THE CENTRAL CONCEPTION OF BUDDHISM AND THE MEANING OF THE WORD "DHARMA"

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PREFACE

This short treatise was originally conceived as a contribution to the Royal Asiatic Society's Journal: its size induced the Council to publish it as a monograph, and my best thanks are due to the Council for this kind decision. I must also express my gratitude to Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, who was always ready to help with her vast knowledge of Pali literature. Professor H. Jacobi kindly went through the proofs, and to him I am indebted for many a valuable suggestion. Dr. McGovern contributed some of the references to Chinese sources. But my deepest gratitude is due to Dr. F. W. Thomas, who devoted much of his precious time to the revision of my work and to carrying it through the press.

In transliteration I have usually not distinguished the guttural, etc., nasals, when occurring before the consonants of their respective classes.

TH. STCHERBATSKY.

July, 1923.
The central conception of Buddhism and the meaning of the term Dharma

I. Preliminary

In a recent work Mrs. M. Geiger and Professor W. Geiger have made an attempt to solve the uncertainty which still prevails about the meaning of the term dharma. They have drawn up a concordance of almost every case where the word occurs in Pali canonical literature, and established a great variety of meanings. Among them there is, indeed, only one that really matters, that is the specifically Buddhistic technical term dhamma. The other significations which Buddhist literature shares with the Brahmanical do not present any serious difficulty. About this meaning the authors rightly remark that it is a "central conception of the Buddhist doctrine which must be elucidated as far as possible". They also contend that the method followed by them is "purely philological". This is also an indication of the limitations of their work, because the central conception of a highly complicated system, a conception which in its varied connotations includes almost the totality of the system, cannot be expected to be fully elucidated by "philological" methods only. We therefore propose, in addition to Mrs. and Professor Geiger's most valuable collections, to consider the matter from the philosophical standpoint, i.e. to give, with regard to this conception, a succinct account of the system in which it admittedly occupies the keystone position. Our chief source will be, not the Pali Canon, but, a later work, the Abhidhamma-kosa of Vasubandhu. Although late, it is professedly

1 Pali Dhamma, von Magalene u. Wilhelm Geiger, Munich, 1921.
2 A plan of an edition and translation of the whole work has been outlined and partly carried through by the Bibliotheca Buddhica at Petrograd. There have appeared, (1) Abhidharma-kosa-karika and Bhāṣya, Tibetan
only a systematized exposition of a much earlier work—the Abhidharma-vibhaśa-pātra, which, in its turn, is but a commentary on the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādin school. This school is one of the earliest, if not the earliest, of Buddhist sects. The question upon which it dissented and from which it received its name had a bearing on the essence of what was called a dharma, so that an exposition of its views will afford the best opportunity of examining the full connotation of this term.  

1. It must be left to later investigation to determine the points where Vasubandhu's exposition may be at variance with the primitive doctrine; but, generally speaking, he seems to have rendered the original doctrine very faithfully. Since his age is about the same as that of the Pali commentaries, the difference between him and the text, p. i, edited by Professor Th. Stcherbatsky, Petrograd, 1917; (2) Sphuṭabhādhyā-abhidharma-kosa-yākhyā of Yasovitra, Sanscrit text, pt. i, edited by S. Lévi and Th. Stcherbatsky, Petrograd, 1917. The second parts of both these works, Tibetan text edition by Professor Th. Stcherbatsky and Vyākhyā (Sanskrit) by Professor W. Wogihara of Tokyo, are being printed in the Bibliotheca Buddhica. An English translation of the ninth (additional) part has been published by Professor Th. Stcherbatsky under the title "The Soul Theory of the Buddhists" in the Bulletin de l'Académie des Sciences de Russie, Petrograd, 1920 (pp. 823-54 and 937-58). A review of the system has been published by the late Professor O. Rosenberg, of Petrograd University, under the title Problems of Buddhist Philosophy, Petrograd, 1918 (in Russian). This scholar has also issued an index of Buddhist technical terms in Chinese and Japanese under the title An Introduction to the study of Buddhism from Chinese and Japanese Sources, Tokyo, 1917. Professor de la Vallée Pousin has published in Brussels a French translation of the third part, and is now engaged in printing a translation of the first and second parts of the Abhidharma-kosa.  

1. Besides Mrs. and Prof. Geiger the question has been treated by Mrs. Rhys Davids, Bud. Psy. Ethics, xxxiii; Walleser, Grundlage, 97-104; Warren, Buddhism in Translations, 116, 209; S. Z. Aung. Compendium, 179 n., 254-9; S. Lévi, Sarvāstivāda, 18, 21; L. de la Vallée Pousin, Notes sur les corps du Bouddha, Musées, 1913, pp. 263, 287. The question has been put in the proper light and brilliantly treated by Professor O. Rosenberg, Problems, chap. vi; but, since his work is written in Russian and inaccessible at present, some of his results are repeated here.  

2. The date of Vasubandhu is not yet quite settled; cf. the references in V. Smith, Early History, 3rd ed., pp. 328 ff. At the end of chap. viii Vasubandhu remarks that in his time the āgama had had an existence of Pali sources is not so much one of time as of school. Nothing is more instructive than the study of the divergent views of different schools, since it allows us to watch the builders of the Buddhist doctrine at work.  

The formula of the Buddhist Credo (ye dhamma, etc.)—which professedly contains the shortest statement of the essence and the spirit of Buddhism—declares that Buddha discovered the elements (dhamma) of existence, their causal connexion, and a method to suppress their efficiency for ever (nirādhi). Vasubandhu makes a similar statement about the essence of the doctrine: it is a method of converting the elements of existence into a condition of rest, out of which they never will emerge again. From the first days of the Buddhist church the novices, before obtaining admittance into the order, went through a course of instruction in what may be termed the Buddhist catechism, i.e. an exposition of the elements (dharma) of existence and their different classifications into skandhas, āyatanas, dhatus. The same training was considered indispensable for the aspiring nuns. These conditions have not changed down to the present day in all Buddhist countries. In the whole of Mongolia and Tibet, in those parts of Siberia where Buddhism is spreading against the primitive Shamanism among the Tunguz tribes of 1,000 (not 900) years, and the adhipi (¼ abhidharma) somewhat less than that. That there were two Vasubandhus is not a 'guess without solid basis'; the Kopa actually quotes the opinions of a Śrīdācārya Vasubandhu and rejects them (i, 13, Tibetan text, p. 23; cf. Yasovitra's comment). There remain the dates of the Chinese translations of the works of Asanga and Vasubandhu, which alone, if correct, would be sufficient evidence to assign them to the fourth century. Otherwise one feels inclined to bring Vasubandhu nearer to Dignāga, whose teacher he was.  

1. Cf. Mahāvagga, i, 23.  


3. Cf. Theragāthā, 1255:  

4. Cf. Geiger's references to Therigāthā, op. cit., p. 65; the dhatus there mentioned are probably the eighteen dhatus (not the six); a number of other divisions into dhatus are mentioned in the Bahu-dhātu-sūtra, cf. Ab. K., i, 27, Tib. text, p. 46.
The occasion upon which Buddha himself is supposed to have put forward the watchword "everything exists" was a discussion with the Ājivikas, who flatly denied the influence of past deeds upon our destinies, since they were past and non-existent. This sect upheld a kind of extreme determinism which served as excuse for moral incontinence; it maintained that "all things are inalterably fixed. There is no cause, either proximate or remote, for the depravity of being, or . . . for its purity . . . There is no such thing as power or energy or human exertion. Everything that thinks, has senses, is procreated, and lives, is destitute of force, power or energy. Their varying conditions, at any time, are due to fate, to their environment and their own nature."  

Buddha’s teaching, both in the moral domain and in ontology, was the reverse of this; it maintained moral responsibility and at the same time transformed all existing things into a congeries of subtle energies (saṃskāra-saṃhāra). When pressed to say what was meant by the words "everything exists," he answered "everything exists means that the twelve āyatanas exist."  

Now the twelve āyatanas are merely one of the many classifications of the elements of existence of matter and mind. The Sarvāstivādin school admitted seventy-five such elements. These elements were called dharmas. The full meaning of the term will emerge at the end of this article; in the works of Agyagosa and Nāgarjuna. Ab., K., bears witness that idealistic views were already discussed in the Vībhāṣastra; cf. i, 42. Tibetan text, p. 77, 10, and Yapomitra’s comment.  

1 Ab. K. ad υ, 24; cf. Appendix I.  
2 Cf. R. Hoernle’s article in Hastings’ Encyclopedia.  
3 This passage (Samyuktāgama, xiii, p. 16 (McGovern)) cannot be traced in the Pali Canon. Evidently the Theravādins suppressed particular tenets. They accused the Vātsiputrika of having suppressed the passages which ran against their views (Soul Theory, p. 840), and evidently did themselves the same. But even in their school the word saṇḍhā seems to have been used rather like a technical term. It did not mean “everything”, but every item of the Buddhist table of elements. This table was supposed to be an “exhaustive division”; cf. Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology, p. 41; Samyutta, iv, 15–27; Visuddhi-Magga, ch. xiv; Warren, Buddhism in translation, p. 158; G. Grimm, Buddhismus, passim.

Transbaikalia, in the governments of Irkutsk and Astrachan, where it is maintaining itself against orthodox Christianity—everywhere it invariably proceeds by starting religious schools (chos-grva), where manuals similar to the Dhamma-sangani containing tables of dharmas are carefully studied, in the Tibetan original with explanations in vernacular, by the young generation aspiring to be admitted to the order and to be gradually promoted to the higher ecclesiastical ranks. Scholars of Buddhism in Europe will do well to follow this example.

A school of Buddhists which claims as its fundamental doctrine the principle that “everything exists” has very naturally been supposed to uphold some kind of realistic views. Tradition affirms that the question which gave rise to this sect had been discussed at the time of Buddha himself. If a division arises in a community with the result that some of its members are declared to be, or claim to be, realists, one would naturally be led to suppose that there were others who were non-realists, i.e., idealists of some kind. But, as a matter of fact, we do not meet with views definitely idealistic, i.e., with the denial of the existence of external objects, until a comparatively late date. Considering, on the other hand, that these would-be realists, like all Buddhists, denied the existence of a soul or a personality (atman, gudgala), our uncertainty increases, and the suspicion arises that the battle between the Sarvāstivādin and their opponents was fought on an altogether different plane, about a question which had little to do with our conceptions of realism and idealism.  

So Takakusu s.v. in Hastings’ Encyclopedia. Mr. S. Z. Aung and Mrs. C., Rhys Davids, Points of Controversy, p. 275–6, rightly observe that the question bears upon the existence of future and past dharmas, but this does not mean that “they believed in continued or immutable existence of everything”. This would be drifting into Sānkhya doctrine, against which Buddhist philosophers were always uttering warnings; cf. Appendix I.  

The Buddhists themselves ascribe the origin of their idealistic philosophy to Vasubandhu; cf. my article in the Museum, 1906, ii. But this was evidently only a revival of a tendency which, in a different form, was already revealed in the works of Agyagosa and Nāgarjuna. Ab., K., bears witness that idealistic views were already discussed in the Vībhāṣastra; cf. i, 42. Tibetan text, p. 77, 10, and Yapomitra’s comment.  

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at present we take it to mean an ultimate entity, the conception of which, in the domain of matter, excludes the reality of everything except sense-data, and in the field of mind, of everything except separate mental phenomena. We will begin by reviewing the different kinds of elements and their various classifications, and then proceed to determine what was the Buddhist conception of an element of existence. This will lead us to ascertain more precisely in what sense the older Buddhist doctrine may have a claim to be called a realistic system.

II. Skandhas

The simplest classification of all elements of existence is represented by a division into five groups of elements: (1) matter, (2) feelings, (3) ideas, (4) volitions and other faculties, and (5) pure sensation or general consciousness. If we realize that the group of matter represents no other matter than sense-data, that a soul is excluded and replaced by feelings, ideas, volitions, and pure sensation, we cannot but be surprised that from under a cover of Oriental terminology an epitome of matter and mind emerges which very nearly approaches the standpoint of modern European science.

Three of these groups, namely, feelings, ideas, and pure sensation, contain one element (dharma) each. They are, nevertheless, called groups because they include feelings, etc., as past, present, and future, proximate and remote, external and internal, morally pure or impure, etc. The group of matter includes ten elements, ten different varieties of sense-data. The group of volitions, etc., includes fifty-eight elements, various mental faculties and general forces.

1 The reasons for these renderings of the terms rūpa, vedanā, samjñā, samskāra, and vijñāna will be given later on.
2 Ab. K., i, 20.
3 Ibid., i, 14.
4 All the samskāras except vedanā and samjñā, ibid., i, 15. The three eternal elements—nirvāṇa—are skandhas, ibid., i, 22. Together with avijñāpti-rūpa this will make seventy-five elements in all.

The physical elements of a personality, including its outer world—the external objects—are represented in this classification by one item—matter; the mental ones are distributed among the four others.

For "Matter and Mind" the old, pre-Buddhistic term nāma-rūpa is used, where rūpa represents the elements of matter and nāma includes the four mental classes.

But the most general division of all elements is into matter (rūpa), mind (citta-caitta), and forces (samskāra). The fourth group (samskāra-skandha), which includes mental faculties and general forces, is here split into two parts; the mental faculties are then united to all other mental groups, and are brought under the head of mind; the general forces or energies receive a separate place (citta-viprayukta-samskāra). This threefold division is very popular and known in Mongolia and Tibet to every schoolboy.

III. Āyatanas

A second, more detailed, classification of the elements is made with a view to a division into cognitive faculties and their objects. There are six cognitive faculties and six categories of corresponding objects. They make the twelve Āyatanas or "bases" of cognition, viz.:

I. Sir internal bases (adhyātya-āyatana) or receptive faculties (indriya).

1. Sense of vision (caksur-indriya-āyatana).
2. Sense of audition (grotri-indriya-āyatana).
3. Sense of taste (gustra-indriya-āyatana).
5. Sense of touch (ghanta-indriya-āyatana).

II. Six external bases (bāhya-āyatana) or objects (vipaya).

7. Colour and shape (rūpa-āyatana).
8. Sound (sabda-āyatana).

1 Among the physical elements there is one called avijñāpti which broadly corresponds to what we might call the moral character of a person; for some special reasons it is entered by the Sarvāstivādins in their physical classification (riipa), but other schools include it in mind (Ab. K., i, 11). In the āyatana and dhatu classifications it is included not in the physical items, but in the general class dharmāb, i.e. āyatana or dhatu No. 12. In the following account we leave this special element unnoticed, cf. Appendix II, under Matter.
2 Or a slightly differing fivefold division: rūpa, citta, caitta, viprayukta-samskāra, and nirvāṇa; cf. Ab. K., ii, 22, and Appendix II.
3 Zugs-ces-lam-min-bdu-byed.
3. Sense of smelling (gṛñā-āndriya-
ciyatana).
4. Sense of taste (jīhe-āndriya-
ciyatana).
5. Sense of touch (kāy-āndriya-
ciyatana).
6. Faculty of the intellect or con-
sciousness (mano-āndriya-
ciyatana).
7. Sense of smelling.
8. Taste.
10. Taste (rasa-āyatana).
11. Tangibles (spṛṣṭavīya-āyatana).
12. Non-sensuous objects (dharma-
āyatana or dharmā).

In this classification the eleven first items correspond to
eleven elements (dharma), each including one. The twelfth
item contains all the remaining sixty-four elements, and it is
therefore called dharma-āyatana or simply dharmā, i.e. the
remaining elements.

The term āyatana means “entrance” (āyatana tanoti). It
is an “entrance” for consciousness and mental phenomena
(citta-caittānām). Consciousness, it is stated, never arises
alone, since it is pure sensation, without any content. It is
always supported or “introduced” by two elements: a
cognitive faculty and a corresponding objective element.
These are the supporters or the “doors” (dvāra) for con-
sciousness to appear. Visual consciousness (caksur-vijñāna)
arises in correlation (pratītya) with the sense of vision
(caksur-āndriya) and some colour (rūpā ca). In the case of
the sixth cognitive faculty (manas), consciousness itself,
i.e. its preceding moment, acts as a faculty for apprehending
non-sensuous objects.

The trend of this classification, which is a characteristic
feature of Buddhism from its very beginnings, is unmistakable.
It intends to give a division of all objects of cognition into
sense-objects and non-sensuous ones. The first are then
divided into ten groups according to the five senses and their
five objects, and the second (dharma-āyatana, or simply
dharmā), including every non-sensuous object, is left un-
divided. There are six items corresponding to six cognitive
faculties. Thus the twelve āyatanas, or “bases of cognition”,
represent all elements of existence distributed within six
subjective and six corresponding objective items. Their
synonym is “everything” (sarvam). When the principle
“everything exists” is set forth it has the meaning that
nothing but the twelve bases of cognition are existent. An
object which cannot be viewed as a separate object of cognition
or a separate faculty of cognition is unreal, as e.g. the soul, or
the personality. Being a congeries of separate elements it is
declared to be a name, and not a reality, not a dharma.¹

IV. Dharma

The division of the elements of existence into eighteen
dhātus, although very similar—it represents, indeed, in its
first twelve items a repetition of the former one—is taken
from a quite different view-point. Buddhist philosophy is
an analysis of separate elements, or forces, which unite in the
production of one stream (samātāna) of events. The un-
philosophic mind of common people supposes this stream
to represent a personality or an individual (pudgala).
Viewed as component of such a stream, the elements are called dhātus.

Just as different metals (dhātus) might be extracted out of
of a mine, just so does the stream of an individual life reveal
elements of eighteen different kinds (dhyāta = gotra).² It always
includes six faculties (from caksur-dhātu up to mano-dhātu),
six kinds of objective elements (from rūpa-dhātu up to dharmā-
dhātu), and six kinds of consciousness, beginning with visual
consciousness, or visual sensation (caksur-vijñāna-dhātu), and
ending with consciousness purely mental, i.e. non-sensuous
(manā-vijñāna-dhātu). Thus, in addition to the twelve compo-
ponents corresponding to the twelve bases of cognition, we have:

¹ The right explanation of the term āyatana is given in O. Rosenberg’s
Problems, p. 138 ff. The usual translation “sphere” ignores the
fundamentum divisionis. S. Z. Aung, Compendium, p. 256, although con-
taining the right suggestion, thinks it “might well be left untranslated. ²
³. 20. It may be noted that the number of component elements
tattvas) of the rudimentary body in Sankhya is likewise eighteen. That
the term dhātu has been borrowed from medical science, where it means
element of the body, can hardly be doubted.
Consciousness, which is but one element (dharma), is split in this classification into seven items, since it enters into the composition of an individual life as a faculty (mano-dhātu) and as six different kinds of sensations, differentiated by their origin, as from one of the senses, or from a purely mental non-sensuous source.  

All these varieties of consciousness exist only in the ordinary plane of existence (kāma-Dhātu). In higher worlds (rūpa-Dhātu) sense-consciousness gradually disappears, in the immaterial worlds (arūpa-Dhātu) only non-sensuous consciousness is left. A division of consciousness into various kinds (dhātu 13-18) is thus made necessary for the composition of formulas of elements corresponding to the denizens of various worlds.

We will now proceed to consider the separate elements in the order of their most general classification into Matter, Mind, and Forces.

1. Material (rūpa-dhātu or sva-rūpa-dhāraṇā)  
2. Sensory (sannāda-dhātu or āṇu-dhārahāraṇā)  
3. Mental (manas-dhātu or sva-manas-dhāraṇā)  
4. Immaterial (arūpa-dhātu)  
5. Intellectual (vijñāna-dhātu)

V. Elements of matter

Matter (rūpa) or the physical elements (rūpinā dharmāh), which in the first classification occupied one item (rūpa-saṅkhaṇa), is otherwise distributed into ten items (Nos. 1-5 and 7-11). The term rūpa-āyatana is reserved for visible matter or, more precisely, the phenomenon of visibility alone, this being matter par excellence. The general characteristic of matter, or material elements, is impenetrability (sa-pratīghāta), which is defined as the fact that space occupied by one of them cannot, at the same time, be occupied by another.

The elements of visibility are divided into two main groups, colours and shapes. There are eight colours and twelve different shapes. Another theory reduces all colours to two, light and darkness. All other varieties of visibility are represented as differences of lines. The opposite view, namely, that colours alone are realities and shapes (saṁsthdna) represent constructions of the mind (mānasam, parikalpita) (superimposed upon the difference of coloration as an interpretation of it), was favoured by the Sautrāntikas.

