

SI 860 - Experimental Methods

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Course Overview

This course provides an introduction to experimental methods and some of the major subject areas that have been addressed by laboratory and field experiments. The course explores experimental methodology and applications by concentrating on series of experiments, to see how experiments build on one another.

Students are introduced to experimental methodology through lectures, by participating in interactive in-class experiments and demonstrations, critically reading and discussing related research papers and eventually designing and (optionally) implementing their own economic experiment. At the end of the course, students will be able to understand the general principles of experimental design and apply them to evaluating published work in the field. Interested students will have an opportunity to start working on their own independent research using experimental methods.

Prerequisites: SI students should have completed at least one doctoral course in an area of specialization, e.g. one graduate course in economics, cognitive psychology, HCI, CSCW or IEM, so that they know enough theory to come up with hypotheses to test. Students from other departments and schools should discuss their background with the instructor.

Why experiments?

Research experiments are conducted in controlled laboratory or semi-controlled field environments in order to look for behavioral regularities and document unanticipated regularities in decision-making, formulate new theories to explain newly observed regularities, and make policy recommendations by testing new policies and fine-tuning existing ones. Reading list below will give you a flavor of the diversity of subjects that have been explored by experimental research. Economic experiments have been recently used outside of academia to study such diverse areas as markets for pollution permits, FCC bandwidth auctions, and matching market for medical internships. In social computing, randomized experiments are done by companies on a regular basis and are often referred to as A/B testing.

How to do readings for this course?

In this course, material will be first presented from the perspective of a participant in the experiments. Afterwards you will learn about underlying theories and interpretations. This means that reading assignments are for the most part back-loaded. Occasionally you will have to do some of the readings in advance because you will be assigned to prepare a short presentation on a specific topic or assist me in running an experiment.

Where can I find the readings?

All the readings you need to do will be either available electronically or distributed to you in class. There is no required textbook to purchase. However, you might want to consider adding the following books to your library:

Reference Books:

- Kagel, J. and A. Roth (ed.) (1995), *Handbook of Experimental Economics*, Princeton University Press.
- Holt, C. A. and D. D. Davis (1993), *Experimental Economics*, Princeton University Press.
- Holt, C. A. (2007) *Markets, Games, & Strategic Behavior*, Pearson-Addison Wesley.
- Friedman, D. and A. Cassar (2004), *Economics Lab*, Routledge.
- Friedman, D. and S. Sunder (1994), *Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists*, Cambridge University Press.
- Camerer, C.F. (2003), *Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction*, Princeton University Press.
- Plott, C. and V. Smith (ed.) (2009), *Handbook of Experimental Economics Results*, Elsevier
- Beins, B.C. (2004), *Research Methods: A Tool for Life by Bernard C. Beins*, Pearson from psychology.
- Rubin, J., (2008) *Handbook of Usability Testing*, Wiley

General Interest Books:

- Ariely, D. (2008) *Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape Our Decisions*, HarperCollins
- Banerjee, A. and E. Duflo (2012) *Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty*, PublicAffairs
- Cialdini, R. (2006) *Influence: the Psychology of Persuasion*, Harper Business
- Kahneman, D. (2013) *Thinking Fast and Slow*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux
- Karlan D. and J. Appel (2012) *More than Good Intentions: Improving the Ways the World Poor Borrow, Save, Farm, Learn and Stay Healthy*, Plume
- Ridley, M. (1996) *The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation*, Penguin Books
- Thaler, R. (1994) *The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life*, Princeton University Press

Thaler, R. and C. Sunstein (2009) *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness*, Penguin Books

PEERRS Certification and IRB:

You must be PEERRS certified before you can recruit subjects for your experiments. The URL for PEERRS certification is <http://my.research.umich.edu/peerrs/>. This course has an umbrella IRB, which covers the pilot sessions for class projects. However, if you plan to use the pilot data for future publication, you must have your individual project approved by the IRB.

How to take notes in this class?

