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IPR2015-00969, Paper No. 21

571-272-7822

July 28, 2016

RECORD OF ORAL HEARING

BYRON ROGERS FEDERAL BUILDING UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

APPLE INC.,

Petitioner

v.

OPENTV, INC.,

Patent Owner.

Case IPR2015-00969 Patent 5,884,033

Oral Hearing Held: June 21, 2016

Before: JAMES B. ARPIN, DAVID C. MCKONE (via videoconference), and SCOTT C. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges.

The above entitled matter came on for hearing on Tuesday, June 21, 2016, at the Byron Rogers Federal Building , 1961 Stout Street, 14th Floor, Denver, Colorado, at 10:00 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER, APPLE INC.: MARK E. MILLER, ESQ. O'Melveny & Myers LLP Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor San Francisco, California 94111-3823 (415)984-8700

ON BEHALF OF PATENT OWNER, OPENTV, INC.:

DANIEL C. TUCKER, ESQ. ERIKA H. ARNER, ESQ. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP Two Freedom Square 11955 Freedom Drive Reston, Virginia 20190-5675 (571)203-2700

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:00 a.m.)
3	JUDGE MOORE: Good morning, Counsel.
4	We will hear arguments now in Case No. IPR2015-00969,
5	Apple Inc., Petitioner, vs. OpenTV, Inc., Patent Owner
6	concerning U.S. Patent No. 5,884,033.
7	Counsel for the parties, please step to the
8	podium and introduce yourselves, starting with petitioner.
9	MR. MILLER: Good morning, Your
10	Honors. Mark Miller of O'Melveny & Myers, representing
11	the Petitioner, Apple Inc.
12	JUDGE MOORE: Good morning, Mr.
13	Miller.
14	MR. MILLER: Good morning. If I may
15	approach, I have copies of our slides for hard copies of
16	your slides for you, as requested.
17	JUDGE MOORE: Yes.
18	MR. MILLER: Would you like two or three
19	copies?
20	JUDGE ARPIN: Two copies should be fine.
21	JUDGE MOORE: And if you have a copy
22	for the court reporter?
23	MR. MILLER: She has one already.
24	JUDGE MOORE: Thank you.
25	Counsel for Patent Owner?

1	MR. TUCKER: Good morning, Your
2	Honor. Dan Tucker from Finnegan on behalf of OpenTV,
3	the Patent Owner. With me today is lead counsel, Erika
4	Arner, as well. I also
5	JUDGE MOORE: Good morning.
6	MR. TUCKER: have some
7	demonstratives for you.
8	JUDGE MOORE: You may approach.
9	Okay. Before we begin, a few
10	administrative matters. First of all, I see a couple of
11	laptop computers. As you know, we granted the parties
12	permission to use computers today, so that they do not
13	need to bring paper copies of the entire record into the
14	hearing room with them.
15	However, I remind the parties that they may
16	not record or transmit any audio or video from this
17	proceeding. This prohibition applies to everyone in the
18	hearing room, and it also applies to anyone who is
19	listening today from the overflow room.
20	While in the hearing room, the parties also
21	may not use their computers to communicate with or
22	receive communications from other persons. Also while
23	in the hearing room, the parties may not connect to the
24	Internet, including cellular or wireless hotspot
25	connections.

1	So if you're connected, please disconnect
2	now. Any violation of these rules may result in
3	sanctions.
4	Also, Judge McKone is joining us from
5	Detroit.
6	Can you hear us, Judge McKone?
7	JUDGE McKONE: I can. Can you hear
8	me?
9	JUDGE MOORE: Yes.
10	Please note the location of the camera next
11	to the television screen. It will be easier for Judge
12	McKone to see you if you look into the camera while you
13	are speaking to him. Please also ensure that you remain
14	at the lectern while you are speaking. If you move away
15	from the lectern, Judge McKone may have difficulty
16	hearing you.
17	If you wish to discuss demonstratives
18	during the hearing today, please identify any slides you
19	present by slide number. This will make the transcript
20	easier to read and will allow Judge McKone to follow
21	along.
22	If you wish I'm sorry. As you know, per
23	our order, each party has a total of 30 minutes to present
24	its arguments in each case. The petitioner has the burden
25	to show unpatentability. Petitioner will proceed first, and

then Petitioner reserves rebuttal time; it will also speak
 last.

Neither party has filed a motion to exclude
evidence, a motion for observations on cross-examination,
and Patent Owner has not made a motion to amend claims.
Therefore, Patent Owner may not reserve rebuttal time.

Petitioner will begin by presenting its
arguments. Patent Owner will then present its arguments
in full. After Patent Owner finishes its arguments,
Petitioner may then present rebuttal arguments to the
extent it has reserved time to do so. Rebuttal time may
only be used to rebut Patent Owner's arguments.

Counsel should keep track of how much time they have used during the hearings. We will inform counsel when there are approximately five minutes of time remaining. I advise both parties that we are on a rather tight schedule today, so we intend to enforce the time limits strictly.

In addition, if either party has an objection to an argument or demonstrative presented by another party, counsel for the objecting party shall not state the objection while the opposing party is speaking. Instead, the objecting counsel shall wait until the objecting party's turn to speak and then shall briefly state its objections for

the record. Thus, if a party chooses to state objections, it
 should do so on its own time.

3 Unless the panel requests, it is not 4 necessary or desirable for the objecting party to explain 5 its objections. To the extent Patent Owner has objections 6 to argument or demonstratives used during Petitioner's rebuttal time, Patent Owner shall inform the panel of this 7 8 fact before the hearing adjourns. The panel will then 9 afford Patent Owner's counsel time to briefly state its objections for the record. 10

11 Do both parties understand the instructions12 I have just given?

13 Counsel for Petitioner?

14 MR. MILLER: We do, Your Honor.

15 JUDGE MOORE: Patent Owner?

16 MR. TUCKER: Yes, Your Honor.

17 JUDGE MOORE: Thank you.

18 Counsel for Petitioner, you may approach

19 and proceed.

20

MR. MILLER: Thank you.

May it please the Board, Apple has
presented evidence and arguments demonstrating that the
challenge claims of the '033 Patent are invalid. Claims 1,
2, 15, and 23 are anticipated by the Pitcher reference, and
Claim 9 is obvious in view of the Pitcher reference.

1	In view of the Board's decision instituting
2	review and the subsequent briefing, I'd like to focus on
3	the issues that remain in dispute. The first issue is claim
4	construction.
5	JUDGE MOORE: Counsel, one moment. I
б	noticed would you like to reserve rebuttal time?
7	MR. MILLER: Thank you. Yes, I would
8	like to reserve ten minutes.
9	JUDGE MOORE: Proceed.
10	MR. MILLER: We believe that the first
11	issue to be addressed is claim construction. In the
12	Board's preliminary decision, there are claim
13	constructions which Apple contests are correct. Apple
14	had presented different claim constructions, but at this
15	point, Apple accepts the Board's claim constructions and
16	does not challenge those. These are the constructions of
17	filters specifying
18	JUDGE ARPIN: Counselor, I hate to
19	interrupt, but I think in the did we actually make claim
20	constructions in this case?
21	MR. MILLER: There are claim
22	constructions that appear in the Institution Decision at
23	page 11. If you turn to Slide 8 in our presentation, we
24	have presented we can show you those claim
25	constructions.

