

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,
Petitioner,

v.

FORAS TECHNOLOGIES LTD.,
Patent Owner.

IPR2024-01347
Patent 7,624,302 B2

Before STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, RUSSELL E. CASS, and
LISA A. MURRAY, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

CASS, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

JUDGMENT
Final Written Decision
Determining No Challenged Claims Unpatentable
35 U.S.C. § 318(a)

I. INTRODUCTION

A. *Background and Summary*

BMW of North America, LLC (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting an *inter partes* review of claims 1–27 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,624,302 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’302 patent”). We instituted an *inter partes* review under 35 U.S.C. § 314. Paper 7 (“Dec. on Inst.”). Patent Owner filed a Response (Paper 11, “PO Resp.”), Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 14, “Pet. Reply”), and then Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 19, “PO Sur-reply”). An oral hearing was held. Paper 26 (“Tr.”).

We have authority to enter this final written decision (“Decision”) under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). The standard for review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), which provides that “the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.” For the reasons provided below, we determine that Petitioner has not met this burden of establishing unpatentability of any of the challenged claims.

B. *Real Parties in Interest*

Petitioner identifies Bayerische Motoren Werke AG as an additional real party in interest. Pet. 79. Patent Owner asserts that it is the sole real party in interest. Paper 4, 2.

C. *Related Matters*

Patent Owner identifies the following current district court proceedings involving the ’302 patent: *Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, et al. v. Foras Technologies Ltd.*, No. 1:24-cv-00363 (E.D. Va.); and *Foras*

Technologies Limited v. Nissan Motor Company, Ltd., et al., No. 1:23-cv-00640 (W.D. Tex.). Paper 4, 2.

Petitioner identifies the following additional district court proceedings involving the '302 patent: *Foras Technologies Ltd. v. Toyota Motor North America, Inc.*, No. 2:23-cv-00321 (E.D. Tex.); and *Foras Technologies Limited v. Toyota Motor North America, Inc. et al.*, No. 2:23-cv-00150 (E.D. Tex.). Pet. 79.

The parties also identify the following USPTO proceeding involving the '302 patent: *Ex Parte* Reexamination Control No. 90/019,243, filed by Unified Patents (USPTO). Pet. 79; Paper 4, 2.

This Decision is entered concurrently with a decision in IPR2024-01346 involving the same parties and related patent US 7,627,781.

D. Technology Overview

The crux of the dispute between the parties involves what it means to “switch[]” the “role of boot processor.” *See, e.g.*, Pet. Reply 2–7 (setting out the boot processor argument at a high level), 7–16 (setting out specific arguments with respect to the art); PO Sur-reply 5–7 (setting out the boot processor argument at a high level), 7–9 (setting out specific arguments with respect to the art). We will first provide some context as to what a boot processor does, then provide an overview of the '302 patent.

1. General Background on Boot Processors

A boot processor is responsible for turning on the computer system: testing internal components, checking memory integrity, identifying the system properties, loading the operating system, initializing other resources. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 1023, 1:31–35; Ex. 1018, 1:35–40 (each of which are cited by Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Brogioli, in Exhibit 1002 ¶ 45). Multiprocessor

systems present a unique issue—system startup generally only permits safe operation of one processor, as the multiprocessor coordination features and shared resources are not yet operational. Ex. 1014 ¶ 2. Because a multiprocessor system is unlikely to operate properly with each processor accessing resources at the same time, there needs to be a way to coordinate which processor performs the boot process, for which the prior art offers various solutions. For example, a boot processor may be selected based on which physical location it is attached to. Ex. 1014 ¶ 4 (stating that IA-32 systems select a boot processor “based on the physical location of the processor”); Ex. 1018, 2:1–6 (pre-selecting a boot processor based on physical slot/location).¹ Alternatively, a boot processor may be selected based on it performing a certain task first. Ex. 1014 ¶ 8 (stating some architectures use an “arbitrary” first-to-do-X process); Ex. 1018, 1:44–58, 2:7–14 (describing more “race” procedures). Some systems use specialized firmware. Ex. 1014 ¶ 6 (stating that Intel Itanium processors “rely on a multiprocessor safe firmware to select a [bootstrap processor]”).

However selected, the boot processor begins the boot tasks, which include building tables of various hardware devices so that the operating system knows what hardware it has available to it and where to find that hardware. Ex. 1023, 1:25–39; Ex. 1014 ¶ 3. The ’302 patent provides an example process for booting the operating system in an Itanium processor

¹ In computer hardware, there are *physical* and *logical* devices. For example, if physical CPU0 is in slot 0 in a motherboard and physical CPU1 is in slot 1, but then CPU0 is not working, CPU1 may be designated the first logical CPU, i.e., CPU0. Ex. 1011, 2:9–36. Thus, the actual physical processor that the operating system considers CPU0 is arbitrary and can be changed.

family (IPF) system. Ex. 1001, 11:61. Processors other than the main processors perform initial “sanity checks” and pass control to the boot processor.² *Id.* at 11:61–12:1. The boot processor then has access to ROM (read-only memory) to begin executing code, including code to find all of the processors and other hardware in the system. *Id.* at 11:66–12:13. Various firmware runs on the boot processor, including an extended firmware interface (EFI) layer, which begins loading the operating system. *Id.* at 12:9–27. The firmware creates ACPI (Advanced Configuration and Power Interface) tables so that the operating system can take control of the various hardware devices, including the processors. *Id.* at 12:25–32, 12:60–67. However, because these tables are used to *set up* the operating system, “they are never updated as things change.” *Id.* at 12:67–13:2. This is relevant because, as the system operates, the firmware is handling the swapping of processors when loss of lockstep occurs. *Id.* at 9:4–9 (describing firmware 18 accessing a device tree specifying which processor is the boot processor or spare processor), 9:32–11:3 (describing how the firmware and operating system interact to handle processor swapping). For example, the ’302 patent uses a device tree to keep track of the processors, including which is the boot processor and which is the spare (while keeping the spare hidden from the operating system by not listing it in the ACPI table). *Id.* at 13:21–56.