In order to organize your thoughts, you should divide your notes into three distinct sections: Theory, Experimental Evidence, and Experimental Methodology. Each class session is going to touch on some aspects of these three broad topics. You should look for connections between them. For example, theory assumes that economic agents are rational expected utility maximizers (write down the formulation and predictions of this theory in the theory section of your notes); whether people in fact do maximize expected utility has been tested using economic experiments (write down evidence for or against this theory in your section on experimental evidence); while examining experimental evidence either through participation in experiments or by looking at experiments conducted by others, you learn something about experimental design (write down these rules and tips in the methodology section). In addition, you are required to keep a Journal of Classroom of Experiments to record all of the experiments that you do in class. Each entry should include the date the experiment was done, the title of the experiment, the structure of the experiment, what it was designed to test and a summary of results. Your journal will be collected at the end of the semester and will count in your participation and assignment grade.

How will my grade be determined?

In this course you are required to participate in in-class experiments and help conduct experiments on selected dates, present critical summaries of experimental findings (30% of the grade); complete written take-home and in-class assignments (15% of the grade), undertake a research project (55% of the grade). There will be no final exam.

What constitutes a research project?

There are two possibilities:

- 1) (preferred) Design and (optionally) conduct your own experiment, collect and analyze experimental data, and report on your results.
- 2) Do an extensive literature review of a specific topic (to be approved by the instructor first). Option number two is a risk-averse choice. We will discuss why in class.

If you choose option 1, you will be expected to design an experiment. This involves, among other things, answering the following questions:

- Which research question do you want to answer with your experiment?

- What are potential answers to your question?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of an experiment for answering your question?
- What are the chances that the result of your experiment will surprise others? Will anybody change his/her opinion?
- How do you conduct the experiment? (Describe the design and write down the instructions)
- Is you design the simplest possible design to answer your question?

SBEE Seminar and Guest Speakers:

This course is run in conjunction with SBEE (Social, Behavioral and Experimental Economics) Seminar jointly sponsored by School of Information, Ross School of Business and Department of Economics. You are encouraged to attend SBEE talks (usually held on Mondays from 11:45 to 12:45) on a regular basis. Out of town and local guest speakers will occasionally visit our classroom. Topics will be announced in advance. We will have two joint seminars with RCGD (Research Center for Group Dynamics at ISR). SBEE schedule includes:

Sept 17 Oded Netzer, Columbia Business School

[Sept 24 Drazen Prelec, MIT Sloan, Joint w. RCGD, 3:30pm](#)

Oct 8 Alex Imas, Carnegie Mellon

Oct 15 (Fall break) Sebastian Grueneisen, UM Psychology

Oct 22 Devin Pope, Chicago Booth

Oct 29 Vince Crawford, Oxford

Nov 5 Stephan Meier, Columbia Business School

[Nov 12 Hunt Alcott, Microsoft Research and NYU, joint w/ RCGD @ 11:45am](#)

Nov 26 Brendan Nyhan, UM Ford School

Dec 3 Julia Lee, UM Ross

Dec 10 Ben Bushong, Michigan State

Dec 17 Bob Meyer, Wharton School UPenn

Reading List

(Additional topics vary in different years depending on guest speakers and enrollment. This reading list constitutes methodological core and can be used for reference; it will be updated with additional papers specific topics later on during the semester).

Topic 1: Introduction - Methods, Objectives, Advantages and Limitations of Experiments

Smith, Vernon (1982). "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science,"

American Economic Review 72: 923-955.

Harrison, Glenn, and John List. "Field Experiments." *Journal of Economic Literature* 2004.

Friedman: pp 1-83.

Handbook: pp 1-23.

Beins: pp 1-26, 51-79, 139-197

Other Classic Sources:

- Davis, D. and Holt, C. (1993); *Experimental Economics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey: Chapter 1, Introduction and Overview
- Roth, A. E. (1988); "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview", *Economic Journal*, Vol. 98, 974-1031.
- Roth, A. E. (1994) "Let's keep the Con out of Experimental Econ: A Methodological Note," *Empirical Economics*, Vol. 19, 279–289.
- Smith, V. L. (1989); "Theory, Experiment and Economics", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 151-169.
- Smith, Vernon L. (1994); "Economics in the Laboratory", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 113-131.
- Smith, V. L. (1976); "Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory", *American Economic Review*, Vol. 66, 274-279.
- Smith, V. L. (1982), "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 72, 923–955.
- Berg, J. E., Dickhaut, J. and J. O'Brien (1986), "Controlling Preferences for Lotteries on Units of Experimental Exchange," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 281–306.
- Plott, C. (1987), "Dimensions of Parallelism: Some Policy Applications of Experimental Methods," in *Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View*, Alvin E. Roth (ed), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Holt, C. A. and S. K. Laury. (2002). Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. *The American Economic Review* 92, 1644-1655.
- Harrison G. "Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions", *American Economic Review*, September 1989, vol. 79, pp. 749-762.
- Camerer C. and R. Hogarth "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments" , *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 1999, vol 19., pp. 7-42

