


32. D 2.140.

33. Sadmmp, p. 271.

34. Ibid. 272.

35. Vajr, p. 56.

36. Divy, p. 158, 396; Śīks, p. 159.

37. Vajr, p. 43; AsP, p. 94.


40. S 2.17; TD 2.85c (Tsa 12.19).

41. MK 15.7, “Kātyāyanaśānti caste ti nāstīti cobhayam, pratisiddham bhagavataḥ bhāvabhāvavibhāvinā.”

42. Ibid., 15.10.
Notes

43. *KP*, p. 90: “astiti kāśyapa ayam eko’ntaḥ nāstīti ayaṃ dvīfiyo’ntaḥ yad etayor dvayor antayor madhyam iyam ucyate kāśyapa madhyamā pratipad dharmānāṃ bhūtapratyaveksaḥ.”

44. *MKV*, p. 270, n. 1: “Astiti kāśyapa ayam eko’nto nāstīti kāśyapa ayam eko’ntaḥ, yad enayor dvayor madhyam tad arūpyam anidrāṇānam apratīṣṭham anābhāsām aniketam avijñaptikam iyam ucyate kāśyapa madhyamā pratipad dharmānāṃ bhūtapratyaveksaḥ.”

45. Thus, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, a later text of the Mādhyamika school, seems to maintain that “things that are causally produced belong to the ‘conventional’ (*sāṃvṛti*),” but not causality itself; see p. 352.


48. *MKV*, p. 40: “Utpādaḥ vā tathāgatānāṃ anupadād vā tathāgatānāṃ sthitavaigāśā dharmānāṃ dharmastāḥ.” In spite of the occurrence of this passage in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, as well as in the Ārya-sālistamba-sūtra and several other texts, Stcherbatsky believes that “the second *tathāgatānām* must be dropped and the first understood with Madhyavacarya, Sarvadars (anasalāgra) p. 21.8, in the sense of *tathāgatānāṃ mate,*” (Nīrṇāṇa, p. 123, n. 4). Having thus misconstrued this important statement, in spite of its acceptance by all the schools of Buddhism, Stcherbatsky suggests a translation that is not at all consistent with the teachings of early Buddhism. In the *Mādhyamikavṛtti*, the passage was quoted by Candrakīrti to illustrate the opponent’s view that the early teachings did accept the fact of ‘arising’ (*utpāda*) and ‘passing away’ (*nirūda*), which the Mādhyamikas were trying to refute.


50. *MKV*, pp. 40–41. See also *A* 1.60, *TD* 2.592c (*Cheng 9.9*), which need a different explanation.

51. *Sn* 884.


54. Murti, *Central Philosophy*, p. 27.

55. Ibid., pp. 49–50.


CHAPTER VIII

1. *AK* 2.61: “catvārah pratrayā uktā;”

   *MK* 1.2: “catvārah pratrayāḥ hetus kālambanaṃ anantaram, tathavādiḥpateyāḥ ca pratrayo nāsti pāñcamaḥ.”

2. *MVBB*, p. 31; see also *Madhyāntavibhāgaḥ*, pp. 84–89. *Bbh*, pp. 97–98. In the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*; *TD* 31.41b (*Ch'eng 8*); *Siddhi*, pp. 453ff.


5. D 3.214; TD 1.50a (*Ch'ang 8.2*).

6. Tikap 1.27.


8. Abvn, p. 137.

9. Tikap 1.27; D 3.214; TD 1.50a (*Ch'ang 8.2*).

10. TD 31.40a (*Ch'eng 7*); Siddhi, p. 436; Madhyāntavibhāga-tīkā, pp. 32–33: translation by Freedman, p. 42.


15. Visn, p. 533; see also Abvn, p. 138.


20. Ibid.

21. See Kośa 2.299, n.

22. TD 31.41a (*Ch'eng 7*); Siddhi, p. 448.

23. AK 2.62d: “kāranahetuḥ adhipati-pratyaya ucyate.”

24. TD 31.41a (*Ch'eng 7*); Siddhi, pp. 448–449.

25. Tikap 1.3; AK 2.62a–b; Kośa 2.233ff., 236, 245; Abhs, p. 29; TD 31.671c (CL 3.1); 714a–c (TCL 4); 40c (*Ch'eng 7*); Siddhi, pp. 437ff.