Not to be confused with ACPI, APIC is an Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller. This is a controller for interrupt handling from various

² As explained in Exhibit 1014, Itanium processors “rely on a multiprocessor safe firmware to select a [bootstrap processor].” Ex. 1014 ¶ 6.

sources, interrupts being a well-known way to notify the processor of some important task or event. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 1008, 268 (Intel developer manual’s chapter on APIC, listing various interrupt sources). The ACPI table will include the APIC ID of the various processors so that the system can use the APIC to route interrupts to the proper locations. *See id.* at 240 (processors adding their APIC ID to the ACPI table during boot), 244–45 (describing the APIC ID format); Ex. 1005 ¶ 26 (noting that “an APIC . . . processes external and normal interrupts that the processor . . . may receive at its interrupt pins”); Ex. 1011 ¶ 21 (describing “an ACPI . . . [A]PIC . . . table, where this table is a structure used by ACPI to describe interrupt routing”).

2. Overview of the ’302 Patent

The ’302 patent discloses a method for “detecting loss of lockstep (LOL) for a processor in a multi-processor system.” Ex. 1001, code (57). The method “determin[es] that the processor for which the LOL is detected is assigned the role of boot processor, and switch[es] the role of boot processor to a spare processor without shutting down the system’s operating system.” *Id.*

The ’302 patent explains that “[t]he traditional response to detected LOL [loss of lockstep] has been to crash the system to ensure that the detected error is not propagated through the system.” Ex. 1001, 3:13–16. According to the ’302 patent, “crashing the system each time LOL is detected is not an attractive proposition,” especially for large systems having many processors. *Id.* at 3:19–25. As a solution, the ’302 patent describes techniques for “recovering from LOL detected for a boot processor in a multi-processor system, in which a spare processor is utilized for such recovery” by assuming the role of boot processor. *Id.* at 4:60–5:1, 5:26–28.

The '302 patent describes a multi-processor system storing information (“device tree”) that “identifies the processor in the system that is the boot processor and identifies the processor that is the spare for the boot processor.” Ex. 1001, 5:40–44. Notably, because ACPI tables “are never updated as things change,” the '302 patent keeps track of the boot processor in the device tree. *Id.* at 12:60–13:35. The '302 patent also explains that the system’s firmware can access such additional information, and “upon detecting LOL for the boot processor, determine[] the spare processor from the device tree and assign[] the spare processor the role of boot processor.” *Id.* at 5:44–48. According to the '302 patent, “[t]he firmware then attempts to recover lockstep for the processor for which LOL was detected,” and “[i]f the recovery of lockstep is successful, the processor for which lockstep was recovered (i.e., the former boot processor) may be assigned the role of spare for the current boot processor.” *Id.* at 5:48–53. In this way, the '302 patent explains, “the multi-processor system may recover from LOL detected for the boot processor without requiring a crash of the system (at least for certain types of ‘recoverable’ LOLs).” *Id.* at 5:53–56.

According to the '302 patent, the spare processor for the boot processor may be a “hot” spare processor, which “is held in reserve, idling until such time as it assumes the role of boot processor responsive to detected LOL for the boot processor.” Ex. 1001, 5:60–63. Alternatively, the spare processor may be an “active” processor that is not held in reserve, but “is made available to the OS for executing instructions during normal system operation,” and “[u]pon LOL being detected for the boot processor, [it] is dynamically transformed into a hot spare (i.e., it is idled) such that it can assume the role of the boot processor.” *Id.* at 5:63–6:2. The system in the

'302 patent performs the swap to a spare processor only for boot processors, not for non-boot processors. *See, e.g., id.* at Fig. 1 (item 103), 9:65–10:9 (process for non-boot processor), 11:4–18 (processor for boot processor). The reason the system provides spares for boot processors, but not non-boot processors, is because keeping spares is expensive and to be avoided. *Id.* at 14:64–15:20. The reason the system uses spares at all, then, is because certain systems require keeping the boot processor active (as far as the system knows), which can be done by substituting in the spare. *Id.* at 11:4–18 (identifying the issue that some systems have with ejecting a boot processor), 6:25–27 (same), 15:62–65 (explaining how the '302 patent fools the operating system by maintaining the ID of the original boot processor on the spare).

According to the '302 patent, in response to detection of LOL for the boot processor, the system's firm ware "changes the assignment of the role of boot processor to the spare processor," where "[t]his change in the role of boot processor occurs dynamically during system runtime, rather than requiring that the system be interrupted (e.g., shutdown and restarted, or crashed)." Ex. 1001, 18:59–19:3.

E. Challenged Claims

Claims 1–27 (all claims) are challenged. Claims 1, 13, 21, and 26 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed subject matter and is reproduced below.³

[1pre] A method, comprising:

³ Paragraph labels provided by Petitioner have been added in brackets.

[1a] detecting loss of lockstep (LOL) for a processor in a multi-processor system;

[1b] determining that the processor for which said LOL is detected is assigned a role of boot processor;

[1c] changing a system identifier, used by the system's operating system to recognize the boot processor, of said boot processor for which said LOL is detected, to a different value, which causes the system's operating system to not recognize the processor for which said LOL is detected as the boot processor; and

[1d] changing a system identifier of the spare processor to that of the boot processor, thereby switching the role of boot processor to a spare processor without shutting down the system's operating system.

Ex. 1001, 19:6–20.