More Methodology: Experimenter Effects

- Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K. and Smith, V. L. (1994). "Preferences, Property Rights and Anonymity in Bargaining Games." *Games and Economic Behavior*, 7(3), 346-80.
- Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. and Smith, V. L., (1996), "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games." (1996) *American Economic Review*, 86(3), 653-60.
- List, J. A., R. Berrens, A. Bohara, and J. Kerkvliet (2004) "Examining the Role of Social Isolation on Stated Preferences," *American Economic Review*.

More Methodology: Hypothetical Bias

- Cummings, R. D., Elliott S., Harrison, G. and J. Murphy, 1997. "Are Hypothetical Referenda Incentive Compatible?," *Journal of Political Economy*, 105, 609-621.
- Cummings, R. G., and L. O. Taylor (1999) "Unbiased Value Estimates for Environmental Goods: A Cheap Talk Design for the Contingent Valuation Method," *American Economic Review*, 89 (3)

Cummings, R., and L. Taylor (1998) "Does Realism Matter in Contingent Valuation?," *Land Economics*, 74:2 203-215.

List, J. A. (2001) "Do Explicit Warnings Eliminate the Hypothetical Bias in Elicitation Procedures? Evidence from Field Auctions for Sports cards," *American Economic Review*, 91(5), 1498-1507

List, J. A. and Shogren, J. (2002) "Calibration of Willingness to Accept." *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 43(2): 219-233.

More Methodology: Lab vs. Field Experiments

Harrison, G.W. and J.A. List, 2004. "Field Experiments," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 42, 1009-1055.

Levitt, S. D. and J. A. List, (2007). "What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*.

Lazear, E., U. Malmendier, and R. Weber, 2004, "Sorting in Experiments," NBER Working Paper 12041.

G. W. Harrison & J. A. List, 2008. "Naturally Occurring Markets and Exogenous Laboratory Experiments: A Case Study of the Winner's Curse," *Economic Journal*, 118(528), 822-843

Topic 2: Competitive Experimental Markets

Davis, D. and Holt, C. (1993); *Experimental Economics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey: Chapter 3 (Double Auction Markets) and Chapter 4 (Posted Offer Markets).

Smith, V. L. and Williams, A. W. (1990); "The Boundaries of Competitive Price Theory: Convergence Expectations and Transaction Costs", in: L. Green and J. H. Kagel (eds.), *Advances in Behavioral Economics*, Vol. 2, Ablex Publishing Corporation, Norwood, New Jersey.

Roth, A. E. and Prasnikar, V. and Okuno-Fujiwara, M. and Zamir, S. (1991); "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study", *American Economic Review*, vol. 81, 1068-95.

Topic 3: Behavioral Game Theory

McKelvey, R. & Palfrey, T., (1992) "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," *Econometrica*, vol. 60, pp. 803-836.

Nagel, R. (1995) "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," *American Economic Review*, 85:5 (December), 1313-1326.

DeJong, D., R. Cooper, R. Forsythe, and T. Ross, (1993) "Forward Induction in the Battle of the Sexes Game," *American Economic Review*

Holt, C. and Brandts, J. (1995) "Limitations of Forward Induction and Dominance: Experimental Evidence," *Economics Letters*, 49, 391-95.

Van Huyck, J., Battalio, R., and Beil, R. (1990) "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," *American Economic Review*, pp. 234-248.

Dal Bó, Pedro (2005) "Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games." *American Economic Review*, 95(5), pp. 1591-1604(14).

Topic 4: Bargaining Behavior

Roth, A. E. (1995); "Bargaining Experiments", In: Kagel, John H. and Roth, Alvin E. (Eds.) *Handbook of Experimental Economics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

Bolton, G. and Zwick, R. (1995); "Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining", *Games and Economic Behavior*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 95-121

Cameron, L. (1999); "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia", *Economic Inquiry*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 47-59

Abbink, K., Bolton, G. E., Sadrieh, A., Fang-Fang T. (2001); "Adaptive Learning versus Punishment in Ultimatum Game Bargaining", *Games and Economic Behavior*, Vol. 37, 1-25.