A line, say a line drawn by the motion of the hand, being an illusion from its very outset viewed the phenomenal world as an illusion and relegated every reality to some transcendental world (cf. Problems, chap. x). He suggests "sense-elements" for rūpa. This would find a place in an idealistic system and would be supported by the above interpretation of Kumaralāṅka. But it is, evidently, not the view adopted by the school of the Sarvāstivādas. It is true that there is no other matter than sense-data. This should not prevent us, just as it does not prevent modern philosophers who favour the same view, from using the term "matter" for facts characterized by impenetrability.

1 Ab. K., i, 24.
2 The etymological explanation is: rūpyata iti rūpam, i.e. matter is what materializes. Different meanings are then given of this materializing : pressure, pain, disappearance, or change. Thus matter is something that disappears. The real meaning is impenetrability (sa-pratīghāta), which is further variously explained. Kumaralāṅka gives to the phenomenon of impenetrability an idealistic interpretation: "the impossibility for the intellect to imagine the presence of two such objects occupying the same space" (ibid., Tibetan text, p. 50, 17 ff.). Professor O. Rosenberg strongly objects to the interpretation of rūpa as matter. He maintains that Buddhism from its very outset viewed the phenomenal world as an illusion and relegated every reality to some transcendental world (cf. Problems, chap. x).
3 Ab. K., i, 10, end Yap. comment.
intimation of something (vijñapti) is an element (rūpa-Warma) of length; the line of the flight of a bird in the air is the same. They are interpreted as the apparitions of the element of length or of some colour, and all Buddhist matter must be conceived according to this pattern. They are material elements without any matter in them.

A glance at the ten items corresponding to matter in the Zyatana-division will convince us that no other matter except sense-data is recognized. It is broadly divided into two categories, objective sense-data (viśaya) constituting external objects, and sense-objects (indriya) conceived as a kind of translucent subtle matter which covers the body when it is living. This division reminds us of the Sāṅkhya view that matter developed along two different lines, the one with predominance of the translucent intelligence-stuff (tan-mātra) resulting in sense-organs, the other, with predominance of dead matter (tamas), resulting in sense-objects in their subtle (tan-mdtra) and gross (mahābhūta) forms. In fact the concept of tan-mātra comes very near to the Buddhist conception of an element of matter (rūpa-dharma). The fundamental difference between the two conceptions is that in the Sāṅkhya system these elements are modifications or appurtenances of an eternal substance. In Buddhism they are mere sense-data without any substance.

The translucent matter of the sense-organs (rūpa-prasāda) is very subtle; it is like the shining of a jewel, it cannot be cut in two, it cannot be burnt, it has no weight, and it disappears without a residue at death. It is, nevertheless, atomic, and is represented by five different kinds of atoms. The atoms of the organ of sight (caksur-indriya) cover in concentric circles the eye-ball. The atoms of the organ of taste, or, more precisely, that matter which is supposed to convey the sensation of taste, covers in concentric semicircles the tongue. The atoms of the organ of touch (kāya-endriya) cover the whole body. The idea that all these different kinds of special matter are, indeed, the same translucent subtle stuff covering the whole living body and disappearing at death had also its advocates, who consequently reduced all senses to one, the sense of touch, but this did not find general acceptance. Being as subtle as the shining of a jewel, this matter cannot appear alone; it is supported by gross matter (mahābhūta), of which the eye-ball and flesh in general consist.

The atoms of external matter are likewise divided into atoms of general, universal, or fundamental matter, and special atoms of colour-, sound-, tangibility-matter, etc. The fundamental elements are four in number; they are manifested by the facts of hardness or repulsion, cohesion or attraction, heat and motion. Conventionally they are called earth, water, fire, and air; but it is specified that these are only conventional appellations, and that in the name of the fourth general element (ākāra) alone both the technical and the usual meanings coalesce, because the word ākāra has both the significations of motion and air as well. The fact that the fourth element is motion is an indication of the trend of this division; the general elements of matter, like all Buddhist elements, are more forces than substances. These four elements appear always together, always in equal proportion.

There is as much element of heat in a blazing flame as there is in wood or in water, and vice versa, the difference is only in their intensity. The general elements of matter (mahābhūta)
are brought under the head of tangibles (Zyatana No. 11). Since there is only a limited number of general manifestations of tangibility, therefore their number is four? There is, apparently, a distinction between the elements in themselves and their manifestations, because the four facts of resistance, attraction, heat, and motion are clearly called manifestations (laksana) of the elements (dharma), which, accordingly, must be something different, something mysterious or transcendent, similar in this respect to the gunas of the Sāńkhyas. The other five kinds of objective matter (āyatanas Nos. 7-11) were not general, but special, corresponding to each of the five senses; the tangibility-matter alone (ayatana No. 11) includes both the general (mahābhūta) and the special (bhautika) elements of matter.2 They were also atomic, but could not appear independently without being combined with the fundamental ones, in the ratio of four atoms of primary matter to one of secondary. Thus the minimum number of atoms indispensable for their actual appearance in life was eight: four atoms of general materiality combined with each atom of colour, odour, taste, and secondary tangibility-matter (such as smoothness, coarseness, etc.). If the particular piece of matter resounded, atoms of sound were added and the combination consisted then of nine different atoms.3 The combined atoms (sanghāta-paramāṇu) alone appear in phenomenal reality, the simple ones, or infra-atomic elements, presumably, were relegated to transcendent reality, in accordance with the general character of cohesiveness, i.e. of the element "water" in a flame, is proved by its keeping a shape; the presence of repulsion, i.e. of the element "earth", in water, is proved by the fact of its supporting a ship, etc. (cf. Ab. K., ii, ii, and Yāgom.).

VI. ELEMENTS OF MIND

In the Zyatana classification two items (Nos. 6 and 12) are devoted to the elements of mind (citta-caitta-dharmāḥ, arūḍino dharmāḥ) and, according to the principle of this classification, they represent two correlative groups: a subjective one (indriya) and an objective one (viśaya). The principle of externality of one element in regard to another, i.e. the idea of separate elements (prthug-dharma), is maintained in the field of mind just as in the field of matter. Mind is split into two chief parts. The subjective part, or mind viewed as a receptive faculty, is represented by one element called, indiscriminately, citta, vijñāna, or manas.2 It represents pure consciousness, or pure sensation, without any content. Its content is placed in the objective part which contains the definite sensation (sarpa), feelings (vedanā), ideas (sanijñā), volitions (cetanā), and various other mental phenomena up to the number of forty-six separate elements.4 So it is that feelings come to be viewed as objects of the mind, a position which, for other reasons, they likewise possess in the Śāṅkhyā system. The category in which they are entered is called the (general) group of elements (dharma-āyatana) or simply "the elements" (dharma). As stated above, the first eleven "bases" contain one element (dharma) each, but this last one contains the remaining sixty-four elements of the list. Beside the forty-six mental phenomena it contains the fourteen elementary forces (viprayukta-sāṁskāra), the element of character (avijñapti) and the three eternal elements (asamśakti): among the latter is Nirvāna, the chief dharma.

1 Ab. K., i, 35, Tibetan text, p. 61, 5 ff.
2 Ibid.
3 The actual number of atoms in a sanghāta-paramāṇu will be much greater, since each atom of secondary (bhautika) matter needs a set of four primary atoms of its own, but if dhātu alone are reckoned the number will express the classes (dhātu) of elements (dharma) represented (cf. Ab. K., ii, 22).
4 Ab. K., i, 43, Tibetan text, p. 83.
5 Ab. K., ii, 34. The same terms in the Pali Canon, Samyutta, ii, 94.
6 The Theravāda reckoned fifty-one. Cf. the fifty dhānas of the Śāṅkhyas, some of them exhibiting an analogy with corresponding Buddhist caitta-dharmas. A full list of the forty-six caitta-dharmas is given below, App. II.
For this reason the term "elements" (dharmdh) is a sufficient indication of this group, because the other categories, although also containing elements (dharmdh), have a special name each. The common feature of all these elements is that they are apprehended by the intellect directly without any intermediate agency of the senses. In the apprehension of sense-objects there is likewise participation by the intellect; but these dharmdh are non-sensuous objects, they are the exclusive domain of the receptive intellect, just as colour is the exclusive domain of the sense of vision. The definition of receptive consciousness is pregnant: vijnānam prativedijñapih, i.e., "consciousness is an intimation, or awareness, in every single case of the other, although quite indefinite, content, say some indefinite visual sensation, it will then represent the next degree, a real sensation (sparça). The definite perception (parichitti) of a colour will be an "idea" (sanjñā), but consciousness as the receptive faculty is pure sensation. Although quite undifferentiated in itself, this pure sensation is, nevertheless, distinguished from the standpoint of its origin or, more precisely, its environment, i.e., the elements by which its appearance is accompanied. From this point of view, as stated above, there is a set of six different kinds (dhātu) of consciousness, corresponding to a set of six receptive faculties and a set of six kinds of objects. We thus have six categories of consciousness (pad-vijnāna-kāyāh), beginning with visual sensation or, more precisely, pure sensation arising in connexion with some colour (caksur-vijnāna-dhātu) and ending with consciousness accompanying a non-sensuous object (mano-vijnāna-dhātu). We have besides the same consciousness as a receptive faculty (dhātu No. 6). As a receptive faculty mano-dhātu is not different from consciousness arising in connexion with abstract objects (mano-vijnāna-dhātu); it is the same reality, the same dharma. But for symmetrical arrangement it has been found necessary to have a set of three items for the purely mental elements, just as there is a threefold set of faculty, object, and sensation corresponding to each of the senses. The difference between consciousness as a receptive faculty and the same consciousness accompanying an abstract object is then said to be a difference of time. Consciousness in the role corresponding to the place occupied in the system by the senses is the consciousness of the preceding moment? The Theravādins, evidently for the same purpose of symmetrical arrangement, introduced into

1 Every āyatana is thus a dharmāyatana, but No. 12 is dharmāyatana par excellence. Just so is it that the ten material āyatanas all include each matter. They are, consequently, all of them, rūpāyatanae. But only one of them—the visible element, āyatana No. 7—retains the name of rūpāyatana as its special designation, because it represents the most characteristic and important among the elements of matter. Cf. Ab. K., i, 24, Tibetan text, p. 42, 17 ff.

2 Prof. and Mrs. Geiger, op. cit., p. 80, have established for the dharmdh in the technical sense the signification "the empirical things". This is an example of the impotence of the "philological method"! It has not escaped their attention that dharmdh is synonymous with dharmāyatana and dharmadātu, in which Nirvāṇa is included (p. 93), which is anything but empirical. The dharmdh are apprehended by mano (p. 81), but the emphasis is put on the fact that they are apprehended without the cooperation of the āyatanae. Everything is apprehended by mano but the dharmdh are external with regard to mano: their place in the system is among the senses, as opposed to the six indriya, one of which, the sixth, is mano. Concerning the meaning of the terms "external" and "internal" some remarks will be made later, pp. 58–9, when discussing the theory of cognition.

3 Ab. K., i, 16. Cittam vijñānāt. "is aware variously" (M. Tiāng), must have the same import, if any. Cf. the Sāṅkhya definition of pratyakṣa in Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 5: pratiṣeṣay-adhyavesaya dyastam, where we have likewise the distributive prati, but vijnāna = vijnāpati, since it is in the Sāṅkhya system represented by purusa (cf. below, Theory of Cognition, p. 63), is replaced by adhyavesaya—the function of the internal organ (synthesis).
the system a "heart-stuff" (hadaya-vatthu) which supports the non-sensuous cognitions, just as the other sense-stuffs "support" sense-cognitions. It occupies in the system the place of the sixth organ (ayatana or dhatu No. 6)?

Although external in regard to one another, consciousness and mental phenomena (citta-caitita) were conceived as being in a closer, more intimate, connexion than other combining elements. Pure sensation (citta) could never appear in life in its true separate condition; it was always accompanied by some secondary mental phenomena (caitita). Among these mental phenomena (caitita-dharma) or faculties (samskara) three are especially conspicuous, namely, feelings (vedana), ideas (sanjna), and volitions (cetana). In the classification into groups (skandha) they occupy three separate items, all the remaining ones being included together with the volitions in the samskara-skandha. Feelings (vedana) are defined as emotions pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. Ideas (sanjna) are defined as operations of abstract thought, as that which "abstracts" (udgraha) a common characteristic sign (nimitta) from the individual objects. Even the definite representation (parichitti) of a colour is brought under this head.4 It is exactly what in later Indian philosophy, Buddhism as well as Brahmanical, was understood by "definite" (sa-wikalpaka) cognition. Dignaga and Dharmakirti introduced into Indian logic the distinction between pure sense knowledge, free from any operation of abstract thought (kalpanapodha), and definite cognition (sa-vikalpaka).5 It was then adopted by Uddyotakara and

1 Cf. Mrs. C. Rhys Davids, B. Psych., pp. 32, 70. This heart-stuff had, presumably, as little to do with the actual heart as the caulkur-indriya-stuff with the actual eye. Indian medical science assumed the existence of a subtle abhava-food-stuff as a vehicle of mental processes. It is here called heart-stuff.

2 Ab. K., i, 23.

3 Ab. K., i, 14.

4 Ibid.

5 Cf. the definition of pratyaksa in Nyaya-bindu 1.

the whole of the Nyaya-Vaisesika school? It now appears that Dignaga was not the originator of this doctrine, he only adapted it to his system. From the very beginning Buddhism had established this difference: vijñana and its synonyms citta, manasa represent pure sensation, the same as the kalpanapodha pratyaksa of Dignaga, and sanjña corresponds to definite ideas. Every construction (kalpana), every abstraction (udgraha), every definite (parichinna) representation, such as blue and yellow, long and short, male and female, friend and enemy, happy and miserable—this is all brought under the head of ideas (sanjña) as distinguished from vijñana = pure sensation.

Volition (cetana) is defined as the mental effort that precedes action. It is an element or a force which enters in the composition of a personal life (santana). It must not be forgotten that, since there is no personality in the Buddhist outlook of the universe, there certainly is no will in our sense, i.e. no personal will. There is a certain arrangement of elements, there is an element, or a force, or, still more precisely, the simple fact (dharma) that the elements are arranged in a certain way, according to certain laws. This fact is pointed to by the term cetana. It "arranges" (santayati)6 the elements in "streams", which simple folk deem to be personalities. It is synonymous with the law of moral causation (karma)4 and likewise with the force of vitality, the "elan vital" (bhavana, vasanä), which in the Buddhist system replaces any conscious agent, whether soul or God or even a conscious

1 Cf. Nyaya-vartika, pratyaksa-sutra.

2 Udgraha is literally "abstraction", kalpana "imagination", "construction". It corresponds to the part taken in Kant's system by "productive imagination", whereas vijñana, or the pratyaksa of Dignaga, corresponds to "reine Sinnlichkeit". Cf. my Logic of later Buddhists (chapter on kalpana).

3 To be derived from the root ci from which the Buddhists derive citta as well (Abh., p. 63); santayati is exactly, in form and meaning, the Russian sochetayeti; the Pali abhisandhati has the same import, cf. S. Z. Aung, Compendium, p. 235.

4 The definition of karma as cetana cetayitva ca karanam, Ab. K., iv, 1 ff., the same as in Anguttara, iii, 416; of Mrs. C. Rhys Davids, B. Psych., p. 93.
human being.' A moment of this kind of will accompanies every conscious moment (citta).

There are, on the whole, ten mental elements which accompany every conscious moment; they are called the "general" mental elements. There are ten others which are particularly "favourable" for progress towards the final appeasement of life; they are faith, courage, equanimity, etc. Ten others have the contrary unfavourable or oppressive (kliśta) character. There are some others which have no definite moral character. All these mental elements are not general; they accompany only some of the moments of consciousness, not all of them.

VII. Forces

The definitions of the will (cetani) and of the force (samskāra) are indeed the same, "what produces the manifestations (abhī-samskaroti) of combining elements (samskṛtam)"; it is a "concerted agency". Since all forces are agencies acting in some combination with other elements, we may in rendering this conception, for the sake of expediency, safely drop the word "combing" and use "forces" alone! There are some indications that originally there was only one samskāra in the Buddhist system, the will, and that gradually a whole catalogue of them was developed, some of the elements being entered into this group rather forcibly, with excuses.

The most typical forces are the four forces of origination and decay, etc., which accompany every other element in life. Some details concerning them will be given in the sequel. In general, all elements may be divided into substances and forces (dravya and samskāra). The forces are then divided into mental faculties, with the will as chief among them, and non-mental (citta-viprayukta) forces, among which the origination and decay forces are the most typical. But even these latter forces are sometimes given a certain amount of substantiality (dravyatopi santi). The word and conception samskāra performs a conspicuous part in all Indian philosophical systems. It usually means some latent mysterious power, which later on reveals itself in some patent fact. It sometimes is identified with the "unknown" (adrṣta) conceived as a force sui generis. Since every philosophy is but a search for the hidden reality as opposed to the patent surface of life, the importance of the conception of a samskāra is quite natural. Every system had its own definition and scope attributed to the connotation of this term. The Ājīvika sect, as we have seen, was known by its denial of the existence of such forces. The Buddhists, on the contrary, converted all their elements into subtle forces of some degree. The subtler the element the more was it given the character of a force; but even the coarsest elements, the mahābhūtas, look more like forces than substances. There is a constant fluctuation in Buddhist terminology between a force (samskāra) and a substance influenced by these forces (samskṛta). A force, it must be recalled, should not be regarded as a real influence of something extending beyond its own existence in order to penetrate into another — this would be

Mrs. C. Rhys Davids calls my attention to the following very illuminating words in Samyutta, iii. 60: Kalamā ca bhikkhave saṃkhāraṃ. Cha-yime cetanābodhī rūpa-sadda-gandha-rasa-phatthabba-saṃcetanā dhammasaṃcetanā ime saṃkāra saṃkāraṃ. According to Yapomitre, i.e., the mental faculities are included in the samskāra-sandha because they obey the will, the other forces because they are similar to the will (cetanā).

1 Ab. K., ii, 2, 24.
The central conception of Buddhism

upakāra—but simply as a condition, a fact, upon which another fact arises or becomes prominent (ulkāra) by itself—this is samśkāra in the Buddhist system.1

The little we know of the history of Indian philosophy induces us to look to the Śāṅkhyā system as the foundation of scientific thinking. In that school the fundamental ideas were formed which sometimes unconsciously affected all later constructions. What do we find there? Three fundamental principles, Matter, Mind-stuff, and Energy-stuff, as interdependent moments in every real and substantial existence. Even energy is substantial in this sense. The infinitesimals of energy, present everywhere, are semi-material; although different from the inertia of Matter, and the luminosity of Mind, they are separate and substantial.2 The Buddhist elements as infinitesimal realities, divided into elements of Matter, Mind, and Forces, look like a reply to the Śāṅkhyā constructions from an architect of greater skill: "you maintain the realities are guṇas, we say they are dharma." The fundamental idea of infinitesimal realities may be recognized in the dharma, the idea of forces everywhere present can be traced to its origin in the Śāṅkhyā conception of rajas; there are forces which are different from matter and mind (rūpa-citta-viprayukta). A pluralistic view of the whole is added to make the originality of the new system, in contrast to the unitarian tendency of the old one. But, be the case as it may, every element of matter and mind may be called in Buddhism a samskāra, which, in this case, will stand for samskṛta-dharma.3 The Buddhist idea of a force seems to be that it is the subtle form of a substance, but even substance is here subtle enough. The order in which the elements appear in the first classification into groups is interpreted as a gradual progress from coarseness to subtility; matter (rūpa) is coarser than feeling (vedanā), feeling more palpable than idea (sanjñā), the remaining energies (samskāra) still more subtle.1

The pure forces (viprayukta-samskāra) are the most subtle among the elements. In the loftiest, highest worlds, where existence is entirely spiritualized, their agency continues; they are the last to be suppressed before final extinction is reached. The chief among them are the four forces of origination and destruction, etc., which are the very essence of every existence. Then there are two forces, prāpti and aprāpti, which are supposed to control the collection of elements composing a personal life or to prevent (aprāpti) the appearance in it of an element that is not in agreement with its general character. The Saṃdrāntikas and Vasubandhu deny the reality of these forces; for them they are mere names (prajñapti).2 There are two forces supposed to be active in producing the highest degrees of trance—the unconscious trance (asanjtā-samāpatti) and the cessation (niruddha)-trance or catalepsy. They are also brought under the head of pure forces.3 They evidently could not be brought under the head of mind, because consciousness at that time is supposed to be suppressed. Then there are three forces corresponding to the sphota of other systems. All Indian systems contain speculations about the nature of sound, its physical as well as its significative aspect. The physical sound was in Buddhism considered, in agreement with the whole system, as a production, i.e. (flash[ing]) of sound-atoms reposing on the atoms of fundamental matter. If Saṃskāra etymologized as karma-sādhanā would mean force, and as karma-sādhanā would be equal to samskṛta-dharma. The individual life, which consists of all these physical and mental elements end forces, is called samskāra-samādhiḥ, cf. Yāṣom. (Ab. K., 1), or ca āpi Cālā-abhidhanāb samskāra-saṁbhāṣa-saṁdhanāḥ. 