F. Prior Art and Asserted Grounds

Petitioner's grounds rely on the following prior art references:

Name	Reference	Exhibit No.
Landry	US Pat. 5,408,647, iss. Apr. 18, 1995	1011
Bigbee	US Pub. 2003/0126498 A1, pub. July 3, 2003	1012
Safford	US Pub. 2004/0006722 A1, pub. Jan. 8, 2004	1006
Fox	US Pub. 2005/0172164 A1, pub. Aug. 4, 2005	1005
Arai	US Pub. 2006/0036889 A1, pub. Feb. 16, 2006	1007

Petitioner asserts that the challenged claims would have been unpatentable on the following grounds:

Claim(s) Challenged	35 U.S.C. §	Reference(s)/Basis
1–25	103	Fox, Safford, Arai

Claim(s) Challenged	35 U.S.C. §	Reference(s)/Basis
1–25	103	Fox, Safford, Landry, Arai
26, 27	103	Fox, Safford, Arai, Bigbee
26, 27	103	Fox, Safford, Landry, Arai, Bigbee

Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Michael Brogioli, Ph.D., a professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering who has experience in the fields of “computer architecture, computer hardware, computer firmware, and computer software systems.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 16. Patent Owner relies on the testimony of Mr. Nigel Jones, a consultant who “advises a variety of clients on engineering and intellectual property matters” and has experience “in writing low-level, real-time firmware designed to interact with the hardware features of a microprocessor.” Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 7, 9.

G. Overview of the Prior Art

1. Fox (Ex. 1005)

Fox is titled “Autonomous Fail-Over to Hot-Spare Processor Using SMI.” Ex. 1005, code (54). Fox is directed to “a method and system for dynamically activating a spare processor when processor failure is detected in a multi-processor data processing system.” *Id.* ¶ 2. Fox describes a method and system for dynamically replacing a failing processor using Systems Management Interrupt (SMI) functionality provided within basic input output system (BIOS) of the IA-32 architecture.⁴ *Id.* ¶ 15. At least

⁴ IA (Intel Architecture)-32 refers to an architecture used by Intel in its Pentium and certain other microprocessors. *Barron’s Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms* 244 (12th ed. 2017) (Ex. 3001).

one processor of the multiprocessor system (MP) is initially provided as a reserve (or hot-spare) processor that remains in an idle, off, or low-power mode. *Id.* While in that mode, the OS is prevented from initially utilizing the hot-spare processor. *Id.* When a processor failure is detected, SMI code running on a good processor instructs the OS to hold off allocating processes to the failing processor. *Id.* Contemporaneously, the SMI (and OS) activates and completes an initialization of the hot-spare processor to prepare it to begin receiving the held-off processes. *Id.* Control is then returned to the OS, which updates the “active” processor list and allocates the threads that were running on the failing processor to the hot-spare processor. *Id.*

2. *Safford (Ex. 1006)*

Safford is titled “Method and Apparatus for Recovery from Loss of Lock Step.” Ex. 1006, code (54). Safford describes a computer system using lock-stepped processor cores that operate in a master/checker pair to improve reliability of processing assets. *Id.* ¶ 15. Each of two processors in the pair processes the same code sequences. *Id.* When a logic circuit compares the resulting outputs of the processors, any difference in the processor outputs indicates the existence of an error, prompting the logic circuit to initiate a sequence of steps to halt operation of the two processors. *Id.*

Figure 3 of Safford is reproduced below.




FIG. 3

Figure 3 depicts computer system 100 with processors 111, 113, 121, 123, 125, and 127 that operate as pairs when in lock step (i.e., processors 111 and 113 are a first pair; processors 121 and 123 are a second pair; and processors 125 and 127 are a third pair). Ex. 1006 ¶ 18. The processor pairs are coupled to a lockstep logic, and connected to node controller 130. *Id.* According to Safford, “[t]he processor 125 may be designated as a ‘hot standby,’ and is sitting idle in lock step mode with the processor 127.” *Id.* ¶ 20. “Should one of the processors 111, 113, 121, and 123 suffer an error, the hot standby processors 125, 127 may be used to speed recovery from the resulting loss of lock step.” *Id.* ¶ 20.

3. *Arai (Ex. 1007)*

Arai is titled “High Availability Multi-Processor System.” Ex. 1007, code (54). *Arai* describes “a method and system for reserving a processor in a multiprocessor system for availability of replacement in response to detection of an error in a non-reserved processor.” *Id.* ¶ 2. According to *Arai*, “[w]hen a central processor in a multiprocessor system encounters an

error, it is very desirable to not lose the work being done on that processor and to move that work to another processor that is still operating in the system.” *Id.* ¶ 5.

In Arai, during system initialization, one or more logical processors may be reserved in an inactive state. Ex. 1007, code (57). In the event an error is detected on a logical or physical processor, the execution context of the processor experiencing the error is transferred to one or more of the reserved logical processors. *Id.* “Thereafter, the active processor is designated as inactive and replaced by the inactive processor to which the execution context has been transferred.” *Id.*; *see also id.* ¶ 19.

Figure 4b of Arai is reproduced below.




FIG. 4b

Figure 4b depicts the identification and status of each processor following occurrence of an error in a logical processor. Ex. 1007 ¶ 16. Following detection of an error with logical CPU₀ (142), logical CPU₀ is placed in an idle state and assigned the identification number of logical CPU₆ (164). *Id.* ¶ 23. At the same time, logical CPU₆ (164) is placed in an active state and assigned the identification number of CPU₀ (142). *Id.* In this way, in response to an error in an active processor, the execution context of the active processor may be transferred to an identified inactive processor, followed by activation of the processor that has received the execution context. *Id.* ¶ 25.

4. *Landry (Ex. 1011)*

Landry is titled “Automatic Logical CPU Assignment of Physical CPUs.” Ex. 1011, code (54). *Landry* relates to “startup logic for assigning logical central processing unit (CPU) designations among multiple CPUs.” *Id.* at 1:7–10.