1	JUDGE ARPIN: Thank you.
2	JUDGE McKONE: So Counselor, my
3	understanding is that we adopted, for the most part, the
4	District Court constructions of the two filter terms and
5	then did not adopt, at least at the Decision to Institute
6	stage, the whether or not the filters must operate at
7	Levels 6 and 7 of the OSI stack. Is that the correct is
8	that correct?
9	MR. MILLER: That's our understanding of
10	the situation, Your Honor, that is correct. And my
11	presentation today will explain why it would be
12	inappropriate to add the limitation that the filters operate
13	at the between the Presentation and Application Layers.
14	JUDGE McKONE: Let me ask you one
15	preliminary question here. I did not see any evidence in
16	your briefing that would state that the Pitcher reference
17	discloses filters operating at Levels 6 and 7. Is that is
18	that correct, that you have not contested that Pitcher's
19	filters do not operate at Levels 6 and 7?
20	MR. MILLER: That is correct, Your
21	Honor. We contest that the claims cover operation at
22	Level 3 and that Pitcher discloses operation at Level 3,
23	and that is where the situation should be determined.
24	JUDGE McKONE: So at least as to this
25	issue, this is a pure claim construction issue, if we rule in

1 your favor, we move on to the other -- the Internet term. 2 If we -- if we rule in Patent Owner's favor, then it's 3 dispositive, correct? 4 MR. MILLER: That is correct. 5 JUDGE McKONE: For filters? 6 MR. MILLER: Yes, that's correct. JUDGE McKONE: Okay. Thank you. 7 8 JUDGE ARPIN: And sir, before you move 9 on, the patent in this case has, in fact, expired, hasn't it? 10 MR. MILLER: Yes, it has. JUDGE ARPIN: Do you know the date of 11 12 the expirations? 13 MR. MILLER: I do not know the date. 14 Your Honor. 15 JUDGE ARPIN: Thank you, Counsel. 16 JUDGE McKONE: But, I guess, following up on that, is it your view that we should be applying the 17 18 *Phillips* standard, that the District Court applies, or when 19 we construe the terms, given that the patent has expired? 20 MR. MILLER: Our understanding is that 21 the Board applied the *Phillips* standard when providing 22 claim constructions in the decision in instituting the IPR. 23 We don't contest those constructions or the application of 24 the *Phillips* standard for that purpose. 25 JUDGE McKONE: Okay. Thank you.

1	
1	MR. MILLER: The Board
2	JUDGE McKONE: I know your time is
3	short, so you're welcome to dive right into the filter
4	terms.
5	MR. MILLER: Yeah. So OpenTV's
6	constructions, which appear at Slide 9, are not the proper
7	constructions. If we look at the reasons why, there are
8	several. Those reasons appear on Slide 10.
9	And the first and most important reason is
10	that there's a significant problem with alleging that the
11	'033 Patent relates to operation at Layers 6 and 7; that is,
12	that the '033 Patent never mentions the seven layer ISO
13	protocol model. It's not in the claims. It's not in the
14	specification. The '033 Patent is completely silent on any
15	operation relating to the ISO model.
16	The absence of any disclosure of the OSI
17	model dooms OpenTV's arguments. Why? Because there
18	is no support for disclosure of OpenTV's arguments in the
19	patent. Because interpreting
20	JUDGE McKONE: Let me ask you a
21	question here. Let's assume that we accept Patent
22	Owner's argument that the prosecution history is clear and
23	there is a disclaimer, and then we also accept your
24	argument that the patent does not disclose it does not
25	provide written description support for Layers 6 and 7.

1	How are we supposed to resolve that? Are
2	we supposed to ignore the disclaimer in the prosecution
3	history?
4	MR. MILLER: Well
5	JUDGE McKONE: Or are we supposed to
6	accept the prosecution history and then evaluate and
7	then some other entity will evaluate whether they have
8	written description support?
9	MR. MILLER: Your Honor, I believe that
10	it would be inappropriate to adopt a claim construction
11	that would render the claim invalid, and when construing
12	a claim, you always find seek a claim construction that
13	is results in why the claim is valid. So if there's no
14	support in the specification for a claim limitation, that
15	limitation should not be added to the claim.
16	And, in this case, the logical conclusion of
17	OpenTV's arguments is that a patentee or a patent
18	applicant could add any limitation to any claim at any
19	time whether or not that limitation was disclosed in the
20	specification or whether it's supported. And that is not
21	JUDGE McKONE: Now, I now, are you
22	familiar with the Liebel-Flarsheim vs. Medrad case, 358
23	F.3d 898?
24	MR. MILLER: Not

1	JUDGE McKONE: And that's a case where
2	we had a similar the Federal Circuit had a similar
3	scenario there where the prosecution history resulted in
4	the claim being construed in such a way that the patent
5	itself might not have provided written description
6	support.
7	And the Federal Circuit, in that case, held
8	that the tools of claim construction, including the
9	prosecution history, arrived at that claim construction;
10	and that when that is clear, we're not supposed to
11	construe terms to preserve validity. Instead, validity
12	would then be evaluated later.
13	Why is that not this case?
14	MR. MILLER: Well, this in that case
15	because we are evaluating validity here. The claim
16	construction determination here is for the purposes of
17	validity determination. This proceeding is intended to
18	determine validity. And if we don't evaluate that issue
19	here, then we have no record for evaluating the issue
20	later. And in we can't
21	JUDGE McKONE: Well, but this is
22	validity of your your concern is that if we construe this
23	as Patent Owner is asked us to construe it, we would
24	result in there being an invalidity problem under Section

1 112, which is not a section that you did or could have 2 raised in the Petition. 3 MR. MILLER: That's correct. But --JUDGE McKONE: So that isn't the validity 4 5 issue that we're worried about here. That's a different 6 validity issue that we -- we are not supposed to be considering here, right? 7 MR. MILLER: Well, let me -- let me say 8 9 this. I believe that when you're performing claim 10 construction, you have to consider all issues relevant to 11 claim construction, not just those that are consistent with 12 the ultimate outcome. 13 And by saying that, I mean that because there is no ability to challenge the validity on 112 does 14 15 not mean that you can't consider 112 issues when 16 performing claim construction. 17 The Board is intended, here, to come up 18 with the appropriate claim construction applying the 19 *Phillips* standard. And if you're applying the *Phillips* 20 standard, you have to consider all claim construction issues, including whether the construction would render 21 22 the claim invalid. 23 Now, if I may --24 JUDGE McKONE: My understanding under the Liebel case, though, was that we're only supposed to 25

consider, I guess, a construction that would save validity
 if the claims are still ambiguous after application of all
 the other claim construction tools, such as the prosecution
 history.

5 MR. MILLER: Well --6 JUDGE McKONE: And this -- and my 7 question assumes that Patent Owner is right, that the 8 prosecution history is clear on its face. Would we, 9 nevertheless, still consider 112 issues even if the 10 prosecution history is clear on its face? MR. MILLER: Well, I can't address that in 11 12 the context of this case because I don't believe the 13 prosecution history in this case is clear on its face. The 14 prosecution history is inconsistent with the dependent 15 claims, it lacks support, and it doesn't teach one of 16 ordinary skill in the art how to apply the proposed construction. 17

18JUDGE ARPIN: Counselor, we don't19presume that the patent is valid here, though, do we?20Isn't that the reason why we don't have to find a valid21claim construction?