26. Abhs, p. 28; TD 31.671c (CL 3.1); 41b (*Ch'eng 8*); Siddhi, p. 456.


28. Sakv, p. 188.

29. Kośa 2.245.


31. Sakv, p. 188: “anyonyānuparivarṇataīkārthena hi eṣa vyavasthāpyate.”

32. Abhs, p. 28; TD 31.671b (CL 3.1).

33. Ibid., p. 29: “ye dharmāḥ sahabhāvenotpadyante nānyatamavākalyena tad yathā bhūtiś nibhautiḥ ca.”

34. Tait 3.7.1: “Praṇe śārīrāṃ pratiṣṭhitam, śārīre pṛāṇaḥ pratiṣṭhitah”; see also Kaṭś 3.7–8; 4.20.

35. S 2.114.

37. Abhs, p. 28; TD 31.671b (CL 3.1). Abhs, p. 29: “ye dharmāḥ sahabhā-
venālamanāṃ sampratipadyante tad yathā cittaṁ caitasikāḥ ca.”
38. TD 31.713c (TCL 4).
39. TD 31.135b (STCL 1); E. Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’ Asanga
(Louvain: Bareaux du Muséon, 1932), p. 46.
40. Bunge, Causality, p. 91.
41. Vism, p. 535.
42. Abhs, p. 28; TD 31.671b (CL 3.1): “dhṛtikāraṇaṃ tad yathā pṛthivī
sattvānām.”
43. TD 31.713b (CL 4).
44. Vism, p. 536.
45. Nyanatiloka, Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, p. 102.
46. Paṭṭhāna, 1.15.
47. See D. J. Kalupahana, “The Philosophy of Relations in Buddhism,”
48. Sakv, p. 189: “mithyādṛṣṭeḥ puruṣapudgalasya yac ca kāyakarma tad
dṛṣṭer yac ca vākkarma yā cetanā yaḥ prāṇidhiḥ ye ca saṃskārās tad anvayaḥ.
sarve ye tate dharmā anīṣṭayaṃ samvartante’kantavyāpriyatvāyāmanāpatvāyā.”
49. TD 31.713c (TCL 4).
50. Tikap 1.17: “Paṭhamatarama upajjītvā vattamānabhāvena upakārako
dhammo.”
51. Abhs, p. 28; TD 31.671c (CL 3.1); Bbh, p. 97; TD 31.41c (Ch’eng 8);
Siddhi, p. 456.
52. Abhs, p. 28; TD 31.671c (CL 3.1).
54. Tikap 1.17: “Purējātānaṃ . . . dhammānaṃ upatthambhakaṭṭhena upa-
kārako dhammo.”
55. Ibid.
56. Abhs, p. 28; TD 31.671b (CL 3.1); MVBB, p. 31.
57. Paṭṭhāna, 1.17.
58. Abhs, p. 29. Reference to this characteristic is missing in the list given
in Abhs, p. 28. TD 31.671b (CL 3.1).
59. Ibid., p. 29: “pārabhavāvitānāṃ kuśalakusālaśāyākṛtānāṃ dharmānām yā
aparaṇe uttarottarā puṣṭatarā puṣṭamā pravṛttīḥ.”
60. TD 31.713c (TCL 5.1).
61. Sakv, p. 29: “jananāṃ niśrayat sthānād upasthambhopabṛmhāṇat; also
upabṛmhāṇahetut vṛddhiḥhetvāt.”
62. Tikap 1.45: “kamman ti cetanā kammañi c’eva”; Abvn, p. 139.
63. Ibid. 1.18.
64. Ibid. 1.45–46.
65. Sakv, p. 189.
66. TD 31.713c (TCL 5.1).
67. Abhs, p. 29; TD 31.671c (CL 3.1).
68. Abhs, p. 28; TD 31.671c (CL 3.1); Bbh, p. 97; TD 31.41c (Ch’eng 8);
Siddhi, p. 456.
69. Tikap 1.46: “avasesapaccayāsāmyoge sati phalaṁ uppādeti.”
70. Abvn, p. 139: “sati hi janakabhāve upathambhakattam eva āhārassa padhānakiccam.”