Henrich, J., Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H., and R. McElreath (2001); "In Search of Homo Economicus - Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small Scale Societies", *American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)* 91 73-78.

Topic 5: Fairness and Competition

Agell, J. and Lundberg, P. (1995); "Theories of Pay and Unemployment: Survey Evidence from Swedish Manufacturing Firms", *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, vol. 97, 295-308.

Akerlof, G. A. and Yellen, J. L. (1988); "Fairness and Unemployment", *American Economic Review (P&P)*, vol. 78, 44-49.

Bewley, T. F. (1995); "A Depressed Labor Market as Explained by Participants", *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, vol. 85, 250-254.

Fehr, E. and Kirchsteiger, G. and Riedl, A. (1993); "Does Fairness prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 108, Issue 2, 437-460

Fehr, E. and A. Falk (1999); "Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market, *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 107, No. 1, 106-134.

Kahneman, D., J. L. Knetsch, and R. Thaler, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," *American Economic Review* LXXVI, 728-41.

Topic 6: Voluntary Cooperation and Public Goods Provision

Ledyard J. (1995); "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research", In: Kagel, John H. and Roth, Alvin E. (Eds.) *Handbook of Experimental Economics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

Frank, R. H., Gilovich, T. and Regan, D. T. (1993); "Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 159-171.

Fischbacher, U., S. Gächter and E. Fehr (2001); "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment", *Economics Letters*, Vol. 71, 397-404.

Chen, Y. and Plott, C. (1996); "The Groves-Ledyard Mechanism: An Experimental Study of Institutional Design", *Journal of Public Economics*, Vol. 59, 335-364.
Falkinger J., Fehr E., Gächter S. and Winter-Ebmer R. (2000); "A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods - Experimental Evidence", *American Economic Review* 90 (2000), 247-264.

Topic 7: Enforcement of Social Norms

Holländer, H. (1990); "A Social Exchange Approach to Voluntary Cooperation", *American Economic Review*, Vol. 80, 1157-1167.
Dufwenberg, M. and Lundholm, M. (2001); "Social Norms and Moral Hazard", *Economic Journal* 111, 506-525.
Ellison, G. (1994); "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching", *Review of Economic Studies* 61, 567-588.
Kandel, Eugene and Edward Lazear (1992); "Peer Pressure and Partnerships", *Journal of Political Economy* 100, 801-817.
Kandori, M. (1992); "Social Norms and Community Enforcement", *Review of Economic Studies* 59, 63-80.
Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2000); "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments", *American Economic Review* 90, 980-994.

Topic 8: Fairness and Reciprocity

Charness G. and M. Rabin (2002); "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117: 817-869.
Dufwenberg, M. and G. Kirchsteiger (2004); "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity", *Games and Economic Behavior*.
Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt (1999); "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114: 817-868.
Levine, D. (1998); "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments" *Review of Economic Dynamics* 1: 593-622.
Rabin, M. (1993); "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics." *American Economic Review* 83: 1281-1302.

Topic 9: Incentives

Church, A. H. (1993); "Estimating the Effects of Incentives on Mail Survey Response Rates: A Meta-Analysis", *Public Opinion Quarterly* 57: 62-79.
Fehr, E. and Falk A. (2002); "Psychological Foundations of Incentives", *European Economic Review* 46: 687 - 724.
Fehr, E. and J. List (2004); "The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives – Trust and Trustworthiness among CEOs", *Journal of European Economic Association*, 2 (5): 743-771
Gneezy, U. and Rustichini, A., 2000a. A Fine is a Price. *Journal of Legal Studies* 29, 1-17.
Gneezy, U. and Rustichini, A., 2000b. Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115(2), 791-810.

James, J. H. and Bolstein, R. (1992); Large Monetary Incentives and their Effects on Mail Survey Response Rates. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56, 442-453.

Baker, G., Gibbons, R. and Murphy K. J. (1994): "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 109, 1125-56.

Banerjee, A. Duflo, E. (2000): "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* CXV, 989-1017.

Brown, M., Falk, A. and Fehr, E. (2004); "Incomplete Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions", *Econometrica*, 72(3): 747-780.

Topic 10: Loss Aversion and Labor Supply

Browning, M., A. Deaton and M. Irish (1985); "A Profitable Approach to Labor Supply and Commodity Demands over the Life-Cycle", *Econometrica* 53: 503-543.