22 MR. MILLER: Well, I -- it is true that the 23 patent doesn't -- you don't presume that the patent is valid 24 for purposes of this proceeding, but I think that when we 25 apply the canons of claim construction, whether the

construction renders the claim valid or invalid is one of
 the appropriate things to consider as part of the claim
 construction process.

JUDGE ARPIN: Well, isn't prosecution
history estoppel or disclaimer one of those canons of
claim construction? And didn't the applicant, in fact,
argue that these ISO levels distinguished these claims
over the prior art?

9 MR. MILLER: Well, the applicant did 10 argue about the ISO levels, but the arguments were 11 presented in the context of the Shwed reference and 12 referring to what was disclosed in Shwed and not what 13 was disclosed in the '033 Patent. So --

JUDGE ARPIN: But don't they go to the
limitations on the claims? If the claims were
distinguishable over Shwed, isn't that the issue that we
need to consider?

MR. MILLER: I don't believe that that was
the reason that the claims were valid, or found to be
valid, over Shwed. It may be one of the reasons, but that
--

JUDGE McKONE: But is that the question we have to ask? The question, I don't think, is whether or not the Examiner accepted that disclaimer as distinguished in the prior art. It's the fact that Patent

Owner made the disclaimer that we have to consider; isn't
 that correct?

3	MR. MILLER: Well, we have to consider
4	the applicant made the statements. We're not disputing
5	that those statements appear in the prosecution history.
6	We don't believe that they are clear and unambiguous
7	limitations on the claim, and some of the reasons include
8	the fact that those limitations are inconsistent with the
9	dependent claims. If you turn to Slide 13
10	JUDGE ARPIN: Well
11	MR. MILLER: we will show
12	JUDGE ARPIN: before we go to Slide
13	13 and maybe this is answered on your Slide 13.
14	If we are faced with a situation where we
15	find that there was a disclaimer by the applicant during
16	prosecution, and we find that that disclaimer is consistent
17	or inconsistent with dependent claims, how do we
18	weigh them? Which is which is the prevailing canon,
19	the disclaimer or claim differentiation?
20	MR. MILLER: I believe that, in this case,
21	the overriding issue is what is in the patent. There is no
22	language in the claim that corresponds to the arguments
23	about the claim construction. There's no language in the
24	specification that supports that construction. There's
25	language in the

1	JUDGE McKONE: I
2	MR. MILLER: specification
3	JUDGE McKONE: Hold on
4	MR. MILLER: and the patent that the
5	dependent claims that is inconsistent and I believe,
6	therefore, that the language in the patent has to give
7	precedence over the prosecution history arguments. And
8	if I may
9	JUDGE McKONE: Well
10	MR. MILLER: just one more time
11	JUDGE McKONE: So, I mean, what was
12	your answer to Judge what was your answer to Judge
13	Arpin's question here: If we have the prosecution history
14	clearly pointing one way and claim differentiation clearly
15	pointing another, how do we break that tie? I mean, do
16	you have any any case law support that would help us?
17	MR. MILLER: I don't believe we have a
18	case that specifically breaks that tie, and I my answer
19	to the question in this case is that, in context of one of
20	ordinary skill in the art reading the patent in this case,
21	because there is language in the patent, the dependent
22	claims, it would be inconsistent with the proposed
23	construction, the language in the patent would control.
24	That would be the appropriate way to break the tie in this
25	case.

1	There's no disclosure of the OSI model.
2	One of ordinary skill in the art would not interpret the
3	statements in the prosecution history to be a clear and
4	unambiguous disavowal of the claim scope when that
5	would be inconsistent with the dependent claims.
6	JUDGE ARPIN: Counsel, what is the claim
7	construction that the District Court applied? Did it rely
8	on the ISO layers?
9	MR. MILLER: The claim the district
10	court did adopt a construction involving the ISO layers,
11	yes.
12	JUDGE ARPIN: And as a follow-up
13	question, didn't Judge Breyer Justice Breyer, excuse me
14	in yesterday's Cuozzo opinion, caution us or remind us
15	that we can't deal with 112 in an IPR?
16	MR. MILLER: It is true, as I we
17	discussed earlier, that this Board is not here to determine
18	validity based on 112. But again, my position is that it is
19	appropriate to consider 112 issues as part of the claim
20	construction process, and the case law from the Federal
21	Circuit states that the a claim construction that results
22	in an invalid claim is rarely the appropriate claim
23	construction.
24	JUDGE ARPIN: Please proceed.

1	MR. MILLER: Well, if the Board has no
2	other questions on the claim construction issue, I'd like to
3	do one particular point on that issue.
4	Slide 14 shows the Tanenbaum textbook
5	that is cited by OpenTV in this case. That's Exhibit 2004.
6	And what that shows is that Internet Protocol addresses
7	are treated at the Network Layer of the OSI protocol, and
8	that the Network Layer of the OSI protocol corresponds to
9	the Internet Layer of the TCP/IP protocol.
10	The TCP/IP protocol is disclosed in the
11	specification. And Claims 3 and 4, the dependent claims
12	that we are talking about, require that you compare and
13	using the filters and IP address; that comparison would
14	occur at Layer the Internet Layer of the TCP protocol
15	or the Network Layer of the OSI protocol. That is not the
16	Presentation Layer of the OSI protocol.
17	And final point on this issue is that the
18	Presentation Layer is not present in the TCP/IP protocol.
19	That means that there's no support in the specification for
20	the limitations proposed by OpenTV, and that one of
21	ordinary skill in the art wouldn't necessarily find a way to
22	apply those limitations to the disclosure in the claims.
23	JUDGE MOORE: Counsel, you have about
24	four minutes left until you start going into your rebuttal
25	time.

1	MR. MILLER: Thank you. I'd like to
2	address
3	JUDGE ARPIN: Counselor, before you
4	move on, this textbook that is on Slide 14 it is a
5	textbook?
6	MR. MILLER: Yes.
7	JUDGE ARPIN: This is extrinsic evidence?
8	MR. MILLER: Yes, it is.
9	JUDGE ARPIN: So we have prosecution
10	history estoppel, we have claim differentiation, we have
11	the District Court's construction of the terms, and now we
12	have extrinsic evidence.
13	How do we look at these? What is the
14	order? What is the precedence? What's the priority?
15	MR. MILLER: I believe that the
16	precedence and the priority is the patent first, the lack of
17	disclosure, and the dependent claims. I believe that the
18	District Court's construction comes after those, and that
19	the extrinsic evidence and the District Court level are
20	probably District Court construction are probably both
21	at the same level of extrinsic evidence.
22	JUDGE ARPIN: And the prosecution
23	history, hasn't the Federal Circuit told us that that is to be
24	considered with the intrinsic evidence?