71. Abhs, p. 28; TD 31.671b (CL 3.1); MVBB, p. 31.

72. Vbh, p. 5.

73. Tikap 1.18.

74. Abhs, p. 28 (TD 31.671b [CL 3.1]), which may be read as samāpatti-kārana; MVBB, p. 31 reads prāpti-kārana; see TD 31.454b (CPFPL 2).

75. Abhs, p. 28: “mārgo nirvānasya.”

76. S 1.25, 38; 4.37; M 1.38; TD 1.575c (Chung 23.5).

77. Tikap 1.19.

78. Sakv, 189: “ekālambanakṛtyena hy eṣa vyavasthāpyate.”

79. TD 31.713c (TCL 4).

80. Tikap 1.20; Vism, p. 540.

81. Abhs, p. 28; TD 31.671c (CL 3.1).

82. TD 31.41c (Ch’eng 8); Siddhi, p. 456.

83. Abhs, p. 28; TD 31.671c (CL 3.1).

84. Tikap 1.18; also Abvn, p. 139.

85. Tikap 1.51.

86. Ibid. 1.21.

87. Ibid.

88. De la Vallée Poussin has reconstructed the term as janana-hetu; see Siddhi, p. 453, note c.

89. TD 31.713b (TCL 4).

90. Siddhi, p. 453, note c, gives vyañjana-hetu.

91. Ibid.: dhvamsana-hetu.

92. TD 31.713b (TCL 4).


94. Ibid.: vikāra-hetu.

95. Ibid.: jñāpana-hetu.

96. Ibid.: avagama-hetu.

97. Ibid.: anuvyavahāra-hetu.

98. DA 1.101.


CHAPTER IX

1. M 1.426; TD 1.804a–b (Chung 60.6).


3. Ibid.

4. Sn 1076: “Atthaṅgatassa na pamāṇam atthi yena naṁ vajju taṁ tassa natthi.”


6. M 1.184; TD 1.658a (Chung 36.2).

7. See Johansson, Psychology of Nirvana, for discussion of all the aspects of nirvāṇa attained in this life.
Notes

8. D 2.156.
9. Vin 1.235; 3.2; A 4.174, 182f.
11. Translation by Chalmers (Buddha’s Teachings, HOS 37.187).
12. Sn 862ff.
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Index of Chinese Terms

A-pi-ta-mo chū-shē lun 阿毘達磨俱舍論
A-pi-ta-mo chū-shē shih lun 阿毘達磨俱舍釋論
ch'a na (kṣaṇa) 剃那
ch'a pieh (prabheda) 差別
Ch'ang a-han ching 長阿含經
chang ai (paripantha) 障礙
ch'ang chien (sassata-diṭṭhi) 常見
chao nêng tso (prakāśakāraṇa) 作能作
chao yin nêng tso (ākṣepakāraṇa) 招引能作
ch'êng ('accomplishing') 成
chêng chien (sammā-diṭṭhi) 正見
chêng chih ch'u ju (satisampajañña) 正知出入
chêng szŭ wei (yoniso manasikāra) 正思惟
Ch'êng wei shih lun 成唯識論
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ch’i (upāda) 起
chiai t’o (vimutti) 解脱
chieh (dhātu) 界
chieh (kappa) 劫
ch’ien p’ien (thitassa aññathatta) 遷変
ch’ih (moha) 症
ch’ih nēng tso (dhātikāraṇa) 持能作
chih t’ung (abhīññā) 智通
chin (vartamāna) 今
ch’iu lo (sukhāma) 求樂
ch’iu sheng (jīvitukāma) 求生
chu (‘sustaining’) 住
ch’u (phassa) 触
ch’ü (upādāna) 取
ch’ü (atīta) 去
chu nēng tso (sthitikāraṇa) 住能作
chu pan (sahāya) 助半
chū yu yin (sahabhū hetu) 俱有因
chuan pien (pariṇata) 轉變
chuang lun sheng wang (cakkavattirajja) 轉輪聖王
chuang pien nēng tso (pariṇatikāraṇa) 轉變能作