1 Ab. K., i, 22. 2 Ab. K., ii, 37. 3 Ibid., ii, 46.
simultaneously some atoms of translucent sound matter (cābda-rūpa-prasāda) appeared in the ear, an auditory sensation (srotā-vijñāna) was produced. But the significance of the sounds of speech was given by special forces. The Mimāṃsā school was known for its theory of transcendental, intelligible sounds which were eternal and ubiquitous, like Platonic ideas, and manifested themselves in the case of physical words being pronounced. Following their fundamental principle of analysing everything into minutest elements, the Buddhists imagined three separate forces which imparted to the sounds of speech their significativeness; the force of sound (vyanjana), which would seem to correspond to the modern idea of a "phonema", the force of words (nāma), and the force of sentences (pāda).

Generalities, general ideas, are also conceived as a kind of force, and it is christened by the name of nikāya-sabhaṃgha, a conception intended to replace by a "force" the substantial reality of the sāmānya of other systems. In general this group of forces is a rather incongruous assemblage of elements which could not be placed elsewhere. As a separate group, it is absent in the Theravāda school. Some of its members seem to have found a place, for some reason, among the physical (rūpa) group of that school.

VIII. Non-Substantiality of the Elements

After this succinct review of the elements of existence and their different classifications, we may consider the question as to what were they in their essence, what was the Buddhist conception of an element. The elements had four salient features: (1) they were not-substance — this refers to all the seventy-five elements, whether eternal or impermanent; (2) they had no duration — this refers only to the seventy-two impermanent elements of phenomenal existence; (3) they were unrest — this refers only to one part of the latter class, that which roughly corresponds to the ordinary man as opposed to the purified condition of the elements of a saint (arya); and (4) their unrest had its end in final deliverance. Speaking technically: (1) all dharmas are anātman, (2) all saṃskṛta-dharmas are anitya, (3) all suṣrava-dharmas are duḥkha, and (4) their nirvāṇa alone is ānanda. An element is non-substantial; it is evanescent, it is in a beginningless state of commotion, and its final suppression is the only Calm. These are what the Tibetans call the four "seals" of Buddha? We now proceed to examine them separately.

Anātma

The term anātman is usually translated as "non-soul", but in reality ātman is here synonymous with a personality, an ego, a self, an individual, a living being, a conscious agent, etc. The underlying idea is that, whatsoever be designated by all these names, it is not a real and ultimate fact, it is a mere name for a multitude of interconnected facts, which Buddhist philosophy is attempting to analyse by reducing them to real elements (dharmas). Thus "soullessness" (nairātmya) is but the negative expression, indeed a synonym, for the existence of ultimate realities (dharma).

1 Ab. K., ii, 47 ff. Vyanjana here corresponds to varṇa, nāma to sāvāja, and pāda to vākyā, a case exhibiting clearly the desire to have a terminology of one's own, so common to Indian systems: "you maintain it in sphoṭa, we say it is vyanjana-nāma-pāda-samskāra." The real existence of these forces is admitted by the Sarvāstivādin alone. For this reason they bring the Holy Scriptures under the head of samskāra-skandha, whereas the Saṃśkritikas classify it under rūpa, as cābda, and the Vijñānavādins under vijñāna-skandha; of. Vinitadeva's introduction to the Saṃśkritikas, Siddhi, edited by me in the Bibl. Buddhica.

2 Ab. K., ii, 41.

1 The Southerners reckon three "marks", evidently including the fourth in duḥkha, as its cessation; cf. S. Z. Aung, Compendium, p. 210.
2 The whole issue with every detail is admirably expounded by Vasubandhu in a concluding, ninth, chapter of Ab. K., translated in my Soul Theory of the Buddhists. The terms ātma, jīva, satya, pudgala are here used as synonyms; cf. Soul Theory, p. 838, and Kathāvatthu-āthakathā, p. 8. The Vatsupāryyas made some difference between pādāīga and ātman; they were pādāīgaśāntyas, but not ātmāknarakas. Although admitting a limited, very shady, reality of pādāīga, they denied it the ultimate reality of a dharma; cf. Soul Theory and below, p. 70 ff.
3 Pravacanaśarvaṃ pudgar atra nairātmyam buddhānucāsati vā, Viṣṇom. ad Ab. K., ix, in fine.
there is absolutely nothing the name could be applied to? The same principle is applied to the mental sphere; there is no spiritual substance apart from mental elements, or faculties, that are conceived as subtle realities or substances sui generis, very much on the same pattern as the elements of matter. There is no soul apart from feelings, ideas, volitions, etc. Therefore an element technically means "non-self". 4

1 Prithivī gandhavatī utkṣerupā-gandhāra-saparāḥdhaya nānā dhāroṣaḥ dhageṣu caṇāya, Yaṣām. ad Ab. K., ix; cf. Soul Theory, p. 742.
2 In his History of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge, 1929), p. 244, Professor S. Dss Gupta maintains that in Sāṁkhya philosophy there is likewise no separate existence of qualities (i.e. no inherence of qualities in a substance). This is based (as the learned author informs me in a letter) on Vyāsa, iii, 12 (śāntasa dharmo-dharmī-bhavaḥ) and Vācaspatī’s comment. There are other passages suggestive of a similar idea, e.g. dharmo-sārūpamādhir hi dharmah (ibid., iii, 13). But it is added dharmo-vikriya uṣah dharmo-dvārā prapaṇuyate. In Buddhism there cannot be any change of dharmas, since everything is new at every moment. Besides it must not be forgotten that Vyāsa, as will be shown later, was strongly influenced by the Abhidharmaists. 1 Professor S. Dass Gupta’s view that the ultimate entities in Sāṁkhya were called guṇas, probably to suggest that they are the entities which by their various modifications manifest themselves as guṇas or qualities, is accepted, this would constitute a very strong analogy between the Sāṁkhya guṇas and the Buddhist dharmas. In his Vijñānāmatra-ādhiṣṭhāna Vasubandhu applies the term dharma to the tattvas of the Sāṁkhya (O. Rosenberg).

3 It is a matter of surprise how long it has taken European science to realise this doctrine, which is so clearly stated in numberless passages of Buddhist writ, and in one of them even in terms very nearly approaching to Hume’s statement (Samyutta, iii, 46): “all Brahmanas or Ārāmanas who attentively consider the soul, which so variously has been described to them, and either the five groups of phenomena (physical, feelings, ideas, volitions, or pure sensation) or one of them, etc. The stumbling-block has always been the supposed theory of transmigration of souls and its glaring contradiction with the denial of soul. Buddhism always had two languages, one for the learned (nīḍhāra) and one for the simple (nāgārtha).

4 Ab. K., ix, cf. Soul Theory, p. 840, where it is stated that anāta is synonymous with 5 skandhas, 12 ayatanas, and 18 dhātus, i.e. with all dharmas: a single dharma is likewise synonymous with nisṣulata. It is, therefore, misleading to translate Buddhaghosa’s interpretation of dharmas = nisṣulata, nijjvata, as meaning “inanimate thing”, as Mrs. and Prof. Geiger have done. op. cit., p. 4 (Unbeleibtes, Ding. Sache). Since consciousness itself and all mental phenomena and even Nirvāṇa are dharmas, Buddhaghosa could not have meant that they are “inanimate things” in the ordinary sense of the word. The compound nisṣulata must be explained either as a madhyama-pada-lopi—nirgataḥ sattvab, or as a bakwerti—nirgataḥ sattvo yasmat.
IX. Pratitya-samutpāda (Causality)

Although the separate elements (dharman) are not connected with one another, either by a pervading stuff in space or by duration in time, there is, nevertheless, a connexion between them; their manifestations in time, as well as in space, are subject to definite laws, the laws of causation. These laws bear the general name pratitya-samutpāda. We have seen that the connotation of the word dharmas implies the meaning of elements operating together with others. This concerted life of the elements (sanskṛtavā) is but another name for the laws of causation—the combined origination (samutpāda) of some elements with regard (pratitya) to other elements. Thus it is that the fundamental idea of Buddhism—the conception of a plurality of separate elements—includes the idea of the most strict causality controlling their operation in the world-process. The "theory of elements"—the dharmasamketa, says Vasubandhu, means "if something appears, such and such result will follow."—asmin sati īdam bhavati. 2

The most popular form of the laws of causation is represented by the theory of the twelve consecutive stages in the ever revolving stream of life from birth to death; it is, so to say, the vertical line of causation, while other relations are the horizontal. 

In the popular literature of the Sūtras, the term pratitya-samutpāda is almost exclusively applied to this formula of the "wheel of life", although the general meaning of it must have been present to the mind of all Buddhists. It is implied in the division of dharman into āyatana, which is founded on the theory that knowledge arises (samutpadyate) when conditioned (pratitya) by an object and a receptive faculty. "All abhidharma is but an interpretation of the sūtras," the current says definition. Therefore the general meaning of the idea of "interconnected origination of elements" may have appeared in the abhidharma by a sort of generalization founded on actual conceptions that are to be found in the sūtras in a somewhat different form. This question is directly asked by Vasubandhu. "Why is it," says he, "that the twelve members of interconnected origination of the elements are differently treated in the Scripture and in the Exegesis? e.g. it is stated in the latter that the interconnected origination of elements (pratitya-samutpāda) is a term equivalent to all the active elements (samskṛtendra)? And he answers: "Because in the sūtras this relation is treated intentionally (in a popular way, with reference to the development of an individual's life), whereas the exegetical work explain its essence (in regard of all elements in general)." 1

Some of the causal relationships have already been mentioned. Thus the relation of simultaneity (sahabhā) eighteen, though there is difference in meaning. According to Caraka (sarvasramā, iv) the sperm-cell of the father contains minute particles of all the organs. Consequently viññāna, as the third member in the "wheel of life," is a technical term indicating the first moment of a new life arising out of pre-natal forces (vidyā, sanātana). The next seven members mark the stages of the development of the embryo into a child, youth, and grown-up man. The tyād-stage corresponds to sexual maturity, when new karma begins to be formed. The two last members refer briefly to future life. The idea that all elements are present through the whole process, the difference being only in the relative "prominence" (utkarṣaṇa) in abhiṣepayajñakā (cf. Suprutsa, Sūtrasthāna, xxii) of one element over the others, points out to Sāṃkhya habits of thought, where everything was considered immutable, always existing (sarvaṃ nityaṃ), all things entering in one another (sarvaṃ sarvātmanam), the difference being only a passing manifestation of some element, while the others continued to assist in a latent state. 2
ties together the four fundamental and the secondary elements of matter—bhūta and bhautika. The same relation applies to the simultaneous origination of consciousness and mental phenomena (citta and caitta). But for the vice versa conjunction—one would be tempted to say “inherence” if it was not so grave a mistake against the fundamental principle of Buddhism—of the mental elements with pure consciousness (citta), a specific, more intimate, association was imagined. Evidently there was a feeling that the various mental facts were more closely united with consciousness than the atoms of matter with one another. This fact received the name of samprayoga, i.e. a thorough and intensive union, and it was explained as anuparivartana, i.e. a following and enveloping of, consciousness by concomitant mental phenomena or the secondary mental elements (caitta). It must not be imagined that this close connexion of consciousness with other mental elements means any unity between them, allowing only a logical distinction for purposes of analysis, as in modern psychologies. A Buddhist element is always a separate entity, it is neither “compound” nor “phenomenon”, but an element (dharma). The close connexion, “envelopment” of consciousness by other mental elements only means that they are its satellites, they appear and disappear together, they are produced by the same causes, and have the same moral aspect.\(^1\) Ten such satellites are the minimum number to accompany consciousness (citta) at every moment; a feeling, an idea, a volition, some attention, some understanding (mati = prajñā), some concentration (samādhi), etc., are always present in every conscious moment.\(^2\) They are conjoined, but conjoined by the law of “satellites” (samprayoga).\(^3\)

The Sarvástivādin school reckons in all six different causal relations, but in these details the schools varied a great deal, and they evidently represent a later development of the original idea. The detailed account given in the Abhidharma-koṣa represents the doctrine in its final form which it received in the abhidharma of the Sarvástivādins.

X. KARMA

One of the most illuminating features of Buddhist philosophy is its deep research into the phenomenon of moral causation. All Indian systems contain an appeal to the “unknown” (adṛṣṭa, aparāva) as a transcendental cause which has to be posited in explaining the origin and the ultimate goal of life. The Buddhists distinguish between (1) causation among elements of dead matter, where the law of homogeneity (sabhāga-hetu) between cause and result reigns, (2) causation in the organic world, where we have the phenomenon of growth (upacaya), and (3) causation in the animate world, where the operation of moral causation (vipāka-hetu) is superimposed upon the natural. The elements constituting the stream of our present life are conditioned, in addition to the natural course of events, by the mysterious efficiency of past elements or deeds, if the latter have possessed a moral character of some force or prominence. The indifferent activities of everyday life have no such efficiency. But a prominent deed, whether good or bad, will affect the whole stream and may carry its result either at an early or very remote date. The resulting event (vipāka-phala) is always indifferent (avyākṛta) in the

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\(^1\) The figurative words of Buddhaghosa (quoted by Mrs. Rhys Devis, B. Psych., p. 54) are apparently intended to describe this kind of union. That viṁśāna is the most general mental element is admitted by all Buddhists; but that it “includes and involves” other elements, let alone aggregates, has never been admitted in abhidharma—it would be pure viṁśāna-vāda. The samprayoga connexion is known to Buddhaghosa; ef. Asl., p. 42. The Ab. K., i, 36, Tibetan, p. 62, 9, argues that, if the mental phenomena were not different from citta, they would not have been called caitta.

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\(^2\) The figurative words of Buddhaghosa (quoted by Mrs. Rhys Devis, B. Psych., p. 54) are apparently intended to describe this kind of union.

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\(^3\) The number is then increased by the four samskṛta-lakṣaṇas and the four anulakṣaṇas of citta itself, thus making fifty-eight satellites the minimum number to unite in every single kṣaṇa with citta, the fifty-ninth (Ab. K., ii, 52).
moral sense, because it is a natural outflow of a previous cause, and is supposed not to be produced voluntarily. This moral law is also called *karma*.

The influence of *karma* is not in the Buddhist outlook so overwhelming, controlling the whole universe, as it is in other non-Buddhist systems, and as it also becomes, under the name of *vāsanā*, in the later idealistic systems of Buddhism also. In *abhidharma* it is one of the forces controlling the world-process: it is the chief force so far as it controls its gradual progress towards Final Deliverance. Its operation is subject to the following conditions. Every fact produced by the "maturing influence" (*vipāka*) of moral or intellectual antecedents (*karma*) necessarily belongs to animate life (*sattvākhyāna*), but is by itself morally indifferent (*avyākṛto dharma*). It is indifferent because it is a natural outcome of antecedents, it always arrives involuntarily, automatically. If something is produced voluntarily, it may become the starting-point of a new development. When it has an outspoken strong moral character, whether good or bad, it becomes *karma*, and will have corresponding consequences which, again, will appear automatically, since they are fully foreshadowed by their antecedent and are not voluntary acts. This explains the definition of *Karma*, as given by Vasubandhu: *Karma* is will (*cetanā*) and voluntary action (*cetayitva karaṇam*).1 Exactly the same definition is found in the *Pali* canon, and evidently was current in Buddhism from the beginning."

When a new life is produced, its component elements, i.e. the eighteen classes (*dhatu*) of elements, are present, although in an undeveloped condition. The first moment of the new life is conventionally called *vijñāna*. It constitutes the third member (*nidāna*) of the ever revolving "wheel of life". Its antecedents are *karma*, i.e. the good or bad instincts sticking to it from the beginning. In the formula of the "wheel of life" this member appears under the name of *samskāra*, i.e.

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1 Ab. K., iv, 1 ff.  
tidiness (samśkāra-viçeṣa), and careful behaviour (samādhi-viçeṣa). But this growth is not the only factor which controls the development of living bodies. The influence of what we may term heredity steps in, and is superimposed upon the natural process of growth. This is the influence of karma, the maturing (vipāka) influence of moral antecedents. When the organs of the body are being formed, or are developing, this influence conditions their final constitution. The question is then raised, what is the mutual relation of these two different agencies, natural development and heredity? The answer is that the first process constitutes the "vanguard", or a rampart, under the protection of which the second, the vipāka, may safely operate. It is not quite easy to realize what such an answer may exactly mean. At any rate, it suggests a more subtle, spiritual, or semi-spiritual character of the second force. Karma is not quite physical (pauḍgalika) with the Buddhists, as it is with the Jains, but it seems to be semi-physical, since it interferes in the disposition of atoms along with the principle of growth that accumulates them.

A very interesting illustration of the meaning of these Buddhist conceptions about heredity, retribution, etc.—all facts falling under the head of karma-vipāka—is given by the following scholastic question. Voice is always produced voluntarily, consequently it cannot be the product of moral antecedents, of karma. It is not vipāka, for all the facts of heredity are produced automatically (niśyana). But we know that the Great Man (mahāpuruṣa), i.e. a Buddha, has a captivating, melodious voice, a noble elocution. It is one of the characteristic gifts of a Buddha, and is due, like all his sublime qualities, to heredity, i.e. to a long course of moral progress running through generations. Therefore his extraordinary voice and elocution must likewise be a consequence of his moral antecedents (vipāka). The puzzle is solved by assuming a double causality. The configuration of atoms in his organs of speech was influenced by heredity, i.e. moral causes (vipāka), but his actual speech is a voluntary, not an automatical act, and therefore could not be interpreted as a direct product of his sublime nature, or the result of his former achievements?

The elements of moral defilement (kleśa) are always present in a life (saṃtāna), in a latent or patent condition. When latent they have the form of "residues" (anugaya), they stick to the other elements, pollute them, bring them into commotion and prevent their coming down to rest. This influence of the disquieting elements in life is termed "general cause" (sarvatraga-hetu) because it affects the whole of the stream of life (saṃtāna), all its elements become soiled. The primary cause of this unhappy condition is "illusion" (avidyā), the first, fundamental member in the wheel of life. It continues to exist and exhibit its influence as long as the "wheel" turns, and is gradually neutralized and finally stopped by an antidote in the form of transcending wisdom (prajñā amala). Some details about this process will be given later on when dealing with the "unrest" of the elements. This process of gradual extinction of the kleśas and the consequent purification of life is the ultimate aim of the Buddhist doctrine. For the sake of it the analysis of life into elements, the research into their functions and connexions was undertaken: sankleśa-vyavadānikam idam āstre—this doctrine is a doctrine about defilement and purification, or, more exactly, about the commotion and final appeasement of life.3

Although emphatically banned from the dwelling of Buddhist philosophy and replaced by the laws of interconnexion, the conceptions of substance and quality seem to have found a back-door through which partly to

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1 Ab. K., i, 37, and Yaço., upacaya-saṅtāna vipāka-saṅtānasya parivāra-avasthānāvaiś āraśā.