1 MR. MILLER: That would be in between 2 the two, Your Honor. I did leave that out of my answer. 3 JUDGE ARPIN: Thank you. Please continue. 4 5 MR. MILLER: One other issue that I'd like 6 to address with respect to the Pitcher reference is the field of the invention. If you look at column 1, at lines 8 7 8 through 9 of the Pitcher reference of the '033 Patent, it 9 states that the invention relates to a system for filtering 10 messages transmitted between the Internet and a client 11 computer. 12 That description of filter -- of the filtered -13 - and the later description of the filter -- the filter 14 database demonstrates that those filters don't operate on 15 the Internet. 16 The inclusion of Internet -- of the Internet in the preamble of the claim is not a limitation; it is a 17 18 statement of purpose, and that the filtering operations that 19 are claimed by the '033 Patent occur someplace between 20 the Internet and the client computer, or on the client 21 computer. 22 And for that reason, the limitation -- the 23 words "the Internet" in the specification are not a limitation on the claim. 24 25 Secondly, the reference --

1	JUDGE ARPIN: Counsel, isn't "the
2	Internet" in the preamble? Isn't the claim part of the
3	specification?
4	MR. MILLER: Yes, the claim is part of the
5	specification.
6	JUDGE ARPIN: Was "the Internet" in the
7	original claims as filed?
8	MR. MILLER: It was "the Internet" was
9	added.
10	JUDGE ARPIN: Thank you, Counsel.
11	Please continue.
12	MR. MILLER: The reference to "the
13	Internet" in the preamble relates to the content that is
14	filtered, but the claims are not content-dependent. So
15	there's no need to rely on "the Internet" for purposes of
16	determining the scope of the claim.
17	And lastly, on this point, there's no
18	difference
19	JUDGE McKONE: Now now, this only
20	affects Claim 15, though, right? Because Claims 1 and 23
21	both positively recite opening or you know, opening
22	data streams with an Internet server, correct? So we are
23	only worried about the preamble in Claim 15, which does
24	not positively recite "Internet server" in the body of the
25	claim; am I correct?

1	MR. MILLER: Well, I'm addressing the
2	claims that do address "the Internet," and asserting that
3	that those words in the preamble are not a limitation on
4	the claims, as OpenTV argues, because they are just a
5	statement of the purpose and they don't limit, and should
6	not limit, the operation of the filters, which occur on a
7	local area network, not on the Internet itself.
8	With that, I will reserve the rest of my time
9	for rebuttal. Thank you.
10	JUDGE MOORE: Thank you, Counsel.
11	You thank you, Counsel. You'll have 10 1/2 minutes
12	for rebuttal.
13	Counsel for Patent Owner, you may proceed
14	when you're ready.
15	MR. TUCKER: Good morning, Your
16	Honors. May it please the Board, Dan Tucker on behalf of
17	OpenTV, the Patent Owner. With me today in the hearing
18	room is lead counsel Erika Arner, as well as OpenTV
19	representative Brian Platt. In the overflow room today is
20	OpenTV representative Bill Goldman, backup counsel
21	Josh Goldberg, and my colleague Cory Bell.
22	Your Honors, flipping to Slide 3, there are
23	two independent reasons to confirm the claims of the '033
24	Patent. The first is that Pitcher operates at a different
25	level of the ISO protocol model than the claimed

invention. As we will discuss in more detail and was
discussed earlier today at argument, this argument is
based entirely on patent prosecution history disclaimer
because the Petitioner does not dispute that Pitcher
operates between Layers 2 and 3 of the ISO protocol
model.

So if the Board agrees with the District
Court, that during prosecution the applicants made
statements that clearly and unequivocally limited the
claims to functioning between Layers 6 and 7 of the ISO
protocol model, that is all it needs to do to confirm the
claims.

JUDGE ARPIN: Counselor, do we need to
determine whether or not Levels 6 and 7 are supported by
-- or any levels are supported by the specification of this
patent?

MR. TUCKER: Your Honor, the answer to
that question is that the disclaiming statement absolutely
is disclosed -- or supported by the specification, and one
of the --

JUDGE MOORE: Counselor, what is -JUDGE McKONE: Well, but -- first of all,
that wasn't the question. If we agree that the -- with
Petitioner, that it's not -- that Layers 6 and 7 are not
disclosed, yet we find that we agree with you as to

1 prosecution history disclaimer, what would happen? Do 2 we go with you or do we go with Petitioner? 3 MR. TUCKER: So in that event, putting aside the -- our position that it is disclosed in the 4 5 specification, the intrinsic evidence in this case, which is 6 the prosecution history disclaimer and the clear and 7 unmistakable statements that the Petitioner admits were 8 describing the claim filters would trump. 9 112 is not before the Board in this 10 proceeding and is not properly before the Board in an 11 IPR. Petitioner would be free to raise 112 in the District 12 Court. But we're at the Patent Office right now. JUDGE MOORE: So Patent Owner's 13 14 position is that we need not construe the patent to 15 preserve its validity under 112 in an IPR? It's totally 16 irrelevant? MR. TUCKER: So not -- not that it's 17 irrelevant. I think our position -- our position is that the 18 19 specification, coupled with the undisputed expert 20 testimony of what one of ordinary skill in the art would 21 know, clearly shows that there is support for the 22 disclaiming statement in the specification. 23 So I don't even think the Board needs to 24 reach that issue because the support is in the 25 specification.

1	JUDGE MOORE: But if we do need to
2	reach that issue, what is your position?
3	MR. TUCKER: Then the prosecution
4	history trumps and the statement that was made during
5	prosecution clearly limits the claims. 112 is not at issue
6	in this case.
7	JUDGE ARPIN: But is it ever appropriate,
8	Counsel, for us, under a <i>Phillips</i> construction, to ignore
9	the specification or deficiencies in the specification?
10	MR. TUCKER: No. I think you're
11	absolutely right, Your Honor, that is part of the intrinsic
12	evidence.
13	But here, when distinguishing the prior art
14	reference, the other part of the intrinsic evidence is that
15	the inventors clearly and unequivocally limited their
16	claim to operation only between Layers 6 and 7 of the
17	ISO protocol model.
18	JUDGE ARPIN: Please continue.
19	MR. TUCKER: Sure.
20	JUDGE MOORE: Counsel, before you
21	continue, can you please point me to where in the
22	specification supports your interpretation of this
23	limitation as limited to Layers 6 and 7 of the ISO model?
24	MR. TUCKER: Yes, absolutely, Your
25	Honor. So both the original specification and the current

specification disclosed and claimed filtering messages
 and not packets.

So, for example, the original abstract -- and this is shown, if I just move forward to Slide 20 -- I apologize, I'm just going to step away to get there. The original abstract discloses comparing portions of the messages to filtering information and then determining whether or not to block or allow the messages.

9 Now, this distinction between messages and 10 packets is important because, in this case, there's expert 11 testimony from our expert, Dr. Tygar, that one of ordinary 12 skill in the art would have been familiar with the ISO 13 protocol model and would have known that in the ISO protocol model -- and I'm moving to Slide 6 right now --14 15 I'm sorry, Slide 7 -- in the ISO protocol model, data that 16 is transmitted at these higher levels, such as Layer 7 of 17 the ISO protocol model, is referred to as a "message," 18 whereas data transmitted at these lower levels is referred 19 to as "packets."

20

So the --

JUDGE McKONE: Can you show me the
evidence that defines the message as Layer 7, please?
What is the evidence you're relying on?