Chung a-han ching 中阿含經
Chung lun 中論
Chung pien fēn pieh lun 中邊分別論
chung tao (majjhima paṭipadā) 中道
fa (dhamma) 法
fa (daṇḍa) 罰
fa chieh (dhammadhātu) 法界
fa chu chih (anvaye ṅāṇa) 法住智
fa hsing (dhammadhātu?) 法性
fa pu i ju (anaññathā) 法不異如
fa pu li ju (avitathā) 法不離如
fa tsū jan (dhammatā) 法自然
fan hsing i wei (vusitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ) 梵行已位
fei ching chieh (avisaya) 非境界
fei tsū fei t’ä tso (asayamkāram aparamekāram) 非自非他作
fēn li nēng tso (viyogakāraṇa) 分離能作
fēng (vāyu) 風
fu ch’ān (pettikaṁ dāyajjāṁ) 父產
Fu shuo chiu ch’ēng yū ching 佛說舊城喻經
Fu shuo ta ch’ēng tao ch’ien ching 佛說大乘稻芓經
Fu shuo tao ch’ien ching 佛說稻芓經
hēng yu (sarvadā asti) 恒有
ho hui (saṅgati, sannipāta) 合會
hsiāng (saññā) 想
hsiāng hsū (saṅgatibhāva?) 相續
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hsiang i (lakṣaṇānyathātva) 相異

hsiang wei nēng tso (virodhikāraṇa) 相違能作

hsiang yin (gandhabba) 香陰

hsiang ying yin (sabhāgahetu) 相應因

hsien liao nēng tso (sampratyāyanakāraṇa) 顯了能作

hsin (citta) 心

hsin chiai nēng tso (sampratyayakāraṇa) 信解能作

hsing (saṅkhāra) 行

hu ch’u kēn (indriyasaṃvara) 護處根

huai (saṃvāṭṭa) 壞

hui chiai t’ō (paññāvimutta) 慧解脫

huo (tejo) 火

i (mano) 意

i ch’ieh ch’ung sheng, yu ming chih lui 一切衆生有命之類

i chieh fa wu o (sabbe dhammā anattā) 一切法無我

i chieh yu (sarvam astī) 一切有

i fa (manodanḍa) 意罰

i shu (vipāka) 異熟

i shu yin (vipākahetu) 異熟因

jo 若

jo yu 若有

jo yu tzu tsē yu pi, jo wu tzu tsē wu pi (imasmiṃ satī idāṃ hoti, imasmiṃ asati idāṃ na hoti) 若有此則有彼若無此則無彼
ju chū (āyatana) 入處
ju fa ērh (tathā) 如法爾
ju i tsu (iddhividha) 如意足
Ju lêng-chia ching 入楞伽經
ju mieh chêng shou (saññāvedayitani-radm samāpanno) 入滅正受
ju yu ming sê (nāmarūpāsavakkanti) 入有名色
kēn (mūla) 根
kēng lo (phassa) 更樂
kēng pu shou yu (nāparam itthattāya) 更不受有
k‘ou (vacī) 口
k‘u (dukkha) 苦
kuang yin (ābhassara) 光音
kuan tai nêng tso (apekśākāraṇa) 觀待能作
k‘ung (suñña, ākāsa) 空
lai (anāgata) 來
Liao pēn sheng szü ching 了本生死經
liu ju chū (saḷ̥āyatana) 六入處
liu sheng (chañabhiñāti) 潛盡智
lou chin chih (āsavakkhayañña) 六生
lui i (bhāvāñyathātva) 類異
mieh chin (vaya) 滅盡
ming hsiang (nāmarūpa) 名像
ming sê (nāmarūpa) 名色
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nèng tso (kāraṇa) 能作