Landry discloses a multiprocessor computer system that “includes fault tolerant power up logic for finding a functioning CPU to operate as logical CPU₀.” Ex. 1011, code (57), 2:9–11. When the system is powered up, all of the CPUs except the CPU in physical slot 0 (CPU P₀) are initially placed in a SLEEP mode. *Id.* at 2:15–18. The microprocessor in physical location 0 performs its power on self-test (POST) routine and tests its associated cache memory system. *Id.* at 2:18–20. If the CPU functions properly, the CPU is designated as CPU L₀, and the microprocessor retains this designation until the system is power cycled. *Id.* at 2:20–23. The CPU designated as CPU L₀ then awakens the remaining CPUs and boots up the rest of the computer system. *Id.* at 2:23–25.

If CPU P0 is not functioning properly, it is designated as inoperative. Ex. 1011, 2:26–27. The system then awakens CPU P1 and repeats the process of testing the CPU. If CPU P1 is operational, then it is designated as CPU L0, and it boots the remainder of the system. *Id.* at 2:27–31. On the other hand, if CPU P1 also fails, it is also given an inoperative designation. The computer system then turns on CPU P2, and repeats the process. *Id.* at 2:31–32. The process repeats until an operational microprocessor is found to perform the CPU L0 functions. *Id.* at 2:33–35. Consequently, if at least one of the microprocessors in the system is functioning, the computer system boots and then operates. *Id.* at 2:35–37. Thus, the multiprocessor system is not crippled by the failure of a single processor, enhancing the dependability of the computer system. *Id.* at 2:37–40.

5. *Bigbee (Ex. 1012)*

Bigbee is titled “Method and Apparatus for Functional Redundancy Check Mode Recovery.” Ex. 1012, code (54). Bigbee describes data processing systems where “two or more physical processing elements or ‘cores’ are associated with and function as a single logical processor.” *Id.* ¶ 2. Bigbee discloses that “[t]he processor cores are operated in a functional redundancy check (FRC) mode in which identical instructions are provided to each core and concurrently executed on identical data so that any error occurring within a single core will produce an inconsistent result as compared to the remaining cores associated with a given processor.” *Id.* “Specialized FRC logic performs this comparison and generates a signal such as an interrupt or exception once an inconsistent result has been detected.” *Id.*

II. ANALYSIS

A. *Legal Standards Used in the Merits Analysis*

“In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” *Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc.*, 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring *inter partes* review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)); *Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc.*, 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in *inter partes* review).

A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” *KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective indicia of non-obviousness. *Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City*, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). To support this conclusion, however, it is not enough to show merely that the prior art includes separate references covering each separate limitation in a challenged claim. *Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.*, 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Rather, obviousness additionally requires that a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention “would have selected and combined those prior art elements in the normal course of research and development to yield the claimed invention.” *Id.*

Moreover, in determining the differences between the prior art and the claims, the question under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is not whether the differences themselves would have been obvious, but whether the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious. *Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp.*, 755 F.2d 158, 164 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“It is elementary that the claimed invention must be considered as a whole in deciding the question of obviousness.”); *see also Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.*, 713 F.2d 1530, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[T]he question under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is not whether the differences *themselves* would have been obvious. Consideration of differences, like each of the findings set forth in *Graham*, is but an aid in reaching the ultimate determination of whether the claimed invention *as a whole* would have been obvious.”). As a factfinder, we also must be aware “of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon *ex post* reasoning.” *KSR*, 550 U.S. at 421.

B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art

The level of skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. *Okajima v. Bourdeau*, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “This reference point prevents . . . factfinders from using their own insight or, worse yet, hindsight, to gauge obviousness.” *Id.*

“The *Graham* analysis includes a factual determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Without that information, a . . . court cannot properly assess obviousness because the critical question is whether a claimed invention would have been obvious at the time it was made to one with ordinary skill in the art.” *Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc.*, 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); *see also Ruiz v. A.B.*

Chance, 234 F.3d 654, 666 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The determination of the level of skill in the art is an integral part of the *Graham* analysis.”).

Factors pertinent to a determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art include: (1) educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of workers active in the field. *Env’t Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co.*, 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing *Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc.*, 707 F.2d 1376, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. *Id.* Moreover, these factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. *Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc.*, 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In determining the level of ordinary skill, we also may look to the prior art, which may reflect an appropriate skill level. *Okajima*, 261 F.3d at 1355.

Petitioner asserts that:

A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent, and at least two years of prior work experience with computer architecture design, including fault-tolerant computer architecture design, as of the earliest priority date of the ’302 Patent—October 25, 2004. [Ex. 1002] ¶¶28–30. Additional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa. *Id.*

Pet. 4.

Patent Owner asserts that:

A person of ordinary skill in the art in the field of the ’302 patent would have been a person with at least a bachelor’s degree

in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or equivalent, and at least two years of prior work experience with computer architecture, including experience relating to fault tolerant computer architecture, as of the earliest priority date of the '302 patent—October 25, 2004. If a person did not have a bachelor's degree, additional relevant and practical experience with fault tolerant computer systems could provide an acceptable substitute. Likewise, further education beyond a bachelor's degree could compensate for a deficiency in practical experience. See EX2004, Declaration of Nigel A. Jones (“Jones”), ¶ 26.

PO Resp. 7–8. Patent Owner further notes that its position is “similar, but not identical to, Petitioner’s [position]” but that “the analysis [of the claims] is identical for both proposed determinations.” *Id.* We agree that our analysis would not differ based on choosing one proposed level of skill over the other, but as Petitioner is the losing party, we select Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.

C. Claim Construction

As stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b),

a claim of a patent . . . shall be construed using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the International Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in the *inter partes* review proceeding will be considered.