2 The second part of the second Koṣa-sthāna contains an exposition of the hetu-pratītya theory. Cf. also Ab. K., i, 35-6, Tibetan text, pp 64 ff.
re-enter in their usual position. For the division of the elements of matter into primary and secondary (bhūta and bhautika) and of the mental elements into fundamental and derivative (citta and caitta) approaches very nearly the relation of substance and quality. The secondary are supported (āgṛita)1 by the primary, and this connexion is inseparable; the one cannot appear without the other. In the Buddhist interpretation they are, nevertheless, separate elements although linked together by the laws of causation. A special relation of simultaneous or reciprocal causation (sahabhū) is then imagined to save the situation. In theory the one element is as much the cause of the other as the latter is the cause of the former.2 Nevertheless, the apparition of the ghost of the Soul, which it has cost so much to produce (caittas), is then imagined to save the situation. In the Buddhist interpretation they are, nevertheless, separate elements.3 Notwithstanding these efforts to maintain their equal rights, we see that the attempt has not been successful, since there is a primary and secondary position; the secondary is spoken of as supported by the primary, and their connexion is inseparable. It is presumably for this reason that Buddhadeva, one of the celebrities of the Sautrāntika school, revolted against such inequality of treatment, and denied the difference between primary and secondary elements; he maintained that all were equally primary (bhūta and bhautika). But this stricture had no success; it was disposed of by reference to the Scriptures and by pointing, as it would seem, to the prominence of the tactile sensedata; the general manifestations (lakṣaṇa) of matter — repulsion, attraction, heat, and motion — are all tactile phenomena, and they are general whereas colour, etc., can be apprehended by vision alone. Moreover, the translucent matter of the sense organs could not exist (i.e., appear) without being backed by some more consistent forces.2

XI. IMPERMANENCE OF THE ELEMENTS

The elements of existence are momentary appearances, momentary flashings into the phenomenal world out of an unknown source. Just as they are disconnected, so to say, in breadth, not being linked together by any pervading substance, just so are they disconnected in depth or in duration, since they last only one single moment (lakṣaṇa). They disappear as soon as they appear, in order to be followed by the next moment by another momentary existence. Thus a moment becomes a synonym of an element (dharma), two moments are two different elements. An element becomes something like a point in time-space. The Sarvāstivādin school makes an attempt mathematically to determine the duration of a moment.3 It, nevertheless, admittedly represents the smallest particle of time imaginable. Such computations of the size of the atom and of the duration of a moment are evidently mere attempts to seize the infinitesimal.

1 Caraka (Caritrasāhasī, chap. 1) likewise points out that the lakṣānas of his five bhūtas are tactile phenomena — sparś-endriya-gocaram.
2 Buddhadeva in his turn quotes the Garbhavākṛanti-sūtra (not to be traced in the Pali canon) and a passage stating that the Buddha (i.e. the three nidāna, technically called vijnāna) the embryo was sādhābhutā, i.e. consisting of six elements; vijnāna, four mahābhūtas, and ātma: the bhautikas are not mentioned. But it is answered that the mahābhūtas are alone mentioned, since bhūta represents the bhautikas as well, and vijnāna is here equivalent to citta and caitta (Ab. K., i, 35, Tibetan text, p. 62, 6 ff.). Saṃgruta (Sūtra-sāhasī, iii) has the same view as Buddhadeva. He likewise shares the view that the prominence, ukarpa, not the quantity, of one kind of atoms, determines the class of the compound.
remains. Consequently, the elements do not change, but disappear, the world becomes a cinema. Disappearance is the very essence of existence; what does not disappear does not exist. A cause for the Buddhists was not a real cause but a preceding moment, which likewise arose out of nothing in order to disappear into nothing.

It is at present impossible to determine the epoch when this theory was definitely framed. Some of the oldest schools, at any rate, expressed it very clearly. They maintained that mountains, trees, the elements of matter, ill elements in general, were momentary appearances, like moments of thought. The schools differed on this point, and the complete logical demonstration was constructed, probably, at the time when logic had taken the place of abhidharma. But it is easy to realize that, given the fundamental Buddhist idea of the plurality and separateness of their elements, this idea, worked out with the characteristic Indian intrepidity in philosophical construction, must have been carried to its logical consequence, i.e., the assuming of no duration, since there was no stuff that could possess duration.

A consequence of this doctrine was a denial of motion: A really existing object, i.e., an element, cannot move, because it disappears as soon as it appears, there is no time for it to move. This does not contradict the circumstance that one of the general characteristics of matter, the fourth mahābhūta, is motion. Every motion is resolved in a series of separate apparitions, or flashings, arising in continuity to one another? Motion of physical objects, as explained in the abhidharma, gave the best support to the consideration of dead matter as a series of evanescent flashings. The phenomenon of acceleration of falling bodies is explained by a difference in the intensity of the element weight or motion (ṭraṇa) at every moment of its downward course, since the object at every moment is differently composed. An element is thus comparable to a fire, it consists of a series of separate flashings following one another, every moment representing a new fire.

The Sarvāstivāda constructure the theory of the momentary character of the elements in the following manner. Every element appearing in phenomenal life is affected simultaneously by four different forces (sāṃskāras), the forces of origination (uṭpāda), decay (jarā), maintenance (sthitī), destruction (anityāta). These forces affect every element at every moment of its existence, they are the most universal forces, the characteristic feature or the manifesting forces of phenomenal existence (sāṃskṛta-lakṣāṇāmi). The elements affected by them are called the manifested elements (sāṃskṛta-dharma). Unaffected by them are only the three

1 Thus existence becomes synonymous with non-existence, since every fact disappears at the same moment when it appears. This is the Indian way of expressing the idea developed by H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 2: "the truth is that we change without ceasing, and that the state itself is nothing but change." The conclusion of Bergson is to the indivisibility of duration. whereas the Buddhists stick to the separate moments and make them appear out of nothing—asata uṭpāda—and again disappear into nothing—nirvāṇa-vinācā; of. Nāyāyika, p. 68. Vedānta-sūtra, ii, 2, 6, and Sāṅkhya-sūtra, 1, 44-5, accuse the Buddhists of converting existence into non-existence.

2 Kathāsthūla, xxii, 8: eka-citta-khaṇḍa sabbe dhammā. The ancient term seems to have been anitya, which is received by all schools. It was replaced in the sequel by kṣaya. This may reflect some change in the meaning of the word. The logical meaning is that every moment being a different determination, must be a separate entity: uṣṇīsakā-laṅkāsāra-saṃskāra-dhyāna anupādavastu, of. Nāyāyika, p. 5 (Bibl. Ind.). By the conversion of the proposition yat sa tat kṣayaṁ it was proved that, if something did not disappear, it did not exist. The doctrine is fully expounded in Ratnākīrti's Kṣanabhāgavatīdhi (Six Buddhist tracts, Bibl. Ind.), and it is controverted in numerous Brahmanical works.

3 It is expounded with all details of the issue between Sautrāntikas and Sarvāstivāda by Vasubandhu in Ab. K., ii, 46. Professor L. de la Vallée Poussin has kindly communicated to me his French translation of this important text, which I compared with my own English translation.

4 Sometimes reduced to three—birth, subsistence, and decay.
elements of eternal unchanging existence (*asamskṛta-dharma*). The term *samskṛta* is therefore synonymous with *ksanika*, i.e., impermanent or momentary.  

According to the laws of interconnexion between elements, these four forces always appear together and simultaneously. They are *sahābhāva*. Being elements themselves, they are in need of secondary forces (*upalakṣaṇa*) in order to display their efficiency. The realistic tendency of the *Sarvāstivādins*, if there was any, consisted in constructing some realities corresponding to our ideas or habits of speech. This tendency they shared with the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system. Just as the latter had a quality of conjunction (*samyoga*) as something real, additional to the things which were joining, just so the *Sarvāstivādins* had their origination, decay, existence, and destruction in addition to the elements originating and disappearing at the same moment. They insisted that these four forces, and the secondary potencies influencing them in their turn, were realities (*dravyatāh santi*). Against this idea of an element which was simultaneously originating, existing, and disappearing, the very natural objection was raised by all the other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools that production and destruction could not be simultaneous. On the other hand, it was impossible to allow an element more than one single moment's duration, since two moments constituted two elements. The *Sarvāstivādins* met the objection by pointing to the difference between an element in itself, its real nature (*svabhāva*) and its efficiency-moment, its function, or manifestation (*kārīva, lakṣaṇa*). The elements or forces may be opposed to one another, yet their effect may result in some single real fact, as e.g., supposing three assassins have resolved together to kill a man hiding in some dark recess, one of them (*utpāda*) pulls him out of his hiding-place (the future), the other seizes him, the third stabs him, all acting simultaneously. The victim (*dharma*) appears only to disappear. The reality moment is the moment of action, of its being achieved. "We call a moment," the *Sarvāstivādins* maintain, "the point when an action is fully achieved."  

We have here the germ of the later idea that this moment is something transcendental, something that cannot be expressed in a discursive thought. The moment was then raised to the position of the "thing in itself," the transcendental foundation of reality; indeed, the absolute reality itself—a conception which had great importance in the development of later Indian philosophy.  

The *Saṅgāyana* school takes a more simple and reasonable view of the question. They deny the reality of the four manifestation-forces of production, decay, etc.? The corresponding notions of production, destruction, etc., refer, not to single moments, but to series of them (*santāna*). Even if applied to one moment these notions do not imply the existence of corresponding realities, they are mere names for the fact that a momentary entity appears and disappears. This entity itself appears and disappears, there is no need of supplementary forces for this. Consequent on that, a further very important, divergence between the two schools arises. As stated above, the *Sarvāstivādins* maintain that all elements

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1 Kriyā-parīvāramāṇi-lakṣaṇa eko naḥ ksanah, Ab. K., ii, 46; cf. *Nyāyabindu*ṭikā, p. 13 (*Bibl. Ind.*): *ksanikā vastro... ek-ksaniyā kārīvānā sahākāri grhyate.*
2 *Kṣanakṣaṇa (jātana) prāpayītum açakayatvāt* (ibid., p. 16).
3 *Svalaksana*, ibid.
4 *Paramārtha-rat*, ibid.
5 Dharmakīrti identified the moment with pure sensation, where subject and object coalesce, and the Vedāntins deemed that we have in this moment a direct perception of *brahma*. The Indian astronomers and mathematicians knew the differential conception of instantaneous motion of a planet, *tākāliki gatiḥ*, a motion constant during an infinitesimally small interval; cf. B. Seal, *Positive Sciences*, p. 77.
6 Dravyatāh santi, of Ab. K., ii, 46.
7 Ibid.
exist on two different planes, the real essence of the element (dharma-svabhāva) and its momentary manifestation (dharma-lakṣaṇa). The first exists always, in past, present, and future. It is not eternal (nitya) because eternality means absence of change, but it represents the potential appearances of the element into phenomenal existence, and its past appearances as well. This potentiality is existing for ever (sarvātā asti). Even in the suppressed state of Nirvāṇa, when all life is extinct, these elements are supposed to represent some entity, although its manifestation-power has been suppressed for ever. The future potential elements are, indeed, divided in this school into two different sets, those that will appear (utpatti-dharma) and those that are suppressed and never will appear (anutpatti-dharma). Since the moment (kṣaṇa) is not something different from the element (dharma), time in general is not different from the elements taken collectively, as far as they have not lost their capacity of appearing in phenomenal life. In fact, "the times" is one of the synonyms used to designate collectively the elements appearing in ordinary life. But the term "time" (kāla), implying the reality of one time, is carefully avoided; it is replaced by the term "transition" (adhyāna). When the Śarvāstivādin maintains that "everything exists", it means that all elements exist, and the emphasis which is put on the reality of elements refers to the conception that their past as well as their future transition represents something real. From this fundamental tenet the school derives its name. Since the conception of an element answers rather to our conception of a subtle force than of a substance, the reality, i.e. effectiveness, of the past is not so absurd as it otherwise would appear. The Sautrāntikas denied the reality of the past, and the future in the direct sense, they admitted the reality only of the present. The future, they contended, was not real before becoming present, and the past was not real after having been present. They did not deny the influence of past facts upon present and remote future ones, but they explained it by a gradual change in an uninterrupted sequence of moments, this sequence having a starting-point in a conspicuous or strong impinging fact; it was for them one of the laws of interconnexion between separate elements.

There was another school which occupied an intermediate position between the Sautrāntikas and Śarvāstivādins; it maintained the reality of the present facts and of that part of the past ones which had not already lost their influence, but the reality of the future ones and of that part of the past ones which had ceased to exhibit any influence it denied. Vasubandhu calls this school the Vibhajyavādins, or Distinguishing School. The whole argument between the rival schools is presented by Vasubandhu with every detail in his usual masterly manner and need not be repeated here.

XII. IMPERMANENCE IN SĀNKHYA-YOGA

The deprecation of "change and decay" and its contrast with something that "changes not" is a popular theme with many religions and philosophies. The merit of having worked it out up to the remotest logical consequences appertains to Buddhism. It appears that in this work the Buddhists were assisted by the parallel work of Brahmanical philosophers of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga school. The starting-point of the latter was just the reverse of the Buddhistic one. They maintained a unity of existence, cause and effect were one in essence. But a corollary of the

1 uddhāna-sūkṣma, of Ab. K., 7, Tibetan tent, p. 12, 6

2 Ab. K., v, 24 ff., cf. Appendix I.

3 In the Kathāvatthu, i, 8, such opinions are ascribed to the Kācyapīyas. These also admitted the reality of that part of the future which was foreshadowed or fixed by the past or present. Huen Thang states in his Commentary that the Kācyapīyas are here meant under the name of Vibhajyavādins (McGovern). The Theravādins seem to have shared the same opinions as the Sautrāntikas. The explanation of vibhajīva-nāda as orthodox or analytic school because Buddha himself was vibhajīva-vādin (cf. Kathāvatthu, introduction) seems to be unknown to Vasubandhu.

4 Cf. translation in Appendix I.
unity of substance (satkārya-vāda) was the constant change of its manifestations; this change was also conceived as momentary (pratiksana-parinīma). The moment is here defined as the infinitesimally small measure of time, just as the atom is the smallest imaginable fraction of matter. Two moments cannot coalesce, therefore there is no real duration, no time outside the moment. Time is an idea without reality, an empty construction of the mind. The only reality is the momentary thing. The past and the future are not real directly, but, since the present cannot exist without a past, the latter is inherent in the fact of change. Therefore," says Vyāsa, "the whole universe is included in one single moment, all the real units of change you may imagine are merged in every single moment." Concluding, Vyāsa admits two kinds of eternity, immutable eternity belonging to the soul and eternity of mutation belonging to matter. The unit of change is termed dharma, and it is identified with the moment (ksana) in Yoga as well as in Buddhism. The change of manifestation was called a change of dharma; but in the Brahmanical system it is quite natural to make use of this term, since an old and usual meaning of it is "quality", and in the Sāṅkhya view the changing manifestations are appurtenances of some pervading stuff. It is therefore probable that the technical meaning of this term in Buddhism developed from one of its old meanings, with the difference that, quality being left without any support by the substance, it became an independent quality, or quality in the role of substance. As in the Buddhist system, these manifestations are conceived as forces (gāti) and even potential forces (yogya-tāvācchinna), corresponding to the Buddhist conception of a sanskāra. The difference is that they belong to some substance (dharma). The reality of a "transition-time" (adhyāv) as distinguished from a "duration-time" (kṣāla) was admitted; the same term—adhyāv—is used on both sides to express the first of these conceptions.

If we turn to the Sāṅkhya view, which admitted some transcendental everlasting reality of the elements along with their passing manifestations, the similarity becomes still more striking, and the difference is often restricted to the wording. A dharma, says Vyāsa, exists in all the three times. The manifestation (dharma) and the manifested (dharmin) are quite the same, the manifestation represents only the way in which the manifested appears. The reality of the past and the future is then proved by Patanjali and Vyāsa in almost the same expressions that are used by the Sarvāstivādins, with the difference that there is no mention of separate forces (samskāra-laksanā) of production and destruction. When accused of drifting into Sāṅkhya, the Sarvāstivādins justified themselves by pointing to these momentary forces, which saved the Buddhist principle of detached entities.

The question of the relation between the permanent; essence of an element and its manifestation was thoroughly discussed

1 Vidit., ad iii, 52.
2 Vidit.
3 Ksana-satramoyo nasti vastu-samāhāraḥ, ibid.
4 Vastu-caryo buddhi-nirmāṇaḥ, ibid.
5 Pariṇāmānūsī, ibid.
6 Vidit., amī sarve dharmaḥ.
7 Vidit., tatksaraphuruddhāḥ.
8 Vidit., iv, 33.
9 Vidit., iii, 13.
among Buddhists, and four solutions were suggested. The first belonged to Dharmatara: it maintained unity of substance (dravya) along with a change in existence (bhāva). This was dismissed by simply pointing to the obvious fact that this was Sānkhya and not Buddhism. The second explanation belonged to Ghosa; it assumed that elements, although existent in the past, present, and future, changed their aspect (laksana), or intensity, accordingly as they appeared at different times; just as the passionate love for one woman is only an intensification of a feeling which is alive towards women in general; it does not mean total absence of this feeling in other cases. This explanation was not accepted on the ground that it implied co-existence of a different aspects at the same time. Vasumitra advocated a change of condition (avastha), i.e., of efficiency (kārīta) in the present, and non-efficiency in past and future. This view was accepted in the school as the correct one. It was illustrated by the ball of an Indian abacus: being thrown in the hole for units it means one, in the hole for hundreds—hundred, etc. Finally Buddhadeva thought that past, present, and future were contingent (apeksa) upon one another, just as the same woman may be a mother with respect to her child and a daughter with respect to her mother. This was dismissed as leading to a confusion of the times. The passage of the Vibhāṣa, where these opinions of four celebrated masters of the Sarvāstivādin and Sastrāntika schools were reported, enjoyed apparently great popularity. Reference is made to it in later Buddhist works, and it evidently was borrowed from the Buddhists by Patanjali and Vyāsa. Yogasūtra, iii, 13, aims at giving an explanation of the time variations of one substance; it adopts the suggested explanations not as exclusive of one another, but as subordinate and co-existent. The change of manifestation (dharma) is characterized further on as a change of aspect (laksana) and condition (avastha). The characteristic examples for illustrating the suggested explanations are repeated in Vyāsa's Bhāṣya with slight modifications. As though answering the variety of the Buddhist theories, Vyāsa emphatically maintains that the change of quality (dharma), aspect (laksana), and condition (avastha) is but the same fact variously described. "There is, therefore," says he, "only one kind of mutation of matter, though variously described by us... The mutations of external aspect (dharma) and of time-variation (laksana) and of intensity (avastha), as here described, do not transcend the substance as such. Hence there is only one kind of mutation which includes all those varieties we have described."  1 Buddhadeva's theory that the time variations are contingent upon one another, which logically leads to the conclusion that essence and manifestation are interchangeable terms, may have influenced the somewhat similar theory of Patanjali and Vyāsa that substance and quality are contingent (apeksikā) terms?

The doctrine of momentary universal change originated probably in the Sānkhya system. From this doctrine it receives the name of a Theory of Change—parināma-vāda, which is only a natural corollary of its fundamental principle of unity between cause and effect (sātkārya-vāda). It is natural to surmise that early Buddhism has been influenced by it. But in a later period the Sarvāstivādin philosophers unquestionably exercised a considerable influence on the formation of the Sānkhya-Yoga doctrine.  3

2 Vyāsa, iii, 15.
3 The points of similarity between the Buddhist system and the Sānkhya-Yoga, especially as presented in the Yoga-Sūtra and Bhāṣya, are so overwhelmingly numerous that they could not escape the attention of the students of abhidharma. Some of them have been occasionally noticed above. The point deserves special treatment. Professor de la Vallée Poussin has kindly communicated to me in MS. a paper prepared by him on the subject. He also informs me that Professor Kimura in Japan has arrived at the same conclusions independently from him.

1 Ibīd.
2 As e.g. in Bhavya’s account of the sects; cf. Rockhill’s Life of Buddha.
XIII. Unrest or the Elements

The third salient feature of Buddhist elements is that they represent duhkha, a term which has always been rendered by suffering, sorrow, etc. Sufficient as this interpretation may be for popular literature, it is evident that theoretically something else is meant. Such expressions as "the element of vision (cakṣuḥ) is sorrow", "all elements influenced (sāsrava, i.e. influenced by desire to live) are sorrow"—an element "colour" might be brought under the head of "sorrow"—could not be understood if our usual idea of sorrcw was brought in. The idea underlying it is that the elements described above are perpetually in a state of commotion, and the ultimate goal of the world process consists in their gradual appeasement and final extinction. The old Buddhist credo (ye dharmā hetu-prabhāvāḥ) already expresses the idea very sharply: "the Great Recluse has indicated that all elements influenced by desire to live) are sorrow".