nèng tso yin (kāraṇahetu) 能作因

nu (dāsa) 奴

pao (phala) 報

Pei to shu hsia szu wei shih ērh yin yüan ching 貝多樹下思惟十二因緣經

pēn sheng pēn chien (pubbantakappanā) 本生本見

pēn wu (abhūtā) 本無

pēn wu chin yu (abhūtvābhāva) 本無今有

pēn wu chin yu sheng (abhūtvābhāva utpāda) 本無今有生

pi (asau) 彼

Pi-p'o-shih fu ching 昀婆尸佛經

Pieh i tsa a-han ching 別譯雜阿含經

 pien (anta) 遼

 pien (vivaṭṭa) 變

Pien chung pien lun 辨中邊論

 pien hsing yin (sarvatragahetu) 循行因

 pien i fa (vipariṇāmadhamma) 變易法

 pien huai nèng tso (vikārakāraṇa) 變壞能作

 pu chu shih shen (appatiṣṭhita viññāṇa) 不住識神

 pu hsiang wei nèng tso (avirodhipāraṇa) 不相違能作

 P'u-sa ti ch'ih ching 苦薩地持經

 pu shan (akusala) 不善
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sè (rūpa) 色
shan (kusala) 善
she shou (parigraha) 攝受

Shè ta ch'èng lun 攝大乗論

shen (atta?) 神
shen (kāya) 身
shen fa (kāyadaṇḍa) 身罰
shen shih (viññāṇa) 神識
sheng (jāti, uppatti, uppāda) 生
sheng chiai chū (ariya sīlakkhandha) 聖戒聚
sheng i chin (khīṇa jāti) 生已盡
sheng mu t'ai (gabbhassāvakkanti) 生母胎
sheng nēng tso (uppattikārana) 生能作
sheng szū chih (cut'ūpapātaṇāṇa) 生死智
shih (viññāṇa) 識
shih (āhāra) 食
shou (vedanā) 受
shou ming shen ch'ang (appamāṇavi-hārī) 壽命甚長
shou ming sheng tuan (appadukkhavi-hārī) 壽命甚短
shou yin (upādānakkhandha) 受陰
shui (āpo) 水
shuo wu lun chē (n'atthikavāda) 說無論者
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shuo wu tso (akiriyavāda) 說無作
shuo wu yeh (n'atthikavāda) 說無業
shuo yu lun chē (atthikavāda) 說有論者

So ch'u ching 所處經

so tso i p'an (kataṃ karanīyam) 所作已辨
so yüan yüan (ālambana-pratyaya) 所緣緣
su ming chih (pubbenivāsānussatiṇiṇā) 宿命智
sui shun yüan ch'i (idappaccayā) 隨順緣起
sui shuo nèng tso (vyavahārakāraṇa) 隨說能作
sui so yüan sheng (paccayam paṭicca) 隨所緣生
szū (cetanā) 思

Ta ch'èng a-pi-ta-mo chi lun 大乘阿毘達磨集論
Ta ch'èng a-pi-ta-mo tsa chi lun 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論
Ta ch'èng she-li-so-tan-mo ching 大乘舍利句摩摩經
ta chia (ayya) 大家
t'a hsìn chih (cetopariyānā) 他心智
ta fan (Mahā Brahmi) 大梵
t'a so tso (param katan) 他所作
t'a tsao (param patam) 他造
t'a tso (param katam) 他作
tai i (aṇoṇyathātva) 待異
t'an (rāga, lobha) 貪
tē ('acquisition') 得
tèng chih nèng tso (prāpanakāraṇa) 等至能作

tèng hsing (sampratipatti) 等行

t'eng lai yu (punabhavābhinībatti) 當來有

tèng wu chien yüan (samanantarapratyaya) 等無間緣

ti (paṭhavi) 地

t’ien ěrh (dibbasota) 天耳

t’ien yen (dibbacakkhu) 天眼

ting fēn (niyati) 定分

ting fēn hsīang hsū chuan pien (niyati-saṅgatībhāvaparīnātā) 定分相續轉變

ting pieh nèng tso (pratiniyamakāraṇa) 定別能作

Tsā a-hān chīng 雜阿含經

tsē 則

tsēng i (vṛddhi, puṣṭi) 增益

Tseng i a-hān ching 增壹阿含經

tsēng shang yüan (adhipati-pratyaya) 增上緣

tsō 作

tsō yeh (saṅcetanīkam kammaṁ) 作業

tsū hsīng (svabhāva) 自性

tsū tsao (attakatam, sayām kataṁ) 自造

tsū tsai (issara) 自在

tsū tso (attakatam, sayām kataṁ) 自作

tsū tso t’a tso (sayām katañ ca param patañ ca) 自作他作
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tsun yu (issara) 尊祐