24 MR. TUCKER: The evidence that we're 25 relying on is the testimony of Dr. Tygar, supported by the

1 Tanenbaum textbook, which describes messages operating 2 at Layer 7 and packets operating at these lower layers. 3 And I think it's important --JUDGE McKONE: And I saw in the --4 5 when you said the Tanenbaum reference. I saw in there 6 the evidence that the message may be referencing Layers 4 or 5, but I never saw anywhere where it's referencing 7 8 Layer 7. Could you point that out to me, please. 9 MR. TUCKER: Yes. It will take me one 10 second, Your Honor, but I'm happy to do that. 11 Your Honor, I can't find the exact segment 12 now. I'm going to ask my co-counsel to look for it. 13 But I would point out that aside from the 14 Tanenbaum textbook, there is undisputed expert testimony 15 in this case from Dr. Tygar -- Apple did not dispute this 16 testimony -- that one of skill in the art would understand this data exactly as we're saying, which is that the data at 17 Layer 7 is referred to as a "message," whereas the data 18 that is transmitted at Layers 2 and 3 is referred to as 19 20 "packets." 21 JUDGE MOORE: Counsel, but, I mean, 22 what we're doing here is we're construing the '033 Patent. 23 And, I mean, I understand your argument, that if we're 24 looking at -- we're talking in terms of the ISO stack. 25 MR. TUCKER: Yes.

1	JUDGE MOORE: Your argument is that in
2	that context, the term "message" would be viewed as
3	being a Level 6 or 7 concept. But the '033 Patent doesn't
4	talk about the ISO stack, does it?
5	MR. TUCKER: So this is one of Apple's
6	arguments, that the '033 Patent, Mr. Miller used the
7	phrase "never mentions" or is completely silent regarding
8	the phrase "ISO protocol model." But there is no in haec
9	verba requirement for written description or specification
10	support.
11	So especially in this case, where the ISO
12	protocol model is undisputedly well-known, and that's
13	Slide 6 shows that the citation to Dr. Tygar's testimony
14	that the ISO protocol is well-known. The patent need not
15	use the exact term "ISO protocol model." One of skill in
16	the art would have known when the ISO or when the
17	'033 Patent was disclosing and claiming comparing
18	messages to filtering information and filtering allowing
19	or blocking those messages, it was talking about filtering
20	at these higher levels, Layers 6 and 7 of the ISO protocol
21	model.
22	And that's exactly what the Patent Owners
23	told the Examiner when they were distinguishing the

24

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Shwed reference. And as I mentioned, Apple does not

1 dispute that the statements that were made during 2 prosecution talked about the claimed filters. 3 This isn't a case like some of the other 4 disclaimer cases or lexicography cases that we've seen, 5 where the question is whether or not the patent applicant 6 is talking about the claimed filters -- or the claims or the written description or a certain embodiment. 7 8 Here, Apple admits that there were -- that 9 the patentees were talking about the claimed filters when 10 they made these statements to the examiner. 11 JUDGE MOORE: I understand that, but 12 isn't it --MR. TUCKER: Yeah. 13 14 JUDGE MOORE: -- at least somewhat odd 15 that we're -- you're asking us to construe a patent claim as 16 limited to Layers 6 and 7 of the ISO model, and you're saying it's consistent with the specification by pointing to 17 the word "messages," and you have an expert saying that 18 19 messages references levels in the ISO model; but there's 20 no indication whatsoever in the specification that the drafter of this patent was even thinking about the OSI 21 22 model when they were using those terms? 23 MR. TUCKER: Because that was a term 24 and a concept that was well-known to one skilled in the art, and that is undisputed here. 25

1	So a patent does not need to recite
2	everything that is well-known to one of skill in the art.
3	There are Federal Circuit cases that say if they did that,
4	then the patent would be a treatise on technology instead
5	of a summary of the invention. But
6	JUDGE ARPIN: Counselor
7	MR. TUCKER: what
8	JUDGE ARPIN: could you look at page
9	21 of Exhibit 2004.
10	MR. TUCKER: Yes, sir. I'm there.
11	JUDGE ARPIN: In the paragraph before
12	the end of the page, beginning "An analogy," doesn't it
13	talk about messages going across Layers 2 and 3, not
14	packets?
15	MR. TUCKER: Yes, Your Honor, it does
16	use the term "message" in connection with Layers 2 and
17	the Layer 2 and 3 interface in this analogy.
18	JUDGE ARPIN: Thank you. Please
19	continue.
20	MR. TUCKER: One other point to note,
21	Your Honors, for specification support of filtering at this
22	higher level, the message level, Layer 7 of the ISO
23	protocol model. The '033 Patent, at column 6 line 10,
24	discusses an example of filtering an HTTP transmission.

1	It is also undisputed that HTTP operates at
2	the Application Layer, Layer 7, of the ISO protocol
3	model. So the specification actually does provide an
4	example of filtering at Layer 7.
5	JUDGE McKONE: But it teaches filtering
6	based on IP address, right? An IP is, what, Layer 4 3
7	or 4, I believe. So wouldn't that tend to suggest that
8	you're actually doing the applying the filter at a lower
9	level, or at least there's some ambiguity?
10	MR. TUCKER: No, I don't think it would,
11	Your Honor, and I would like to address that point
12	because it relates to Apple's argument about our
13	disclaimer argument being inconsistent with the
14	dependent claims that use the phrase "IP address."
15	So IP addresses are are one of the
16	addressing mechanisms used in Layer 3, but it is also
17	undisputed in this case that IP addresses are available in
18	DNS protocol. For example, the DNS protocol, which is a
19	Layer 7 protocol, uses IP addresses.
20	So while the IP address may be used as the
21	addressing mechanism at Layer 3, it is indeed available at
22	Layer 7.
23	So to answer your question, no. And then
24	to answer Apple's argument about the dependent claims,
25	there is no inconsistency here. The '033 Patent actually

describes using IP addresses with DNS, a Layer 7
 protocol, showing that that information would have been
 available at Layer 7.

JUDGE McKONE: Now, if we accept -- if we accept your argument as to the prosecution history estoppel and accept Petitioner's argument as to claim differentiation, in other words, we -- would we have to construe Claim 1, essentially, as narrower than Claim 3? Is that -- would we have to do that?

10 MR. TUCKER: No, Your Honor. So in 11 that instance, I think it is clear. The intrinsic evidence in 12 the record would trump the claim construction standard of 13 claim differentiation.

14JUDGE McKONE: So then Claim 3 would15then be broader than Claim 1. If Claim 1 is limited to16Layers 6 and 7, and then Claim 3 opens up to additionally17claims -- or Layers 3 and 4, I mean, what do we do about18Claim 3 if we rule in your favor on Claim 1?

MR. TUCKER: So, of course, our position
is that, for the reasons I just mentioned, Claim 3 would
not be broader than Claim 1. It could be limited simply
to operation between layers --

23 JUDGE McKONE: Right.
24 MR. TUCKER: -- 6 and 7.

1	JUDGE McKONE: My question is, if we
2	believe Petitioner on this point, on claim differentiation,
3	and believe you on prosecution history, we have an
4	inconsistency. How do we resolve it?
5	MR. TUCKER: By looking at the intrinsic
6	evidence that clearly and unequivocally limits Claim 1 to
7	filtering between Layers 6 and 7. Claim 3 depends from
8	Claim 1, so it can be in no way be broader than Claim
9	1.
10	JUDGE ARPIN: Counsel, is that
11	JUDGE McKONE: Claim 3 is also
12	intrinsic.
13	JUDGE ARPIN: Go ahead, Judge McKone.
14	Sorry to interrupt.
15	JUDGE McKONE: Okay.
16	I mean, Claim 3 is also intrinsic evidence.
17	So we have intrinsic evidence in the form of Claim 3, and
18	intrinsic evidence in the form of prosecution history. If
19	they both point in the opposite direction, why do we give
20	the prosecution history more weight than Claim 3?
21	MR. TUCKER: Because Claim 3 the
22	only reason we're looking at Claim 3 is because of the
23	claim construction standard of claim differentiation,
24	which has to give way to the unequivocal testimony or
25	evidence in the prosecution history.