37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2025). Thus, under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), we apply the claim construction standard set forth in *Phillips v. AWH Corp.*, 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). As stated in *Phillips*, “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning’ . . .

that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” *Id.* at 1312–13.

Limitation [1d] requires “changing a system identifier of the spare processor to that of the boot processor, thereby switching the role of boot processor to a spare processor without shutting down the system’s operating system.” The remaining independent claims include a similar limitation. *See* claim 13 (reciting “changing a system identifier of the spare processor to that of the boot processor, thereby switching the role of boot processor to said spare processor”), claim 21 (reciting “caus[ing] said operating system to recognize another processor module as system boot processor without shutting down the operating system”), claim 26 (reciting “switching the role of boot processor to a spare processor without shutting down the system’s operating system”).

The parties make similar arguments for the various versions of this limitation in the different independent claims. *See* Pet. 28–30 (addressing limitation [1d]), 43 (referring to limitation [1d] for its argument for limitation [13e]), 52 (referring to limitations [1c] and [1d] for its argument for limitation [21e]), 73 (referring to limitation [1d] for its argument for limitation [26c]); PO Resp. 24–30 (addressing claim 1), 30 (explaining that limitation [13e] “is substantially similar to claim limitation 1[d] and would have been obvious for the same reasons set forth with respect to . . . limitation [1d]”), 30–31 (explaining that “caus[ing] said operating system to recognize another processor module as system boot processor” in limitation [21e] “is equivalent to ‘changing the role of the boot processor to a spare processor’”), 73 (referring to its argument for claim 1 for limitation [26c]).

At the oral hearing, Petitioner asserted that the claims all require transferring, during system runtime, the role of boot processor to a spare processor. Tr. 23:1–2 (Petitioner’s counsel asserting, “[t]he claims simply recite switching the role of boot processor to the spare processor during system runtime”); *see also* Pet. Reply 2–7 (analyzing the claim language). Patent Owner’s position is that the limitation requires the system to substitute the spare processor for the boot processor not only to take over for the boot processor during runtime, as Petitioner proposes, but also to be specifically designated the boot processor in the system so that it is recognized as such for a future reboot. Tr. 49:2–5 (Patent Owner’s counsel asserting that, “to be transferred the role of boot processor, [it] means that it has to be marked or flagged or dedicated to play the role of boot processor, which is to boot the system, load the operating system, initialize things . . . at some point”), 50:18–51:9 (similar); *see also* PO Resp. 10–11 (referring to the “boot processor role, including . . . initializing the system or booting the operating system”); PO Sur-reply 5–7 (further argument). Reviewing the claims in light of the evidence, we determine that the correct reading is somewhere in between the parties’ positions.

Considering claim 1 as exemplary, we note that it requires a system identifier that is used to “recognize the boot processor” as well as “switching the role of boot processor to a spare processor without shutting down the system’s operating system.” Notably, claim 1 specifically calls out a *boot* processor, not just any processor, and focuses on switching the *role* of boot processor, not just its tasks, to a spare processor without shutting down the system’s operating system. Thus, there are four critical components: (a) a *boot* processor, (b) a *spare* processor, (c) a switching the *role* of boot

processor, and (d) the transfer to the spare occurring without shutting down the operating system. We review the specification for disclosure about transferring the role of boot processor to a spare without shutting the operating system down.

The '302 patent states that not all processors need to have a spare waiting or ready to be created in the event of loss of lockstep. For example, in the event of loss of lockstep in “non-boot processors . . . the lockstep recovery process . . . can be utilized without requiring a spare for lockstep recovery for those non-boot processors.” Ex. 1001, 15:10–20. That is, boot processors are treated differently from non-boot processors in that non-boot processors do not need a spare. *Id.* at 14:66–15:12 (explaining that holding spares for non-boot processors is “undesirably expensive and wasteful”); *see also id.* at 6:32–41 (“[T]he spare processor is used for recovering from [loss of lockstep] only in the case in which [loss of lockstep] is detected for the boot processor. For instances in which [loss of lockstep] is detected for non-boot processors, the lockstep may be recovered without the use of a spare.”), 9:18–31 (similar), 9:46–64 (similar). Non-boot processors are recovered without a spare, and are simply idled or ejected from the system until recovered. *Id.* at 9:65–11:3.

The reason why the '302 patent treats boot processors differently during runtime by providing a spare is because, “for various reasons, in certain system architectures[,] problems arise in attempting to idle (or eject) the boot processor from the system.” *Id.* at 6:25–29; *see also id.* at 11:6–11 (same). Thus, we find that the system in the '302 patent treats the boot processor differently during runtime because the *system architecture* it interfaces with treats processors identified as the boot processor differently.

The process of recovering a boot processor in such systems requires the use of a spare. Therefore, because there is a problem *unique to boot processors* during runtime unrelated to booting, the system in the '302 patent needs to keep track of which processor was the boot processor, for reasons other than booting.

This is why the '302 patent describes the firmware working in the background to manipulate the device tables to figure out if the problem is with the boot processor during runtime, and if so, identify a spare processor, free it up, and then modify the device tables so that the operating system thinks the spare processor is the boot processor. *See, e.g., id.* at 13:21–14:3 (describing a table or “device tree” of the available processors, their status, and their roles), 14:53–65 (describing how the swap is done through a “LID register”), 15:57–62 (describing how the LID register swap makes one CPU appear as another to the operating system), 15:39–50 (describing how the firmware can free up a working processor predesignated to be the spare by sending a “lie to the OS by indicating . . . that [the spare] is not functioning”). In effect, the operating system continues to believe it is working on a certain processor, but in the background the firmware has swapped the processors, made possible by the fact that the operating system relies on the information provided by the firmware regarding the location of the system’s hardware. *Id.* at 13:2–3; *see also id.* at 10:3–9 (using ACPI allows firmware to cooperate with the operating system, such that “no processor or platform specific knowledge is required to be embedded in [the operating system]”), 15:57–67 (describing the mechanism for fooling the operating system as to which processor is which). In sum, the reason to go through this trouble is because runtime identification of a processor as a boot

processor is important in order to accommodate certain system requirements to treat boot processors differently.