Vasubandhu likewise states that Buddha in his compassion for the troubles of mankind offered them a means of salvation which did not consist of magic or religious boons, but of the knowledge of a method of converting all unhappiness into bliss.

1 Ab. K., i, 19, Tibetan text, p. 31, 5.
2 Ibid., i, 9, Tibetan text, p. 13, 6.
3 Because it is entered into the upādāna-skandhas, a synonym of which is duhkha and dukkha-samudaya (Ab. K., i, 8, Tibetan text, B.W.). The translation of ārya-satya by "Aryan facts" (M. Ting and Mra, Rhys Davids) is evidently better than the old translation "truth". What is really meant is a distribution of the elements (dharmas) into the separate elements, their interconnexion as causes and effects, and their final suppression.

Thus dukkha in this formula does not at all mean "sorrow", but it is a synonym of the seventy-two dharmas, or the five upādāna-skandhas. Its general meaning is exactly the same as the meaning of the formula ye dharmā. This duhkha is paripāma-duhkha. Evidently Ledi Sudaw had this conception in view when painting to the difference between two kinds of dukkha; cf. Mrs. Rhys Davids, B. Psych., p. 83.

4 Ad Ab. K., i, 1.

1 C. F. Ab. K., i, 3. The derivation of the word from the root śru is, no doubt, correct, as is proved by the Jaina view of the karmic matter "flowing" into the body through the pores of the skin.
2 The eternal unasamakṣa elements are included among the anāsrava class (Ab. K., i, 3).
3 Ad Ab. K., i, 2. dharmā-prāvacaya—a thorough picking out of elements one by one.
A special element received in this connexion extraordinary prominence. It is termed prajñā, which may roughly be translated as "understanding". It is one of the citta-mahā-bhūmika elements, i.e., a mental faculty always present, in every conscious moment. In the ordinary plane of existence it is synonymous with mati and means simple understanding, the capacity of appreciating something. But it is capable of development and becomes then prajñā amalā, "immaculate wisdom," anāsaraṇā prajñā, "understanding uninfluenced (by mundane considerations)." Its presence gives the whole stream (santāna) a special character, it becomes the central element of the stream, and its satellites—all other elements of the "stream"—feelings, ideas, volitions, become pure. The presence of this element acts as an antidote against other elements that are "unfavourable" (akuṣala) for progress; they gradually disappear and cannot reappear in the same stream. The first thing to be realized in such a state is the theory of the elements (dharmatā), the idea that there is no permanent personality (pudgala, ātma), that the supposed personality really is a congeries of eighteen components (dhātu).

When the wrong view of an existing personality (sattāya-dṛṣṭi) is disposed of, the path that leads to Final Deliverance is entered. Every vicious, or disquieting, "unfavourable" (akuṣala) element has a special antidote in the agency of wisdom; when suppressed it becomes an apattati-dhāro, an element which never will return, a blank is substituted for it; this blank (nirūdha) is called "cessation through wisdom" (pratisankhyā-nirūdha)1. But only the initial stages of saintliness can be reached through this so-called dṛṣṭi-mārga, i.e., through knowledge a certain, amount of dharmas has its flashings stopped. The remainder are stopped by mystical concentration, they are bhāvanā-heya, i.e., to be suppressed by entering the realms of trance. In all Indian systems the ultimate instrument of salvation is Yoga. This can not only do away with the intellectual and moral elements that are "unfavourable", but can stop the existence or appearance of matter itself. We have seen that matter is reduced in this system to sense-data, which are conceived rather as forces, momentary flashings. Practical observation has shown to the philosophers that when a certain degree of intense concentration is reached the sensations of taste and smell disappear, hence, it is concluded, the objects, the sense-data of touch and taste, have likewise vanished. Founded on this practical observation, a plane of existence has been imagined, where living beings or "streams" (santāna) consist only of fourteen instead of eighteen components.2 In the Abhidharma-kosha the question is raised, how many elements can be suppressed through knowledge and how many through ecstasy? and it is answered that some mental elements are suppressed by mere knowledge only, namely, the belief in a real personality (sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi) and its

1 Pratisankhyā is synonymous with prajñā amalā; it is the same as the prajñā or prasankhyāna in the Śāṅkhyā-Yoga system, an agency destroying the klesas. It was probably the original meaning of the word sankhyā, from which the system received its name. The Buddhist specification in the way of the preposition prati—refers to the separateness of the elements, of which every one needs a separate action of wisdom in order to be suppressed; cf. Ab. K., i, 4. The same tendency is probably responsible for the term prati-mokṣa instead of mokṣa, as prati-nirujñāti, cf. above, p. 16; the term prati-buddha, on the contrary, is used as a designation of the "Enlightened One", in the Upanisads (cf. H. Oldenberg, Die Lehren der Upaniṣaden, p. 131), by Jains, Śāṅkhyas, but not by Buddhists.

2 Ab. K., i, 20.

3 Ab. K., bhāṣya, ad i, 30, Tibetan text, p. 63, 4, where this explanation is attributed to Śrīla Śaṅkara, and is, evidently, shared by Vasubandhu himself.

4 The dhātus Nos. 8–7 and 14–15 are in abeyance.
consequences—all the feelings, ideas, and volitions and forces connected—they disappear as soon as the antidote, i.e., the antâma = dharma-theory, is realized. Other impure elements (sâsrava), all the material elements (dâhû 1–5 and 7–10), and all sensuous consciousness (dâhû 13–17; fifteen dâhûs in all) can be suppressed only by e@sât. Since matter was conceived as a play of subtle forces, its disappearance in a manner similar to the suppression of passion and wrong views is not so illogical. The purified elements of the saint (anâsrava-dharma) could not be suppressed at all, but they likewise disappeared at the time of Nirvâna, through absence of new karma, i.e., elements of unrest (duhkha), to which the commotion of the world was due. Imagination has constructed whole worlds where these kinds of matter and sensations corresponding to them are absent, they are the worlds of reduced, or purified, matter. They can be entered either by rebirth in them (utpatti), or by an effort of concentration (samâpatti), an absorption which transports into higher planes of existence not merely Buddhists. Working further on upon the same principle, higher worlds are constructed where the material side—the sense-data-experience further reduction and finally worlds purely spiritual are reached, where every matter, i.e., all sensations and sense-data are absent. Speaking technically, the formula of a living being in these planes of existence will reveal only three component terms (dâhû): consciousness (mano-dâhû), mental phenomena and forces (dharma-dâhû), and abstract, non-sensuous cognition (mano-vîjñâna-dâhû). These purely spiritual beings (or, more precisely, formulas of being) have their consciousness and mental phenomena brought to a standstill at some very high planes of existence: the unconscious trance (asamât-samâpatti) and cessation trance (nirâdha-samâpatti). But this is, nevertheless, not an eternal extinction. At last the absolute stoppage of all the pure dharma of the highest spiritual beings is reached, an eternal blank is substituted for them. This is Nirvâna, absolute annihilation of the sanskṛta-dharma, which is tantamount to the presence of the asamskṛta-dharma.

According to the Sarvâstivâdins, this quite negative result is, nevertheless, an entity of some kind. They make a difference, as stated above, between the essence and the manifestations of the dharma. At the time of Nirvâna the manifestations have ceased for ever, there will be no rebirth, but this essence remains. It is, nevertheless, a kind of entity where there is no consciousness.

Thus the ultimate goal of the world-process, the final result of all purifying, spiritualizing agencies and efforts is a complete extinction of consciousness and all mental processes. The absolute (nirvâna) is inanimate, even if it is something. It is sometimes, especially in popular literature, characterized as bliss, but this bliss consists in the cessation of unrest (duhkha). Bliss is a feeling, and in the absolute there neither is a feeling, nor conception, nor volition, nor even consciousness. The theory is that consciousness cannot appear alone without its satellites, the phenomena of feeling, volition, etc., and the last moment in the life of a bodhisattva, before merging into the absolute, is also the last moment of consciousness in his continuity of many lives. The appeasement of wrongs and passions is the general ideal of humanity; but this appeasement carried further on and raised to the state of absolute insensibility is a peculiarity of the Hindu ideal. Philosophy has converted that into conceptual formulas, and the result may seem absurd, but "whosoever wishes to be a philosopher must learn not to be frightened by absurdities", says a distinguished modern author. Buddhism was not the only Indian system of philosophy to arrive at

1 Ab. K., i, 40.
2 Ab. K., i, 30, rûpa-Dâhû
3 Ab. K., i, 31.
such a result: in the Vaiśeṣika system the liberated soul is as inanimate as a stone (pāṣāṇavata), or as ether (ākāśavat), because cognition, feeling, etc., are not considered as of its essence, but as an accidental quality produced by special contacts, which cease when final deliverance is reached. The absolute is spiritual only in those systems which accept the doctrine that consciousness is of the essence of the absolute, i.e., the doctrine of self-luminosity (sva-prakāśa) of knowledge.  

XIV. THEORY OF COGNITION

The character of a philosophical system generally comes forth very clearly in its theory of cognition; it enables us to assign it a place among either the realistic systems, maintaining the reality of the outer world, or among the idealistic ones, denying such reality. Among the Indian systems we find every variety of such theories represented. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system favoured a naively realistic view of a series of real contacts—of the object with the sense-organ, of the latter with an internal organ, which in its turn entered into contact with the soul, and thus cognition was produced. The Buddhist idealistic school of Dignāga and Dharmakirti developed a transcendental theory which exhibited some striking points of similarity with the transcendental theory of Kant. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga system would explain the origin of knowledge through an assumed assimilation of the mind-stuff to the object through the medium of a sense-organ, compared with the attraction of an object by a magnet. Even later Vedānta, notwithstanding its strictly monistic principle, managed to establish some kind of realistic view about “seizing” the object by the senses. What was, as compared with these views, the conception of earlier Buddhism, that part of Buddhist philosophy which admitted the existence of elements (dharma) as ultimate realities, i.e., the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas?

Their explanation of the origin of knowledge was in perfect agreement with their ontology, i.e., with the theory of a plurality of separate, though interdependent, elements (dharma). The phenomenon of knowledge was a compound phenomenon, resolvable into a number of elements simultaneously flashing into existence. Being conceived as momentary flashes, the elements could not move towards one another, could not come into contact, could not influence one another, there could be no “seizing” or “grasping” of the object by the intellect. But, according to the laws of interconnexion (pratitya-samutpāda) prevailing between them, some elements are invariably appearing accompanied by others arising in close contiguity with them. A moment of colour (rūpa), a moment of the sense-of-vision-matter (cakṣuh), and a moment of pure consciousness (citta), arising simultaneously in close contiguity, constitute what is called a sensation (sparṣa) of colour. The element of consciousness according to the same laws never appears alone, but always supported by an object (viśaya) and a receptive faculty (indriya).

A very important, though somewhat scholastic, question is then raised: how is it that, if these three separate elements—the element colour, the element visual sense, and the element consciousness—merely appear, or flash, together, without being appurtenances of some non-existing living being, without being able to influence one another, to “grasp”, apprehend, or come into contact with one another—how is it, then, that there, nevertheless, is an “apprehending” of the object by the intellect? Why is it that the resulting knowledge is a cognition “of colour”, and not a cognition of the visual sense,

1 Cf. references in A. B. Keith’s Indian Logic, p. 261 n.
2 Clearly expressed by Dharmakirti in the celebrated verse: avibhāgo lut buddhyāmsa. . .
3 Yoga Śūtra, i, 4, 7.
4 Vedānta-sūtra, 29.
which is supposed to enter the combination on terms of equality with the other elements? The question about the relation between external (objective) and internal (subjective) element, and the "grasping" of the one by the other which was to have been evaded by the construction of a plurality of interdependent, but separate and equal, elements, reverts in another form. The answer is that, although there is no real coming in contact between elements, no grasping of the objective element by the intellect, nevertheless the three elements do not appear on terms of absolute equality; there is between two of them—consciousness and object—a special relation which might be termed "co-ordination" (śārūpya), a relation which makes it possible that the complex phenomenon—the resulting cognition—is a cognition of colour and not of the visual sense.

Such an answer amounts, of course, to a confession of ignorance: this relation exists because it exists, it is required by the system, without this patchwork the system collapses. In all Indian—and, indeed, not only Indian—systems we always reach a point which must be acquiesced in without any possible justification. It must be assumed, not because it could be proved (na sādhayitum cačayam), but because there is no possibility of escape (naverjanāyatayā), it is a postulate of the system (siddhānta-prasiddhām).

In the Abhidharma-kāsa we have the following account of the process of cognition:

**Question.**—We read in scripture, "Consciousness apprehends." What is consciousness here meant to do?

**Answer.**—Nothing at all! (It simply appears in co-ordination with its objective elements, like a result which is homogeneous with its cause.) When a result appears in conformity with its own cause it is doing nothing at all; but we say that it does conform with it. Consciousness, likewise, appears in co-ordination (śārūpya) with its objective elements. It is (properly speaking) doing nothing. Nevertheless, we say that consciousness does cognize its object.

**Question.**—What is meant by "co-ordination" (between consciousness and its objective element)?

**Answer.**—A conformity between them, the fact owing to which cognition, although caused (also) by the activity of the senses, is not something homogeneous with them. It is said to cognize the object and not the senses. (It bears the reflection of the objective element which is its corollary.) And, again, the expression “consciousness apprehends” is not inadequate, inasmuch as here also a continuity of conscious moments is the cause of every cognition. (“Consciousness apprehends... means that the previous moment is the cause of the following one.) The agent here also denotes simply the cause, just as in the current expression "the bell resounds" (the bell is doing nothing, but connected with it every following moment of sound is produced by the previous one). (We can give) another (illustration): consciousness apprehends similarly to the way in which a light moves.

**Question.**—And how does a light move?

**Answer.**—The light of a lamp is a common metaphorical designation for an uninterrupted production of a series of flashing flames. When this production changes its place, we say that the light has moved, (but in reality other flames have appeared in another place). Similarly, consciousness is a conventional name for a chain of conscious moments. When it changes its place (i.e. appears in co-ordination with another objective element) we say that it apprehends that object. And in the same way we are speaking about the existence of material elements.

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1 Thin same śārūpya reappears in the transcendental system of Dharmakīrti, as it would seem, in a different, but similar, role of a salvage in extremis. Dharmakīrti establishes an absolute reality, the thing in itself, the single moment of pure sensation (śuddham pratyakṣam = kalpand. = svālakṣaṇam = keśa = paramārtikastu); this single moment of reality is the transcendental (jñātavyaṃ prāparīṣṭum na cačayate) reality underlying every representation with its complex of qualities, constructed by imagination (kalpanā). There is a difficulty in supplying some explanation of how this quite indefinite moment of pure sensation combines with the definite construction of reason, and śārūpya steps in to save the situation. Its role is consequently similar to Kant’s schematism, that was intended to supply a bridge between pure sensation (reine Sinnlichkeit) and reason. Cf. my *Logic according to later Buddhists*, chap. on pratyakṣa. About śārūpya in Śāṅkhyā-Yoga see below. p. 64.

The question of the reality of an outer world is, strictly speaking, obviated. In a system which denies the existence of a personality, splits everything into a plurality of separate elements, and admits of no real interaction between them, there is no possibility of distinguishing between an external and internal world. The latter does not exist, all elements are quite equally external towards one another. Nevertheless, the habit of distinguishing between internal and external, subjective and objective, could not be dropped altogether, and we meet with curious situations into which the philosopher is driven by logical deductions; consciousness itself sometimes happens to be considered as an external element with regard to other elements. Such elements as ideas (saññā), feelings (vedanā), volitions (cetanā), and all forces (samkhāra) are, as a rule, considered to be external elements. The Abhidharma-koça gives the following account of the question:—

Question.—How many among the eighteen categories of elementary components (dhātu) of life are internal, how many external?

Answer.—Internal are twelve, (the remaining six) colour, etc., are external.

Question.—Which are the twelve internal ones?

Answer.—They are the six varieties of consciousness (gadhāya), i.e. consciousness (1) visual, (2) auditory, (3) olfactory, (4) gustatory, (5) tactile, (6) purely mental, and their six respective bases (ācayya): the sense-organs of vision, audition, smell, taste, touch, and consciousness itself, i.e. its preceding moment (being the basic element of the next moment)—are internal. The remaining six, comprising visibility-matter (sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, and mental or abstract objects, e.g. ideas), are external.

The theory sketched above does not by any means prevent our using the expressions of common life with regard to an outside world.

1 Ab. K., i, 39.
inter-action or contact between sense-organ and object. We meet even with the comparison of this contact to a clash of butting goats, but these expressions need not be taken literally. About the possibility of any real contact between the sense-organ and its object, we find the following explanations. The senses are divided into two sets according to their power of acting at a distance, or through contact only. The senses of vision and audition apprehend their objects at a distance. For the eye a distance is even a necessary condition, because e.g. a drop of medicine introduced into the eye cannot be seen by it. The three organs of smelling, tasting, and touch must be in immediate contact with the object. The question is then raised, how is contact possible if there is no movement, and it is answered that contact is only a name for production of two elements in immediate vicinity. The question of contact between object and organ of sense affords an opportunity for debating the question of contact between objects in general. The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that when there is a contact, i.e. simultaneous production of two things in close vicinity, their vicinity is absolute, there is nothing between, but Vasubandhu objects that absolute vicinity is impossible for many reasons. He quotes the opinion of two celebrated philosophers, Vasumitra and Bhadanta; the first says: "If the atoms of which the objects are composed could really come into contact, they would be existing during the next moment," i.e., since every atom is but a momentary flashing, its coming into contact is impossible; the contact will be achieved by another atom appearing in the next moment. Bhadanta says: "There is no such thing as contact. Contact is only a name for the close vicinity (of two apparitions)."

With regard to matter (rūpa), the Abhidharma-koça gives two different standpoints from which to consider its position as either external or internal. It is external if part of another's personality (samatāna), his faculties or his objects, internal if part of my own personality, my faculties or my objects. Otherwise it may be distinguished according to the classification into "bases" (āyataṇa) of cognition. As we have seen, this classification divides everything according to the faculties by which it is perceived: the five sense-organs (indriya) are internal bases (adhyātmāyataṇa) and the objective sense-data represent the external ones (bhāyāyataṇa). Since there is no real difference of external and internal, the senses do not really play any part in perception; they are mere facts or elements that appear together with other elements according to laws of interconnexion. If we speak of the sense of vision as perceiving colour, this must not be taken literally. There is in the Abhidharma-koça a long discussion about the relative parts of the two elements, of the visual sense and of consciousness, in the process of perception. First an idealist opponent maintains that consciousness alone produces cognition, the part of the senses is nil. This opinion is disposed of by pointing to the fact that consciousness does not apprehend objects behind a wall, which it ought to have achieved if it were independent of the sense-organs. The Sarvāstivādin then reviews several explanations of the difference between the parts of the sense-organ and consciousness in perception. "We find in Scripture," he says, "the following statement":—

"This, O Brahmin, is the organ of vision; it is a door through which to see colours and shapes." This means that consciousness perceives (colours) through the organ of vision (which is comparable to a door). It, strictly speaking, means that when we use

1 Ab. K., i, 43, Tibetan text, p. 82, 6 ff.
the verb "to see" we only indicate that there is an (open) door (for the consciousness to apprehend a colour). It is wrong to maintain that the organ of vision (cakṣuḥ) "looks" (paśyati), with the result that it "sees", (perception is produced only by the element of consciousness).

**Question.**—If it is the element of consciousness that "sees", who is it that becomes conscious (of the thing seen)? What is the difference between these two expressions, "to see a colour" and "to become conscious of the presence of a colour"?

**Answer.**—Although that (element) which produces consciousness cannot, strictly speaking, be supposed "to see", nevertheless both expressions are used indiscriminately: "he sees" and "he is conscious of", just as with regard to understanding (prajñā) we may equally use the expressions "he sees it" and "he understands it".

The Sārvāstivādin then states that the elements of visual sense and consciousness do not exhibit any agency, they simply appear under certain conditions: the organ of sense and the object being present, consciousness arises, and the mere fact of its apparition is tantamount to a sensation of colour, just as with regard to understanding (prajñā) we may equally use the expressions "he sees it" and "he understands it".