1	JUDGE MOORE: Well, it's not just claim
2	differentiation, is it? Doesn't the Patent Statute itself
3	require that the dependent claim adds further limitations
4	to an independent claim, and can you do that if it's
5	broader?
6	MR. TUCKER: Yes, Your Honor. And
7	Claim 3, even under Judge McKone's interpretation,
8	would still add a limitation because it would where
9	Claim 1 doesn't necessarily require filtering based on the
10	IP address, Claim 3 still would. So it wouldn't run afoul
11	of that requirement.
12	JUDGE ARPIN: You may proceed.
13	MR. TUCKER: Your Honors, I would just
14	like to address one other point that Apple made regarding
15	the disclaimer, and that is Apple's argument that the
16	specification uses only TCP/IP, which does not include
17	the Presentation Layer.
18	So this argument was made for the first
19	time in the Reply. It was not in the Petition, and it is not
20	supported by expert testimony. But more importantly, it's
21	wrong. It assumes that the TCP/IP protocol model and
22	the ISO protocol model are independent and separate
23	options, when, in fact, they are analogues of each other
24	and not, in fact, mutually exclusive.
1	This is heat shown has Dr. Karataan's
----	---
1	This is best shown by Dr. Knutson's
2	testimony, Exhibit and that's Apple's expert Exhibit
3	1010, paragraph 36, Note 3. I have hard copies of that
4	paragraph if it would be easier for the judges
5	JUDGE ARPIN: We have it in front of us.
6	MR. TUCKER: Okay. In that paragraph
7	JUDGE McKONE: I'm sorry, which
8	paragraph did you say?
9	MR. TUCKER: It's paragraph 36, and in
10	particular
11	JUDGE McKONE: Okay.
12	MR. TUCKER: the part of the paragraph
13	that starts on page 12. I'm sorry, the yeah, the part of
14	the paragraph on page 12, not the beginning of the
15	paragraph. But in this end part of the paragraph and the
16	corresponding footnote, Dr. Knutson himself conflates the
17	IP protocol model and the ISO protocol model.
18	So Dr. Knutson explains in the first full
19	sentence on page 12, he's talking about Layer 3 of the
20	seven level OSI Dr. Knutson refers to it as OSI OSI
21	protocol model.
22	But then he drops an explanatory footnote,
23	and in it, he in order to explain his statement about the
24	OSI protocol model, he refers to the TCP/IP protocol
25	stack. And then, when talking about the TCP/IP protocol

1 stack, he mentions the Presentation Layer of the TCP/IP 2 protocol stack, which belies Apple's argument on Slide --3 I believe it is 14 of Apple's presentation that --JUDGE McKONE: I'm sorry, where did it 4 5 describe the -- the Layer 6 Presentation Layer with TCP/IP? 6 7 MR. TUCKER: Sure. So the whole 8 sentence is discussing -- the whole sentence in Footnote 3 is discussing the TCP/IP protocol stack. It's talking --9 10 and then it talks about enumerating, quote, "layers of the 11 TCP/IP protocol stack." 12 He then goes on to talk about the Network 13 Layer, one of the lower layers of the TCP/IP protocol stack and not part of the higher protocol layer, such as 14 15 Application or Presentation Layers. 16 So that whole sentence is talking about the TCP/IP protocol stack and expressly referencing the 17 18 Presentation Layer. 19 JUDGE MOORE: Counsel, didn't you argue 20 a few minutes ago that the IP address is available to the 21 higher layers? 22 MR. TUCKER: Yes, I did, Your Honor, 23 and it is. This -- this testimony does not change that at 24 all.

1	JUDGE McKONE: Yeah, I don't read this
2	footnote as saying that the TCP/IP has a Presentation
3	Layer. It says the Network Layer is part of the you're
4	talking about the Network Layer is not part of a higher
5	protocol layer, such as a Presentation Layer.
6	That doesn't look, to me, like an admission
7	that theTCP/IP protocol stack has a Presentation Layer.
8	Are you don't you think you're trying to make a little
9	too much out of this footnote?
10	MR. TUCKER: I think this sentence and
11	the footnote together show that the OSI protocol model
12	and the TCP/IP protocol model are used to describe each
13	other. And, yes, I think that this whole sentence
14	describes the use of the TCP/IP protocol stack and
15	describes using the Presentation Layer of that protocol
16	stack.
17	JUDGE McKONE: Do we need to credit
18	this evidence in order to determine that the the claims,
19	as you want to construe them, have written description
20	support?
21	MR. TUCKER: No, your Honor, you do
22	not. I just submitted it as rebuttal to Apple's new
23	argument that the TCP/IP protocol and the disclosure of
24	using TCP/IP in the '033 Patent somehow excludes the use

1 of the ISO protocol model and excludes the use of the 2 Presentation Layer. That's all. 3 JUDGE McKONE: Okay. 4 MR. TUCKER: So unless Your Honors 5 have any questions about the disclaimer and claim 6 construction issue, I would like to briefly address the 7 second argument. 8 JUDGE MOORE: Please proceed. 9 MR. TUCKER: Thank you. 10 JUDGE ARPIN: Counsel, before you move 11 on, one last question about the claim construction, and I 12 asked this question of the Petitioner. 13 We have these various canons, for lack of a better word, of claim construction: The prosecution 14 15 history disclaimers or estoppel, claim differentiation. We 16 have extrinsic evidence as presented by the Petitioner. We have the District Court's claim construction, and we 17 18 have the specification, of course. 19 How do we order these? How do we weigh 20 them? How are we supposed to decide which one should most influence or shape our opinion as to what the claim 21 22 means? MR. TUCKER: Sure. 23

1 So I think the intrinsic evidence is obviously the number one thing that the Board should 2 3 look at --4 JUDGE ARPIN: And --5 MR. TUCKER: -- but --JUDGE ARPIN: -- is this in that intrinsic 6 7 evidence --MR. TUCKER: This includes -- sorry. Go 8 9 ahead, Your Honor. 10 JUDGE ARPIN: I was going to say, does this include the prosecution history? 11 12 MR. TUCKER: Yes, it absolutely does. It 13 includes both the specification, as it would be understood 14 by one of skill in the art, and the prosecution history. 15 And so that is why Dr. Tygar's testimony is 16 so important, because it explains how one of ordinary 17 skill in the art would understand the specification. And when you couple that with the clear and unmistakable 18 19 disclaimer of the claim scope, that alone is enough to agree with the District Court and find disclaimer. 20 21 In addition --22 JUDGE ARPIN: Let me stop you there for 23 one second.