Accordingly, when claim 1 recites switching the “role of boot processor” to the spare processor, we determine that the claim is describing this transfer of *identification* of “boot processor,” which is required when transferring a boot processor’s functions to a spare because of the “problems [that] arise in attempting to idle (or eject) the boot processor.” *Id.* at 6:25–27. This is confirmed by the language of limitation [1d], stating that the switching of the role of boot processor involves “changing a system identifier of the spare processor to that of the boot processor.” Thus, the firmware and operating system exchange this information identifying the boot processor, which is described in the specification as a device tree. *See, e.g., id.* at 13:21–35.

The ’302 patent makes clear that accurate identification of which processor is the boot processor remains critical during runtime. *See, e.g., id.* at 6:25–27. Thus, Patent Owner is correct in requiring the system to have a way to identify the boot processor and to transfer this identification during runtime. However, as made clear in the embodiments described in the ’302 patent discussed above, this identification is for runtime purposes to accommodate runtime problems, not for booting purposes. Although Patent Owner may be correct that a function of the boot processor is to boot the system (PO Sur-reply 5), the problem identified in the ’302 patent is a problem relating to the runtime reassignment of the boot processor identity, to address a runtime need to identify the boot processor. *See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 11:6–9.*

Accordingly, based on our analysis of the claims and specification, we determine that “switching the role of boot processor to a spare processor without shutting down the system’s operating system” means causing the system to identify the spare processor as the boot processor (e.g., in a device tree), which then causes the spare processor to appear as the boot processor to the system during runtime. Ex. 1001, 6:25–41, 11:4–18 (describing why boot processors are treated differently even after the boot process has completed); *compare id.* at 9:65–11:3 (process for recovering from loss of lockstep of a non-boot processor without using a spare), *with id.* at 11:4–43 (process for recovering from loss of lockstep of a boot processor using a spare because boot processors, during runtime, need special treatment); *see also* 14:66–15:21 (emphasizing that spares are only needed for recovering boot processors). We construe switching a “role of boot processor” to mean transferring an identification in the system of which processor is the boot processor. This construction comports with the embodiments described in the specification. We do not adopt an additional requirement that this procedure also requires designating which processor will boot the system in the next reboot, which is not disclosed in the specification.

Based on the clear support in the specification for the above interpretation, we see no need to resort to extrinsic evidence. *Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC*, 8 F.4th 1285, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“If the meaning of a claim term is clear from the intrinsic evidence, there is no reason to resort to extrinsic evidence.”) (citing *Profectus Tech. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co.*, 823 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Extrinsic evidence may not be used ‘to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence.’” (quoting *Phillips*, 415 F.3d at 1324))). In

general, the cited portions of testimony from the declarants from both parties in the briefs do little more than point to the portions of the '302 patent described above or argue about what a boot processor does during booting. *See, e.g.*, Pet. Reply 2–7. The specification makes clear that it is focused on the role of boot processor during runtime because of problems encountered during runtime; it is not focused on the boot processor during booting. Ex. 1001, 6:25–41, 11:4–18. Thus, the testimony about what a boot processor does during booting, or that a function of the boot processor is to boot, is not particularly pertinent, and does not undo the unambiguous discussion in the '302 patent.

D. Availability of Exhibits 1008 and 1028

Exhibit 1008 is titled “IA-32 Intel Architecture Software Developer’s Manual” and Exhibit 1028 is titled “MultiProcessor Specification.” Ex. 1008, 1; Ex. 1028, 1.⁵ Petitioner cites Exhibits 1008 and 1028 for its analysis of the claims, e.g., for what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand a certain disclosure in the prior art to mean, but does not rely on them as a listed reference in the grounds. *See, e.g.*, Pet. 12–13 (Fox discloses an “IA-32” processor and Petitioner providing Exhibit 1008, the IA-32 developer’s manual, as evidence of a feature of the IA-32 processor), 15, 22, 26. Patent Owner does not seek to exclude the references, but does assert that we should give “no weight” to these disclosures.

The USPTO has established Rules for objecting to and challenging evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64. This process sets various timeframes and permits briefing and curative actions, all of which are designed to crystallize

⁵ We follow the parties’ convention of citing to the later-added “Page X of Y” pagination rather than the native pagination.

the issues and ensure a full and fair opportunity for the parties to be heard. *See id.* In this instance, Patent Owner’s evidentiary arguments regarding Exhibits 1008 and 1028 are untimely. Accordingly, we will not exclude Exhibits 1008 or 1028 on the basis of their authenticity, admissibility, or for any reason that should have been raised under the proper procedures. *See, e.g.,* PO Resp. 7–8; PO Sur-reply 7–8; *see also* Pet. Reply 11 (asserting that “Patent Owner has not filed any objection to or a motion to exclude these references”). We consider Petitioner’s citations to these documents in our prior art analysis below. Notwithstanding, as is clear from our patentability analysis below, Exhibits 1008 and 1028 do not serve to demonstrate the unpatentability of any claim.

E. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 1–27

Petitioner contends that claims 1–25 would have been obvious over Fox, Safford, and Arai, and alternatively over Fox, Safford, Landry, and Arai.⁶ Pet. 9–66. Petitioner also contends that claims 26 and 27 would have been obvious over Fox, Safford, Arai, and Bigbee, and alternatively over Fox, Safford, Landry, Arai, and Bigbee. Pet. 67–74. We will focus our discussion on independent claim 1, limitation [1d], which illustrates a dispositive issue.