The transcendental school of Dharmakīrti denied the difference. It maintained that, distinct or indistinct, the fact of knowledge remained the same in its essence.

There is no great disagreement between the Vaibhāśikas (Sarvāstivādins) and the Sautrāntikas on the interpretation of the origin of cognition. It is in their opinion a complex phenomenon in which several elements participate, interconnected, but separate, with the essential presence of the element of consciousness among them.

In the light of this theory of cognition it is surprising to see the family-likeness which reveals itself between the consciousness (cit, puruṣa) of the Sāṅkhya and its Buddhist counterpart (viśīṣtā). Both are absolutely inactive, without any content, a knowledge without an object, a knowledge "of nothing", pure sensation, mere awareness, a substance without either qualities or movements. Being the pure light of knowledge it "stands by" the phenomena, illuminates them, reflects them, without grasping them or being affected by them! The only difference is that in Sāṅkhya it represents an eternal principle, whereas in Buddhism momentary light flashes appearing at the time when certain other

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62 Ab. K., i, 42, Tibetan text, p. 79, 18.
7 Okkavārtika, Pratyakṣa-vādīka.
8 Nyāgnyāntid, p. 4 ff.
9 The information about the Sautrāntika theory of cognition, contained in the Sarva-darçana-saṅgraha and similar works (bahyārthānamya-vādīka), rests on a confusion by Brahmanical authors between Sautrāntika and Viśīṣtā-vāda, not seldom to be met with.
elements are present? The order which it occupies among the Buddhist groups (skandhas) of elements is likewise suggestive. It is not included in the mental groups. It has a place of its own just at the end of the list, similar to the position occupied by it as the twenty-fifth principle of Sāṃkhya. In order to avoid the difficulty involved in the idea of one element "grasping" the other, it is imagined that there is the mere fact of them being near one another. Whatever that may mean in Yoga, in Buddhism it refers to interconnected flashings into existence of two elements. Their relation of subject and object, nevertheless, remains unexplained, and this fact is christened by the name of "co-ordination" (sārāpya). We meet the same deus ex machina performing an analogous task in both systems; subject and object stand aloof from one another, yet they are "co-ordinated".

It can hardly be doubted that the emphatic denial of any difference between consciousness, mind, and intellect in Buddhism is likewise a direct reply to the Sāṃkhya system, where we find such a gap between consciousness and mind, and the latter then divided into the threefold internal organ.

The doctrine of identity between consciousness and an internal organ of knowledge is characteristic for Buddhism from its very beginning. It is, in fact, another manner of expressing the denial of a soul and is the direct consequence of its being replaced by separate elements. We find it clearly stated in the oldest texts. It probably was, at the time, a new doctrine, intended to replace an older one. The

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1 Sāṃkhya-karika, 64, which has given an opportunity to impute to the system the negation of a soul, only proves that the conscious principle deprived of any characteristic or content, represents in Sāṃkhya nothing else than pure sensation, or pure consciousness. Cf. Garbe, op. cit., p. 364.

2 About the order in which the skandhas stand we find a great many speculations in Ab. K., i, 22; cf. Mrs. C. Rhys Davids, B. Psych., p. 64.

3 Vyāsā, ad i, 4; ii, 23.

4 Professor J. H. Woods translates "correlation", which is much the same (op. cit., p. 14, 160 ff.).

5 Ab. K., ii, 34; Mrs. C. Rhys Davids, B. Psych., p. 66.

6 Samyutta, ii, 94; Majjhima., i, 256 ff.

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XIV. THEORY OF COGNITION

pre-Buddhistic use of the terms is clearly discernible in the Pali texts. One or the other of these synonymous terms is used with preference in certain contexts? As an organ (indriya, āyatana No. 6) and as a common resort (pratisara) for the sense-organs, the term "mind" (manah) is preferred; consciousness purely mental, non-sensuous, is called mano-vijñāna (dhatu No. 18), i.e. consciousness arising, not from an organ of sense, but from consciousness itself, from its Preceding moment, when the preceding moment takes the place of a support (ācayā), or an organ (indriya), for a non-sensuous idea. These distinctions are mere traces of older habits of thought. The philosophical atmosphere in the time of Buddha was in all probability saturated with Sāṃkhya ideas. Buddhism cannot be fully understood if these connexions are not taken into account.

XV. PRE-BUDDHISTIC BUDDHISM

Can the theory sketched above be characterized as a system of realism? It is certainly not the naive realism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. For the Brabmanical writers it was realism (bhāyārthāstiva) because it was different from the later, more definite, idealism. But the difference between Sarvāstivāda and Vaiśeṣika consists rather in that the former is pluralistic and the latter converts all elements into aspects of one store-consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna). The whole system of elements is retained with slight variations. Professor O. Rosenberg is inclined to conclude that in theory of cognition the Buddhists were idealists from the beginning, but they were realists so far as they accepted the real existence of a transcendental absolute reality? It has, in any case, a position of its own, very far from ordinary realism, resembling perhaps some modern theories which accept the reality of external as well as internal facts and a certain "co-ordination" between

1 Mrs. C. Rhys Davids, op. cit., pp. 11 ff., has with very fine discrimination traced the different shades of meaning conveyed in the Pali canonical texts by these terms, which are emphatically declared to be synonymous.

them, without the one "grasping" the other. The cinematographic representation of the world and the converting of all the facts of the inner and outer world composing an individual stream of life into a complex play of inter-connected momentary flashes, is anything but realism. The world is a mirage. The reality underlying it is beyond our cognition. Nāgarjuna gave the right explanation in calling it an empty (çūnya) illusion (māya). Professor O. Rosenberg insists upon the illusionistic tendency of Buddhism from the very outset. Even for Buddhaghosa not only outer objects, but men were nothing but puppets trying to deceive us as to their reality. That Čāṇkara established his illusionistic doctrine of Vedānta under Buddhist influence is at present more or less generally accepted. But we must make the difference between the radical illusionism of Čāṇkara and Nāgarjuna and the half-way illusionism of primitive Buddhism. The visible world was, as Vācaspatimīra² says with reference to Shāṅkya-Yoga, similar to an illusion, but not exactly an illusion (māyeva na tu māya). The position of the Sāṅkhya, accepting the transcendental elements (gunas) as the only reality, was just the same.

Whether the anātma-dharma theory was the personal creation of Cākyamuni Buddha himself, or not, is a quite irrelevant question. In any case, we do not know of any form of Buddhism without this doctrine and its corollary classifications of elements into skandha, āyatana, and dhātu, the laws of their interconnexion (pratītya-samutpāda), and the complicated constructions which these termini involve. This is also, as Professor O. Rosenberg rightly remarks, the common foundation of all the forms of Buddhism in all the countries where this religion flourishes at present. Failing to realize that, some superficial observers concluded that in the northern countries Buddhism was "degenerate" and altogether a different religion. It is a salient feature of Indian philosophy that its history splits into several independent lines of development which run parallel from an early beginning down to modern times. Each development has its own fundamental idea to start with, and the development makes every effort to keep faithful to the start. Thus we have the realism (ārambha-vāda) of the Vaiśeṣika, the pluralism (sāṅkha-vāda) of Buddhism, the evolutionism (parinīma-vāda) of Shāṅkya-Yoga, and the illusionism (vivarta-vāda) of Vedānta running in parallel lines of development from the remotest antiquity, each with its own ontology, its own theory of causation, its own theory of cognition, its own idea of salvation, and its own idea of the origin of the limitations (avidyā) of our experience.

We know of celebrated philosophers who have been engaged in more than one line, but the lines were always kept separate. In Buddhism the development began in the discussions of the early Hinayāna schools. The Sarvāstivāda established a catalogue of seventy-five elements. The Saṅgrahikas excluded a number of them as mere names; the Madhyamikas viewed all of them as contingent (çūnya) upon one another, and therefore declared the world to be an illusion; the Vijñānavādins converted them into ideas, aspects of one store-consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), but the pluralistic fundamental idea remained; its idealistic and illusionistic tendency, which was clear from the beginning, was elaborately worked out by later scholars.
The possibility is not precluded that the foundation stone of the anatma-dharma theory was laid before Buddha. Just as Mahavira was not the first to proclaim Jainism, but only adopted and gave lustre to a doctrine which existed before him, just so Buddha may have adopted and spread a doctrine which he found somewhere in that philosophical laboratory which was the India of his time. He, indeed, is reported to have emphatically disowned the authorship of a new teaching, but claimed to be the follower of a doctrine established long ago by former Buddhas. This is usually interpreted as a kind of propaganda device, but it is not quite improbable that a real historical fact underlies these assertions.

Among that oldest set of Upanisads which for many reasons are generally admitted to be pre-Buddhist, but display some knowledge of the Saṁkhyā system, we find, along with Saṁkhyā conceptions, a statement that might be an indication of the existence of such a pre-Buddhist form of the anatma-dharma theory. In the Kañkakeshupanisad, which belongs to this class, a doctrine is mentioned that is evidently strongly opposed to the monistic view of an immortal soul (citman) and favours instead a theory of separate elements (prthag-dharmān pacñyati). This theory is repudiated with the following remark: "Just as rainwater that has fallen down in a desert is scattered and lost among the undulations of the sand, just so is (a philosopher) who maintains the existence of separate elements lost in running after nothing else but these (separate elements)."  

Professor H. Jacobi has shown that unorthodox opinions, opposed to the accepted soul-theory, are alluded to even in the oldest set of the Upanisads. These indications are made in the usual Upanisad style and anything but precise.

What emerges from the passage of the Kāthaka cited above is that there was a doctrine opposed to the reigning soul-theory, that it maintained the existence of subtle elements and separate elements (prthag dharma), and that such a doctrine, in the opinion of the author, did not lead to salvation. Cāṇkara, in his commentary, agrees that Buddhism is alluded to, but, very bluntly, he interprets dharma as meaning here in viśuddha soul? As a matter of fact, dharma never occurs with this meaning in the Upanisads. Its occurrence in the Kāthaka leaves the impression that it is a catchword, referring to a foreign and new doctrine, some anatma-dharma theory.  

Professor Jacobi, in a recent work, arrives at the conclusion that at the epoch of which the Kāthaka is the most characteristic exponent the theory of an immortal individual soul was a new idea which, in all probability, enjoyed great popularity as a novelty and met with general approval.

1 In his commentary on the Gaudapāda Kārikā, where the term dharma occurs, very clearly in the sense the Mahāyāna interpretation has given it, namely, as something unreal, a mere illusion, the real or the pseudo-Cāṇkara likewise enforces the meaning of an individual soul.

2 There are no traces of the Buddhist meaning of dharma having been known to Pāṇini, but there are some traces with regard to its corollary, the term samskāra or samakāra. When causation is to be expressed, he makes a difference between real efficiency, i.e., one fact transgressing its own existence and affecting the other, which he calls pratijñayā, explained as gacchita (the same as atijñayā, parasaṁparāpya, or simply upakāra), and an efficiency which is contrasted with it and conceived as two separate facts conditioning one another which he simply calls samkāra; it is explained as satam utkārayādhaman samkāraya, i.e., "a force which produces (being conditions) an enhancement in (some) existent." In the first case, upakāra or samakāra is used, in the second samakāra, cf. ii, 3, 53; vi, 1, 139; iv, 2, 16; iv, 4, 3; cf. the Kārikā. That the two paribhāṣās, gacchita and samkārayādhaman and satam utkārayādhaman samkāraya, refer to the Saṁkhyā and Buddhist views respectively is probable. In later literature the difference between upakāra and simple samkāra is frequently referred to, cf. Nyāyāvakāśa, ed. Peterson (Bibl. Ind.), p. 13: deśavāca cā suhāki parasaṁparāpya . . . ; cf. Sūtra Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, p. 48 ff. Sarvanarājanānanda, p. 10 (Bibl. Ind.): suhākāram kim bharasya upakārayante na mi. That the philosophical conceptions involved in this difference were known to Pāṇini would appear from the suggestive word pratijñayā = upakāra, as opposed to samakāra, but this is by no means certain. The conception of gacchita-gaṇo = eka (i.e., mentioned in M. bhāya, ad v, 1, 2. A similar contrast lies in adhyāya versus pratijñayā-sam utpāda, cf. Bh. jala-sūtra.


3 Die indische Philosophie in Dar Lichi des Ostens (Stuttgart, 1922).
There is, indeed, a wide gap between this class of Upaniṣads and the older set, a difference in style, terminology, and the whole intellectual atmosphere. The idea of a surviving personality, of a Self and even a Universal Self, is not unknown in the Veda: its essence and its relation to Brahma is the main topic of discussion in the Upaniṣads. But this Self is a psycho-physical entity, different explanations of its nature are proposed, and materialistic views are not excluded. The idea of an immortal soul in our sense, a spiritual monad, a simple, nncomposite, eternal, immaterial substance is quite unknown in the Veda, inclusive of the older Upaniṣads. The new conception was accepted by the Jains, the Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṃsakas, and later by all philosophical systems except the materialists and the Buddhists. In the Sāṅkhya the old theory survived, in the shape of the linga-carīra, along with the adoption of the new. The attitude of Buddhism towards both the old and the new theories was that of a most emphatic denial. Scholars were always struck by the spirit of extreme animosity which undoubtedly reveals itself in the oldest Buddhist texts whenever the idea of a soul is mentioned. In the light of Professor Jacobi's hypothesis this may find a natural explanation in the feeling of excitement with which the adoption of the new theory was met and assailed by its chief opponents, for which mere theoretical considerations of abstract argument seem insufficient to account. In Buddhist records we find the old and the new soul-theories clearly distinguished. The doctrine which maintains the reality of a Self corresponding to the psycho-physical individual is called ātma-vāda, whereas the view approaching the doctrine of a permanent Soul is padgala-vāda. All Buddhists rejected the ātma-vāda, since Buddhism (buddhāmuṇḍān), philosophically, means nothing else than the dharmatā, the theory of dharmas, which is but another name for anātman, nairātmya. But there are two schools—the Vātsiṣṭhiyās and the Saṃmitiyās—which are, nevertheless, adherents of the padgala-vāda. According to the exposition of Vasubandhu, this means that the internal

skandhas at a given moment constitute a certain unity, which is related to them as fire to fuel? It had not the absolute reality of a dharma, it was not included in the lists of dharmas, but, nevertheless, it was not quite unreal. This padgala was also regarded as surviving, since it is maintained that it assumes new elements at birth and throws them off at death. The padgala of a Buddha seems to be an Omniscient Eternal Spirit. The sūtra of the burden-bearer, where padgala is compared with the bearer and the skandhas with the burden, was invoked as a proof that Buddha himself admitted some reality of the padgala. For all the other Buddhist schools padgala was but another name for ātman, and they refuted both theories by the same arguments. That the position of the Vātsiṣṭhiyās was wrong, i.e., not in strict conformity with the dharma-theory, is evident, since this theory admits no real unity whatsoever between separate elements. Therefore Self, Soul, personality, individual, living being, human being—all these conceptions do not answer to ultimate realities: they are but names for some combinations of dharmas, i.e., formulas of elements. If our supposition that the anātma-dharma theory is mentioned in the Kāṭhakopaniṣad is correct, it evidently was directed against both the old and the new Soul-theories as equally unacceptable. But, on the other hand, the tenacious effort of some Buddhist schools to save the idea of some real unity between the elements of a personal life, or the idea of a spiritual principle governing it, is partly due to the difficulty of the problem and partly to an old tradition. We find, indeed, in the Brāhmaṇas and the

1 Soul Theory, p. 830.
2 Ibid., p. 851.
3 Ibid., p. 841.
4 Ibid., p. 842. Udyotakara, in his exposition of ātma-vāda (pp. 338–49), likewise mentions this sūtra as contradicting the doctrine of anātman.
5 Ibid., p. 838.
6 The Sarvāstivādins explained the union of the elements in a personality by the operation of a special force (ṣaṃskāra), which they named prāpti; of. above, p. 23, and in the tables of elements in the Appendix II, where it is found under vīprayuktā-ṣaṃskāra. No. 1.
Upanisads something like a forerunner of the Buddhist skandhas. The individual is also composed of elements; during his lifetime they are united; the union ceases at death, and through a reunion of them a new life begins. Curiously enough, the number of these elements, or factors, as Professor Jacobi prefers to translate the term prāna, is the same as the number of the Buddhist skandhas. The elements themselves are quite different, and this difference bears witness of the enormous progress achieved by Indian philosophy during the time between the primitive Upanisads and the rise of Buddhism. In the Buddhist system we have a division of mental faculties into feeling, concept, will, and pure sensation, in which modern psychology would not have much to change. In the Upanisads it is a very primitive attempt, giving breath, speech, sense of vision, sense of audition and intellect as the elements. But one point of similarity remains: the last and, evidently, the most important element is in both cases manas. The makrocosm, or the Universal Soul, is likewise analysed by the Upanisads into five component elements. In the number of the Buddhist skandhas and in the position of manas (= viññāna) among them we probably have the survival of an old tradition. It is only by such an indirect influence that we can explain the astonishing fact of the simultaneous existence of different classifications of the elements for which there is no intrinsic requirement in the system. When the anātma-dharma theory was definitely framed, with its theory of causation and theory of cognition, the classification of elements into “bases” of cognition (Eyātana) became quite natural and indispensable, but the classification into skandhas was useless. It, nevertheless, was retained in compliance with an old habit of thought, and such changes as were required by the progress of philosophic analysis were introduced.

Thus it is that the fundamental idea of Buddhism—a plurality of separate elements without real unity—had its roots in the primitive speculations of the Upanisads. At the time when a new conception of the Soul was elaborated in Brahmanical circles, some kind of pre-Buddhaic Buddhism, under which we understand the anātma-dharma theory, must have been already in existence. This time is the epoch of the Kāthakopanisad, which, as Professor Jacobi points out, might also be the time of pre-Jinistic Jainism, the time of Pārīvanātha, i.e. the eighth century B.C.

XVI. SUMMARY

To summarize:—

The conception of a dharma is the central point of the Buddhist doctrine. In the light of this conception Buddhism discloses itself as a metaphysical theory developed out of one fundamental principle, viz. the idea that existence is an interplay of a plurality of subtle, ultimate, not further analysable elements of Matter, Mind, and Forces. These elements are technically called dharmas, a meaning which this word has in this system alone. Buddhism, accordingly, can be characterized as a system of Radical Pluralism (sanghāta-vāda): the elements alone are realities, every combination of them is a mere name covering a plurality of separate elements. The moral teaching of a path towards Final Deliverance is not something additional or extraneous to this ontological doctrine, it is most intimately connected with it and, in fact, identical with it.

As contrasted with the arambha-vāda, which maintains the reality of the whole as well as of the elements, and the parivāma-vāda, which ascribes absolute reality only to the whole.
The connotation of the term dharma implies that—
1. Every element is a separate (prthak) entity or force.
2. There is no inherence of one element in another, hence no substance apart from its qualities, no Matter beyond the separate sense-data, and no Soul beyond the separate mental data (dharma = anatman = nirjiva).
3. Elements have no duration, every moment represents a separate element; thought is evanescent, there are no moving bodies, but consecutive appearances, flashings, of new elements in new places (ksanikatva).
4. The elements co-operate with one another (samskrtatva).
5. This co-operating activity is controlled by the laws of causation (pravtya-samutpadatva).
6. The world-process is thus a process of co-operation between seventy-two kinds of subtle, evanescent elements, and such is the nature of dharmas that they proceed from causes (hetu-prabhava) and steer towards extinction (nirodha).
7. Influenced (susravat) by the element avidya, the process is in full swing. Influenced by the element prajna, it has a tendency towards appeasement and final extinction. In the first case streams (santana) of combining elements are produced which correspond to ordinary men (prthag-jana); in the second the stream represents a saint (aryya). The complete stoppage of the process of phenomenal life corresponds to a Buddha.
8. Hence the elements are broadly divided into unrest (dukhha), cause of unrest (dukhha-samudaya = avidya), extinction (nirodha), and cause of extinction (marga = prajna).
9. The final result of the world-process is its suppression, Absolute Calm: all co-operation is extinct and replaced by immutability (asamskrtatva = nirvana).

Since all these particular doctrines are logically developed out of one fundamental principle, Buddhism can be resolved in a series of equations:—
dharmatva = nairatmya = ksanikatva = samskrtatva =

pravtitya-samutpannatva = susravatv-anasarvatva = samkleavavyavadanatva = dukhha-nirodha = samsarau-nirvana.