1 Is the testimony of the declarant, is that 2 extrinsic evidence, and how does that weigh into what we 3 are to decide? MR. TUCKER: Yes, Your Honor. Of 4 5 course that is extrinsic evidence, and it would be lower in 6 the stack of *Phillips* evidence that we would want to 7 consider. 8 But that evidence is extremely important 9 here for two reasons. One, it informs how one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the intrinsic 10 evidence. And two, the statements that Dr. Tygar made, 11 12 namely that the ISO protocol model was well-known and 13 one of skill in the art would understand that the higher 14 level protocols, Layer 7, filters messages, whereas the 15 lower levels filter packets, has gone unrebutted. 16 So -- so that evidence informs the intrinsic 17 evidence, and when combined with the other part of intrinsic evidence, the prosecution history, that alone is 18 19 enough to find disclaimer. 20 Supporting that is the fact that the District 21 Court has already construed these terms under the exact 22 same standard that the Board will apply today, and it has 23 found that the -- that the statements are clear and unmistakable. And this -- the statement from the District 24 25 Court is shown on Slide 12 of our demonstratives, that the

1 disclaiming statements were clear and unmistakable, and the terms must be construed in light of this disclaimer. 2 3 Now, the Board noted in its Institution Decision it's not bound by the District Court's 4 5 construction by notions of res judicata or issue 6 preclusion, but it must consider the District Court's 7 reasoned analysis. And that's particularly important in 8 this case where, unlike, for example, in the Proxycon 9 case, the District Court -- or the Board is actually 10 applying the same construction as -- as the District Court did. 11 12 So *Proxycon*'s discussion weighs even more 13 in favor of analyzing the District Court's construction and trying to have some sort of homogeneity between the 14 District Court's construction and the PTO's construction. 15 16 So ---JUDGE ARPIN: Did the District --17 18 JUDGE MOORE: Counsel, one moment 19 please. So you have about 4 1/2 minutes remaining. 20 MR. TUCKER: Okay. Thank you. JUDGE ARPIN: I'll make this a quick 21 22 question, then. 23 Did the District Court make a finding on the 112 issue that Petitioner raised during its 24 presentation; namely, did the District Court make a 25

1 finding that the claim construction, consistent with the disclaimer, is supported by the spec? 2 3 MR. TUCKER: So the answer to that question -- and I'm trying to find the exact record cite --4 5 is that the District Court considered the exact same piece 6 of evidence; namely, this excerpt from the Tanenbaum book, that the TCP/IP protocol stack doesn't include the 7 8 Presentation Layer. It was couched in different terms --9 JUDGE ARPIN: But that --10 MR. TUCKER: It was --JUDGE ARPIN: -- was not really my 11 12 question, Counselor. 13 MR. TUCKER: Yes. JUDGE ARPIN: I'm trying to find out 14 15 whether the District Court made a finding on the 112 16 issue that the Petitioner is asserting is a problem with the 17 claim construction; namely, that the claim construction, consistent with the disclaimer, is not supported by the 18 19 spec? 20 MR. TUCKER: The District Court did not 21 make a statement in its order saying unequivocally that 22 the specification supports the disclaimer. But the District 23 Court did have before it the same type of argument 24 couched in terms of written description that the Presentation Layer is not at the TCP/IP Layer. 25

1	This was in Dr. Knutson's declaration
2	before the District Court, and it was in Apple's brief. And
3	the District Court had that evidence and argument in front
4	of it, and it still found that there was clear and
5	unmistakable disclaimer in the prosecution history.
6	So the answer, I guess, is, no, it didn't
7	expressly include it in its opinion, but it clearly had it
8	before it and the parties briefed it to the court. And in
9	light of that evidence, it still found, as we're asking the
10	Board to do today, that the disclaiming statements were
11	clear and unmistakable.
12	JUDGE ARPIN: Do you agree that the
13	District Court's claim construction is not bounding
14	binding on this Board?
15	MR. TUCKER: For purposes of res
16	judicata?
17	JUDGE ARPIN: For any purpose.
18	MR. TUCKER: I agree that the Board is
19	not bound by issue preclusion from having to accept,
20	without performing its own analysis, the District Court's
21	construction.
22	JUDGE ARPIN: If the District Court had
23	found that the claim, as construed consistent with the
24	disclaimer, was supported by the spec, would that bind
25	this Board?

1	MR. TUCKER: Not for purposes of issue
2	preclusion.
3	JUDGE ARPIN: Thank you very much.
4	Please continue.
5	MR. TUCKER: So with the last three
6	minutes, I just want to briefly address the Internet issue.
7	JUDGE MOORE: Counsel, you have about
8	1 1/2 minutes remaining.
9	MR. TUCKER: Thank you, Judge.
10	Two of the arguments or one of the
11	arguments that Apple makes today is that the preamble of
12	these claims is not limiting. That is incorrect, and it is in
13	contrast with the Catalina Marketing case, which makes
14	clear that when you add a or a part of the preamble to
15	the claim and you rely on it during prosecution, it
16	transforms it into a claim limitation.
17	And that's exactly what the applicants did
18	here. On Slide 33, they added the green "to prevent or
19	allow access to Internet sites" part of the preamble, and
20	that transformed it into a claim limitation.
21	I would just like to also note, with regard
22	to this issue, the Internet the Internet issue. This is not
23	a semantic distinction. This is a substantive distinction,
24	and it goes to the nature of the claimed invention.

1	When the invention was made, the inventors
2	were at a company called Spyglass, and they invented this
3	web browser called Mosaic that became the basically
4	the blueprint for Microsoft Internet Explorer. And they
5	were facing a problem. That was to make sure that
6	parents could protect their children from indecent
7	material over the Internet.
8	This problem that they solved with this
9	invention is drastically different from Pitcher's problem.
10	Pitcher just relates to filtering messages sent over this
11	internal LAN, so that you can more efficiently route data
12	within an organization's local local LAN network. It
13	discusses things called such as printer requests and
14	how to most efficiently route that information.
15	Pitcher does not disclose, however,
16	filtering messages sent over the Internet, like the claimed
17	invention does.
18	JUDGE MOORE: Thank you, Counselor.
19	Your time has expired.
20	Judge McKone, do you have any further
21	questions for Counsel?
22	JUDGE McKONE: Nothing further. Thank
23	you.
24	JUDGE MOORE: Judge Arpin?
25	MR. TUCKER: Thank you, Your Honor.

1	JUDGE ARPIN: Nothing further.
2	JUDGE MOORE: Thank you, Counsel.
3	MR. TUCKER: Thank you very much.
4	JUDGE MOORE: Counsel for Petitioner,
5	please proceed with rebuttal. You have 10 1/2 minutes.
6	MR. MILLER: Your Honor, can you give
7	me a moment while we change the
8	JUDGE MOORE: Certainly.
9	MR. MILLER: The Patent Owner presents
10	arguments regarding messages, but it's important to note
11	that the Patent Owner did not request a construction of
12	the messages that would limit that to something that
13	exists at the Presentation Layer or the Application Layer.
14	Every communication on a network is a
15	message, and TCP/IP communications are messages. This
16	is supported by the testimony of Dr. Knutson, if you look
17	at paragraphs 48 and 98 of his declaration, where he says
18	that it would be inherent to understand that a
19	communication sent on the Internet using the TCP/IP
20	protocol is a message.
21	The '033 Patent is consistent with this and
22	it when it talks about HTTP. And the column 3 and
23	lines 13 and 19, it talks about the IP address of a
24	message.