Camerer, C., L. Babcock, G. Loewenstein and R. Thaler (1997); "Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112: 407-41.

*Card, D. (1994), Intertemporal Labor Supply: An Assessment. In: Christopher Sims (Ed.), *Advances in Econometrics: Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society*, Vol. II, 49 – 78.

Fehr E. and L. Goette (2007); "Do Workers work more if Wages are high? – Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment", *American Economic Review*, 1: 298-317

Oettinger, G. S. (1999): "An Empirical Analysis of the Daily Labor Supply of Stadium Vendors", *Journal of Political Economy* 107: 360-92.

Topic 11: Money Illusion

Lucas, Robert E. Jr. (1996); "Nobel Lecture: Monetary Neutrality", *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 104, 661-682.

Bernanke, B. S. and Carey, K. (1996); "Nominal Wage Stickiness and Aggregate Supply in the Great Depression", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. CXI, 853-884.

*Shafir, E. and Diamond, P. and Tversky, A. (1997); "Money Illusion", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 112, No. 449,

Fehr, E. and Tyran, J. R. (2001); "Does Money Illusion Matter?" *American Economic Review* 91, 1239-1262.

Topic 12: Neuroeconomics

Sanfey et al. (2003) "Neural basis of economic decision-making in the ultimatum game" *Science* 300, pp. 1755-8.

King-Casas et al. (2005) "Getting to know you" *Science* 308, pp. 78-83.

Kosfeld et al. (2005) "Oxytocin increases trust in humans" *Nature* 435, pp. 673-6.

Takahashi (2009) "When your pain is my gain" *Science* 323, pp. 937-9.

Singer (2006) "Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others" *Nature* 439, pp. 466-9.

Wegenar et al. (2008) "Neural correlates of pure time preference"

Topic 13: Relaxing Anonymity – Experiments on Discrimination, Gender, Social Networks

Ayres, I., and P. Siegelman, (1995) "Gender and Race Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car," *American Economic Review*, LXXXV, 304-321.

Neumark, D., R. Bank, and K. van Nort, (1996) "Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, CXI, 915-941.

List, J. A. (2004) "The Nature and Extent of Discrimination in the Marketplace: Evidence from the Field," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*

Bertrand M., and S. Mullainathan, (2004) "Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination," *American Economic Review*.

Gneezy U., M. Niederle and A. Rustichini (2003), "Performance in competitive environments: Gender differences," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1049–1074.

Gneezy U. and A. Rustichini (2004), "Gender and competition at a young age," *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*, 377–381.

Andreoni J. and L. Vesterlund (2001), "Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 116, 293–312.

Niederle M. and L. Vesterlund (2007), "Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete too Much?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 122, No. 3: 1067-1101.

Gneezy., U., K. Leonard, J. List, (2008) "Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence from a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society", *Econometrica*

Niederle, M., C. Segal, and L. Vesterlund, (2008) "How Costly is Diversity? Affirmative Action in Light of Gender Differences in Competitiveness."

Mobius, M., Niederle, M., Niehaus, P. and T. Rosenblat (2008) "Gender Differences in Response to Performance Feedback."

Fershtman C. and U. Gneezy (2001) "Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*

Mobius M. and T. Rosenblat (2006) "Why Beauty Matters" *American Economic Review*

Andreoni J. and R. Petrie (2008) "Beauty, gender and stereotypes: Evidence from laboratory experiments" *Journal of Economic Psychology*

Slonim R. and E. Garbarino (2008) "Increases in trust and altruism from partner selection: Experimental evidence" *Experimental Economics*

Glaeser E., Laibson D., Scheinkman J. and C. Soutter (2000) "Measuring Trust" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*

Karlan D. (2005) "Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions" *American Economic Review*

Leider, S. Mobius, M., Rosenblat T. and Do Q. A. (2009) "Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (forthcoming)

Leider, S., Mobius, M., Rosenblat T. and Do Q.A. (2009) "What Do We Expect From Our Friends?" *Journal of European Economic Association*

Mobius, M., Niehaus, P. and T. Rosenblat (2009)

"Social Learning and Consumer Demand" in preparation

Goeree, J., McConnell, M., Mitchell, T., Tromp T. and L. Yariv (2009) "The 1/d Law of Giving" *American Economic Journal: Micro-Economics*