But, although the conception of an element of existence has given rise to an imposing superstructure in the shape of a consistent system of philosophy, its inmost nature remains a riddle. What is dharma? It is inconceivable! It is subtle! No one will ever be able to tell what its real nature (dharmasvabhava) is! It is transcendental!
APPENDIX I

VASUBANDHU ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF THE SARVASTIVADA SCHOOL

The fifth chapter (koça-sthāna) of the Abhidharma-koça (v, 24-6) contains a detailed exposition of the argument between the Sarvastivādins, the Vaibhāṣikas, and the Sautrāntikas upon the question of the reality of future and past elements (dharmas), written according to the method of later dialectics. It is divided in two parts, pūrṇapakṣa and uttarapakṣa. In the first the Vaibhāṣika makes a statement of his case, and he is attacked by the Sautrāntika; he answers the questions and triumphs over the opponent. In the second the parts are reversed: the Vaibhāṣika puts the questions and the Sautrāntika answers them and secures the final victory. As a conclusion the Vaibhāṣika gives voice to his despair at the impossibility of conceiving the transcendentally deep essence of the elements of existence. The translation is made from the Tibetan text of the Peking edition of the Bstan-bgyur, Mdo, vol. 64, fol. 279, b. 5-285, a. 2. Some explanations have been introduced from Yapomitra's Commentary, and the Tibetan commentary of Mchims-pa, which is the standard work for abhidharma throughout Mongolia and Tibet.

AN EPISOICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF PAST AND FUTURE EFFICIENCY

(ABHIDHARMA-KOÇA, KARIKĀ V, 24-6)

The author establishes that some passions exist only at the time when the corresponding objects are present, such as love or disgust towards sense-objects. But there are other passions of a general scope, such as preconceived dogmatical ideas, delusion, a doubting turn of mind, etc.; these have a bearing towards all objects whether past, present, or future. The following question is then raised,

But are there past and this future really existent or not? If they are, it would follow that the elementary forces (samskāra) which are active in the process of life must be permanent (i.e. immovable), since they exist through all time. If they are not,

how is it to he explained that a man is attracted to (objects past and future) by such (passions as he experienced formerly, or will he subject to in future)?

The Vaibhāṣikas do not admit those elements (which combine in the process of life) to be permanent, since they are subject (to the action of four energies which are) the characteristic appurtenance of such elements (viz. the forces of origination, decay, existence, and destruction) But, on the other hand, they emphatically declare that "the times" (i.e. everyone of the three times) are existent in reality.

The Sautrāntika asks, for what reason?

(PART I.—The case for Everlasting Elements)

The Vaibhāṣika answers: The times are always existent Kārikā, v, 24. (1) because this has been declared in Scripture, (2) because of the double (cause of perception), (3) because of the existence of the perception's object, (4) because of the production of a result (by previous deeds). Since we maintain that all this exists, we profess the theory that everything exists (Sarvastivāda).

(1) Because this has been declared in Scripture.—Our Sublime Lord has declared: "The elements of matter, O Brethren, the past and the future ones, are impermanent, not to speak of the present ones. This is perceived by the perfect saint, endowed, as he is, with wisdom. Therefore, he is regardless of past sense-objects, he does not rejoice at future enjoyments, he entertains disgust and aversion in regard to the present ones, he is engaged in keeping them off). O Brethren! If some kind of past matter did not exist, the perfect saint endowed with wisdom could not be regardless of past sense-objects, but, since they are existent, he (enjoys the privilege of) disregarding them. If some kind of future matter were not existent, the wise and perfect saint could not be free from rejoicing at future enjoyments (since his independence would have no object). But future sense-objects do exist, etc."

(2) Because of the double (cause of perception).—It is declared 280, a. 2 in Scripture: "consciousness, when operating, is conditioned by (elements) of a double kind." What are they? The sense of vision and colour (for a visual consciousness), and so on (an organ of perception and its respective object for each of the six kinds
of consciousness, the last being the intellect itself and its non-sensuous objects (for consciousness purely mental).

Thus these first two reasons for admitting the existence of the past and the future are taken from Scripture, but there are others, too, which are founded on argument.

(3) **Because of the existence of an object.**—If there is an object, its cognition can arise; if there is none, neither can its cognition be produced. If the past and the future were not existent, the objects (of the corresponding cognition) would be non-existent, and, as non-existent, they could not be cognized.

(4) **Because of the production of a result (by former deeds).**—If the past did not exist, how could a deed, good or bad, attain, after some lapse of time, its fruition, since, at the time when the latter appears, the cause which has produced retribution is gone. (A former deed, good or had, does exist in reality, because, when it becomes ripe, it produces fruition, just as a present one does.)

For these reasons we Vaiibhasikas maintain that the past and the future necessarily exist. This leads to the theory that everything is existent, and our school is known by emphatically adhering to the principle of such universal existence (Sarvastivāda). Accordingly (it is said above in the mnemonic verse): "since we maintain that all this exists, we profess the theory that everything exists." Those who maintain that everything, past, future, and present, exists are advocates of universal existence (Sarvastivādins). On the other hand, those who make a distinction, partly admitting and partly denying this theory, are termed the Distinguishing School (Vibhajnavādins). They maintain that the present elements, and those among the past that have not yet produced their fruitions, are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and of those among the past that have already produced fruition.

**Sautrāntika.**—And how many branches are there among these advocates of universal existence?

**Vaiibhasika.**—There are four branches, inasmuch as they maintain (1) a change of existence (bhava-parināma), (2) a change of aspect (lakṣaṇa-parināma), (3) a change of condition (avasthā-parināma), or (4) contingency (apekṣa-parināma). The third is all right. The difference in time reposes on a difference of condition (i.e. function of the elements).

1 It was the venerable Dharmatīra who maintained the 280, b. 3, view that existence (bhava) changes in the course of time, not substance (lakṣaṇa). He is known to have been arguing thus: when an element enters different times, its existence changes, but not its essence, just as when a golden vessel is broken, its form changes, but not its colour. And when milk is turned into curds, its taste, consistency, and digestible value are gone, but not its colour? In the same manner, when an element, after having been future, enters into a present time, it gets rid of its future existence, but not of the existence of its essence, and when from present it becomes past, it casts away its present existence, but not the existence of its substance.

2 It was the venerable Ghosā who assumed a change in the 280, b. 6, aspect of the elements (lakṣaṇa). He is known to have professed the theory that, when an element appears at different times, the past one retains its past aspect, without being severed from its future and present aspects, the future has its future aspect, without being altogether deprived of its past and present aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect, without completely losing its past and future aspects. Just as, when a man falls into passionate love with a female, he is not altogether deprived of his capacity of love towards other females (but this capacity is not prominent).

3 A change of condition (avasthā) is advocated by the 281, a. 1, venerable Vasuniitra. He is known to have maintained that, when one element manifests itself at different times, it changes in condition, and receives different designations according to the condition which it has reached, without changing in substance. (When an element is in a condition in which it does not yet produce its function, it is called future; when it produces it, it is called present; when, having produced it, it ceases to work, it is past, its substance remaining the same.) Just as in an abacus the same ball receives different significations according to the place it is thrown in. If it is thrown in the place for units it means one, if in the place for hundreds it means a hundred, if in the place for thousands it means one thousand.

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1 Or, if rūpa stands for svārūpa, "its essence."
An advocate of contingency (apēkṣā) is the venerable Buddhadeva. He is known to have maintained the principle that an element in the course of time receives this or that denomination on account of its relation to the former and the next moment. (An element is future with respect to the former one, be it past or present, it is present with respect to a former, i.e., past one or with respect to the next one, i.e., future one, it is past with respect to the next one, be it present or future.) Just as the same female may be called a mother (with respect to her children) and a daughter (with respect to her own mother).

Thus it is that all these four (lines of thought) are forty many varieties of the theory which maintains Universal Existence. As regards the first of them, it is nothing else than the doctrine of the changing manifestations (of one eternal matter). Therefore it must be included in the Sāṅkhya system (which has already been rejected). As to the second, it is a confusion of all times, since it implies co-existence of all the aspects (of an element) at the same time. The passion of a man may be prominent towards one female, and merely existent (imperceptibly) towards another one, but what has this fact to do with the theory it is supposed to illustrate? According to the fourth explanation, it would follow that all the three times are found together, included in one of them. Thus in the scope of the past time we can distinguish a former and a following moment. They will represent a past and a future time. Between them the intermediate moment will correspond to a present time. Thus it is that among all proposed explanations the (remaining one alone), the third in number, is right, that which maintains a change of condition (or function). According thereto the difference in time reposes on the difference in function: at the time when an element does not yet actually perform its function it is future; when performing it, it becomes present; when, after having performed it, it stops, it becomes past.

Saṅrāntika.—Although I perfectly understand all this, I do not see my way to admit that it implies a real existence of the past and of the future. For, if the past is really existent and the future likewise, what induces us (to make a distinction between them and) to call them past and future?

Vaibhāṣika.—But have we not already explained it: the time of an element is settled in accordance with the time of its function.

Saṅrāntika.—If this be the case, an eye which does not look at the present moment will not be present, because it does not perform its function.

Vaibhāṣika.—It is present (because it performs its other functions): it is the immediate cause of the next moment of its existence and the remote cause determining (its future character).

(Although an eye that does not look is not performing its function, Mahāyāna, ii, it, nevertheless, is efficient in immediately producing and forecasting the homogeneousness of its future with its past and in producing its, so-called, co-operative result. In that sense it is present.)

Saṅrāntika.—In that case the past will be the same as the present, since the past likewise produces such results—the past viewed as a cause of homogeneousness in consecutive moments, as a general moral cause, and as a cause requiring retribution—all these causes would be present since they may perform their actual functions at the present moment.

Vaibhāṣika.—I call present a cause which exhibits at the present moment a double function—that of giving an immediate result
and that of determining the character of its remote future. A past cause, although it may produce a result at the present moment, does not, at present, determine its general character (which has been previously determined). Therefore the past is not the same as the present.

Śauryāntiūka.—If the time is settled according to efficiency, an element may be past inasmuch as its power of determining the general character of a remote result belongs to the past, and it may be present nevertheless, since it produces the result of the present moment. Thus a confusion of the characteristic signs of all the three times will arise, and I maintain that you are guilty of such confusion. Your standpoint leads to the absurdity of assuming actual or semi-actual past causes (i.e., semi-present elements), since the cause of homogeneity and other past causes may produce a (present) result. A confusion of the essential natures of the three times is the consequence.

Vaiṣākha.—The function of an element were something different from the element itself, your objections would be right. But since it is not different, they do not hold good.

Śauryāntiūka.—Then there is no time at all! If the function is the same as the substance, the elements will always remain identical. For what reason are they sometimes called past, sometimes future, and sometimes present?

Vaiṣākha.—An element that has not yet appeared is future, one which has appeared and not yet disappeared is present, one which has disappeared is past. What is it you find unfounded in this explanation?

Śauryāntiūka.—The following point needs here to be established:—

Kārikā, v. 25.

If the substance of the same element has appeared and not yet disappeared is present, why is it future and past? The essence of the elements of existence (dharmās) is deep!

If the essence alone of the elements of existence persists throughout all the three times, but not their function, what is it that constitutes an impediment to this function? What is it that sometimes induces them to perform and sometimes keeps them hack from performing their function?

Vaiṣākha.—The function is performed when all the necessary conditions are present.

Śauryāntiūka.—This won't do! because (according to your theory) these conditions are always present. Again, as to the functions themselves, they likewise may be past, future, and present. They then require an explanation in their turn.

Will you admit the existence of a second function (which will determine the time of the first)? or will you suppose that it neither is past, nor future, nor present, but that it, nevertheless, does exist? In this case this function will not be subject to the elementary forces of life (samkṛta) and will represent an immovable eternal entity (asamkṛta). For this reason you cannot maintain that, as long as an element does not yet perform its function, it is future.

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The Central Conception of Buddhism

same time. This, indeed, is something quite new! It has been said on this occasion:—

Maintained eternal essence;
Denied eternal being!
And yet no difference between
This essence and this being.
'Tis clearly a caprice
Of the Almighty!
'Tis spoken by His order!

(Vaibhāṣyika.—But Buddha has said that there "is" a past and there "is" a future.)

Sautrāntika.—We, likewise, maintain that there "is" a past and there "is" a future. But this means that what has been formerly "is" past, and what, in the (presence of its causes), will happen "is" future. They exist in this sense only, not in reality.

(Vaibhāṣyika.—But! Buddha has declared that there "is" a past and there "is" a future.)

Sautrāntika.—No! He meant that a force to produce a past deed into the run (of combined elements which constitute an individual). Were it existent in reality, it would not be past. This is the only way in which this passage needs be understood, because on another occasion, in the sermon about "Non-substantiality as the Ultimate Truth", the Sublime Lord has spoken thus: "When the organ of vision appears into life, there is absolutely nothing from which it proceeds, and when it vanishes, there is to which it retires. Therefore, O Brethren, this organ of vision has no former existence. Then it appears, and after having been existent it vanishes again." If a future organ of vision were existent, Buddha would never have declared that it appeared out of non-existence (out of nothing).

Sautrāntika.—This passage means that, as far as the present time is concerned, it did not exist, and then appeared (in the scope of this time).

Sautrāntika.—Impossible! Time is not something different from the object (existing in it).

Sautrāntika.—But may not its essence have not been present and then have appeared?

Sautrāntika.—This would only prove that it had no (real) future existence.

(To the second argument of the Sarvāstivādins refuted)

Sautrāntika.—Now your second argument is drawn from the circumstance, when arising, reposes on two factors:

The second argument of the Sarvāstivādins is refuted.

1 Paramārtha-dṛṣṭyā-dūtra. Saṃyuktāgama, xii, 22 (McGovern).
a perceptive faculty and a corresponding object. Here we must at first (consider the instance) of mental cognition reposing on the operation of the intellect and on a mental (not sensuous) object. Is this object a real cause in the same sense as the intellect? or is it a mere (passive) object realized by the intellect? If it were a real active cause, how could events happen after the lapse of a thousand aeons, or those which never will happen, possibly constitute an active cause of the corresponding cognition? And the Final Deliverance, which is synonymous with the total cessation of every operation of all the elements of existence, how can it constitute a really active cause of its own conception? But if, on the other hand, such objects are mere passive objects of the operating mind, then I maintain that they may be future and may be past.

283, a. 7.  
**Vaibhāṣika.**—If they altogether do not exist, how can they possibly be objects?  
**Sautrāntika.**—Their existence I admit, (understanding by existence) that very form in which they are conceived by us at the present moment in the present place.

283, a. 8.  
**Vaibhāṣika.**—And how are they conceived?  
**Sautrāntika.**—As past and as future. If somebody remembers a past object or a former feeling, he has never been observed to say “it exists”, but only “it did exist”.

(The third argument of the Sarvāstivādin examined)

283, b. 1.  
**Sautrāntika.**—As (to the cognition of past and future) sense objects, the past ones are remembered in that very form in which they were experienced when they were present, and the future ones are known to Buddhas just in that form in which they will appear at the time when they will be present.  
**Vaibhāṣika.**—And if it be just the same existence (as the present one)?  
**Sautrāntika.**—Then it is present.  
**Vaibhāṣika.**—If not?  
**Sautrāntika.**—(It is absent: and thus) it is proved that absence can be cognized just as well (as presence).  
**Vaibhāṣika.**—But (will you not admit that the past and the future) are fragments of the present itself?

1 dharmāś, i.e. 64 dharmas, ayatana No. 12.
Sautrāntika.—If it is something existent, why does it produce an idea of absence?

Vaibhāṣīka.—Then it may be its present absence?

Sautrāntika.—No! it is the same. (If this present absence is something existent, why does it produce an idea of non-existence?)

Vaibhāṣīka.—Then it may be the characteristic sign of a future; (this sign is absent at present, and gives rise to the idea of non-existence).

Sautrāntika.—This sign consists in the fact that the future will appear into existence out of a previous non-existence. Thus it is that both existence and non-existence may be objects of cognition.

Vaibhāṣīka.—And how do you explain the words of the future Buddha, who has spoken thus: "that these persons know or perceive things which do not exist in the world—this is impossible!"?

Sautrāntika.—These words (do not mean that non-existence cannot be an object of cognition, but they) have the following meaning:—"there are other, manifestly deluded, persons (who have not yet attained the divine power of vision: they) perceive things that never did exist. I perceive only existing (remote) things." If, on the contrary, every possible thought had only existing things for its object, what reason could there have been for doubting (the accuracy of the assertion of such people about what they were perceiving by their power of divine vision)? or what would have been the difference (between the bodhisattva's real power of vision and the incomplete power of these men)?

It is inevitable that we should understand the passage in this sense, because it is confirmed by another scriptural passage, which begins with the words: "come unto me, ye monks, my pupils!" and goes on until the following words are spoken: "what I am telling him in the morning becomes clearer at night, what I am conversing about at night becomes clearer to him next morning. He will cognize the existence of what does exist, the non-existence of what does not exist. Where something still higher exists, he will know that there is something still higher; and where nothing higher exists, he will know that (it is the Final Deliverance, that,) there is nothing higher than that!"

Therefore the argument (in favour of a real existence of the past, that you have drawn from the supposed fact that) our intellect can have only existent things for its object—this argument is wrong.

(The fourth argument of the Sarvāstivādins examined)

Sautrāntika.—As to your next argument (in favour of the real existence of the past, viz. because it has a real result—we must observe that we, the Sautrāntikas, never did maintain that a result can be produced from a past deed (directly).

Vaibhāṣīka.—How is it produced, then?

Sautrāntika.—(This deed) is the beginning of a peculiar chain of events (in the course of which the result appears sooner or later). A more detailed explanation of this point will he given later on, when we will refute the theory (of the Vātsāpatīyas, who) maintain the existence of an individual. (As to your view, it is manifestly inconsistent.) What result can a past deed produce according to this view? If the past and the future are actually existent, the result will necessarily he pre-existent from all eternity.

Vaibhāṣīka.—(But we assume the existence of the force of generation?)

Sautrāntika.—Well, then, it will be established that this force itself appears after having previously been non-existent! In fact, if everything without any exception is pre-existent, there can be nothing that could have a force to produce anything! In the end it comes to the same as the theory of the followers of Vasaganyya. According to them there is neither production of something new nor extinction of something existent: what exists is always existent, what does not exist will never become existent.

Vaibhāṣīka.—But the force of a past deed may consist in "making present" (some already existing element)?

Sautrāntika.—How is this "making present" to he understood?

Vaibhāṣīka.—It consists in removing (the result from one) place to another.

Sautrāntika.—Then the result would be eternally pre-existent. And, as to nou-existent elements, how can they (he made to change place)? Moreover, such "removing" means production (of a motion, i.e. of something) which previously did not exist.

1 Ab. K., ix, translated in my Soul Theory.
Vaiśeṣika.—It may consist in a "specification" of the (ever-lasting) essence of an element?

Sautrāntika.—This, again, would prove that there is production of what previously did not exist. To conclude: the principle of Universal Existence, as far as exegetical literature is concerned, where it implies an actual existence of the past and of the future, does not hold good. On the contrary, it is all right if we strictly conform to the words of Scripture, where it is declared that "everything exists".

Vaiśeṣika.—And in what sense has it been declared in Scripture that "everything exists"?

Sautrāntika.—O Brahmins! it has been declared, "everything exists"; that means no more than "the elements included in the twelve categories (āyatana) are existent".

Vaiśeṣika.—And the three times (are they not included among these elements)?

Sautrāntika.—(No, they are not !). How their existence is to be understood we have already explained.

(The Sārvāstivāda reverted to his first argument)

Vaiśeṣika.—If the past and the future did not exist, how could it be possible that a man should be attracted by (a past and future passion) to a (past or future object of enjoyment) ?

Sautrāntika.—This becomes possible because past passions leave residues (or produce seeds), which are the causes of new passions; these seeds are existent (and the saint has the capacity of keeping them down, of being independent of them). Therefore, a man can be bound by (past accesses of) passion. And it is in this sense that he can be allured by (future or past) objects, because the seeds of these passions, which are directed towards (past and future enjoyments), are always present in him.

Conclusion

Cf. Mehims-pa, ii, 167, b. 7.