1. The Parties’ Contentions as to Claim 1, Limitation [1d]

Petitioner presents an element-by-element analysis of claim 1, supported by testimony of Dr. Brogioli, as well as an analysis of a reason to combine the teachings of the references. Pet. 9–35. For the reasons

⁶ For claims 2–25, Petitioner combines its analysis of the two grounds. *See* Pet. 38–61.

discussed below, we find that Petitioner has failed to sufficiently prove that the prior art teaches “changing a system identifier of the spare processor to that of the boot processor, thereby switching the role of boot processor to a spare processor without shutting down the operating system,” as recited in limitation [1d].

Petitioner argues that “Arai discloses switching the identification numbers of the active processor in error and the reserved inactive processor.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 22–23, 25). Petitioner asserts that, in the Fox-Safford-Arai combination, one of ordinary skill would have understood that this switching of identification numbers “would have switched the logical identification of the boot processor lockstep pair with that of the spare processor pair,” and that “such switching would have changed the logical identification, e.g., logical APIC ID, of the spare processor to that of the boot processor,” thus “changing a system identifier of the spare processor to that of the boot processor.” *Id.* at 28–29 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 124–125).

Petitioner argues that “Fox’s BIOS switches the memory save state from the failing processor to the spare processor,” and Arai similarly discloses “transfer[ring] of the execution context from the active processor that is experiencing the error to at least one of the inactive processors that has been designated to replace the active processor.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 41; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 22, 25, Fig. 4b). Petitioner also argues that Arai discloses that “[t]he execution context may include information in the processor registers and other data that supports communication between the processor and the operating system.” *Id.* (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 22). According to Petitioner, one of ordinary skill “would have been motivated to

incorporate Arai's transferring the execution context in Fox's switching process to allow the processes to be continued by the spare processor without interrupting the operating system." *Id.* at 29 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 8, 13, 36; Ex. 1007 ¶ 6; Ex. 1015, 3:6–20; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 126, 49–52); *see id.* at 18–22.

Additionally, Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill would have understood that in the Fox-Safford combination, "in response to determining that the LOL is detected in the boot processor, implementing Arai's identification switching and context transfer would have reassigned the processor logical identification and responsibilities of the failing boot processor pair to the spare processor pair without interrupting the operating system ('switching the role of boot processor to a spare processor without shutting down the system's operating system')." Pet. 29–30 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 8, 10, 13; Ex. 1007 ¶ 6). According to Petitioner, one of ordinary skill "would have understood that incorporating Arai's processor-switching implementation detail would improve the availability and reliability of Fox-Safford," and "would have expected success because it involves using known techniques to improve a similar device in the same way as the prior art." *Id.* at 30 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 127–128).

Petitioner's second ground relies on Fox, Safford, Landry, and Arai for limitation [1d] and refers to the above analysis for this limitation and limitation [1b] in Petitioner's first ground. Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 145).

Patent Owner's position is based on what it means to "assign[]" and "switch[]" a "role of boot processor." Patent Owner argues that merely handing off the tasks being performed by the processor that happened to boot the system is not the same as "assigning the role of boot processor to

the spare processor.” PO Resp. 9–11. In technical terms, as Patent Owner’s declarant, Mr. Jones, states: “Petitioner provides no evidence that changing the logical APIC ID of the processor in error to the logical APIC ID of the reserved processor has any impact on which processor performs any boot processor role.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 34. Patent Owner further asserts that “Arai’s table designating active/idle processors is stored in RAM” i.e., volatile memory storage. PO Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 20–21; Ex. 2007, 103:14–21, 108:10–109:4, 111:7–11; Ex. 2006 ¶ 36). Patent Owner contrasts this temporary, task-based handover with what is allegedly disclosed in the ’302 patent, in which “information regarding the boot device path can be changed during runtime” and “is then persistently stored ‘for the next time the system reboots.’” *Id.* at 27 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:56; Ex. 2006 ¶ 37). In sum, Patent Owner’s position is that merely re-assigning the tasks the processor that happened to have booted the system is currently doing is different from re-assigning the specific role of booting the system.

Petitioner replies with two arguments. First, Petitioner asserts that “boot processor responsibilities are not confined to the ‘initialization’ period or boot-up process” (emphasis omitted); that is, the boot processor does other things, such as shutdown. Pet. Reply 3 (citing, *e.g.*, Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 45–47 (Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Brogioli, asserting that the bootstrap processor “also controls all system hardware, including [Application Processor] startup and shutdown”), 101). Second, Petitioner asserts that the “claims recite that switching the role of the boot processor to a spare processor is achieved by ‘changing a system identifier, used by the system’s operating system to recognize the boot processor,’ and by ‘changing a system identifier of the spare processor to that of the boot processor.’” *Id.* at 3–4 (citing Ex. 1001,

19:11–20, 20:11–20). In particular, Petitioner argues that “[n]othing in the claim requires the ‘system identifier’ to ‘persist through a reset’ or that the spare processor (new boot processor) perform initialization ‘next time the system reboots.’” *Id.* at 4 (citing PO Resp. 27; Ex. 2004 ¶ 36). According to Petitioner, “if the switching requires the spare processor to perform initialization after system reboots, the spare processor would only function as a boot processor after the operating system shuts down and restarts,” contrary to the claimed requirement that the role of the boot processor be switched “without shutting down the system’s operating system.” *Id.* Petitioner walks through the specification of the ’302 patent and asserts that “nowhere does the ’302 specification describe switching the role of the boot processor requires storing information of the new boot processor such that it performs initialization after system reboot or reset.” *Id.*; *see also id.* at 5–8 (discussing specific passages of the ’302 patent).