tsun yu tsao (issaranimmāna) 尊祐造

ts’ung ch’i (uppāda) 從起

ts’ung t’a wên (parato ghosa) 從他聞

tu ch’u (titthāyatana) 度處

tuan (uccheda) 断

tuan chien (ucchedadiṭṭhi) 断見

t’ung lui yin (samprayuktakahetu) 同類因

t’ung shih nèng tso (sahakārikāraṇa) 同事能作

t’ung shih yin (sahakārihetu) 同事因

tz’ū (idam) 此

tz’ū yu ku pi yu, tz’ū ch’i ku pi ch’i; tz’ū wu yu ku pi wu yu, tz’ū mieh ku pi mieh (imasmīm sati idam hoti, imassa uppādā idam uppajjati; imasmīm asati idam na hoti, imassa nirodhā idam nirujjhati) 此有故彼有此起故彼起此無有故彼無有此減故彼減

wei (saṅkhata) 爲

wei (‘sustaining’) 位

wei (dosa) 患

wei i (avasthānyathātva) 位異

wei ming (niyati?) 爲命

wei szū (mato kālakato) 爲死

wu ch’ang (anicca) 無常

wu ming (avijjā) 無明

wu ming lou (avijjāsava) 無明漏
wu o (anatta) 無我
wu tso (akiriya) 無作
wu wei (asaṅkhata) 無為
wu yin tso (ahetu appaccayā) 無因作
wu yin wu yūan (ahetu appaccayā, adhiccasamuppanna) 無因無緣
wu yu ai (vibhavatānha) 無有愛
wu yu pên chi (anavarāgra) 無有本際
wu yu shen shih (appatiṭṭhīta viññāna) 無有神識
yeh (kamma) 業
yen (cakkhu) 眼
yen ch’u (cakkhusamphassa) 眼觸
yen k’u (dukkhapatiṭkūla) 厭苦
yen szū (amaritukāma) 厭死
yen yin yūan sê yen shih sheng (cakkhuṇ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhu-viññānam) 眼因緣色眼識生
yin (hetu, upanisā) 因
yin (khandha) 陰
yin chien (diṭṭhadhammaupakkama-hetu) 因見
yin chū (saṅkhārapuñja) 陰聚
yin fa nêng tso (āvāhakāraṇa) 驚發能作
yin ho hui (saṅgatihetu?) 因合會
yin pên tso (pubbekatahetu) 因本作
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yin su ming tsao (pubbekathetu) 因宿命造
yin tsun yu tsao (issaranimmānahetu) 因尊祐造
yin wei ming (abhijñāhetu, niyatihetu?) 因為命
yin yuān (hetu-pratyaya) 因縁
yin yuān ch'i (paṭīccasamuppāda) 因縁起
yin yuān ch'i so sheng fa (paṭīccasamuppanna dhamma) 因縁起所生法
yin yuān fa (paṭīccasamuppāda) 因縁法
yin yuān ho ho sheng (hetum paṭicca sambhūtami) 因縁和合生
yin yuān hui ērh sheng (hetum paṭicca sambhūtami) 因縁會而生
yu (bhava, bhavati) 有
yu (tāthā) 欲
yu ai (bhavataṇhā) 有愛
yū ai (kāmataṇhā) 欲愛
yu lou (bhavāsava) 有漏
yū lou (kāmāsava) 欲漏
yuān (pratyaya) 緣
yuān ch'i ching 緣起經
yuān ch'i fa (paṭīccasamuppāda) 緣起法
yuān ch'i sheng tao ching 緣起聖道經
yuān sheng fa (paṭīccasamuppanna dhamma) 緣生法
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