APPENDIX I: VASUBANDHU ON SĀRVĀSTIVĀDA

be established by rational methods. (And a3 to the use we make of the notion of time in common life, it is contradictory. We use the expression: "what appears vanishes" (implying that the same element appears and disappears, e.g.) "some matter appears and disappears". But we, likewise, say "one thing appears, another disappears", implying that one element, the future one, enters into life, and another one (the present one), stops. We also speak of the appearing of time (itself "the time is come"), because the element which enters into life is included in the notion of time. And we speak about being born "from time", since the future includes many moments (and only one of them actually enters into life).

End of the Episodical Investigation

1 The Peking and Nanthang Batan-bgyur rend here drañ-bar mi nyus-80. This may mean that the remark of the Vaiśeṣika applies to the elements of mind alone, i.e. the elements that cannot be carried from one place to another. But Śāṅghabhadra's text points to a reading bhañ-ber mi nyus-80, which undoubtedly is the correct one, since it is supported by the translation of Huen-Tsang. The corruption must be very old, since the block-print of the Ags monastery, which is founded on old sources coming from Derge, repeats it and it is retained by Mehims-pa.

286, a. 1.
APPENDIX II

TABLES OF THE ELEMENTS
ACCORDING TO THE
SARVĀSTIVĀDINS
GENERAL VIEW

All elements of existence (sarvaṃ = 75 dharmas)

- sātra (72) “influenced” by avidyā
- andāra (75) “influenced” by prajñā

- sātra (72) 72 elements “co-operating” in full swing
  - upādāya-skandha elements “attached” to life
  - duḥkha samudaya
  - prthag jana
- asātra (3) “non-co-operating”
- anātra-skandha elements the same elements, but attachment fading
  - mārga
  - ārya
- nirodha
- buddha

- samsāra empirical existence
- nirodha absolute existence

75 elements
THE CENTRAL CONCEPTION OF BUDDHISM

CLASSIFICATION OF ALL ELEMENTS OF EXISTENCE

\( \text{Sarvam} = \text{anātman} = 12 \text{ āyatana} = 18 \text{ dhātu} = 75 \text{ dharma} \)

I. First General Division

1. samaskṛta = co-operating, impermanent = 72 dharmas.
2. asamaskṛta = non-co-operating, immutable = 3

II. Second General Division

1. ātsraya = "influenced" by passions, process of life in full swing.
2. anātsraya = "uninfluenced" by passions, process of life abating and suppressed.

The first item corresponds to the seventy-two samaskṛta-dharmas as far as they co-operate in the production of an ordinary life (prthivyājana), the second contains the three eternal elements (asamaskṛta) and the samaskṛta as well, in those cases when life is being gradually suppressed and the individual becomes a saint (dya).

III. Third General Division, into four stages (satya)

1. dhiṣka : unātma = the 72 ātsraya-dharmas.
2. samudaya : its cause = the 3 asamaskṛta ātsraya-dharmas.
3. nirodha : eternal peace = the 3 samaskṛta ātsraya-dharmas.
4. mārga : its cause = the remaining ātsraya-dharmas.

IV. Fourth General Division

from the view-point of the part played by the elements in the process of cognition, into six subjective and six objective "bases" (āyatana) of cognition.

I. Six internal bases (adhyātma āyatana) or receptive faculties (indriya).

1. Sense of vision (cakṣur-indriya-āyatana).
2. Sense of audition (gṛōtra-indriya-āyatana).
4. Sense of taste (jihvā-indriya-āyatana).
5. Sense of touch (kāya-indriya-āyatana).
6. Faculty of the intellect or consciousness (mum-indriya-āyatana).

II. Six external bases (bhāya-āyatana) or objects (visayā).

7. Colour and shape (rūpa-dhyātam).
8. Sound (ghadb-āyatana).
10. Taste (rasa-āyatana).
11. Tangibles (spraṣṭavya-āyatana).
12. Non-sensuous objects (dharma-āyatana or dharmāḥ),

In this classification the eleven first items correspond to elements (dharma), each including one. The twelfth item contains all the remaining sixty-four elements, and it is therefore called dharmā-āyatana or simply dharmāḥ, i.e. the remaining elements.

V. Fifth General Division

into eighteen classes (dhātu = gotra) of elements represented in the composition of an individual stream of life (santāna) in the different planes of existence.

I. Six indriyas.

1. Cakṣur-dhātu, sense of vision.
2. Gṛōtra-dhātu, audition.
3. Ghrāṇa-dhātu, smelling.
5. Kāya-dhātu, touch.

II. Six visayās.

7. Rūpa-dhātu, colour.
8. Ghrāṇa-dhātu, sound.
10. Rasa-dhātu, taste.
11. Sprāṣṭavya-dhātu, tangibles.
12. Dharmā-dhātu, or dharmāḥ, non-sensuous objects.

III. Six vijnānas.

15. Olfactory (ghṛāṇa-vijnāna-dhātu).
17. Tactile (kāya-vijnāna-dhātu).

Ten of these dhātus contain one dharma each (Nos. 1–5 and 6–11); the dhātu No. 12 contains sixty-four dharmas (forty-six caitta, fourteen cītta-viprayukta, three asamaskṛta, and avijñāpti); consciousness, representing a single dharma, is split into seven dhātus, No. 6 and Nos. 15–18.

On the sensuous plane of existence (kāma-Dhātu) the individual streams (santāna) are composed of all the eighteen dhātus. In the world of "Reduced Matter" (rūpa-Dhātu) the dhātus Nos. 9–10 and 15–16 are absent, and the individuals are composed of only fourteen dhātus. In the Immaterial Worlds (arūpa-Dhātu) they are composed of only three dhātus, Nos. 6, 12, and 18, since all matter and sensuous consciousness does not exist there.

The six visayās are visaya in regard to the six indriyas, but ālambana in regard to the six vijnānas.
VI. Sixth division, of the seventy-two active elements (samskṛta-dharma) into five groups (skandha).

1. rūpa-skandha, the physical elements, matter
2. vedanā-skandha, feeling
3. sanjñā-skandha, conception
4. sanātana-skandha, will and other forces
5. vijñāna-skandha, pure consciousness (without content)

Together . . 72

Group means collection, viz. of dharmas past, present, and future, remote and near, pure and defiled, etc. The asamskṛta are not included in this division, but the other anāsra, as well as the sāsra, are included. When the sāsra alone are meant, the groups are called upādāna-skandha, i.e. elements of "attachment" to life. Other synonyms are rāga "struggle", duhkha "unrest", duhkha-samudaya "cause of unrest", loka "mundane existence", āsāsi-sthiti "the place where the belief in the existence of personality obtains", bhava "existence" simply, since by existence simply the usual existence of ordinary men is meant.

When the skandhas embrace all the same-dharmas, the sāsra and anāsra as well, they receive, in contradistinction to the upādāna-skandhas, other names: adhviniḥ "the (three) times", kathā-vastra "objects of speech", samāharaṇa "elements to be suppressed", savāstuka "having empirical reality", or "being subject to causality". The skandha No. 4 contains all the caitya-dharmas, except vedanā and sanjñā, i.e. forty-four mental faculties with cetasā, the will as the principal one, and fourteen general forces (caitya-viprayuktas).

The Single Elements of Matter (rūpa), Mind (citta-citta), Forces (viprayuktasamskāra), and Eternity (asamskṛta)

A. Matter (rūpa)

1. cakṣura-indriya, translucent matter (rūpa-prāṇāda) conveying olfactory sensations.
2. ātma-indriya, translucent matter (rūpa-prāṇāda) conveying auditory sensations.

APPENDIX II: TABLES OF ELEMENTS, VI, A

3. ghrāna-indriya, translucent matter (rūpa-prāṇāda) conveying olfactory sensations.
4. jihvā-indriya, translucent matter (rūpa-prāṇāda) conveying taste sensations.
5. kāya-indriya, translucent matter (rūpa-prāṇāda) conveying tactile sensations.
6. rūpa-viṣaya, visual sense-data.
7. cānḍa-viṣaya, auditory
8. gandha-viṣaya, olfactory
9. rasa-viṣaya, taste
10. sapraṣāya-viṣaya, tactile
11. aviṣṣapt, unmanifested matter, the vehicle of moral qualities.

Matter is divided into primary (bhūta = mahābhūta) and secondary (bhautika). Four atoms of primary matter, one from each mahābhūta, are necessary to support one bhautika-atom. Only No. 10, the tactile class, contains both the primary and some secondary kinds of tactility: all the other classes contain only secondary, supported, kind of matter.

The Four Universal Elements of Matter (mahābhūta)

1. pṛthvi, element manifesting itself as hard-stuff, or repulsion.
2. ap, "vācas-stuff, or attraction.
3. tejas, "heat-stuff.
4. tāṇa, "motion-stuff.

Aviṣṣapti is a variety of karma. Actions can be either mental (cetasā) or physical—corporeal and vocal acts (kāya- and vācika-karma). They are also divided into manifest acts (viṣapti) and unmanifested ones—aviṣṣapti. The latter are, for our habits of thought, not acts, but their results, they are not physical, but moral. If a novice has taken the vows he has committed a physical, vocal action, which is viṣapti, but the lasting result is some moral excellence hidden in consciousness, and this is aviṣṣapti. It constitutes a link between the act and its future retribution; it is, therefore, the same as samskāra, apūrva, adṛṣṭa of the Brahmanical systems. Although by no means physical, since it lacks the general characteristic of matter which is impenetrability (sapratīghata), it nevertheless is brought by the Sarvāstivādins (not by others) under the head of rūpa,
because of its close connexion with the physical act upon which it follows as a shadow cast from an object always follows that object.

B. CONSCIOUSNESS, PURE, WITHOUT CONTENT (CITTA = MANAS = VIJÑĀNA)
1. manas, consciousness in the rôle of an independent, sixth, perceptive faculty, cognizing the non-sensuous, or abstract, objects (dharmāḥ); it represents the preceding moment with regard to the mano-vijñāna.
2. caksur-vijñāna, the same pure consciousness when associated with the visual sense.
3. gṛotra-vijñāna, the same pure consciousness when associated with the auditory sense.
4. ghāna-vijñāna, the same pure consciousness when associated with the olfactory sense.
5. jihvā-vijñāna, the same pure consciousness when associated with the taste sense.
6. kāya-vijñāna, the same pure consciousness when associated with the tactile sense.
7. mano-vijñāna, the same pure consciousness when associated with a previous moment of the same run of consciousness without participation of any of the five senses.

C. THE FORTY-SIX MENTAL ELEMENTS (CITTA-DHARMA) OR FACULTIES INTIMATELY COMBINING WITH THE ELEMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS (CITTA-SAMPRAVYUETA-SĀMSKĀRA)

They are divided into —
1. 10 citta-mahābhūmika-dharma, Mental Faculties.
2. 10 kuṭala-mahābhūmika-dharma
3. 6 klea-mahābhūmika-dharma
4. 1 akulas-mahābhūmika-dharma
5. 10 upakāla-(paritta)-bhūmika-dharma
6. 8 amiyata-bhūmika-dharma

Together 48

a. Ten General Mental Faculties present in every moment of Consciousness (citta-mahābhūmika) —
1. vedāṇa . faculty of feeling (pleasant, unpleasant, indifferent).
2. saññā . will, conscious effort (citta-abhisekasāra, citta-prasāpa).
3. cethā . sensation (comparable to a first contact) between object, sense-organ, and consciousness.
4. aparā . concepts (capable of coalescing with a word).

b. Ten Universally "good" Mental Forces, present in every favourable moment of Consciousness (kuṭala-mahābhūmika) —
1. pradhā . faculty of belief in retribution, the purity of mind, the reverse of passion.
2. vīrya . courage in good actions.
3. upekṣā . equanimity, indifference.
4. hri . shyness, modesty.
5. apaśatā . aversion to things objectionable, feeling disgust with reference to other people's objectionable actions.

The reverse of IV, 2.

6. aloha . absence of love.
7. adveśa . absence of hatred.
8. akāśa . causing no injury.
10. apramāṇa . acquiring and preserving good qualities.

c. Six Universally "Obscured" Mental Elements present in every unfavourable moment of Consciousness (klea-mahābhūmika) —
1. moha . faculty of ignorance, the reverse of prajñā ( = avidyā).
2. āciras . carelessness, the reverse of apramāṇa.
3. kaupiṣṭa . mental heaviness, clumsiness.
4. acraddhā . disturbed mind, the reverse of pradhā.
5. sthāna . sloth, indolence, inactive temperament.

These six faculties are not always absolutely bad; they sometimes may be indifferent (avayākṣa) for the progress towards Final Deliverance, but they are nevertheless always "obscured" (*nivṛtta = āchādita = kliṣṭa) by promoting the belief in an existing personality (sattāya-anugrāha-dṛṣṭi-samprajñātaka). Always bad (akūcalā ṇ eva) are the following two—

**d. Two Universally "bad" Elements present in every unfavourable moment of Consciousness (akūcalā-mahā- bhāmiśa-dharma)***


2. *anapatraśya* - not feeling indignated at offences done by others (avadye sadbhir garite bhaya-adacāreṇam). The reverse of II, 6

**e. Ten Vicious Elements of limited occurrence (upakleca- (parītta-)bhāmikā-dharma)***


2. *māsāya* - hypocrisy, deceit (of courtiers and others).

3. *maṭārya* - envy.


5. *pradīṣa* - approving objectionable things (śāvadāya-kastu-parāmaṛṣa).


8. *māyā* - deceit.


These ten elements are described as purely mental (*mano-bhāmiśa eva*); they are never associated with any of the

1. pratiṣṭha = guru-sāhūmā.

Five varieties of sensuous consciousness (*na puna-vijñāna-kāyikāḥ*), they cannot combine with the four alternating *kleças* (rāga, dveṣa, māna, vicikitsā), but with *moha* = avidyā alone, the purely mental *kleça*. They must be suppressed by knowledge (dṛṣṭi-heyā, not by concentration (bhāvanā-heyā). For all these reasons they are classified as vices of a limited scope (parītta-bhāmiśa).

**f. Eight Elements not having any definite place in the above system, but capable of entering into various combinations (anuyāta-bhāmiśa-dharma)***

1. *kaukṛtya* - faculty of repenting.

2. *mīddha* - absent-mindedness, dreamy state of mind.

3. *vālaka* - a searching state of mind.

4. *vīcāra* - a fixing state of mind.

5. *rāga* - love, passion.


7. *māna* - pride, an exaggerated opinion of one's own preeminence by real or imagined qualifications (cf. māda, V, 10).

8. *vicikitsā* - a doubting turn of mind.

*Kaukṛtya* is brought under this head because it neither has a place among the universal faculties, nor has it a definitely "good" or definitely "bad" significance: it can mean repentance for a bad deed and being sorry for having e.g. overdone in charity.

*Mīddha* can also have various moral aspects.

*Vālaka and vīcāra* are universal only in the *kāma-Dhātu*.

*Rāga, dveṣa, māna, and vicikitsā* are *four kleças*, the fifth being *moha* placed in *III, 1*. *Moha* is a universal "defiler", entering in every unfavourable conscious moment, but the other four "defilers" cannot combine with one another; if *there is rāga* associated with one's consciousness, there can be no association with *dveṣa* at the same time. Thus it is that in every *favourable*, "good" moment, consciousness is associated with at least twenty-two elements: the ten universal ones (I, 1–10), the ten universally good ones, and *vālaka, vīcāra* (VI, 4–5). If repentance (VI, 1) is added, the
number will increase by one. In every unfavourable or "bad" moment the minimum number will be twenty elements: the ten universal ones (I, 1-10), the six universal "obsurred" (III, 1-6), the two universally bad (IV, 1-2), and vitarka, vicāra (VI, 4-5). If all the samskṛta-lakṣānas, citta itself, its lakṣānas and upalakṣānas are taken into account, the number will increase accordingly (cf. p. 30, n. 2).

Vasubandhu remarks that it is very difficult to distinguish all these elements even in the long run, let alone in a moment, but difficult does not mean impossible. Contradictory elements, e.g. pleasure and pain, cannot enter into the same combination, but contradiction is often only on the surface, e.g. sthayī and avidhātya, an inactive and an exuberant element, are present in every vicious moment, it is some indulging in vice and some active participation. Whether the individual or the conscious state shall be more passive or more active depends on the occasional predominance of one element over the others. In every moment, or mental state, there always is one predominant element, just as in material substances we have earth, water, fire, and air, according to the predominance of one of the mahābhūtas (cf. p. 13). Among the universally good elements indifference (upekṣā, II, 3) and inclination (adhimokṣa, II, 9) are not contradictory: they are directed towards different objects: indifference towards pain and pleasure, and inclination towards good deeds, they can go together. But apramāda (II, 10) and pramāda (III, 2) are the reverse of one another, not mutual absence alone, and therefore they never can combine.

Vitarka. Vicāra.

Vitarka and vicāra are sub-conscious operations of the mind (na nirodha-dharmayau). Vitarka is "an indistinct murmur of the mind" (mano-jalpa), which is searching (pratyayāsaka) after its object. In its initial stage (anatulyāha-avasthāgām) it is simply a move of will (cetāna-viṣesa); when emerging into the conscious plane (atyūha-avasthāgām), it becomes a certain thought (prajñā-viṣesa). Vicāra is also an "indistinct murmur of the mind", but it is attempting to fix (pratyayāsaka) its object; it has the same two stages; it is also characterized as a refinement (sūkṣmatā) of the coarser (audārīka) vitarka. Since both these functions are associated with sense-consciousness, they very nearly approach the Kantian doctrine of synthesis of apprehension preceded by the mira running through a variety of sense-impressions, as far as they are sub-conscious operations of the mind preceding a definite sense perception. The Vaibhāsikas maintain that there is some vitarka (= vikalpa) in every moment of consciousness; they then call it svabhāva-vikalpa; but Vasubandhu seems to admit "pure sensation" (reine Sinnlichkeit) without any participation of discursive thought (vikalpa). Cf. Ab. K. i, 30; ii, 33. Vyāsa-bhāṣya in i, 44, according to Professor B. Seal (Positive Sciences, p. 18), trans. pure intuition (nirvicāra-nirvikalpa-prajñā) and "empirical" intuition (svaćāra-nirvikalpa-prajñā); the latter contains the three relations of Space, Time, and Causation, in addition to pure consciousness.

D. Forces which can neither be included among material nor among spiritual elements (Rūpa-citratā-vipyrtukta-samskāra)

1. prāpti . . a force which controls the collection of the elements in an individual stream of life (sāntāna).
2. aprāpti . . a force which occasionally keeps some elements in abeyance in an individual sāntāna.
3. nikāya-sa-bhāgata . . a force producing generality or homogeneity of existences, the counterpart of the realistic generality of the Vaibhāsikas.
4. āsanājīka . . a force which (automatically, as a result of former deeds) transfers an individual into the realms of unconscious trance.
5. āsanājī-kā samādhi . . a force stopping consciousness and producing the unconscious trance (through an effort).
6. nirodha-samādhi . . a force stopping consciousness and producing the highest, semi-conscious, dreamy trance.
7. jīvita . . the force of life-duration, a force which at the time of birth foretells the moment of death, just as the force with which an arrow is discharged forecasts the moment when it will fall down.
II. Present Life.

1. viśuddha. . . first moment of a new life, the moment of conception (= pratiśandhi-viśuddha).
2. nāma-rūpa . . the five skandhas in the embryo before the formation of the sense-organs.
3. saṃ-śaya . . . the formation of the organs.
4. sparśa . . . organs and consciousness begin to co-operate.
5. vedānā . . . definite sensations.
6. teṣām. . . . awakening of the sexual instinct, beginning of new karma.
7. upādāna . . . various pursuits in life.
8. bhava . . . . life, i.e., various conscious activities (= karma-bhava).

III. Future Life.

11. jāti. . . . . rebirth.

The five skandhas are present during the whole process; the different stages receive their names from the predominant dharma (cf. p. 28, n. 3). The first two stages indicate the origin of the life-process (dukkha-samudaya).

In regard to a future life Nos. 8–10 perform the same function as Nos. 1–2 in regard to the present life. Therefore the series represents an ever revolving “wheel”.

G. The Twelve Consecutive Stages in the Ever-Revolving Life-process

(Avasthika or prakārṣika pratītya-samutpāda)

1. Former Life.
1. avidyā. . . delusion (caitta-dharma, III, 1).
2. saṃskāra. . . (= karma)
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