1	And what happens there is that the HTTP
2	request gets sent to a DNS server so that you can get the
3	IP address. Then that IP address comes back and you
4	have an IP address for a message.
5	So it is not correct that message is limited
6	to something that occurs at the Presentation or
7	Application Layers. Packet base does not make a
8	difference. Every message transmitted on the Internet is
9	sent as packets. There's no difference between packets
10	and messages for this purpose.
11	Now, another important issue is the Pitcher
12	filters, if we turn to a discussion about what the Pitcher
13	filters do. Those filters allow or block access to
14	information. It could be information coming from the
15	Internet or it could be information coming from a LAN.
16	And for purposes of this exercise, in
17	determining what the scope of the claim is, it's important
18	to note that the statement that we have in the '033
19	Patent that says that the invention relates to a system for
20	filtering messages transmitted between the Internet and a
21	client computer.
22	Those communications between the Internet
23	and a client computer occur on the local area network.
24	Almost in no case is there a computer connected directly
25	to the Internet.

1	As the '033 Patent acknowledges, there are
2	firewalls and other devices that sit between the Internet
3	and a local area network, and what happens is that the
4	filtering occurs locally.
5	Again, at column 1, lines 59 to 64 of the
6	'033 Patent, there's a discussion of firewalls, gateways, or
7	proxy servers, where the filter database of the '033 Patent
8	resides.
9	And there's nothing, there's no nothing
10	from the Patent Owner and there's that would indicate
11	the Pitcher does not filter on Internet content if the
12	filtering occurs on a local area network, but the fact that
13	the filtering doesn't occur on the Internet makes no
14	difference.
15	The fact is that Pitcher discloses filters.
16	Those filters can block or allow access to information
17	coming from the Internet.
18	Now, if you go
19	JUDGE McKONE: Now, is your argument
20	that Pitcher actually discloses filtering messages coming
21	from the Internet or that it's merely capable of doing so?
22	MR. MILLER: I think the what we see in
23	Pitcher is filtering that occurs in a way that it is capable
24	of filtering messages from the Internet. You have an
25	example of a MAC address that's something that could

come from the Internet or it could come on a local area
network.

3 And for purposes of our discussion here, a local area network and the Internet operate in exactly the 4 5 same fashion. They use TCP/IP addresses to send 6 messages from one place to another. Every message has 7 to have --8 JUDGE McKONE: Now --9 MR. MILLER: -- an address. 10 JUDGE McKONE: Now, this is an anticipation ground; is that correct? 11 12 MR. MILLER: Yes, it is. JUDGE McKONE: It's not an obviousness 13 14 ground, right? MR. MILLER: That is correct. 15 16 JUDGE McKONE: We have to find actual disclosure, either explicit or inherent. 17 18 It seems to me that you're arguing that this 19 capability argument is more geared towards an 20 obviousness analysis. Where have you shown either explicit or inherent disclosure of, for example, opening a 21 22 data stream to send a message through an interface to an 23 Internet server as recited in Claim 1? 24 MR. MILLER: Our expert has testified that sending a message to a local area network is the same as 25

1 sending it to the Internet because that transmission is 2 based on the TCP/IP protocol. And for purposes of --3 JUDGE McKONE: So is this an actual disclosure or is this an inherent disclosure? 4 5 MR. MILLER: It's an inherent -- it's 6 inherent --7 JUDGE McKONE: Which is it? 8 MR. MILLER: It's an inherent disclosure, 9 and that's what --10 JUDGE McKONE: So necessarily -- so what you're saying is, when you open a data stream to 11 12 send a message through an interface to the -- one of 13 Pitcher's LAN switches, you're necessarily opening a data 14 stream to the -- to an Internet server? 15 MR. MILLER: You are necessarily opening 16 - -JUDGE McKONE: Necessarily? 17 MR. MILLER: You are necessarily opening 18 19 a data stream that could come from the Internet or it 20 could come over the local area network. And in the context of what one of ordinary skill in the art would 21 22 know, every Internet server sits on a local area network. 23 No Internet servers are exposed directly to the Internet. 24 So they're on a local area network. They get -- they send the data to the Internet, and then they 25

1 send the data from the Internet to the next local area 2 network where the filtering occurs. 3 And so the transmission on the local area 4 network by the data -- the Internet server is also a 5 transmission on a local area network. Then it goes across 6 the Internet, which is a network just like the local area 7 network, and opening that data stream is inherently 8 receiving a message in a way that it can be filtered in 9 accordance with Pitcher. 10 JUDGE McKONE: Is it possible to, using Pitcher's technology, open a data stream to send a 11 12 message through an interface to another node on the same 13 local area network. 14 MR. MILLER: Yes, it is. That is possible. 15 JUDGE McKONE: So it's -- so it's not 16 necessary that Pitcher's technology is used to open a data 17 stream to send a message through an interface to an 18 Internet server: is that correct? 19 MR. MILLER: It is not necessarily the 20 case; that is true. The message is -- I would say that the 21 message is --22 JUDGE McKONE: But isn't it the standard 23 that we're held -- the Federal Circuit is going to hold us 24 to the standard that we have to find -- for inherent anticipation, we have to find necessary that necessarily 25

1 discloses opening a data stream to send a message through 2 interface to an Internet server? If we don't find it's 3 necessary, then we have erred; is that correct? 4 MR. MILLER: Well, that is not correct 5 because our position is that Internet, in the preamble, is not a limitation. If -- it's not a limitation --6 7 JUDGE McKONE: But then --8 MR. MILLER: -- because it's only -- go 9 ahead. I'm sorry. 10 JUDGE McKONE: That's why I was referring to, in Claim 1, Claim 1 Element A, which is not 11 12 in the preamble. I was specifically focusing on the 13 language: Opening a data stream to send a message through an interface to an Internet server in the body of 14 15 the claim. MR. MILLER: Well, here's -- you could do 16 that on a local area network. If you have an Internet 17 18 server that is on a local area network and you send a 19 communication from, for example, a computer that's used 20 to administer the Internet server, you are sending that 21 communication on the local area network to an Internet 22 server. I don't believe that that limitation requires that 23 you send the transmission across the Internet.

1	JUDGE ARPIN: Counsel, then what is the
2	significance of the interface between the data stream to
3	send a message through an interface to an Internet server?
4	MR. MILLER: The interface is where you
5	make the transition from the local computer to the
6	network, and that's where the filtering occurs. The
7	interface is where you can do filtering. The TCP/IP
8	protocol that reads the address and sends the message to
9	the right location on the Internet is part of that interface.
10	JUDGE MOORE: Counsel, you have about
11	1 1/2 minutes remaining.
12	MR. MILLER: If there are no other
13	questions, I have nothing further.
14	JUDGE MOORE: Judge McKone?
15	JUDGE McKONE: I have no other
16	questions. Thank you.
17	JUDGE MOORE: Judge Arpin?
18	JUDGE ARPIN: I have no questions.
19	JUDGE MOORE: Okay. Thank you,
20	Counsel.
21	MR. MILLER: Thank you.
22	JUDGE MOORE: Okay. In a moment,
23	we're going to adjourn for a 15-minute break. I'd like to -
24	- before we adjourn, I'd like to thank both counsel for

1 their presentations today. They were very useful and helpful for the Board. 2 3 So as I mentioned, we'll adjourn for 15 minutes. It's very important, because we're on a tight 4 schedule, that both parties make sure that they're back 5 6 and ready to go 15 minutes from now, at 11:25. 7 With that being said, we're now adjourned 8 until 11:25, when we will hear arguments in IPR2015-9 00980. 10 Thank you. 11 (Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter was concluded.) 12