Based on this interpretation of what it means to assign the role of boot processor, Petitioner reaffirms its position that the combination set out in the Petition (described above) meets the limitations of the claims. *See generally* Pet. Reply 7–10.

In its Sur-reply, Patent Owner responds to Petitioner’s arguments, and summarizes its position by stating that “the ’302 Patent specification describes a specific approach by which a persistent identifier [is] used” and set to switch the role of boot processor, which will be used during the boot process, without shutting down the operating system. PO Sur-reply 6–7; *see also id.* at 5–7 (argument regarding claim construction); *id.* at 7 (argument regarding the art).

The parties also argue over whether Petitioner and its declarant can rely on Exhibits 1008 and 1028, which are documents purporting to describe features of Intel processors. PO Resp. 20–24; Pet. Reply 12–16; PO Sur-reply 8–9.

2. *Analysis of Limitation [1d]*

Although the Fox-Safford-Arai combination (with or without Landry) may swap processors that are failing, and perform the necessary bookkeeping to keep the operating system informed as to how to address the processors available, nothing in the Petition persuasively explains whether this generic processor swapping switches the boot processor role. As we explained in our claim construction section, the term “boot processor” is not merely a label of convenience to describe the processor that happened to have earlier booted the system. The *role* of boot processor is specifically *switched* to the spare; it is a piece of information tracked by the system. As we explain below, Petitioner does not adequately address the transfer of this information to make the system aware of which processor has the boot processor role.

Petitioner asserts that “the BSP flag” of the IA-32 system is used to “determine whether a processor is the boot processor.” Pet. 17–18. Petitioner here is relying on a register used in IA-32 processors to identify whether or not they are the boot processor. This register is used during booting so that only the boot processor boots the system. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 1008, 238–40, 710. This register does not appear to serve any further role, and Petitioner offers no persuasive evidence or argument that the processor register flag is exposed or copied to the operating system or APIC table. Petitioner’s proposed combination does not involve updating this

register, nor does Petitioner explain how, even if the register were updated, it would meet the “switching” a “role of boot processor” in limitation [1d].

Instead, Petitioner’s discussion around transferring the role of boot processor is limited to identifying processors in the APIC table. *See* Pet. 26–30; Pet. Reply 8–12. Petitioner identifies Fox’s teaching to use interrupts “in response to the detection of loss of lockstep” to identify the failing processor using a unique physical or logical identification of the processor, and switching the memory state from the failing processor to the spare processor. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 32, 41; Ex. 1008, 142, 269–270, 287–288), 16 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 30, 42; Ex. 1008, 277–278, 255, 294), 19 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 41); *see id.* at 36 (identifying Fox’s teaching to use interrupts (SMI) “in response to detecting the processor failure to facilitate the processor replacement,” wherein “[t]he SMI identifies the failing processor to the OS and the BIOS, utilizing the SMI handler, replaces the failing processor with the spare processor”). Notably, Fox here is agnostic as to the processor; it does not disclose transferring any flag or identifier specific to identifying a *boot* processor. Petitioner’s discussion regarding Arai is similar. *See* Pet. 27. Arai discusses a table created by the BIOS that identifies the processor and its active/inactive state. *Id.* (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 2, 8–9, 19–25; Ex. 1002 ¶ 121). Petitioner does not explain how any of these disclosures mentions any flag or identifier regarding the *boot* processor.

Petitioner similarly argues that Fox’s IA-32 system stores a BSP flag set to 1 to indicate that a processor is a boot processor and assigns each processor a unique local APIC ID. Pet. Reply 13–14 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 45–47, 62, 97, 116; Ex. 1008, 238, 244; Ex. 1028, 33). However, aside from the

previously discussed IA-32 register, used by the processors during the booting process to identify whether they are the boot processor or not (Ex. 1008, 238, 710), Petitioner does not explain how such information is exposed to the BIOS or operating system, nor how it is changed during runtime, after its purpose has been fulfilled.

In sum, even if Petitioner’s proposed combination swaps the spare processor for the processor that booted the system, Petitioner’s proposed combination does not appear to transfer the *role* of boot processor to the spare processor. At best, Petitioner’s proposed combination transfers the tasks of one processor to another. *See* Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 15 (Fox describing its disclosure as “updat[ing] the ‘active’ processor list” and “[re-]allocat[ing] the threads that were running on the failing processor”), 46 (transferring “processes (instructions, threads, etc.) initially allocated to the failing processor” to the spare processor)). Of the art of record, we are only aware of the ’302 patent transferring a designation of which processor is the boot processor during the swap to a spare processor. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 1001, 11:4–16, 11:25–27, 15:65–67. In conclusion, we find that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, how the prior art teaches “switching” a “role of boot processor” as required by limitation [1d].

F. Remaining Claims and Grounds

The reason why Petitioner’s ground for claim 1 fails applies to each remaining claim and ground.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that any claim of the ’302 patent would have been obvious in view of the prior art cited.

The following table summarizes the outcome of this proceeding:

Claim(s)	35 U.S.C. §	Reference(s)/Basis	Claim(s) Shown Unpatentable	Claim(s) Not Shown Unpatentable
1–25	103	Fox, Safford, Arai		1–25
1–25	103	Fox, Safford, Landry, Arai		1–25
26, 27	103	Fox, Safford, Arai, Bigbee		26, 27
26, 27	103	Fox, Safford, Landry, Arai, Bigbee		26, 27
Overall Outcome				1–27

IV. ORDER

In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that the record show that Petitioner has not established that any of claims 1–27 of the '302 patent are unpatentable;

FURTHER ORDERED that, because this is a Final Written Decision, parties to the proceeding seeking judicial review of the decision must comply with the notice and service requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 90.2.

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Patent 7,624,302 B2

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